MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON 
^RESIDENT 


Making  Woodrow  Wilson 
President 


By 

WILLIAM  F.  McCOMBS 

Chairman,  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  COMMITTEE 


Edited  by 

Louis  JAY  LANG 

Editor,  AUTOBIOGRAPHY  OF  THOMAS  COLLIER  PLATT 


NEW  YORK 
FAIRVIEW  PUBLISHING  COMPANY 

1921 


COPYRIGHT,      1921,      BY 
CORINNE      HARDY 

All  rights  reserved 


Printed  in  the  United  States  of  America 


FOREWORD 

WILLIAM  FRANK  McCoMBs  was  born  at  Hamburg, 
Ashley  County,  Arkansas,  December  26,  1876.  His 
father,  William  Faulkner  McCombs,  was  a  native  of 
Kentucky.  His  mother  was  Mrs.  Frances  Pugh 
McCombs,  a  native  of  Alabama.  There  were  three 
sisters,  Corinne,  Ethel  and  Addie,  and  two  brothers, 
Robert  and  Ashton. 

While  the  father  tilled  a  17,000  acre  rice  plantation, 
young  McCombs  learned  his  A  B  C's  at  his  mother's 
knee  and  from  a  private  tutor.  As  a  mere  child  he 
suffered  a  fracture  of  the  hip  through  a  fall.  As  a 
result  of  this  accident,  he  was  permanently  lame. 

His  preliminary  training  for  college  was  obtained 
in  the  Webb  Preparatory  School  at  Belle  Buckle, 
Tennessee.  He  entered  Princeton  University  in  1894, 
graduating  with  the  class  of  '98. 

Mr.  McCombs  was  of  medium  height,  while  leaning 
upon  his  ever  present  cane.  He  shot  up  to  six  feet 
when  provoked.  In  youth  his  hair  was  auburn.  It 
was  tinged  with  gray  when  he  attained  the  age  of  two 
score  years.  The  hair  was  brushed  back  from  a  high 
forehead.  His  eyes  were  gray,  the  nose  was  long,  the 
nostrils  frequently  dilated.  The  mouth  was  firm; 
the  lips  thin;  the  jaw  square;  the  ears  small;  the  face 
clean  cut  and  of  an  intellectual  type. 

Mr.  McCombs,  throughout  his  career,  avoided  pyro 

t  5  ] 

4SG228 


FOREWORD 

technics.  He  was  dogged  in  his  determination  and 
cool  in  a  crisis.  He  was  no  compromiser,  but  fought 
to  a  finish.  His  life's  achievements  were  embraced  in 
the  brief  span  of  44  years,  his  death  occurring  on 
February  22,  1921. 

The  genesis  of  this  book  was  in  a  visit  of  the  editor 
to  William  F.  McCombs,  nearly  three  years  ago.  At 
that  time,  Mr.  McCombs,  prostrated  by  illness,  recited 
many  incidents  which  appear  in  this  volume.  The 
editor  was  so  impressed  that  he  begged  the  privilege 
of  writing  them. 

Mr.  McCombs  answered,  "Not  now.  The  story 
would  be  misunderstood.  Let's  get  together  after  I 
recover  and  map  it  out".  A  few  weeks  later,  it  was 
agreed  that  we  should  collect  all  available  material  and 
prepare  it  in  book  form.  Death  intervened  before  the 
task  could  be  completed. 

Mr.  McCombs  wrote  about  one  hundred  thousand 
words,  terminating  at  a  point  in  the  Democratic  Con 
vention  when  Champ  Clark  needed  only  a  few  votes  to 
become  the  Presidential  nominee.  There  was,  in  addi 
tion,  much  detached  material.  Because  of  Mr. 
McCombs'  illness  and  death,  he  was  unable  to  finish 
the  work  he  had  undertaken. 

The  editor  has  been  compelled  to  supply  many 
details  with  which  he  became  familiar  through  an  inti 
mate  friendship  of  nearly  seventeen  years.  An  effort 
has  been  made  throughout  this  book  to  utilize  all  the 
material  that  Mr.  McCombs  had  prepared,  and  to 
distinguish  this  from  the  material  supplied  by  the 
editor. 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

INTEODUCTION 17 

CHAPTER 

I.  PRINCETON  EPISODES 23 

The  Author  Enters  Princeton  —  Finds  Wilson  "Cold, 
Distant,  Intellectual'*  —  McCombs  Prevents  Univer 
sity  President's  Enforced  Deposition  by  Grooming 
Him  for  Governor  of  New  Jersey  —  "To  Let  Him 
Down  Easy"  —  Elected,  Wilson  Repudiates  Bargain 
to  Make  James  Smith,  Jr.,  United  States  Senator  — 
McCombs  Predicts  Wilson  Will  Be  President  of  the 
United  States. 

II.  GENESIS  OF  WILSON'S  PRESIDENTIAL,  CAMPAIGN    .         34* 

Wilson  Asks  McCombs  to  Manage  His  Presidential 
Primary  —  "Let  the  Prophet  Fulfill  the  Prophecy" 
—  McCombs  Embarks  with  Meager  Fundg  —  Wil 
son's  First  Speech  Shocks  Him  —  McCombs  Intro 
duces  McAdoo  to  Wilson  —  "Everybody  is  Against 
Wilson"!  Said  McAdoo  —  State  Chairman  Nugent's 
"Wilson  —  Liar  —  Ingrate"  Speech  Causes  His  Oust 
ing. 

III.  McCoMBS  IN  COMMAND     ........         45 

Begs   Wilson   to   Help   Himself  —  Wilson   Replies: 

"See  Hudspeth"!  — Hudspeth  "Too  Busy"  — Har 
mon  "Logical"  Nominee  —  McCombs  Aims  to  Defeat 
Him,  Clark,  Underwood  and  Bryan  —  Wilson  Peevish 
About  Speaking  When  Revolt  Faces  Him  in  His  Own 
State  —  Pennsylvania  and  West  Virginia  Among 
First  States  Captured  —  But  Pennsylvania  Wavers 
Because  of  Wilson's  "Radicalism". 

[7] 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAOK 

IV.  WILSON  GOES  His  OWN  WAY  . 54s 

Disowns  Colonel  Harvey,  Editor  of  Harper's  Weekly 

—  The  Colonel  Ceases  to  Support  Governor's  Candi 
dacy  —  McCombs  Fails  to  Patch  Up  Wilson's  Quarrel 
with   Harvey  and   Colonel   Watterson  —  Watterson 
Denounces  Wilson   as   Ingrate   and   Autocrat  —  He 
Befriends  Harvey  —  McCombs  Defends  Wilson,  but 
Regards  the  Dispute  as  Very  Injurious  to  the  Wilson 
Candidacy  —  Wilson  Scoffs  at  This. 

V.  ENTER  COLONEL  HOUSE 67 

"Wilson  Impossible:  Name  Bryan  or  Culberson  and 
You  and  I  will  Control  the  United  States",  Says  the 
Colonel  to  McCombs  —  Colonel  Shies  at  Request  for 
Money  —  Views  Wilson  Nomination  from  London  — 
Watterson  Calls  for  "A  Court  of  Honor"  —  Penfield's 
$10,000  —  Senator  Gore  Proves  to  be  a  Friend. 

VI.  LAUNCHING  OP  THE  1912  CAMPAIGN     ....          81 
Wilson's   Letter  to  Joline,   "Knocking   Bryan   Into  a 
Cocked  Hat",  Alarms   His  Manager  —  A   Race  of 

Writers  to  Answer  It  —  Bryan  Mollified  and  "Shakes" 
with  Wilson  —  McCombs  Wins  Big  Advantage  for 
Wilson  in  Selection  of  Baltimore  for  Convention  City 

—  McAdoo,  Morgenthau  and  Elkus  "Drop  In". 

VII.  PUBLICITY  AND   STRATEGY 90 

How  McCombs  Apprised  the  Voters  Who  and  What 
Wilson  Was  —  Second  Choice  Chances  in  the  Conven 
tion   Enhanced   by    Keeping   Out   of    "Favorite-Son 
States'*  —  Bryan's  Ohio  Tour  Financed  —  Nineteen 
Wilson  Delegates  Elected  in  Buckeye  State  —  Even 
Break  in  Oklahoma  —  Campaign  Fund  Lacks  $36,000 

—  McCombs    Borrows    More    Money  —  Charles  R. 
Crane  Makes  His  First  Donation,  $5,000. 

VIII.  PREPARATIONS  FOR  CONVENTION 99 

Only  327  of  the  1088  National  Delegates  for  Wilson 

as  the  Net  Result  of  Presidential  Primaries  —  Mc 
Combs  Tours  South  and  West  to  Gain  Veto  Power  in 

[8] 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

Convention  —  "Only  a  Miracle  Can  Save  Wilson", 
Says  Davies  —  Wilson  Conference  at  Washington 
Gloomy  —  Newton,  Publicity  Man,  Discharged. 

IX.  McCoMBs'  ORGANIZATION 

Battle    for    Convention    Control  —  Bryan    Bitterly 
Attacks  Parker  as  "Predatory  Interests  Candidate" 
—  Parker  Defeats  Bryan  for  Temporary  Chairman 
of  the   Convention  —  The  Wilson  Group   Supports 
Bryan    to    Eliminate    Clark  —  Clark's    Manoeuvres 
Against  Bryan  to  Prevent  His  Fourth  Presidential 
Nomination. 

X.  THE  BALTIMORE  CONVENTION 

McCombs  Secures  Abrogation  of  the  Unit  Rule  — 
Murphy,  Taggart,  Sullivan,  et  al.  Ignore  the  Injunc 
tion  —  Bryan  Demands  Withdrawal  of  Ryan  and 
Belmont  as  Delegates  —  Calls  Them  "Money-Trust 
Despots"  —  Clark  Receives  a  Majority  Vote  on 
Tenth  Ballot,  but  Not  the  Necessary  Two-thirds  — 
Chairman  James  is  Accused  of  Trying  to  Stampede 
the  Convention  for  Clark. 

XI.  WILSON  HOISTS  THE  WHITE  FLAG 143 

Begs  McCombs  to  Withdraw  His  Name  as  a  Presi 
dential  Candidate  —  McCombs  Replies:     "You  Bet 
Your  Life,  I  Won't" !  —  Other  Instances  of  Wilson's 
Trying  to  Quit  When  He  Feared  Defeat  —  Bryan 
Excoriates    Murphy    and    "Subtlety"  —  Swings    to 
Wilson. 

XII.  BRYAN  UNMASKS 160 

In   Deshabille,  He  Beseeches  McCombs  to  Desert 
Wilson  and  Nominate  Him  —  The  Petition  Spurned 
Indignantly  —  Mitchell  Palmer's  Plan  Thwarted  — 
Mayor  Gaynor  Bowled  Out  —  Murphy  Says   "Let 
Caucus  Decide"  —  Wilson  Leads  Clark  for  the  First 
Time  —  James  Orders  Anti-Unit  Rule  Enforced  — 
Almost  a  Death-Blow  to  Clark. 

[9] 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAOK 

XIII.  WILSON  WINS  NOMINATION 173 

Victorious  on  Forty-Sixth  Ballot  —  Sullivan  Clinches 

It  —  Murphy  Capitulates  —  McCombs  Warned:  "Re 
member  Jim  Smith"!  —  McAdoo  Picks  Palmer  for 
Vice  President  —  McCombs  Selects  Marshall  —  Sum 
mary  of  the  Unprecedented  Ballots  for  the  Presi 
dency. 

XIV.  "PROVIDENCE  DID  IT" 180 

Wilson  So  Exclaims  to  McCombs,  Who  is  Chilled  by 
Absence  of  Gratitude  from  the  Presidential  Nominee 

—  McCombs,  in   Collapse,  Beats  McAdoo   to   "His 
Presence"  —  Messrs.  Kern,  Palmer,  Daniels,  Taggart 
and  Hudspeth  Urge  McCombs  for  National  Chairman 

—  Wilson   Prefers   McAdoo,  but  Makes   Him   Vice 
Chairman  and  Chooses  All  Campaign  Committee. 

XV.  McCoMBs  AND  McAooo  QUARREL 190 

At    Bitter    Odds    as    Campaign    Begins  —  McAdoo 
Ignores  His  Chief  in  Selecting  Headquarters  Force 

—  "Beat  Roosevelt",  Directs  McCombs  as  He  Falls 
111  —  McAdoo  Levies  on  McCombs'  Political  Assets 
and  is  Put  Out  of  His  Pre-empted  Post  —  Nominee 
Fails  as  a  Peace-Maker. 

XVI.  "I  OWE  You  NOTHING  — " 204 

Wilson  Elected  by  an  Unprecedented   Plurality  — 
O'Gorman  Proclaims  "This  Boy,  McCombs,  Did  It" 

—  President-Elect  Wires  His  "Thanks"  —  "It  Was 
Ordained  of  God  That  I  Should  be  President" !  Said 
Wilson  to  McCombs  When  Actually  Elected  —  Wil 
son  Ignores  All  National  Committee  Recommendations 
for       Appointments  —  Names       Bryan,       McAdoo, 
Tumulty,  et  al.,  Despite  Protests  of  Those  Who  Won 
for  Him  —  McCombs'  Slate  Thrown  Into  the  Waste 
Basket  —  House  Picks  Cabinet  Ministers. 

XVII.  INSIDERS  AND  OUTSIDERS 219 

McCombs  Declines  All  Offers  of  Place  Under  Wilson 

—  Treated  as  a  "Rank  Outsider"  at  Inauguration  — 

[10] 


CONTENTS 

CIIAPTEB  PAOK 

Cannot  Pass  Bryan-McAdoo-Tumulty  Trocha  — 
Republican  Manager  Frank  H.  Hitchcock,  "Down 
and  Out'*,  Commiserates  with  McCombs  —  White 
House  Announcement  That  McCombs  is  "Patronage 
Distributor"  —  McAdoo  is  Real  Dispenser. 

XVIII.  COLONEL  HOUSE  —  THE  "INTRIGUER"     .     .       229 
Tries  to  Bargain  with  McCombs  to  Discard  Wilson 

for  Bryan  and  "We'll  Control  the  United  States"  — 
Offer  Furiously  Rejected  —  Though  Opposed  to  Wil 
son's  Nomination,  the  "Colonel"  Names  Whom  He 
Pleases  for  Office  —  "Fed  on  Wilson's  Passion  for 
Greatness  and  Said  'No'!  or  'Yes'!  as  Required  — 
How  He  Muddled  Things  for  the  President  —  Mor- 
genthau,  Baruch  and  Elkus  Portrayed. 

XIX.  THE  COST  ofcVANiTY^> 243 

"Stand-Patter"  Aldrich  Provoked  the  1912  Republi 
can  Revolt  —  "Roosevelt  Lost  Through  Bad  Tactics 

—  Wilson  Won  Because  Sick  Parties  Clutched  Each 
Other's  Throats  —  Wilson  Lost  Through  Lust   for 
Power,  Which  Made  Him  the  Joke  of  the  World 
Powers  —  Meddling,  Muddling  and  Colossal  Vanity 

—  Brutal  in  Victory  —  Cowardly  in  Defeat". 

XX.  McCoMBs  A  "SOCIAL  LION" 258 

Gets  Appendicitis  and  a  Bride  —  Feted  in  London 

and  Paris  —  Refuses  Public  Service  Commissioner- 
ship  and  State  Chairmanship  —  Frames  Party  Plat 
forms  and  is  Nominated  for  Constitutional  Conven 
tion  Delegate  —  Attacks  Roosevelt  as  a  Bolter  — 
Offers  Services  as  Party  Peace-Maker  —  Backs 
Glynn  for  Governor  and  Gerard  for  United  States 
Senator. 

XXI.  McCoMBs  RETIRES  AS  CHAIRMAN 264« 

Quits  National  Committee — Defeats  All  McAdoo- 
Burleson-Tumulty    Plots    to    Oust    Him  —  Wilson 
Coterie  Conspires  Four  Years  to  Supplant  the  Presi 
dent-Maker —  McCombs  Wins  Fight  for  1916  Con- 

[ii  ] 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

vention  City  and  Voluntarily  Steps  Out  in  Formal 
Notice  to  the  President  —  Wilson's  "Greatest 
Regrets". 

XXII.  "WAR  SAVED  WILSON  IN  1916"!     ....       272 
McCombs  Refuses  to  be  a  Party  to  the  President's 
Violation  of  His  One-Term  Pledge  —  "You  Know  I 

Do  Not  Oppose  a  Third  Term",  Says  Wilson  to 
McCombs,  When  Asked  to  Fulfil  His  Paramount  Pre- 
Election  Promise  —  How  McCombs  Saved  Vice 
President  Marshall  His  Renomination  —  Balks 
Palmer  and  Baker,  Who  Seek  to  Supplant  the 
Hoosier. 

XXIII.  DRAFTED  FOR  THE  SENATE 282 

Wilson  Runs  Conway  Against  McCombs,  but  Mc 
Combs  Sweeps  the  Primaries  —  Wilson's  "Congratu 
lations" —  McCombs'    Reply  —  Wrath    of    "Crown 
Prince"  —  McAdoo-Wilson  Handicap  So  Great  That 
Calder  Wins  at  the  General  Election  —  McCombs 
Assails  "Pap  Hunters"  and  "Blank-Check  Profiteers". 

XIV.  RETRIBUTION 293 

Wilson's  Greeting  on  Return  from  Paris  —  Mc 
Combs  Foils  Baruch  and  Chadbourne  in  Their  Efforts 
to  Make  McAdoo  President  —  Uses  Edwards  to  Con 
solidate  Eastern  States  —  Solidifies  Anti-Third  Term 
Forces  —  Destroys  Wilson  Dynasty  at  San  Fran 
cisco. 

XXV.  WILSON'S  ATTITUDE  TOWARDS  McCoMBS  .  .  300 
McCombs  Made  No  Promises  of  Office  —  Sullivan, 
Wood,  Reed  and  Others  Suffer  from  President's  111- 
Will  —  McCombs'  Suggestions  for  Cabinet  Appoint 
ments  Ignored  Because  Made  by  Him  —  Denied  a 
Seat  Because  "You  Are  a  Politician"* 


[  12  ] 


ILLUSTRATIONS 

William  F.  McCombs .     ,     ,     ,     «     *     *     •     •     Frontispiece 


FACING 
PAGE 


Woodrow  Wilson •  48 

Henry  Watterson 6* 

McCombs    Felicitates    Wilson    on    His    Presidential 

Nomination  at  Sea  Girt,  N.  J.,  1912    ....  174 

Edward  M.  House 230 

"I  Waded  Through  Fire  to  Make  Wilson  President — "       260 
Democratic  National  Committee  Before  White  House, 
1916  


PREFACE 

This  book  depicts  a  double  tragedy.  The  chief 
actors  were  Princeton  University  men.  One  was  an 
instructor;  the  other  was  his  pupil.  Enthralled  by 
the  artful  intellectuality  of  the  instructor,  the  pupil 
conceived  and  executed  the  idea  of  making  him  Presi 
dent  of  the  United  States. 

The  President  not  only  spurned  his  political  maker, 
but  treated  as  outcasts,  many  others  who  sacrificed 
their  near-all  to  elevate  him  to  the  office  of  America's 
chief  executive.  The  President-Maker  went  to  an 
early  grave.  The  President  was  repudiated  by  the 
American  people.  Retribution  came  but  a  few 
months  before  the  President-Maker  gave  up  his  life. 

"Whoso  diggeth  a  pit,  shall  fall  therein.     And  he 
that  rolleth  a  stone,  it  will  return  upon  him." 

—  PROVERBS  26:  27. 

Louis  JAY  LANG 
Princeton  '81 


INTRODUCTION 

I  would  have  little  reason  for  writing  this  book 
were  it  not  more  than  a  mere  discussion  of  a  man's 
life.  I  have  no  desire  to  be  Woodrow  Wilson's 
biographer.  I  have  been  urged  to  write,  because  of 
my  personal  contact  with  his  political  career,  and 
because  of  my  knowledge  of  the  events  connected 
therewith. 

I  knew  Mr.  Wilson  twenty-six  years.  I  sat  under 
him  at  Princeton  University.  I  know  how  he  became 
Governor  and  twice  President.  I  was  manager  by 
personal  appointment  of  Mr.  Wilson's  prenomination 
Presidental  campaign.  I  was  Chairman  of  the  Demo 
cratic  National  Committee  of  1912  which  conducted 
the  campaign  that  resulted  in  his  election.  I  was 
intimate  with  his  conduct  for  his  entire  official  career. 
I  write,  not  as  an  enemy  of  Woodrow  Wilson,  but  as 
an  opponent  of  the  subversion  of  the  American  con 
stitution  and  the  destruction  of  our  system  of  Govern 
ment,  through  vanity  and  greed  for  individual  power. ; 

I  consider  Woodrow  Wilson  one  of  the  most  re 
markable  developments  of  modern  times.  Brilliant 
in  mind,  and  a  master  of  history  and  rhetoric,  I  would 
not  call  him  learned.  He  was  actuated  always  by 
the  purpose  of  the  moment.  He  was  an  opportunist. 
Suave  of  manner,  he  constantly  strove  to  advance 
himself.  He  saw  only  himself  —  and  only  his  personal 

[17] 


INTRODUCTION 

individual  exaltation.  He  played  the  game  as  an 
expert  whist  player  —  always  to  win  —  never  to  lose. 
Winning  was  his  passion. 

He  was  brutal  in  victory.  He  was  the  first  to  run 
when  threatened  with  defeat,  There  is  evidence  of 
this  in  his  begging  me  to  withdraw  his  name  as  a 
Presidential  candidate  at  the  Baltimore  convention 
of  1912,  when  Champ  Clark  was  leading  him  slightly. 

Had  I  yielded  to  his  panic  at  that  time,  there  would 
have  been  no  President  Wilson. 

Mr.  Wilson  was  insensible  of  political  obligations. 
He  recognized  no  debt  to  the  giver.  He  was  adroit 
in  conduct,  and  skilled  in  the  use  of  language.  His 
English  was  a  model  of  classicism.  His  strength  lay 
in  his  cleverness  of  expression.  His  oratorical  out 
bursts  were  at  times  dazzling.  One  became  intoxi 
cated  with  the  veneer  of  his  intellectuality. 

The  Wilson  ideal  was  Alexander  Hamilton,  the 
Federalist — not  Thomas  Jefferson,  the  Democrat. 
Like  Hamilton,  he  believed  in  a  limited  monarchy  — 
a  life  tenure  for  the  President.  He  was  an  advocate 
of  the  British  Government  system.  He  taught  it  at 
Princeton  University.  While  President,  he  regarded 
himself  not  only  as  President,  but  Premier.  Had  he 
dared,  he  would  have  prorogued  Congress  as  the  King 
of  England  prorogues  Parliament. 

It  was  during  the  Paris  Peace  Conference  that  he 
proclaimed  himself  Premier  of  the  United  States. 
His  was  the  most  audacious  proclamation  ever  emitted 
by  an  American  President.  He  overrode  Congress 
and  made  it  a  creature  of  his  whims.  His  juggernaut 

[18] 


INTRODUCTION 

crushed  those  who  dared  oppose  him.  He  imperiously 
strode  a  world-wide  stage.  He  was  fortunate  in  that 
there  is  no  American  constitutional  provision  for  the 
retirement  of  the  President  from  office  during  the 
term  for  which  he  is  elected  when  repudiated  by  popu 
lar  vote.  This  alone  saved  him  from  earlier  oblivion. 
Mr.  Wilson  absorbed  a  great  and  powerful  party, — 
the  Democratic  Party.  It  has  been  more  often  out 
of,  than  in,  power,  but  it  always  set  a  continuity  of 
principle.  Long  before  his  first  inauguration  for 
President,  I  found  that  the  Democratic  Party  must 
cease  to  exist  except  as  a  vehicle  for  his  will.  No  man 
in  history  ever  survived  who  had  the  boldness  and  the 
audacity  to  employ  his  practices  and  probably  no  one 
ever  will. 


[19] 


PART   I 


WOODROW  WILSON 


PRINCETON   EPISODES 

THE  AUTHOR  ENTERS  PRINCETON  —  FINDS  WILSON  "COLD, 
DISTANT,  INTELLECTUAL"  —  McCoMBs  PREVENTS  UNIVER 
SITY  PRESIDENT'S  ENFORCED  DEPOSITION  BY  GROOMING  HIM 
FOR  GOVERNOR  OF  NEW  JERSEY — "To  LET  HIM  DOWN 
EASY"  —  ELECTED,  WILSON  REPUDIATES  BARGAIN  TO  MAKE 
JAMES  SMITH,  JR.,  UNITED  STATES  SENATOR  —  McCoMBs 
PREDICTS  WILSON  WILL  BE  PRESIDENT  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES. 

IN  THE  fall  of  1894, 1  went  to  Princeton  Univer 
sity.     Never  having  been  in  the  East,  I  had  a 
great  feeling  of  loneliness.     In  addition,  I  was 
not  satisfied  that  Princeton  was  the  place  for  me,  my 
first  choice  being  Harvard.     My  family,  however, 
having  more  prescience  than  I  did,  preferred  Prince 
ton.     I  acceded  to  their  wishes. 

Some  time  in  October  of  that  year,  I  became  a 
member  of  the  Southern  Club,  an  organization  of 
about  a  hundred.  Shortly  thereafter  the  Club  held  a 
meeting.  Woodrow  Wilson,  but  recently  called  to  a 
professorship,  was  invited  to  speak.  After  the  meet 
ing,  as  we  came  out  of  the  door,  I  happened  to  fall  in 
with  him.  We  walked  across  the  campus  together. 

[  23  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

I  accompanied  him  to  his  home.  The  point  of  contact 
between  us  was,  that  we  were  both  from  the  South. 

I  made  inquiries  about  Princeton.  We  discussed 
the  relative  merits  of  various  institutions.  He  told  me 
that  if  he  ever  became  a  professor  anywhere  else  than 
Princeton,  he  would  go  South.  Being  fresh  from  the 
South  myself  and  somewhat  provincial,  the  idea  im 
pressed  me  greatly. 

For  the  next  two  years  I  came  in  contact  with  Pro 
fessor  Wilson  occasionally.  My  admiration  for  his 
intellect  grew,  although  he  always  impressed  me  as  a 
cold  and  distant  person,  with  a  sort  of  affected 
warmth. 

During  the  last  two  years  of  my  course  at  college 
I  elected  to  take  all  Professor  Wilson's  courses,  which 
included  Jurisprudence,  Politics,  and  English  Com 
mon  Law.  His  lectures  on  Jurisprudence  and  Poli 
tics,  to  my  mind,  far  excelled  any  courses  given  in  the 
University.  Jurisprudence  and  Politics  involved  the 
theoretical  side  of  the  law.  The  course  in  English 
Common  Law  involved  concrete  and  definite  princi 
ples.  It  is  not  surprising  that  Professor  Wilson, 
when  he  was  admitted  to  the  Bar,  did  not  continue  in 
the  practice.  His  disposition  would  be  against  the 
detail  of  preparation  and  the  turmoil  and  struggle  of 
actual  litigation  in  Court. 

On  the  whole,  I  think  I  got  more  from  Professor 
Wilson's  courses  than  from  any  others,  with  the  pos 
sible  exception  of  Professor  Bliss  Perry's  courses  in 
English  and  Aesthetics. 

After  leaving  Princeton,  I  went  to  the  Law  School 

C  24] 


PRINCETON  EPISODES 

at  Harvard,  and  later  to  New  York  to  practice.  I 
saw  little  more  of  Professor  Wilson  until  he  was 
elected  President  of  the  University, —  chiefly  by  those 
in  the  Board  of  Trustees,  including  Moses  Taylor 
Pyne,  James  W.  Alexander  and  others,  with  all  of 
whom  he  later  differed. 

The  burden  of  the  original  complaint  in  the  Board 
of  Trustees  at  Princeton  against  University  President 
Wilson  was  that  he  announced  policies  and  pro 
grammes  totally  irrespective  of  the  Board  of  Trustees, 
which  was  contrary  to  all  of  the  traditions  of  the 
University. 

Mr.  Pyne  and  others  had  been  largely  responsible 
for  the  later  development  of  the  University  and  had 
contributed  vast  sums  for  its  support.  Mr.  Pyne 
lived  in  Princeton.  He  actually  gave  much  of  his 
time  to  the  personal  supervision  of  its  activities. 
Theretofore,  as  in  the  majority  of  the  educational 
institutions  of  the  country,  the  Board  of  Trustees  had 
laid  down  the  policies  and  programmes  of  the  Univer 
sity  and  had  arranged  its  financial  resources.  The 
President  was  presumed  merely  to  co-operate  as  the 
chief  administrative  officer  of  the  University.  Thus 
the  schism  began,  and  this  a  little  over  a  year  after 
Professor  Wilson  became  President  of  the  University. 

In  1908  Mr.  Wilson,  unknown  to  the  Board  of 
Trustees,  announced  a  programme  which  involved  the 
abolition  of  the  student  clubs  of  Princeton  and  the 
division  of  the  University  into  a  group  of  units  called 
Quads,  after  the  English  fashion.  To  each  Quad  was 
to  be  assigned  a  certain  number  of  students  without 

[25] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

reference  to  their  preference  in  the  matter.  They 
were  to  dine  together  and  necessarily  to  be  thrown 
together.  This  was  Mr.  Wilson's  idea  of  the  estab 
lishment  of  a  more  complete  democracy. 

The  objections  to  the  plan,  naturally,  were  the 
destruction  of  property  values  of  several  hundreds  of 
thousands  of  dollars  invested  in  the  Student  Eating 
Clubs,  and  the  enormous  expense  in  connection  with 
the  establishment  of  Quads.  A  further  objection  was 
that  the  Quad  system  must  fail,  because  men  who  are 
uncongenial  will  not  accept  association.  Compulsion 
would  result  in  the  attendance  at  meals  only  of  persons 
who  might  possibly  be  socially  congenial. 

Nevertheless,  the  plan  had  its  elements  of  strength. 
While  I  did  not  agree  with  Mr.  Wilson's  idea  of  the 
Quad  system,  I  did  agree  with  the  general  idea  of  fur 
ther  democratizing  Princeton  and  of  breaking  up  the 
cliques. 

The  fundamental  difficulty  in  the  matter,  however, 
was  that  Mr.  Wilson  had  elaborated  and  published 
an  entire  plan  without  consultation  with  the  consti 
tuted  authorities  —  the  Board  of  Trustees. 

I  was  in  Princeton  when  the  matter  reached  a  fever 
point.  I  called  on  the  President.  I  suggested  that 
he  might  work  out  his  plan  if  he  called  his  Board  of 
Trustees  more  into  consultation.  This  he  agreed  to 
do.  But,  in  some  way  or  other,  at  the  time,  his  nature 
rebelled  against  it. 

Later  on,  and  after  the  discussion  of  the  Quad  Sys 
tem  had  been  taken  up  among  the  Alumni,  the  ques 
tion  of  a  Graduate  School  arose.  Everyone  favored  a 

[  26] 


PRINCETON  EPISODES 

Graduate  School.  Colonel  William  Cooper  Procter, 
of  Cincinnati,  offered  to  provide  the  funds.  The 
question  arose  as  to  its  location.  A  majority  of  the 
members  of  the  Board  of  Trustees  and  Dean  West 
were  in  favor  of  its  location  at  some  distance  from  the 
campus,  in  order  that  the  graduate  students  might  not 
be  disturbed  by  the  enthusiasm  of  the  under-graduates. 
Mr.  Wilson  favored  the  idea  of  erecting  the  Graduate 
School  on  the  campus.  To  my  mind  the  location  was 
totally  immaterial  so  long  as  we  were  able  to  avail  our 
selves  of  the  gift  of  Mr.  Procter. 

Over  the  location  of  the  Graduate  School,  however 
immaterial  as  it  may  seem  to  the  average  reader, —  and 
indeed  it  has  never  seemed  anything  else  to  me, —  the 
discussion  grew  to  such  proportions  and  the  feeling  of 
hostility  against  Mr.  Wilson  became  so  great,  that  it 
was  only  a  question  of  time  until  he  would  be  forced  by 
the  majority  of  the  Board  of  Trustees  to  surrender  the 
Presidency.  I  had  kept  in  close  touch  with  Princeton 
affairs  since  graduation.  I  had,  as  an  officer  of  the 
Princeton  Club  of  New  York,  advised  Mr.  Wilson 
thoroughly  as  to  the  situation,  and  had  stood  in  the 
position  of  acting,  at  least  in  New  York,  as  the  link 
between  him  and  the  Alumni. 

In  1909,  Mr.  Wilson,  as  President  of  the  Univer 
sity,  was  invited  to  make  a  speech  at  the  Princeton 
Club  of  New  York.  The  President  of  the  Club,  who 
had  been  opposed  to  him,  was  on  that  evening,  fate- 
fully  or  otherwise,  not  present.  When  Mr.  Wilson 
came  into  the  clubhouse,  he  received  an  exceedingly 
cold  reception,  especially  from  the  older  men.  Being 

[27] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

an  officer  of  the  Club,  I  met  him  at  the  door  and  took 
him  in.  Noticing  that  he  was  not  to  receive  a  very 
cordial  reception,  and  that  the  attitude  was  one  of 
patent  hostility,  I  took  him  through  a  narrow  hall,  so 
that  he  would  not  have  to  pass  through  the  main  body 
of  the  audience,  and  conducted  him  to  the  platform 
from  which  he  was  to  speak.  The  Vice  President  of 
the  Club  in  his  introduction  said,  merely: 

"We  have  with  us  this  evening,  the  President  of  the 
University,  Mr.  Wilson". 

The  Vice  President  and  I  were  the  only  other  per 
sons  on  the  platform. 

After  the  speech  I  went  up  and  shook  hands  with 
the  President.  We  paused  for  a  moment  to  see  if 
others  would  follow.  The  older  men,  among  whom 
were  several  trustees,  did  not  come  up.  The  younger 
men  disliked  to  volunteer.  I  conducted  Mr.  Wilson 
out  by  the  same  secret  passage,  and  into  the  open  lobby 
of  the  Club  as  the  members  were  filing  out.  Not  over 
twenty  from  the  gathering  of  two  hundred  shook 
hands  with  him. 

I  suggested  to  Mr.  Wilson  that  we  go  up  to  the  grill 
room  of  the  Club,  where  a  buffet  supper  was  being 
served, —  including  liquid  refreshments.  I  was  sure 
that  this  supper  would  attract  the  younger  men,  and 
that  a  better  opportunity  could  be  had  there  to  make 
things  a  bit  more  comfortable  for  him.  I  left  him  in 
the  hands  of  a  group  of  half  a  dozen  younger  Alumni. 
He  appeared  painfully  conscious  of  his  position. 

Then  I  went  to  the  officers  of  the  Club,  and  various 
members  of  the  Board  of  Governors,  all  of  whom  were 

[28] 


PRINCETON  EPISODES 

on  the  Anti- Wilson  side  of  the  issue,  and  stated  that 
he  was  the  guest  of  the  Club,  invited  by  action  of  the 
Board  of  Trustees;  that  whatever  they  thought  of 
him,  they  owed  him  the  courtesy  of  cordial  treatment 
so  long  as  he  was  in  the  Club ;  that  when  he  departed, 
they  were  at  liberty  to  act  as  they  pleased.  I  further 
said,  that,  unless  this  was  done,  I  would  resign  as  an 
officer  of  the  Club. 

Whereupon,  most  of  the  officers  and  Governors  went 
up  and  greeted  him  formally.  I  think  it  was  the  cold 
est  meeting  of  any  sort  that  I  ever  attended. 

In  April,  1910,  it  became  apparent  that  Mr.  Wilson 
was  to  be  deposed  from  the  Presidency  of  Princeton 
University.  I  thought  such  action  would  produce  a 
serious  split  in  the  body  of  the  Alumni  and  cut  off  a 
tremendous  support  from  the  University  itself.  In 
the  second  place,  I  did  not  see  anything  in  the  situation 
at  that  time  to  warrant  such  action. 

I  remember  one  night,  at  the  Princeton  Club,  saying 
to  two  friends  on  the  Board  of  Trustees,  that  in  Wilson 
we  had  one  of  the  intellectual  giants  of  the  continent. 
Even  if  he  lacked  amiability  to  the  suggestions  of  the 
Board  of  Directors,  and  had  acted  arbitrarily  at  times, 
I  thought  much  should  be  written  off  against  genius 
and  that  an  entente  could  still  be  established. 

My  suggestion  met  with  no  response  whatever. 
The  Board  of  Trustees  was  thoroughly  committed, 
pro  and  con.  The  only  man  who  had  been  in  the 
situation  who  could  have  brought  about  peace  was 
Cornelius  C.  Cuyler,  a  banker  in  New  York,  a  mem 
ber  of  Mr.  Wilson's  class  and  friendly  with  all  fac- 

[29] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

tions.  Mr.  Cuyler  died  the  summer  previous.  I  have 
always  thought  that  had  he  lived  he  could  have  laughed 
the  matter  out  of  existence,  as  it  should  have  been. 

In  May,  1910,  it  became  more  obvious  than  ever 
that  Mr.  Wilson  was  to  be  dismissed  at  the  June  com 
mencement.  I  happened  to  be  in  Princeton  during 
that  month.  I  suggested  to  two  members  of  the  Board 
of  Trustees,  hostile  to  him,  that  it  would  be  a  good 
thing  if  Mr.  Wilson  were  nominated  for  Governor  of 
New  Jersey  on  the  Democratic  ticket. 

Former  United  States  Senator  James  Smith,  Jr., 
of  New  Jersey,  was  casting  about  for  a  candidate  out 
side  the  organization,  who  could  win.  Colonel  George 
Harvey  was  very  enthusiastic  about  Professor  Wilson. 
He  enjoyed  the  confidence  of  Senator  Smith. 

In  my  conversation  with  the  two  Princeton  trustees 
referred  to  above,  I  said,  "Why  not  let  Wilson  down 
easy  by  getting  him  the  nomination  for  the  Governor 
ship  of  New  Jersey  on  the  Democratic  ticket"? 

These  trustees  were  very  powerful  men.  They  took 
the  suggestion  very  heartily.  I  said  no  more. 

The  next  I  knew,  it  was  common  gossip  of  New 
Jersey  that  Wilson  would  be  the  candidate.  A  hun 
dred  times  newspaper  men  have  inquired  of  me 
whether  these  two  Princeton  trustees  and  others  did 
not  actually  put  up  the  $75,000  required  by  Senator 
Smith  for  the  Wilson  campaign  fund,  and  whether, 
as  a  matter  of  fact,  Cleveland  Dodge  and  others  did  not 
refund  the  $75,000  when  Wilson  broke  with  Smith. 

In  any  event,  at  the  commencement  in  1910,  there 
was  an  underground  rumor  that  Mr.  Wilson  might  be 

[30] 


PRINCETON  EPISODES 

relieved  of  his  duties  in  another  way  than  by  formal 
action  of  the  Board  at  that  time. 

I  went  to  Europe.  Returning  in  September,  on 
making  inquiries,  I  found  that  the  idea  of  the  nomina 
tion  of  Mr.  Wilson  had  gained  great  headway,  espe 
cially  among  what  were  termed  the  Reactionaries  in 
New  Jersey.  Subsequently,  a  meeting  was  held  at 
the  Lawyers'  Club  in  New  York  at  which  his  nomina 
tion  was  virtually  agreed  upon.  This  meeting  was 
attended  by  Mr.  Wilson,  George  Harvey,  James  R. 
Nugent,  Robert  S.  Hudspeth,  representing  Senator 
Smith,  Robert  J.  Thompson,  former  Congressman 
Eugene  Kinkead,  Robert  Lindabury  and  Milan  Ross. 

Mr.  Wilson  agreed  to  run  for  Governor.  Senator 
Smith  controlled  a  majority  of  the  delegates  to  the 
convention  which  met  at  Trenton  October  10,  1911. 

The  Progressive  element  in  New  Jersey  violently 
opposed  the  nomination  of  Mr.  Wilson.  Among  them 
were  William  Hughes  and  Mayor  Gregory  of  Orange. 
Some  gentlemen  from  Newark,  where  Senator  Smith 
resided,  were  at  the  doorway  of  the  Convention  Hall. 
They  refused  admission  to  Progressive  delegates.  A! 
number  of  personal  encounters  ensued. 

Mr.  Wilson  was  nominated  easily.  He  made  his 
speech  of  acceptance.  He  embarked  upon  his  cam 
paign  under  the  management  of  Senator  Smith,  James 
R.  Nugent  and  Colonel  Harvey. 

The  Progressive  candidate  for  Governor  was  George 
L.  Record.  The  Republican  candidate  was  Vivian 
Lewis. 

Ample  funds  were  provided  for  the  campaign, 
[31] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

$75,000  being  raised  by  Senator  Smith  and  his  friends. 
Mr.  Wilson  made  a  magnificent  stumping  tour  and 
was  elected  by  a  plurality  of  over  forty-nine  thousand. 

After  his  nomination,  on  October  10th,  I  sent  the 
Governor-Elect  the  following  telegram: 

"The  People  of  New  Jersey  are  to  be  congratulated 
on  your  nomination  for  Governor,  and  Princeton  has 
produced  the  next  President  of  the  United  States." 

In  writing  that  telegram,  I  had  in  mind  the  very 
great  probability  of  Democratic  success  through  the 
country,  of  a  Democratic  lower  House  in  Congress, 
and  the  general  feeling  that  the  Taft  Administration 
was  falling  into  a  state  of  collapse.  I  had  also  in 
mind  the  fact  that  Mr.  Wilson  would  prove  intellectu 
ally  superior  to  any  candidate  who  might  be  elected  as 
Governor  from  any  of  the  states,  and  that  his  tours  of 
campaigning  could  be  turned  to  such  an  account  that 
he  would  attract  the  attention  of  the  entire  country. 

His  election  was  so  impressive  that  it  received  very 
general  notice;  but  the  vast  majority  of  people 
throughout  the  country  viewed  it  as  an  experiment  in 
higher  education.  Tersely,  their  general  sentiment 
might  have  been  expressed  in  the  phrase: 

"Watch  the  Professor"! 

After  his  inauguration,  Mr.  Wilson  immediately 
proceeded  to  his  programme. 

Everything  went  along  very  amiably  until  the  ques 
tion  of  the  election  of  a  United  States  Senator  came 
up.  Under  the  then  very  effective  primary  law  an 
informal  primary  had  been  held  a  year  before.  Only 
two  men  participated,  both  of  whom  were  relatively 

[82] 


PRINCETON   EPISODES 

unknown, —  James  E.  Marline  and  Frank  M.  Mc- 
Dermitt.  Very  few  voters  paid  any  attention  to  the 
law  at  all,  considering  it  practically  a  dead  letter.  It 
did  not  provide  that  it  should  be  binding  on  the 
Legislature. 

Soon  after  Governor  Wilson  took  office,  there  were 
rumors  that  Senator  Smith  desired  to  be  elected  Sen 
ator.  It  was  understood,  also,  that  Colonel  Harvey 
would  stand.  No  mention  was  made  of  James  E. 
Martine,  who  had  received  a  majority  of  the  votes  in 
the  informal  primary. 

Mr.  Wilson  came  out  squarely  against  Senator 
Smith,  but  expressed  no  preference  as  to  candidates. 
The  Smith  legislative  forces  were  gathering.  It 
seemed  that  he  would  be  elected  under  ordinary 
circumstances. 

Then  Governor  Wilson  took  the  position  that  the 
primary  candidate,  even  though  the  election  was  in 
formal,  should  be  the  choice  of  the  party.  At  the 
same  time,  he  saw  the  necessity  of  winning  away  from 
Senator  Smith  the  organization  that  was  behind  him. 
He  thereupon  brought  leaders  into  consultation  and 
made  appointments  that  were  satisfactory  to  them. 
Gradually  Smith's  power  was  withdrawn  from  him, 
and  in  a  short  time  he  had  lost  control  of  his  organiza 
tion,  his  influence  being  practically  limited  to  Essex 
County.  Mr.  Martine  was  elected. 


[33] 


II 


GENESIS  OF  WILSON'S  PRESIDENTIAL, 
CAMPAIGNS 

WILSON  ASKS  McCoMBs  TO  MANAGE  His  PRESIDENTIAL  PRIMARY  — 
"LET  THE  PROPHET  FULFIL  THE  PROPHECY"  —  McCoMBs 
EMBARKS  WITH  MEAGRE  FUNDS  —  WILSON'S  FIRST  SPEECH 
SHOCKS  HIM  —  McCoMBs  INTRODUCES  McAooo  TO  WILSON  — 
"EVERYBODY  is  AGAINST  WILSON"!  SAID  McAooo  —  STATE 
CHAIRMAN  NUGENT'S  "WILSON  —  LIAR  —  INGRATE"  SPEECH 
CAUSES  His  OUSTING. 

TOWARD  the  latter  part  of  February,  1911,  I 
saw  Governor  Wilson,  I  discussed  with  him 
the  proposed  Employers'  Liability  Act.     In 
New  York,  I  had  been  very  keenly  interested  in  the 
subject  and  had  studied  it  very  thoroughly.     He  re 
quested  that  I  give  him  a  brief  and  any  suggestions 
that  I  had  to  make.     I  went  to  Trenton  and  took  the 
matter  up  with  him. 

On  his  desk,  I  noticed  huge  piles  of  unanswered 
letters.  I  said  to  him:  "You  must  be  getting  a  lot  of 
mail".  He  said:  "Yes,  those  are  invitations  from 
various  places  to  speak,  and  I  don't  know  what  to  do 
with  them".  I  then  reminded  him  of  the  telegram 
concerning  his  probable  chance  of  being  President 
which  I  had  sent  to  him  in  the  previous  October.  He 
said:  "Yes,  I  remember  it  well,  but  I  think  that  the 

[34] 


GENESIS  OF  WILSON'S  PRESIDENTIAL  CAMPAIGNS 

Smith  incident  has  put  me  out  of  commission  with 
organized  politics  in  this  country.  My  course  in  the 
Legislature  has  been  such  as  to  make  people  afraid 
of  me". 

I  told  him  that  the  first  was  a  serious  obstacle,  but 
if  I  gauged  the  temper  of  the  time  correctly,  the  latter 
could  be  overcome.  Then  I  said:  "I  should  like  the 
prophecy  of  my  telegram  fulfilled".  His  reply  was: 
"The  prophet  should  fulfil  his  prophecy".  I  said:  "If 
you  desire,  I  should  be  quite  willing  to  do  so".  The 
Governor  assented. 

I  looked  at  a  number  of  his  letters.  They  were 
mainly  from  Civic  organizations  in  the  East.  I  said: 
"These  will  never  do.  The  movement  to  make  a  man 
President  of  the  United  States  must  start  in  the  West, 
and  come  East". 

I  returned  to  New  York  and  laid  down  a  plan  of 
campaign.  My  first  move  was  to  organize  a  speaking 
tour  for  the  Governor  through  the  middle  and  far 
West.  It  did  not  seem  desirable  that  he  appear  to  be 
canvassing  for  the  office.  I  selected  the  following 
cities  for  his  speech-making:  Kansas  City,  Denver, 
Los  Angeles,  San  Francisco,  Seattle  and  Portland.  I 
laid  the  plan  before  him.  He  assented.  I  then  had 
suggestions  made  to  Princeton  alumni,  or  friends,  in 
these  various  cities,  that  he  be  invited  to  speak  before 
civic  and  commercial  bodies,  and  that  no  speeches  be 
made  before  political  bodies. 

Invitations  were  readily  extended.  It  was  planned 
that  the  Governor  should  go  west  immediately  after 
the  adjournment  of  the  Legislature.  Meanwhile,  I 

[35] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

got  in  touch  with  various  friends  throughout  the 
country,  chiefly  Princeton  men,  and  made  inquiry  as 
to  whether  they  would  be  willing  to  support,  finan 
cially,  a  Wilson  campaign  for  the  Presidency.  I  got 
many  responses,  but  little  money.  In  the  end,  I  was 
compelled  to  underwrite  the  trip  to  the  West  myself. 
Later  I  received  some  donations  to  offset  my  advances. 

I  was  busy  in  Court  the  day  Mr.  Wilson  left.  I  did 
not  have  a  chance  to  confer  with  him.  But  I  told  the 
publicity  man  to  say  to  Mr.  Wilson  that  on  his  western 
tour  I  did  not  think  it  advisable  to  incorporate  in  his 
speech  anything  about  the  Initiative,  Referendum  and 
Recall.  I  did  not  know  his  views  on  the  subject,  but 
I  thought  that  either  position  he  took  would  be  a  great 
political  injury.  Furthermore,  I  thought  that  it  was 
not  necessary  to  bring  it  into  a  Presidential  campaign. 
These  issues  were  local  and  state  matters. 

The  publicity  man,  either  fearing  to  make  sugges 
tions  to  the  Governor  or  forgetting  it,  did  not  give  him 
the  message.  In  any  event,  in  Kansas  City,  during  a 
speech  before  the  Knife  and  Fork  Cltfb,  he  came  out 
for  the  Initiative,  Referendum  and  Recall,  but  not  the 
recall  of  judges.  His  position  was  very  sweeping  and 
applicable  to  all  states  and  all  conditions,  according  to 
the  text  of  the  speech.  When  I  read  the  speech  I  was 
very  much  alarmed.  I  knew  that  the  views  expressed 
therein  were  contrary  to  that  which  he  had  taught  in 
college.  I  knew,  also,  that  such  doctrine  would  set 
the  more  or  less  conservative  states  against  him.  This 
included  the  great  and  popular  states  in  the  East  and 
in  the  South.  As  I  anticipated,  the  speech  immedi- 

[36] 


GENESIS  OF  WILSON'S  PRESIDENTIAL  CAMPAIGNS 

ately  aroused  the  greatest  hostility.  That  and  the 
Smith  incident  became  powerful  weapons  in  the  hands 
of  our  opponents.  So  far  as  Smith  was  concerned,  it 
was  contended  that,  having  accepted  the  Gubernatorial 
nomination  largely  at  Smith's  hands,  the  Governor 
should  at  least  have  kept  his  hands  off  the  United 
States  Senatorship,  the  more  so  in  view  of  the  fact  that 
the  primary  had  been  an  informal  and  innocuous  affair. 

From  Kansas  City,  Governor  Wilson  went  to 
Denver.  There  the  meeting  had  been  arranged  largely 
by  Mr.  S.  H.  Thompson,  of  the  class  of  1897  at  Prince 
ton, —  now  Deputy  Attorney  General.  I  did  not 
know  what  Mr.  Thompson's  politics  were,  but  I  knew 
he  was  my  friend,  and  that  I  could  trust  him  to  arrange 
a  proper  meeting.  This  he  did.  At  the  time  of  the 
visit  to  Denver,  Governor  Wilson  was  invited  to 
address  a  meeting  there  at  the  celebration  of  the  Ter 
centenary  of  the  Bible.  His  speech  was  magnificent.  I 
immediately  had  thousands  of  copies  of  it  printed  and 
sent  to  every  clergyman  in  the  United  States.  My 
idea  was,  that,  from  thousands  of  pulpits,  this  address 
would  be  commented  on  and  that  Mr.  Wilson's  name 
would  be  heard  all  over  the  United  States.  Prior  to 
the  time  of  his  election  as  Governor,  knowledge  of  Mr. 
Wilson's  existence  was  confined,  in  a  large  measure, 
to  academic  circles  and  to  the  few  who  heard  him  as  an 
after  dinner  speaker  on  a  limited  number  of  occasions, 
chiefly  in  the  East. 

In  the  main,  the  tour  turned  out  to  be  a  great  suc 
cess,  with  the  Exception  of  the  unfortunate  declaration 
for  the  Initiative,  Referendum  and  Recall.  This 

[37] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

declaration  produced  a  distinct  setback  in  the  East. 
It  did  not  help  very  much  in  the  West. 

Up  to  this  time  only  three  persons  had  taken  part 
in  the  financial  campaign, —  Walter  L.  McCorkle,  of 
New  York,  who  donated  a  small  amount;  Walter 
Hines  Page,  afterward  Ambassador  to  England,  who 
found  my  press  agent  for  me  and  contributed,  I  think, 
$100,  and  myself.  Upon  a  further  call,  Mr.  Page  told 
me  he  felt  that  he  could  not  respond.  Nevertheless, 
I  felt  that  the  campaign  should  go  on. 

I  concluded  that,  inasmuch  as  the  political  organiza 
tions  throughout  the  country,  in  the  main,  would  be 
hostile  to  Mr.  Wilson,  and  inasmuch  as  those  Demo 
crats  who  were  possessed  of  means  would  not  support 
organized  politics  in  supporting  him,  I  must  lay  down 
a  campaign  that  differed  materially  and  fundamen 
tally  from  any  Presidential  campaign  ever  previously 
conducted. 

It  seemed  necessary  that  public  sentiment  should  be 
built  from  the  ground  up,  so  that  in  the  end  states 
would  be  compelled  to  choose  delegates  who  would  be 
instructed  for  Mr.  Wilson.  If  uninstructed,  they 
would  support  him  at  some  time  in  the  convention, 
or,  if  hostile,  would  at  some  juncture  be  compelled,  by 
popular  uprising,  to  vote  for  him.  The  theory  of  such 
a  campaign  had,  as  its  basis,  a  continuous  publicity 
reaching  the  individual  himself,  irrespective  of  his 
putative  power  in  politics.  With  this  in  mind,  I  estab 
lished  the  Wilson  Headquarters  at  42  Broadway,  New 
[York  City,  with  experienced  publicity  men  in  charge. 

A  majority  of  the  newspapers  throughout  the 
[38] 


GENESIS  OF  WILSON'S  PRESIDENTIAL  CAMPAIGNS 

country  had  become  very  hostile  and  seemed  to  print 
as  little  about  him  as  they  possibly  could.  This  plan 
was  then  inaugurated.  We  took  a  list  of  every  Demo 
cratic  newspaper  in  the  United  States  and  printed  a 
large  page.  We  called  it  a  clipping  sheet.  It  was  a 
statement  of  excerpts  from  the  best  things  said  about 
Mr.  Wilson  in  the  various  papers.  These  sheets  went 
on  for  a  long  time  daily.  Extracts  from  these  clipping 
sheets  began  to  be  taken  by  the  various  small  papers 
throughout  the  country. 

People  became  aware  of  the  existence  of  Wilson 
Headquarters  at  42  Broadway.  Then  letters  began 
to  come  in  floods  asking  for  more  information  about 
Mr.  Wilson.  These  letters  were  answered  individu 
ally.  The  name  of  the  inquirer  was  put  in  an  index. 
The  western  speeches  of  the  Governor  were  published 
with  the  exception,  I  must  admit,  of  the  Referendum 
speech,  and  were  circulated  broadcast  to  all  inquirers. 
This  publicity  also  went  to  the  various  political  leaders 
in  every  county  throughout  the  country. 

During  the  summer  of  1911,  while  the  initial  stages 
of  the  publicity  were  going  on,  I  took  a  motor  trip 
through  New  England.  I  visited,  personally,  many 
Democratic  leaders.  At  the  Waumbeck  Hotel,  Jef 
ferson,  New  Hampshire,  I  met  Louis  Wiley,  business 
manager  of  the  New  York  Times.  I  also  met  there 
Andrew  Freedman,  of  New  York,  and  William  L. 
Ward,  the  Republican  leader  of  •  Westchester  County, 
New  York.  At  the  risk  of  boring  them,  I  did  not  per 
mit  them  to  talk  about  anything  except  Mr.  Wilson. 
Mr.  Ward,  who  seemed  to  take  a  friendly  interest  in 

[39] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

me  personally,  but  who  did  not  like  the  Wilson  idea 
at  all,  made  many  valuable  suggestions  out  of  his  long 
experience.  Of  Mr.  Wiley  I  made  a  complete  convert, 
and  later  on,  throughout  the  entire  prenomination 
fight,  he  rendered  valiant  and  valuable  suggestions.  I 
say  valiant,  because  Mr.  Wiley's  paper  never  declared 
itself  for  Mr.  Wilson  until  a  very  critical  moment  in 
the  Convention  itself . 

While  in  Maine,  I  went  to  see  Mayor  Fitzgerald,  of 
Boston.  My  idea  was  not  so  much  that  I  would  get 
him  committed,  as  that  I  would  plant  the  Wilson  germ 
in  him  for  future  purposes.  Upon  meeting  Mr.  Fitz 
gerald,  I  told  him  that  I  had  come  to  talk  about 
Governor  Wilson  to  him  and  began  to  lead  him  to  a 
secluded  spot.  Not  for  Fitzgerald!  He  stood  in  the 
middle  of  the  hotel  lobby.  I  commenced  on  him  with 
quiet  tones.  He  responded  in  such  a  way  that  every 
body  in  the  hotel  could  hear.  Presently,  at  least  two 
hundred  people  were  standing  around,  listening  to  the 
merits  of  Governor  Wilson's  candidacy.  His  final 
statement  was:  "The  time  is  not  ripe.  We  must  look 
over  all  the  candidates  carefully".  Meanwhile,  news 
paper  men  were  attracted  and  Mr.  Fitzgerald  paid  me 
the  compliment  in  public  of  saying  that  I  was  a  very 
live  wire. 

I  returned  to  New  York.  The  day  following  I  went 
to  luncheon  with  William  Gibbs  McAdoo,  afterward 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury.  I  had  known  Mr.  McAdoo 
for  five  or  six  years.  Three  years  previous  to  the 
luncheon  I  was  on  the  Nominating  Committee  of  the 
Southern  Society  to  recommend  to  the  Society  a  Pres- 

[40] 


GENESIS  OF  WILSON'S  PRESIDENTIAL  CAMPAIGNS 

ident,  Vice  President,  Secretary  and  Treasurer.  I 
personally  espoused  Mr.  McAdoo  for  the  office  of 
President.  In  doing  so  I  went  counter  to  the  prece 
dent  of  the  Society  of  many  years'  standing,  that  the 
Vice  President  should  succeed  the  President.  Walter 
L.  McCorkle  was  then  Vice  President.  I  thought 
under  the  circumstances  that  Mr.  McAdoo  would  be 
preferable.  I  personally  secured  a  bare  majority  of 
the  Nominating  Committee  and  Mr.  McAdoo's  name 
for  President  went  before  the  Society.  A  rather  bitter 
fight  was  made  on  him,  but  he  was  elected.  It  being 
the  custom  to  have  the  President  succeed  himself,  Mr. 
McAdoo  was  elected  a  second  year.  The  third  year 
I  was  again  on  the  Nominating  Committee  and  re 
versed  another  precedent  of  the  Society.  I  urged  Mr. 
McAdoo  for  the  Presidency  for  a  third  term.  The 
Nominating  Committee  again  nominated  him  by  a 
majority.  There  was  another  fight  on  the  nomination, 
but  he  was  elected.  I  am  afraid  that  this  action  caused 
me  the  temporary  loss  of  some  very  old  friendships  in 
the  Society.  Happily,  I  have  regained  them. 

At  the  luncheon  at  the  Lawyers'  Club,  that  I  have 
referred  to,  Mr.  McAdoo  brought  up  the  question  of 
an  application  to  the  Public  Service  Commission  of 
New  Jersey,  to  regulate  the  traffic  of  the  railroads 
terminating  at  points  in  Jersey  City,  Weehawken  and 
Hoboken.  Mr.  McAdoo  feared  that  the  ferry  service 
would  be  unprofitable  and  that  the  Hudson  tubes 
would  fall  heir  to  the  ferry  receipts.  He  requested 
a  conference  with  the  Governor.  I  had  previously  in 
troduced  Mr.  McAdoo  to  Governor  Wilson.  In 

[41  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

September  I  asked  Mr.  McAdoo  if  he  could  not 
espouse  Mr.  Wilson's  candidacy  and  assist  in  raising 
some  funds.  He  said  everybody  that  he  knew  was 
against  Governor  Wilson,  and  that  the  financial  con 
dition  of  the  Hudson  tunnels  was  such  that  he  did  not 
feel  he  could  do  much. 

Meanwhile,  I  had  sent  out  letters  to  all  of  the  Prince 
ton  Alumni  that  I  thought  would  contribute,  and  had 
received  a  fairly  satisfactory  return.  Cleveland  H. 
Dodge,  a  classmate  of  Mr.  Wilson's  at  Princeton,  had 
up  to  September  contributed  about  ten  thousand  dol 
lars.  Edward  Sheldon,  also  a  classmate  of  the  Gover 
nor,  gave  one  thousand  dollars.  There  were  a  few 
scattering  contributions. 

During  the  summer,  knowing  that  Governor  Wilson 
had  a  small  political  acquaintance,  I  motored  down  to 
Sea  Girt,  the  Summer  Capital  of  New  Jersey.  I  took 
as  many  men  as  I  could  with  me.  From  these  visits 
I  learned  a  valuable  lesson,  to  wit:  That  Mr.  Wilson 
appealed  only  to  those  men  who  were  keenly  and 
actively  interested  in  the  discussion  of  public  ques 
tions.  Those  who  took  a  deep  interest  in  party  politics 
and  party  success  came  away  disappointed.  The  latter 
type  of  man  I  never  took  to  see  Mr.  Wilson  up  to  the 
day  of  his  nomination. 

I  had  been  told  that  early  in  the  summer  of  1911 
Senator  Smith  had  made  a  quite  extensive  trip,  visit 
ing  his  political  friends  and  presenting  his  grievances 
against  Mr.  Wilson.  He  had  been  in  politics  for  many 
years ;  he  had  vast  political  and  business  connections ; 
his  influence  was  great.  From  the  average  point  of 

[  42] 


GENESIS  OF  WILSON'S  PRESIDENTIAL  CAMPAIGNS 

view  it  would  seem  that  this  opposition  would  make 
Mr.  Wilson's  nomination  impossible. 

A  fortunate  incident  occurred.  James  R.  Nugent, 
leader  of  Essex  County,  and  supposed  to  be  Senator 
Smith's  alter  ego,  was  chairman  of  the  State  Demo 
cratic  Committee  of  New  Jersey.  One  Saturday 
evening,  on  the  Jersey  coast,  Mr.  Nugent  gave  violent 
expression  of  his  feelings  toward  the  Governor.  He 
called  him  a  liar  and  an  ingrate,  with  elaborate  orator 
ical  and  vituperative  trimmings.  I  was  at  Sea  Girt 
the  following  Sunday.  It  occurred  to  me  that  the 
extreme  indignity  offered  to  the  Governor  of  New 
Jersey  was  ample  reason  for  the  deposition  of  Mr. 
Nugent.  Furthermore,  it  would  demonstrate  to  the 
country  the  character,  at  least,  of  that  part  of  the 
opposition  to  Mr.  Wilson.  The  Governor,  his  Secre 
tary,  Joseph  P.  Tumulty,  and  I,  went  into  conference 
in  the  library  and  laid  out  a  plan  by  which  we  could 
get  sufficient  votes  from  the  State  Committee  to  depose 
Nugent.  The  key  to  the  situation  seemed  to  be 
Edward  E.  Grosscup,  who  up  to  that  time  had  Smith- 
Nugent  leanings.  We  succeeded  in  capturing  Mr. 
Grosscup  and  had  the  votes.  A  meeting  was  called 
and  Mr.  Nugent  was  deposed.  It  is  not  necessary  to 
state  that  due  publicity  was  given  to  this  incident,  not 
only  through  the  newspapers,  but  by  very  wide  circu 
lation  through  our  clipping  sheets  in  New  York.  In  a 
very  large  degree  I  have  always  considered  that  those 
unhappy  remarks  of  Mr.  Nugent  nullified  the  previous 
Smith  incident.  In  addition  to  the  impropriety  of  the 
matter,  the  political  desirability  of  it  was  patent. 

[48] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

Up  to  the  time  of  this  incident  there  was  no  Wilson 
organization  for  the  Presidency  in  New  Jersey  or  out 
side  of  it,  except  what  was  being  done  from  42  Broad 
way,  and  what  I  was  doing  myself.  The  Jersey  Demo 
cratic  organization,  having  fasted  for  many  years 
under  Republican  rule,  was  very  busy  getting  accus 
tomed  to  a  Democratic  Governor  and  a  Democratic 
regime,  and  the  proper  distribution  of  Democratic 
patronage. 


Ill 

McCOMBS    IN  COMMAND 

BEGS  WILSON  TO  HELP  HIMSELF  —  WILSON  REPLIES:  "SEE 
HUDSPETH"  !  —  HUDSPETH  "Too  BUSY"  —  HARMON  "LOGI 
CAL"  NOMINEE  —  McCoMBS  AIMS  TO  DEFEAT  HIM,  CLARK, 
UNDERWOOD,  AND  BRYAN  —  WILSON  PEEVISH  ABOUT  SPEAK 
ING  WHEN  REVOLT  FACES  HIM  IN  His  OWN  STATE  —  PENN 
SYLVANIA  AND  WEST  VIRGINIA  AMONG  FIRST  STATES  CAPTURED 
—  BUT  PENNSYLVANIA  WAVERS  BECAUSE  OF  WILSON'S 
"RALICALISM". 

IN"  SEPTEMBER  of  1911,  feeling  that  the  drain 
on  my  time  and  my  resources  was  too  great,  I 
went  to  see  Governor  Wilson.  I  asked  him  if  he 
could  not  suggest  a  group  of  New  Jersey  men  to 
handle  his  campaign  in  conjunction  with  myself.  My 
contention  was,  that  handling  a  campaign,  and  financ 
ing  it  at  the  same  time,  was  too  much  of  a  drain  for 
any  man  to  stand.  He  made  the  suggestion  that 
Robert  S.  Hudspeth,  National  Committeeman  from 
New  Jersey,  whom  he  had  weaned  away  from  the 
Smith  forces  by  a  very  adroit  letter,  might  be  of 
assistance. 

I  invited  Judge  Hudspeth  to  come  to  luncheon  with 
me.  He  expressed  great  admiration  for  the  Governor, 
but  told  me  that  he  had  a  large  practice  and  clients 
who  drew  on  his  time  so  steadily  that  he  could  not  give 

[45] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

any  continuous  effort  to  it.  I  went  again  to  Governor 
Wilson  and  asked  him  for  other  suggestions,  but  could 
get  none.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  New  Jersey  Democ 
racy  was  then  coming  out  of  a  state  of  atrophy  and 
was  not  the  virile,  wide-awake  organization  that  it 
subsequently  became. 

About  this  time,  through  Judge  Ball  of  Delaware, 
I  was  able  to  make  the  acquaintance  and  friendship  of 
a  man  who  turned  out  to  be  one  of  the  ablest  and  most 
consistent  supporters  of  the  Wilson  propoganda — 
Willard  Saulsbury,  afterward  United  States  Senator. 
Mr.  Saulsbury  had  a  very  large  experience  in  Dela 
ware  politics,  chiefly  in  fighting  the  dominant  organ 
ization  down  there,  led  by  Andrew  Gray.  Mr. 
Saulsbury  had  been  ambitious  for  office,  but,  as  he 
contended,  his  aspirations  as  a  Democrat  had  been 
impossible  for  a  long  time,  because  Delaware  had 
become  a  pocket  borough  of  the  Republican  Party. 
I  knew  Mr.  Saulsbury  to  be  a  lawyer  of  very  great 
ability,  who  through  his  many  years  of  political 
struggle  had  become  a  resourceful  and  indomitable 
fighter. 

Upon  meeting  Mr.  Saulsbury  I  suggested  that  he 
and  Judge  Ball,  who  was  a  Princeton  man,  go  to 
Princeton,  and  meet  Governor  Wilson,  whose  resi 
dence  was  there  during  his  entire  term  as  Governor. 
Mr.  Saulsbury,  at  once,  saw  possibilities  in  Mr.  Wil 
son.  Upon  his  return  to  Wilmington,  he  wrote  me  to 
the  effect  that,  in  his  judgment,  Mr.  Wilson  was  the 
man  for  President,  and  enclosed  an  exceedingly  wel 
come  contribution.  The  resources  of  the  campaign  at 

[  46  ] 


McCOMBS  IN  COMMAND 

that  time,  as  they  had  been  before  and  subsequently, 
were  always  exceedingly  in  doubt. 

About  the  same  time  I  met  Jerry  B.  Sullivan  of 
Iowa,  one  of  the  Democratic  leaders  of  the  state,  but 
a  member  of  the  minority  wing  of  his  party.  I  had 
previously  found  out  that  Judge  Martin  J.  Wade  and 
the  State  Chairman  were  not  inclined  to  favor  Mr. 
Wilson's  cause  for  the  standard  reasons  that  had  been 
alleged  against  him.  It  became  apparent  to  me,  there 
fore,  that  I  must  take  the  minority  wing  of  the  party 
and  do  the  best  I  could  with  it.  Mr.  Sullivan  put  me 
in  touch  with  the  leaders  of  his  wing  of  the  party,  and 
I  won  a  very  valuable  ally  in  Louis  Murphy,  the  editor 
of  an  influential  Democratic  paper. 

The  usual  process  of  taking  Mr.  Sullivan  to  see  the 
Governor  was  carried  through.  Mr.  Sullivan  was  very 
much  attracted  to  Mr.  Wilson  and  promised  his  sup 
port.  I  did  not  know  then,  as  I  knew  later,  the  very 
great  advantage  which  the  dominant  organization  in 
the  state  had,  regardless  of  its  character.  However, 
had  I  known  it,  I  should  have  been  compelled  to  take 
up  the  minority  cause,  if  for  no  other  reason  than  that 
I  could  not  get  the  majority.  The  minority  would, 
at  least,  be  most  helpful  in  the  circulation  of  literature 
concerning  Mr.  Wilson  and  creating  popular  sentiment 
in  his  behalf. 

No  headquarters  had  hitherto  been  opened  by  either 
of  the  respective  candidates  for  the  Presidency,  except 
for  Governor  Wilson  and  Governor  Harmon.  Up  to 
the  time  that  headquarters  were  opened  for  Governor 
Wilson,  except  for  sporadic  statements  here  and  there, 

[47] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

it  was  generally  admitted  that  Governor  Harmon  was 
the  logical  nominee  for  the  Presidency.  Governor 
Harmon  had  a  long  and  distinguished  public  career. 
He  had  been  a  member  of  Mr.  Cleveland's  Cabinet; 
he  had  won  two  successive  contests  for  the  Governor 
ship  of  Ohio ;  he  was  respected  throughout  the  country. 
The  feeling  was,  that  Mr.  Bryan  should  not  receive 
the  nomination  in  1912  at  least. 

Governor  Harmon  had  the  conservative  strength  of 
the  country  behind  him.  But  for  the  entry  of  Mr. 
Wilson,  I  have  no  doubt  that  Harmon  would  have  been 
nominated  in  Baltimore  in  1912,  practically  by 
default,  with  the  possible  opposition  of  the  Bryan 
wing  of  the  party.  No  doubt  this  would  have  proved 
ineffectual  because  of  the  steady  opposition  of  the 
great  states  of  the  East  and  the  Middle  West  to 
Bryan's  candidacy.  The  nomination,  at  least,  would 
have  been  similar  to  that  of  Mr.  Parker  at  St.  Louis 
in  1904,  with  a  more  united  and  inspirited  party  behind 
him,  consequent  upon  the  success  of  the  party  in  1910 
in  the  lower  House  and  its  necessary  strengthening. 

The  first  victory  for  Mr.  Wilson  was  in  Pennsyl 
vania.  There  were  two  factions, —  the  Philadelphia 
and  Pittsburgh  factions.  The  Philadelphia  faction 
was  supposed  to  be  affiliated  with  Joseph  M.  Guffey. 
A.  Mitchell  Palmer,  of  Stroudsburg,  and  Vance  Mc- 
Cormick  were  the  leaders  of  that  branch  of  the  party 
in  the  rest  of  the  state.  Their  branch  was  in  the 
ascendancy. 

Mr.  Wilson's  achievements  had  been  spread  in 
Pennsylvania  very  carefully.  Each  faction  of  the 

[48] 


WOODROW  WILSON 


McCOMBS  IN   COMMAND 

party  became  anxious  to  steal  a  march  on  the  other. 
By  a  fortunate  chance,  both  factions  endorsed  him. 
If  any  doubt  had  existed  on  either  side,  and  if  the 
tactical  play  of  the  situation  had  varied  in  the  slightest 
degree,  I  seriously  question  whether  either  of  them 
would  have  given  the  endorsement.  However,  it 
stood,  and  it  gave  us  a  splendid  leverage  for  the  rest 
of  the  country. 

The  October  primaries  for  the  nomination  of  the 
members  of  the  Senate  and  Assembly  in  New  Jersey 
were  rapidly  approaching.  The  Smith-Nugent  forces 
in  Essex  County  began  operations  for  the  control  of 
both  branches  of  the  Legislature  or  to  secure  for  their 
leaders  a  veto  power  in  these  two  bodies.  Essex 
County  alone,  if  Smith  and  Nugent  prevailed  there, 
could  bring  about  this  chance  and  compel  a  recognition 
of  their  power. 

The  County  of  Essex  is  the  second  largest  county  in 
the  State  of  New  Jersey  and  is  entitled  to  eleven  mem 
bers  of  the  lower  House.  Of  the  Senators  it  has  one. 
Mr.  Wilson's  prestige  was  in  the  balance.  The  ques 
tion  arose  as  to  whether  opposition  nominees  should 
run  in  the  primaries  and  whether  the  Governor  should 
speak  in  Essex  County.  I  was  strongly  of  the  opinion 
that  opposition  nominations  should  be  made  for  the 
effect  upon  the  rest  of  the  state,  and  that  the  Governor 
should  speak  at  the  same  time  in  Newark. 

The  nominations  were  made.  At  the  last  moment 
Governor  Wilson  refused  to  speak  in  Essex  County, 
although  he  spoke  in  the  rest  of  the  state  —  so  deep 
was  his  disgust  with  Senator  Smith.  The  refusal 

[  49  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

struck  me  as  very  bad  policy  and  exhibited  a  certain 
degree  of  pettishness. 

At  this  time,  also,  New  York  and  other  places  were 
called  upon  for  speakers.  It  was  most  difficult  to  get 
Democratic  speakers  for  New  Jersey  because  the 
average  speaker  from  other  states  occupied  a  potential 
position  in  his  party,  and  he  did  not  feel  like  going 
into  New  Jersey  because  of  an  implied  endorsement 
of  Governor  Wilson.  Some  member  of  the  organiza 
tion,  in  Hudson  County,  suggested  Dudley  Field 
Malone  for  an  Irish  meeting.  I  had  never  met  Mr. 
Malone.  I  called  him  up.  He  was  a  young,  likeable 
sort  of  chap,  who  had  a  good  amount  of  rhetoric  and 
could  stir  a  crowd.  After  I  had  talked  to  him  he 
expressed  his  willingness  to  go.  I  sent  him  over.  He 
made  a  number  of  speeches,  meeting  Governor  Wilson 
on  several  occasions.  Senator  James  E.  Martine  came 
back  to  the  state  and  campaigned. 

The  result  of  the  primary  was  what  might  have  been 
logically  expected.  Had  Governor  Wilson  gone  into 
Essex  County,  he  might  have  saved  two  or  three  nom 
inations  there.  It  was  further  clear  that,  whatever  the 
result  of  the  elections  might  be,  Mr.  Wilson  had  lost 
absolute  mastery  of  the  Senate  and  House  and  that 
his  programme  must  consequently  be  shortened.  This, 
however,  was  not  an  unmixed  misfortune.  The  really 
constructive  measures  that  were  necessary  for  the  wel 
fare  of  the  state  had  been  passed  in  the  previous 
session.  Only  bills  of  minor  importance  were  necessary 
in  the  subsequent  session. 

The  primary  incident  was  used  with  some  effect  over 
[50] 


McCOMBS  IN   COMMAND 

the  country,  as  an  argument  that  the  Democracy  had 
repudiated  Governor  Wilson.  But  the  edge  of  it  had 
been  turned  and  its  influence  was  more  or  less  trans 
itory.  We  kept  the  press  bureau  very  busy  sending 
out  the  clipping  sheets  and  explanations. 

By  this  time  letters  from  individuals  all  over  the 
country  came  in  torrents.  By  January  1,  1912,  we 
had  two  hundred  and  forty  thousand  personal  corre 
spondents. 

About  the  fourth  of  November,  1911,  an  event  of 
passing  importance  arose  which  compelled  me  to  shift 
my  forces  considerably.  The  leading  publicity  man 
had  been  following  a  policy  of  self-exploitation.  He 
was  in  communication  with  people  in  various  states 
who  not  only  could  not  do  our  cause  any  good,  but  did 
it  positive  harm.  Funds  which  I  intrusted  to  him  for 
Headquarters'  purposes  had  been  so  mixed  up  that 
his  milk  bills  became  confused  with  our  printing  bills. 
In  casting  about  for  a  new  head  of  publicity,  I  asked 
the  recommendation  of  Mr.  McAdoo,  knowing  that 
he  was  an  artist  of  artists  in  procuring  publicity.  He 
recommended  to  me  his  confidential  publicity  man, 
Byron  R.  Newton.  I  looked  up  Mr.  Newton's  record 
and  had  some  slight  misgivings.  However,  I  took  him 
on.  Meanwhile,  I  increased  the  publicity  force  at  42 
Broadway  very  largely,  in  order  to  meet  the  increased 
requirements  of  the  circulation  of  publicity.  The 
demands  were  so  great  that  we  increased  the  frequency 
of  the  publicity  sheet  and  began  a  correspondence 
upon  a  more  wholesale  principle.  I,  myself,  was  in 
constant  conference  with  people  from  all  over  the 

[51] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

country.  I  usually  dictated  political  correspondence 
from  eight  at  night  until  two  in  the  morning. 

During  November,  I  first  met  Colonel  John  T. 
McGraw,  of  Grafton,  West  Virginia,  a  member  of 
the  National  Committee  and  well  seasoned  in  Demo 
cratic  politics.  Like  Mr.  Saulsbury,  Mr.  McGraw 
had  distinctly  had  his  ups  and  downs  in  politics.  He 
was  an  able,  alert,  and  ambitious  man  with  an  unusual 
knowledge  of  current  events.  McGraw  was  of  the 
poetic,  temperamental  class  of  Irishmen,  always  ready 
for  a  fight. 

His  business  brought  him  frequently  to  New  York, 
and  I  always  took  occasion  to  have  breakfast  with  him 
at  the  Holland  House  and  talk  Wilson.  Mr.  Mc 
Graw,  as  a  result  of  the  Watson-Chilton  election  to 
the  Senatorship,  to  one  of  the  places  for  which  he  was 
an  aspirant,  had  rather  fallen  into  the  minority  in 
West  Virginia.  But  his  influence  in  the  National 
Committee  was  large.  That  was  a  body  in  which  Mr. 
Wilson  was  very  notably  weak.  He  knew  no  one  in  it. 
None  of  his  friends  had  any  association  with  them. 
Finally,  I  brought  Mr.  McGraw  in  contact  with  Mr. 
Wilson.  They  discussed  issues  delightfully,  and  never 
party  politics.  Subsequently,  Mr.  McGraw  agreed  to 
join  me.  A  warm  friendship  sprang  up  between  us 
and  I  acquired  a  charming  and  effective  associate. 

During  the  latter  part  of  1911,  two  other  names 
began  to  be  mentioned  for  the  Presidency, —  Champ 
Clark,  of  Missouri,  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Repre 
sentatives,  and  Osc^r  Underwood,  of  Alabama,  Leader 
of  the  Democratic  majority  in  the  House.  Mr.  Clark's 

[52] 


McCOMBS  IN  COMMAND 

candidacy  was  not  regarded  very  seriously  at  this  time. 
Mr.  Underwood's  strength  was  greater.  He  had  been 
a  leader  in  enacting  the  Democratic  Tariff  Bill  in  the 
lower  House,  was  regarded  as  a  remarkably  sane  man 
and  an  efficient  general  in  commanding  the  forces  of 
that  House.  Both  had  had  long  experience  in  Con 
gress,  were  thoroughly  familiar  with  the  problems 
before  the  country,  and  had  a  very  broad  political 
acquaintance.  In  the  East  and  in  the  conservative 
states  of  the  South,  Mr.  Underwood  was  particularly 
strong. 

Before  January,  it  may  be  said  that  as  far  as  the 
East  was  concerned  Mr.  Underwood  was  decidedly 
the  favorite,  second  to  Mr.  Harmon.  Mr.  Wilson's 
strength  was  concentrated  in  New  Jersey  and  Penn 
sylvania.  The  leaders  of  the  latter  state  were  becoming 
somewhat  uncomfortable,  and  were  beginning  to 
regret  their  endorsement  because  of  the  general  charge 
of  radicalism  against  Mr.  Wilson,  and  what  I  have 
called  the  standard  reasons  which  had  been  set  forth 
against  him. 


[53] 


IV 
WILSON    GOES    HIS    OWN    WAYi 

DISOWNS  COLONEL  HARVEY,  EDITOR  OF  HARPER'S  WEEKLY  — 
THE  COLONEL  CEASES  TO  SUPPORT  GOVERNOR'S  CANDIDACY- — 
McCoMBs  FAILS  TO  PATCH  UP  WILSON'S  QUARREL  WITH 
HARVEY  AND  COLONEL  WATTERSON  —  WATTERSON  DENOUNCES 
WILSON  AS  INGRATE  AND  AUTOCRAT  —  HE  BEFRIENDS  HARVEY 
— McCoMBs  DEFENDS  WILSON,  BUT  REGARDS  THE  DISPUTE  AS 
VERY  INJURIOUS  TO  THE  WILSON  CANDIDACY  —  WILSON 
SCOFFS  AT  THIS. 

IN  OCTOBER,  1911,  I  learned  that  Colonel 
Henry  Watterson,  of  Louisville,  was  in  New 
York  and  called  on  him  personally  at  the 
Waldorf-Astoria  Hotel.  Colonel  Watterson  had 
been  supporting  Mr.  Wilson's  candidacy.  In  addition 
to  his  political  feeling  in  the  matter,  he  had  a  sort  of 
family  connection.  I  found  Colonel  Watterson  very 
delightful,  as  usual,  and  simply  overflowing  with 
political  information.  Then  it  was  that  I  told  him  of 
the  nature  of  contributions  which  I  was  getting,  and 
the  fact  that  the  amount  of  money  coming  in  was  very 
limited. 

Colonel  Watterson  suggested  that  his  friend, 
Thomas  F.  Ryan,  might  take  a  financial  interest  in 
the  campaign.  He  told  me  that  Mr.  Ryan  was  prac 
tically  retired  from  public  life;  that  he  had  no  inter- 

[54] 


WILSON   GOES   HIS   OWN   WAY 

ests  to  conserve,  and  that  one  of  the  wishes  of  his  life 
was  to  see  a  Democrat  elected.  He  argued,  earnestly, 
the  necessity  of  considerable  sums  of  money  for  the 
campaign,  and  offered  to  go  to  Mr.  Ryan  and  talk  to 
him  about  it. 

I  replied  that  everything  he  said  about  Mr.  Ryan 
was  probably  true;  indeed,  that  I  believed  it  to  be 
true ;  but  that  some  time  the  question  of  the  contribu 
tion  might  come  up  and  that,  regardless  of  Mr.  Ryan's 
personal  character,  I  believed  that  the  public  had 
formed  an  unfavorable  opinion,  and  that  Mr.  Ryan's 
contribution  would  be  of  injury  to  our  cause.  Colonel 
Watterson  was  undoubtedly  a  little  irritated  with  me, 
and  at  what  he  considered  my  amateurish  attitude. 
Nevertheless,  I  deemed  it  expedient  to  stand  by  my 
judgment. 

All  of  this  time,  Colonel  George  Harvey,  who  had 
been  of  such  tremendous  assistance  in  procuring  the 
nomination  and  furthering  the  election  of  Mr.  Wilson 
for  Governor,  had  been  supporting  him  consistently 
and  ably  for  the  Democratic  Presidential  nomination. 
Of  all  the  men  in  public  life  or  semi-public  life  in 
America,  I  have  regarded  Colonel  Harvey  in  the  front 
rank.  His  power  of  analysis  and  of  expression  is  not 
exceeded  by  any  writer  in  America.  He  had  gone 
through  one  or  two  Presidential  campaigns,  being  at 
one  time  William  C.  Whitney's  chief  lieutenant.  I 
thought  the  support  of  Harper's  Weekly,  which  he 
was  editing,  of  great  value.  In  any  event,  it  was  to 
my  mind  not  in  the  least  injurious.  I  was  glad  to  have 
its  support.  But  Colonel  Harvey's  paper  was  sup- 

[55] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

posed  to  be  dominated  by  the  Morgan  interests, —  a 
fact  which  I  did  not  and  do  not  believe,  because  the 
financial  interests  of  New  York  were  unquestionably 
opposed  to  Mr.  Wilson.  Notwithstanding  that  fact, 
Colonel  Harvey's  support  was  consistent  and 
continuous. 

On  December  18,  1911,  Governor  Wilson  came  to 
New  York.  He  met  Colonel  Watterson,  then  editor 
of  the  Louisville  Courier- Journal,  and  Colonel  Harvey 
at  the  Manhattan  Club.  Much  has  been  written  and 
said  of  the  Harvey- Watterson-Wilson  episode.  I 
think  this  is  the  correct  gist  of  it  all: 

Mr.  Wilson  was  coming  to  see  me.  On  his  way,  he 
dropped  into  Colonel  Watterson's  apartment  at  the 
Manhattan  Club.  There  he  found  Colonel  Harvey. 

Harvey  had,  for  a  long  time,  written  articles  and 
printed  letters  from  various  people  supporting  Mr. 
Wilson  for  the  nomination.    The  purpose  of  the  meet 
ing  was  a  discussion  of  the  general  situation.     It  did 
-    not  go  along  smoothly.    The  Governor  had  evidently 
conceived   the   idea   that   the   support   of   Harper's 
Weekly,  the  bonds  of  which  were  supposed  to  be  owned 
S    by  Mr.  J.  P.  Morgan,  was  not  helping  him. 

Colonel  Harvey  had  heard  of  this.  Pie  said  toward 
the  close  of  the  meeting:  "Governor  Wilson,  I  want  to 
know  whether  you  consider  that  the  support  of 
Harper's  Weeldy  is  injurious  to  you." 

The  Governor  bluntly  answered:  "I  think  it  is", 
and  immediately  left  the  room. 

That  set  Colonel  Watterson  on  fire.  Colonel  Harvey, 
naturally,  was  indignant. 

[56] 


WILSON   GOES   HIS   OWN   WAY 

Governor  Wilson  came  immediately  to  my  apart 
ment,  and  at  the  end  of  the  discussion  casually  said: 
"I  think  I  may  have  offended  George  Harvey  a  little 
to-day,  when  I  told  him  that  the  support  of  his  paper 
was  injurious  to  me".  He  was  about  to  dismiss  the 
subject,  when  I  said: 

"Governor,  I  am  amazed!  Our  strings  already  are 
pretty  weak.  We  need  help  in  all  directions.  While 
Harvey's  paper,  itself,  may  not  be  especially  helpful 
to  you  because  of  its  limited  circulation,  I  do  not  think 
that  it  is  injuring  you  a  bit.  And  it  is  now  highly 
important  that  we  keep  every  friend  we  have". 

"Oh"!  he  said,  "I  don't  think  it  makes  much  differ 


ence", 


Within  a  few  days  I  was  informed  from  Charlotte, 
N.  C.,  that  Colonel  Watterson  had,  in  a  conference, 
violently  commented  on  the  event  and  the  dismissal  of 
George  Harvey,  his  friend. 

The  Colonel  intended,  through  the  Courier- Journal, 
to  set  out  his  opinions  of  Wilson  and  renounce  Wilson 
forever.  Meanwhile,  I  had  heard  that  Colonel  Harvey 
intended  to  take  down  the  flag  from  the  foremast  of 
the  Wilson  campaign. 

I  immediately  went  over  to  Princeton  and  told 
Governor  Wilson  what  Harvey  intended  to  do.  The 
late  Mrs.  Wilson,  a  very  sweet  and  emotional  woman, 
burst  into  tears.  The  Governor  was  ashen  pale.  He 
finally  asked  me  if  I  could  get  hold  of  Harvey  and 
straighten  it  out.  There  was  deep  snow  on  the  ground. 
It  was  impossible  to  travel  that  night.  Therefore,  I 

[57] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

used  the  telephone  to  Deal,  N.  J.,  where  Colonel 
Harvey  resided. 

I  told  Colonel  Harvey's  secretary  that  I  wanted  to 
see  the  Colonel  at  once  to  make  a  complete  explanation 
and  retraction  in  the  case  of  his  controversy  with 
Governor  Wilson.  I  told  him  I  wanted  to  talk  on  the 
telephone  with  Colonel  Harvey,  and  that  Governor 
Wilson  also  wanted  to  talk. 

I  was  informed  Colonel  Harvey  was  very  hoarse 
and  out  of  voice.  The  next  day  I  made  the  same 
attempt.  I  was  told  by  the  secretary  that  Colonel 
Harvey  was  still  hoarser,  and  was  not  permitted  to 
speak  to  anyone.  I  knew  the  game  was  up. 

I  was  astounded  at  Governor  Wilson's  attitude. 
From  a  political  point  of  view,  I  thought  he  had  made 
a  mistake.  He  had  certainly  committed  an  error  from 
a  personal  point  of  view,  for  I  could  see,  in  the  inci 
dent,  all  of  the  indications  of  a  tremendous  cry  of 
ingratitude,  especially  so  far  as  Colonel  Harvey  was 
concerned.  For,  be  it  remembered,  that  as  far  back  as 
1906  Colonel  Harvey  had  spoken  in  impassioned 
terms  of  the  availability  of  Mr.  Wilson  for  the  Presi 
dency.  This  was  four  years  before  he  was  even 
nominated  for  Governor  of  New  Jersey. 

The  impelling  reason  for  Governor  Wilson  making 
this  statement  to  Colonel  Harvey  and  Colonel  Wat- 
terson  was,  that  some  letters  had  been  received  from 
the  West  making  pointed  inquiry  as  to  whether 
Colonel  Harvey's  support  was  not  Wall  Street  sup 
port.  Statements  were  made  in  some  Western  news 
papers  that  this  meant  Wall  Street  support.  I  saw 

[58] 


WILSON   GOES   HIS   OWN   WAY 

the  letters  and  the  clippings,  and  they  did  not  impress 
me  very  much.  They  made  Governor  Wilson,  how 
ever,  very  restive  and  very  nervous.  It  was  impossible 
to  tell  what  would  come  out  of  the  situation.  I 
trusted  to  Colonel  Harvey's  reticence  and  discretion. 
I  felt,  however,  that  Colonel  Watterson  was  likely  to 
feel  the  matter  very  deeply  and  that  it  would  not  be 
long  before  we  would  hear  from  him,  as  we  did. 

I  got  hold  of  what  Harvey  was  going  to  print  in 
Harper's  Weekly  about  the  affair.  It  was  very  digni 
fied  and  very  conclusive.  Here  it  is  under  date  of 
January  17,  1912: 

"To  OUR  READERS: 

"We  make  the  following  reply  to  many  inquiries 
from  the  readers  of  Harper's  Weekly: 

"The  name  of  Woodrow  Wilson,  as  our  candidate 
for  President,  was  taken  down  from  the  head  of  these 
columns  in  response  to  a  statement  made  to  us  directly 
by  Governor  Wilson,  to  the  effect  that  our  support 
was  affecting  his  candidacy  injuriously. 

"The  only  course  left  open  to  us,  in  simple  fairness 
to  Mr.  Wilson,  no  less  than  in  consideration  of  our 
own  self-respect,  was  to  cease  to  advocate  his 
nomination. 

"We  make  this  explanation  with  great  reluctance 
and  the  deepest  regret.  But  we  cannot  escape  the 
conclusion  that  the  very  considerable  number  of  our 
readers,  who  have  co-operated  earnestly  and  loyally  in 
advancing  a  movement  which  was  inaugurated  solely 

[  59  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

in  the  hope  of  rendering  a  high  public  service,  are 
clearly  entitled  to  this  information". 

This  incident  produced  a  distinct  shock  all  over  the 
country.  I  went  to  Washington  at  once  and  conferred 
with  Senator  Gore,  Representative  Hughes  and 
Thomas  J.  Pence. 

January  18,  1912,  the  expected  statement  from 
Colonel  Watterson  appeared  in  all  the  papers.  It  was 
peculiarly  Wattersonian.  Its  sentiment  was  most 
difficult  to  overcome.  The  only  way  to  answer  it  was 
to  analyze  it.  This  my  confreres  and  I  did. 

Colonel  Watterson  wrote: 

"Regretting  that  I  must  appear  either  as  a  witness 
or  a  party  to  the  misunderstanding  that  has  arisen 
between  Colonel  George  Harvey  and  Governor  Wood- 
row  Wilson,  I  shall  have  to  speak  with  some  particu 
larity  in  order  to  be  just,  alike  to  the  public  and  the 
principals. 

"The  conference  between  us,  in  our  apartment  at 
the  Manhattan  Club,  was  held  to  consider  certain 
practical  measures  relating  to  Governor  Wilson's 
candidacy.  Colonel  Harvey  stood  toward  Governor 
Wilson  much  as  I  had  stood  five  and  thirty  years  ago 
toward  Mr.  Tilden.  This  appealed  to  me.  Colonel 
Harvey  had  brought  the  Governor  and  myself  together 
in  his  New  Jersey  home  eighteen  months  ago,  and  as 
time  passed,  had  interested  me  in  his  ambitions. 

"I  was  hoping  that  I  might  find  in  Governor  Wilson 
another  Tilden,  in  point  of  intellect  and  availability. 
I  yet  think  that  Colonel  Harvey  made  no  mistake  in 

[  60] 


WILSON   GOES   HIS   OWN   WAY 

his  choice;  but  the  circumstances  leading  to  the  unfor 
tunate  parting  of  the  ways  between  them  leads  me  to 
doubt  whether  in  character  or  temperament, —  it  may 
be  merely  in  the  habits  of  a  life  time, —  Governor 
Wilson  is  rather  a  schoolmaster  than  a  statesman. 

"I  have  from  Colonel  Harvey  and  Governor  Wilson 
statements  according  to  the  memory  of  each,  touching 
what  did  actually  happen,  and  what  was  spoken  on 
the  occasion  named.  These  do  not  materially  differ. 
They  coincide  with  my  own  recollection.  Nothing  of 
a  discourteous  kind,  even  of  an  unfriendly  kind,  passed 
during  the  interview  of  over  an  hour. 

"From  the  first,  however,  there  was  a  certain  con 
straint  in  Governor  Wilson's  manner,  the  absence  of 
the  cordiality  and  candor  which  should  mark  hearty, 
confidential  intercourse,  intimating  the  existence  of 
some  adverse  influence.  His  manner  was  autocratic, 
if  not  tyrannous. 

"I  did  not  take  this  to  myself,  but  thought  it  related 
to  Colonel  Harvey;  and  when  Colonel  Harvey, 
apparently  overcome  by  Governor  Wilson's  austerity, 
put  the  direct  question  to  Governor  Wilson,  whether 
the  support  of  Harper's  Weekly  was  doing  him  an 
injury,  and  received  from  Governor  Wilson  the  cold 
rejoinder  that  it  was,  I  was  both  surprised  and 
shocked. 

"I  had  myself,  as  far  back  as  last  October,  suggested 
to  Governor  Wilson,  that  in  view  of  his  supposed 
environment,  it  might  be  well  for  Colonel  Harvey  to 
moderate  somewhat  of  the  rather  aggressive  character 
of  Harper's  Weekly  in  the  Wilson  leadership.  I  am 

[61] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

not  sure  that  I  had  not  said  as  much  to  Colonel  Harvey. 
But  that  Governor  Wilson,  without  the  least  show  of 
compunction,  should  express  or  yield  to  such  an 
opinion,  and  permit  Colonel  Harvey  to  consider  him 
self  discharged  from  the  position  of  trusted  intimacy 
he  had  up  to  this  moment  held,  left  me  little  room  to 
doubt  that  Governor  Wilson  is  not  a  man  who  makes 
common  cause  with  his  political  associates  or  is  deeply 
sensible  of  his  political  obligations.  Because,  it  is  but 
true  and  fair  to  say,  that,  except  for  Colonel  Harvey, 
he  would  not  be  in  the  running  at  all. 

"Colonel  Harvey  was  grievously  wounded.  He  had 
been  fighting  Governor  Wilson's  battles  for  many 
years,  and  had  idealized  his  chief.  Although  I  was 
given  no  reason  to  suppose  myself  included  in  the  dis 
favor  which  had  fallen  upon  Colonel  Harvey,  I  experi 
enced  a  sense  of  something  very  much  like  indigna 
tion.  But  on  reflection,  I  could  not  rid  myself  of  the 
impression  that  Governor  Wilson  had  been  receiving 
letters  from  Kentucky  written  by  enemies  of  mine, 
who  seek  to  use  his  name  and  fame  to  gain  some  ends 
of  their  own,  warning  him  against  me  and  that  to  all 
intents,  I  sat  in  the  same  boat  with  Colonel  Harvey. 

"I  am  in  receipt  of  Governor  Wilson's  averment  to 
the  contrary.  I  wish  this  had  reached  me  earlier.  I 
have,  during  three  weeks  of  newspaper  importunity, 
refused  to  print  a  word  upon  the  subject,  in  the  hope 
that  no  publicity  might  be  required,  and  that  some 
understanding  could  be  reached.  I  have  reason  to 
believe  that  Colonel  Harvey  withheld  his  statement 
for  the  same  cause,  and  with  the  same  hope.  It  being 

C  62] 


WILSON   GOES   HIS   OWN   WAY 

no  longer  possible  to  suppress  the  matters  at  issue,  this 
full  statement  which  I  make  most  reluctantly,  seems 
needful  to  a  full  and  impartial  knowledge  by  the  gen 
eral  public,  but  more  especially  by  the  mass  and  body 
of  Democrats  who  are  so  earnestly  seeking  a  leader  in 
this  coming  contest." 

On  the  19th  day  of  January,  I  made  the  following 
reply  to  Colonel  Watterson : 

"With  reference  to  the  alleged  Wilson-Harvey 
incident,  it  seems  to  me,  that  Colonel  Watterson  has 
said,  in  a  statement,  all  that  needs  to  be  said.  It 
appears,  therefore,  that  as  far  back  as  last  October,  he 
himself  suggested  to  Governor  Wilson  that  Colonel 
Harvey's  support  through  Harper's  Weekly  might  be 
injurious,  and  that  he  probably  told  Colonel  Harvey 
himself  the  same  thing.  It  would  seem  that  Colonel 
Watterson  had  convinced  the  Governor  of  the  truth 
of  his  opinion,  and  had  at  least  impressed  Colonel 
Harvey  with  the  probability  of  its  truth.  Else,  Colonel 
Harvey  would  not  have  propounded  the  question". 

"It  is  passing  strange  that  Colonel  Watterson 
should  feel  concerned  that  the  Governor,  in  private 
conversation  with  himself  and  Colonel  Harvey,  should, 
in  answer  to  a  pointed  question,  give  frank  expression 
to  the  very  views  that  Colonel  Watterson  himself 
entertained,  and  which  he  communicated  to  the  Gover 
nor,  and  probably  to  Colonel  Harvey.  In  October 
last,  also  the  very  month  in  which  he  made  these  sug 
gestions  to  Governor  Wilson,  Colonel  Watterson  said 
in  the  "Louisville  Courier- Journal,  editorially: 

;  'Two  things  seem  tolerably  sure  to  the  surmise  of 

63 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

the  COURIER- JOURNAL  —  if  Woodrow  Wilson  is  nom 
inated  for  President,  it  will  be  through  the  force  of  an 
irresistible  pressure  of  public  opinion.  And  if  he  is 
defeated  for  the  nomination,  it  will  be  by  some  organ 
ized  agency  well  backed  with  money.  No  Democrat 
of  modern  times  has  come  into  the  running  —  Samuel 
J.  Tilden  alone  excepted  —  with  half  at  once  of  the 
equipment  and  the  claim  of  the  New  Jersey  Governor. 

"  'The  tears  that  are  being  shed  over  the  passing 
incident  are  wrung  from  those  who  have  hitherto  been 
the  most  conspicuous  opponents  of  Governor  Wilson. 
Witness  the  frequent  quoted  statement  of  Mayor 
Dahlmann  of  Omaha,  Nebraska,  who  has  for  months, 
not  only  been  openly  opposed  to  Governor  Wilson, 
but  who  has  been  the  aggressive  champion  of  another 
candidate  (Bryan).  The  same  applies  to  others  who 
have  indulged  in  lachrymose  expressions.  This,  of 
course,  is  to  be  expected,  whenever  any  man  develops 
a  decided  lead  for  the  nomination. 

"  'The  gist  of  the  issue,  as  I  see  it,  is  Whether  one 
friend,  in  private  conversation  with  another,  should,  in 
answer  to  a  plain  question,  resort  to  flattery  or  dis 
simulation,  or  whether  he  should  state  the  truth  as  he 
sees  it.' " 

The  Governor  had  asked  me  to  answer  the  effusions 
as  they  came  out,  and  I  did,  as  stated.  The  statements 
were  given  out  to  the  newspapers.  I  immediately 
went  down  in  the  lobby  of  the  hotel,  at  Washington, 
and  to  my  surprise  saw  Colonel  Watterson  reading 
the  statements.  In  order  to  show  that  there  was  no 
personal  animosity  in  the  matter  I  extended  my  hand. 

[64] 


HENKY  WATTERSON 


WILSON  GOES  HIS   OWN   WAY 

He  shifted  the  statements  from  his  right  hand  to  his 
left  and  we  both  shook  hands,  I  must  say,  rather 
grimly,  but  politely,  and  I  left  him.  The  next  day,  as 
I  recall,  Colonel  Watterson  said  he  had  nothing  more 
to  say  until  he  was  challenged  by  some  responsible 
person. 

In  the  latter  part  of  August,  1913,  upon  my  arrival 
in  Paris,  I  learned  that  Colonel  Watterson  was  there. 
I  went  to  his  hotel.  I  sent  up  my  card.  The  Colonel 
came  down  stairs.  Instead  of  shaking  hands,  he 
embraced  me  and  said:  "There  is  no  feeling  between 
us,  my  boy,  is  there"?  "No,  Colonel.  There  never 
was",  I  replied.  We  spent  two  very  delightful  days 
together.  I  remember  the  Colonel  saying  to  me:  "My 
boy,  don't  stay  here  in  France.  You  will  be  too  far 
from  your  friends". 

Let  me  say  something  here  also  about  George 
Harvey.  His  whims  may  lead  him  into  many  exag 
gerated  positions,  but  he  is  a  man's  kind  of  a  fighter, 
and  not  afraid  of  his  convictions. 

When  I  got  back  to  the  campaign  after  a  brief 
illness  in  September,  1912, 1  called  up  George  Harvey, 
and  I  told  him  that  I  wanted  him  to  draw  a  curtain 
before  that  part  of  his  mind  that  related  to  any  acri 
mony  or  bitterness  toward  Wilson,  and  to  come  in  and 
help  me  make  the  first  Democratic  President  of  the 
United  States  in  twenty  years.  This  was  not  a  time 
for  any  man  who  had  ever  been  any  kind  of  a  Demo 
crat  not  to  "come  up  into  the  color",  as  they  say  in 
the  West.  Harvey,  immediately,  and  at  his  own  cost, 
took  a  suite  of  rooms  at  the  Waldorf,  and  devised  much 

[65] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

helpful  publicity,  or  suggestions  for  publicity,  which 
I  would  pass  along  to  Josephus  Daniels.  He  was 
incognito,  but  effective. 

I  cannot  write  this  book  without  an  adversion  to  the 
facts  in  the  case  of  Harvey.  Afterwards,  he  went 
many  ways  and  expressed  in  his  journal  most  ably 
written,  intense  opposition  to  the  President's  views. 
I  disagreed  with  many  of  them.  I  told  him  often  that 
he  chased  rabbits  on  occasions,  and  made  them  look 
like  lions.  But  on  the  whole,  his  helpful  criticism  of 
Mr.  Wilson's  two  administrations  was  the  boldest,  the 
most  trenchant,  the  most  direct  of  any  expressions 
printed  or  oral,  even  including  the  opposition  in  the 
Senate  and  the  House. 

But  Mr.  Wilson,  by  nature,  cannot  brook  opposi 
tion.  He  has  a  fear  of  strong  men.  He  would  rather 
let  himself  be  reflected  in  weak  men  who  would  do  his 
bidding,  and  flatterers  who  were  about  him  for  per 
sonal  gain.  So  overboard  went  George  Harvey.  He 
might  as  well  have  made  up  his  mind  the  day  of  the 
election  of  Mr.  Wilson,  as  Governor,  that  he  was 
through. 

If  George  Harvey  had  wished  to  be  United  States 
Senator  from  New  Jersey  (and  I  am  told  there  was 
some  little  feeling  between  him  and  James  Smith,  Jr., 
on  that  point),  he  would  have  been  more  brutally 
treated  than  Smith,  because  Smith  had  still  the  control 
of  the  organized  Democracy  of  the  state. 


C  66] 


ENTER   COLONEL    HOUSE 

"WILSON  IMPOSSIBLE;  NAME  BRYAN  OR  CULBERSON  AND  You 
AND  I  WILL  CONTROL  THE  UNITED  STATES",  SAYS  THE 
COLONEL  TO  McCoMBS  —  COLONEL  SHIES  AT  REQUEST  FOR 
MONEY  —  VIEWS  WILSON  NOMINATION  FROM  LONDON  — 
WATTERSON  CALLS  FOR  "A  COURT  OF  HONOR"  —  PENFIELD'S 
$10,000  —  SENATOR  GORE  PROVES  TO  BE  A  FRIEND. 

SENATOR    BENJAMIN    TILLMAN    and 
Colonel  Watterson  later  took  up  the  cudgels 
in  the  Wilson-Harvey  quarrel.     Colonel  Wat 
terson  offered  to  refer  the  whole  of  the  facts  in  the 
matter  to  a  Court  of  Honor,  especially  the  financial 
side  of  it. 

I  had  a  perfectly  definite  idea  to  what  Colonel  Wat 
terson  was  referring. 

In  December,  1911,  Mr.  Josiah  Quincy,  of  Boston, 
who  had  been  a  warm  admirer  and  consistent  supporter 
of  Governor  Wilson,  told  me  that  his  friend,  Frederic 
C.  Penfield,  afterward  Ambassador  to  Austria,  might 
become  actively  interested  in  Mr.  Wilson.  Mr.  Pen- 
field  had  received  an  honorary  degree  from  Princeton, 
had  had  diplomatic  experience  in  Egypt,  had  been  an 
author  on  various  diplomatic  subjects,  was  a  gentle 
man  of  leisure,  except  for  occasional  writing,  and  was 
a  man  of  means.  Mr.  Penfield  also  had  experience  in 

[  67] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

one  of  the  Cleveland  campaigns,  in  the  Publicity 
Department. 

Mr.  Quincy  suggested  that  I  should  meet  Mr.  Pen- 
field.  I  was  very  glad  to  do  so.  Later  we  had  a  very 
pleasant  luncheon  at  the  New  York  Yacht  Club.  At 
that  time  I  argued  the  merits  and  political  potentiali 
ties  of  our  candidate.  It  was  evident  that  Mr.  Pen- 
field  was  impressed.  At  this  luncheon  the  question  of 
contributions  was  in  no  way  mentioned  nor  the 
rewards  for  any  support  that  might  be  given. 

On  January  6,  1912,  a  mass  meeting  wras  to  be  held 
in  Carnegie  Hall  for  the  purpose  of  advocating  the 
abrogation  of  the  Russian  Treaty.  Before  that  time 
I  met  Mr.  Penfield  again.  He  suggested  that  he 
would  like  to  renew  his  acquaintance  with  Mr.  Wilson. 
He  also  suggested  the  propriety  of  inviting  the  Gov 
ernor  to  dine  with  him  prior  to  going  to  the  meeting. 
He  asked  if  I  would  call  up  Mr.  Wilson  to  inquire  if 
it  would  be  agreeable  before  Mr.  Penfield  extended 
the  invitation. 

I  communicated  with  the  Governor.  I  told  him  of 
Mr.  Penfield's  potentialities.  He  accepted  Mr.  Pen- 
field's  invitation  to  dine. 

The  dinner  was  most  successful.  Mr.  Penfield 
proved  an  excellent  host  and  Mrs.  Penfield  a  charming 
hostess.  Those  present  at  the  dinner  were  Governor 
Wilson,  Colonel  Watterson,  Commodore  E.  C.  Bene 
dict,  one  of  the  closest  personal  friends  of  former 
President  Grover  Cleveland,  Mr.  Quincy,  and  myself. 
Governor  Wilson  was  in  high  fettle  and  delighted  the 
whole  dinner  party  with  his  admirable  stories. 

[68] 


ENTER  COLONEL  HOUSE 

We  proceeded  to  Carnegie  Hall.  I  had  labored 
with  him  exceedingly  to  go  there  at  all.  Governor 
Wilson  made  a  remarkable  speech,  but  when  he  got 
on  his  feet  I  could  see  that  he  was  glad  he  was  there, 
and,  being  familiar  with  his  moods,  I  could  tell  that 
he  was  going  to  make  a  tremendous  impression. 

After  the  speaking  was  over,  Mr.  Penfield  took  me 
aside  and  handed  me  an  envelope,  telling  me  nothing 
of  what  was  in  it.  I  took  it  quite  casually,  thinking 
that  it  might  be  a  note  of  some  sort.  He  suggested 
that  I  might  be  tired  and  that  it  would  be  best  to  open 
it  next  morning.  As  I  was  having  breakfast  in  my 
apartment,  I  opened  the  innocent-looking  envelope 
and  found  two  checks  of  $5,000  each.  He  called  me 
up  that  day  and  said : 

"I  should  like  to  help  actively,  but  I  must  go  to 
Europe.  I  gave  you  the  envelope  last  night  to  employ 
as  good  a  man  as  I  am  to  assist  you". 

This  was  indeed  a  tremendous  relief,  as  my  finances 
were  becoming  very  slim.  I  had  no  assurance  that  I 
would  be  able  to  meet  even  my  weekly  payroll. 

Colonel  Watterson  and  Mr.  Quincy,  I  found,  had 
talked  over  the  matter  of  the  contribution  with  Mr. 
Penfield.  Colonel  Watterson,  with  some  reason, 
thought  that  he  induced  the  giving  of  the  subscription. 
Upon  Colonel  Watterson  suggesting  the  Court  of 
Honor,  I  would  have  at  once  made  a  public  statement 
demanding  it.  But  I  knew  that  Mr.  Quincy  had  been 
actively  interested.  My  reason  for  not  demanding  it 
was  this : 

Shortly  after  the  Penfield  dinner,  Mr.  Quincy,  who 

[69] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

was  of  counsel  to  some  mining  companies,  was  indicted 
for  fraudulent  use  of  the  mails.  As  soon  as  the  indict 
ment  was  handed  down,  Mr.  Quincy  immediately  came 
to  me  and  went  over  the  whole  matter.  I  was  per 
fectly  assured  of  his  innocence.  Nevertheless,  the 
indictment  stood.  Unfortunately,  an  indictment 
against  a  man  often  has  as  much  effect,  so  far  as  repu 
tation  and  standing  in  the  community  are  concerned, 
as  if  he  were  actually  convicted. 

Mr.  Quincy  was  subsequently  thoroughly  vindicated 
in  the  Courts. 

This  incident,  in  itself,  should  be  the  most  conspicu 
ous  warning  to  district  attorneys  not  to  recommend 
indictments  to  grand  juries  unless  they  are  more  than 
morally  certain  of  a  conviction.  Reputations  of  inno 
cent  and  honest  men  have  been  blasted  wholesale  by 
the  overzeal  of  prosecuting  officers  who,  under  the 
law,  are  distinctly  quasi- judicial  officials.  But  under 
the  circumstances,  we  could  not  embrace  the  oppor 
tunity  of  going  before  the  Court  of  Honor. 

I  have  a  very  deep  affection  for  Colonel  Watterson, 
and  I  could  not  but  think  that  this  was  one  of  the 
lapses  which  any  man  of  thorough  integrity  and  sound 
judgment  is  likely  to  fall  into  on  occasions  of  stress. 

But  let  me  revert  to  an  interesting  and  very  difficult 
even't  of  December. 

As  is  well  known,  Mr.  Carnegie  created  a  trust 
some  years  ago,  among  the  provisions  of  which  was, 
that  any  teacher  in  our  American  colleges  who  had 
performed  a  service  of  twenty-five  years,  automati 
cally,  upon  retirement,  should  receive  from  the  fund  a 

[70] 


ENTER  COLONEL   HOUSE 

certain  fixed  sum.  Mr.  Wilson  had  retired  from  his 
Professorship  at  Princeton  in  the  autumn  of  1910  and 
had  completed  twenty-five  years  of  service.  Almost 
immediately  upon  his  retirement  he  applied  for  the 
pension  allowance,  Which  was  $3,000  a  year. 

The  papers  first  exploited  this  matter  about  the 
10th  of  December,  1911,  and  also  the  fact  that  it  had 
been  disallowed  by  the  Trustees  of  the  fund.  An 
explanation  of  the  matter  was  very  difficult  to  make. 
It  could  only  be  upon  the  grounds  that  Mr.  Wilson 
was  not  a  man  of  large  means ;  that  he  had  a  family  to 
support,  and  that  his  salary  as  Governor  would  hardly 
meet  the  ordinary  requirements  of  living  in  his  new 
position. 

But  the  fact  remained  that  the  pension  was  to  be 
granted  by  Mr.  Carnegie;  that  Mr.  Carnegie  was  a 
man  of  great  wealth,  derived  from  the  manufacture  of 
steel,  and  presented  elements  of  the  great  play  upon 
the  Homestead  strikes,  and  upon  Mr.  Wilson's  con 
nection  with  capital.  It  was  indeed  a  blow.  The  only 
thing  to  do  with  it  was  to  let  it  rest  where  it  was,  with 
the  probability  that  it  would  blow  over.  The  inspira 
tion  of  the  attack  was  well  known  to  me.  But  an 
attack  is  never  overbalanced  by  fact.  The  circulation 
of  the  incident  became  nation-wide  and  drove  many 
people  from  the  Wilson  cause. 

Along  in  December,  1911,  the  psychological  time 
seemed  to  have  arrived  for  a  public  appearance  of 
Governor  Wilson  upon  one  of  the  issues  brought  out 
before  the  people.  The  Payne- Aldrich  Bill  was  a 
piece  of  patchwork  and  had  aroused  the  resentment  of 

[71  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

a  large  part  of  the  American  people.  The  back  of 
the  Taft  Administration  had  been  broken  by  the  pas 
sage  of  that  Act.  Mr.  Taft's  political  future  was 
ruined  by  his  signature  to  the  Bill.  At  that  time  I  was 
a  Governor  of  the  National  Democratic  Club,  so  I  got 
in  touch  with  my  friend,  John  R.  Dunlap,  who  was 
also  a  Governor  of  the  Club,  and  arranged  that  an 
invitation  be  extended  to  Mr.  Wilson  to  speak  on  the 
Payne- Aldrich  Act  on  January  3,  1912.  I  urged  him 
to  prepare  his  speech  in  advance  and  get  it  out  several 
days  before  the  event  so  that  I  might  give  it  to  the 
Associated  Press.  Governor  Wilson  always  had  a 
horror  of  preparing  formal  speeches  to  be  sent  to  the 
press  associations  far  enough  in  advance  to  get 
country- wide  circulation.  This  objection  was  the  con 
tinual  exasperation  of  our  headquarters.  I  knew  that 
compliance  with  the  idea  meant  a  large  publicity,  free 
of  charge;  and  that  non-compliance  meant  a  slight 
publicity  and  an  added  expense  to  our  Bureau  to  get 
publicity  by  private  circulation. 

On  this  occasion  he  prepared  a  very  scholarly 
address  and  gave  it  to  the  Publicity  Department  in 
ample  time.  My  secretary  went  to  the  meeting  to  see 
what  changes  should  be  made  if  he  altered  the  speech. 
To  our  surprise,  Governor  Wilson  delivered  a  speech 
totally  different  from  the  one  he  had  prepared,  but  on 
the  whole  far  more  masterly.  After  its  delivery,  there 
was  no  doubt  on  the  soundness  of  his  attitude  on  the 
tariff  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  Democratic  Party. 
I  instructed  our  headquarters  that  a  large  number  of 

[72] 


ENTER   COLONEL   HOUSE 

the  speeches  be  printed  for  circulation  throughout  the 
country. 

Shortly  before  this  meeting  I  was,  as  usual,  casting 
about  for  contributions  to  the  campaign,  a  matter  that 
constantly  worried  me,  because  I  had  no  fixed  source 
or  sources  of  supply. 

I  had  gotten  in  touch  through  correspondence  with 
Thomas  Love,  of  Texas,  and  had  broached  the  ques 
tion  to  him  of  his  getting  some  funds  in  Texas  to  carry 
on  the  work.  He  wrote  to  me  that  they  would  prob 
ably  have  difficulty  in  Texas  itself  in  financing  the 
campaign  for  Governor  Wilson,  but  that  a  Texan 
resided  in  New  York  at  the  Gotham  Hotel  who  might 
espouse  our  cause.  At  that  time  the  Texan  was  sup 
posed  to  be  for  Mayor  Gaynor.  If  I  could  bring  him 
around  to  the  Wilson  support,  Love  thought  I  would 
undoubtedly  get  a  contribution. 

This  man  was  Colonel  E.  M.  House.  Because 
Colonel  House  became  so  prominent  in  the  Wilson 
Administration,  I  shall  digress  and  tell  a  little  about 
him.  Next  to  the  President  of  the  United  States,  I 
doubt  if  anyone  has  been  more  inquired  about  as  to 
who  he  was,  and  when  he  was,  and  where  he  was,  than 
Colonel  E.  M.  House,  of  Texas. 

Colonel  House  was  the  son  of  an  Englishman  who 
went  to  Texas  to  reside.  He  took  out  citizenship 
papers  and  made  his  children  citizens  of  the  United 
States.  House's  activities  seem  to  have  been  in  bank 
ing  in  Austin  and  in  the  purchase  of  various  tracts  of 
land  in  Texas.  Colonel  House  was  always  a  weak 
man  physically  and  never  engaged  in  any  apparent 

[73] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

occupation.     He  went  to  Cornell,  but  did  not  finish 
with  his  class,  which  would  have  been  the  class  of  '91. 

He  had  few  associates  and  was  very  reticent,  taking 
very  little  interest  in  the  social  life  of  his  city.  He 
did,  however,  invite  the  Governors  and  other  officials 
to  his  home  and  the  more  important  professors  of  the 
University.  Nobody  ever  knew  him  as  being  active 
in  anything  in  Austin,  although  he  looked  after  his 
farm  and  his  tenants.  After  he  returned  from  Cornell 
he  spent  part  of  the  year  in  Austin,  most  of  the  year 
in  New  York,  and  the  rest  of  the  year  along  the  New 
England  coast.  In  New  York  he  spent  a  quiet, 
studious  kind  of  life,  almost  alone. 

After  we  had  made  arrangements  for  the  Texas 
campaign  in  the  primaries,  I  was  told  by  Colonel 
T.  H.  Ball  to  see  a  Colonel  House,  at  the  Gotham 
Hotel,  New  York  City.  The  Texas  people  who  were 
for  Mr.  Wilson,  and  who  had  charge  of  the  organiza 
tion  down  there,  said,  when  I  asked  if  they  could  not 
produce  further  funds  to  move  into  some  of  the  other 
primary  states,  such  as  Kansas,  Iowa,  Wisconsin  and 
Nebraska,  that  they  had  reached  the  limit  of  their  con- 
tributive  power.  They  stated,  however,  that  there  was 
a  Colonel  House  living  at  the  Gotham  who  had  a  sub 
stantial  income.  If  I  could  enlist  him  in  the  Wilson 
cause  he  might  give  me  some  money. 

At  that  time  I  did  not  know  where  to  turn  for 
funds,  and  as  we  were  in  dire  need,  on  Colonel  Ball's 
information  I  called  House  up,  addressing  him  as 
Colonel  and  asked  for  an  interview.  The  meeting 
was  arranged. 

[74] 


ENTER   COLONEL   HOUSE 

I  dropped  into  the  Gotham  Hotel  one  afternoon  in 
November,  1911,  and  made  myself  known  as  the  man 
ager  of  Mr.  Wilson's  campaign. 

I  found  a  quiet  little  man  with  strange  cat-like  eyes, 
a  broad  forehead  and  a  thin  face. 

He  spoke  in  particularly  low  manner,  almost  as  one 
would  speak  to  another  in  a  cathedral.  A  number  of 
books  lay  upon  his  table.  There  were  novels,  books  on 
current  events,  books  on  essays  and  books  on  psychol 
ogy.  Colonel  House  presented  the  appearance  of  a 
dilletante,  passing  his  life  in  the  calmness  of  his  apart 
ment,  not  caring  anything  about  matters  of  particular 
importance.  When  he  saluted  me  he  had  a  novel  in 
his  hand. 

We  sat  down  and  looked  at  each  other  rather  quizzi 
cally.  He  seemed  to  be  timidity  itself.  He  almost 
obsequiously  offered  me  a  cigar.  He  took  a  cigarette. 
His  appearance  was  that  of  a  poor  debtor  who  was 
trying  to  think  up  some  impossible  excuse  for  not 
paying  a  bill  long  overdue.  Somehow,  it  ran  through 
my  mind,  that  he  knew  I  was  coming  after  money.  I 
also  thought  that  his  excuse  would  be  that  he  was  too 
poor.  I  tried  to  set  the  little  man  at  ease  in  the  best 
way  I  could. 

We  had  discussed  mutual  acquaintances  in  Texas 
for  awhile.  And  only  after  about  twenty  minutes  of 
desultory  conversation,  we  got  on  the  Presidential 
matter.  He  said  he  had  not  thought  much  about  that, 
but  ttiat  from  the  papers  it  seemed  that  Mayor  William 
J.  Gaynor,  of  New  York,  and  Jesse  I.  Grant,  of  Cali 
fornia,  might  well  turn  out  to  be  the  candidates  for 

[  75] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

President  and  Vice  President,  respectively.  He 
claimed  no  particular  enthusiasm  about  either.  I, 
however,  having  a  very  practical  purpose  in  mind, 
continued  to  hold  House  to  Woodrow  Wilson  and  the 
reasons  why  he  should  be  nominated  and  could  be 
elected. 

I  told  him  of  his  friends  in  Texas  who  had  avowed 
themselves  for  Governor  Wilson  and  repeated  my  oft- 
spoken  argument  as  to  Governor  Wilson's  availability. 
After  about  an  hour  I  realized  that  I  had  another 
engagement  and  told  him  I  would  drop  in  some  other 
time. 

The  conversation  ended  without  reaching  any  con 
clusion.  I  went  away  with  the  impression  that  I  had  met 
a  little  man  of  ill  health  who  spent  most  of  his  time 
trying  to  cling  to  life  and  some  of  its  pleasures,  and 
who  was  quite  willing  to  subordinate  everything  to  this. 
He  did  not  impress  me  as  a  man  having  any  particular 
notions,  and  certainly  no  executive  ability.  He  seemed 
to  take  his  grasp  of  things  merely  from  current  read 
ing.  His  views  of  men  were  such  as  one  gained  as  they 
passed  by  on  Fifth  Avenue.  I  certainly  concluded 
that  there  was  not  much  in  House,  but  I  still  had  in 
my  mind  that  the  Wilson  campaign  was  bankrupt. 

In  two  or  three  days  I  went  back.  I  said  to  him  that 
I  would  very  much  like  to  have  him  meet  Governor 
Wilson.  He  gladly  assented.  Meanwhile,  I  made 
inquiries  about  him  in  Texas.  My  reports  were  that 
he  was  a  man  worth  something  more  than  a  million 
dollars;  that  he  had  virtually  retired  from  business; 
that  he  had  taken  a  silent  part  in  politics  in  Texas  for 

[76] 


ENTER  COLONEL  HOUSE 

many  years,  and  that  he  was  usually  to  be  found  with 
the  winner. 

I  have  said  that  I  called  him  Colonel.  He  protested 
and  told  me  that  he  had  never  liked  the  title  inasmuch 
as  he  had  merely  been  on  the  staff  of  one  of  the  Gover 
nors  of  Texas.  But  I  must  confess  that  my  mind  was 
on  Mr.  House's  contribution  rather  than  on  Mr.  House 
as  a  political  factor. 

Soon  after  that,  Governor  Wilson  was  in  town.  I 
volunteered  to  take  him  to  call  on  Mr.  House.  The 
conversation  on  this  visit  was  very  pleasant.  Later  on 
I  dined  with  Mr.  House  and  told  him  of  the  proposed 
meeting  of  January  3d.  He  suggested  that  Mr.  David 
Houston,  afterward  Secretary  of  Agriculture,  be 
brought  into  conference  with  Mr.  Wilson  on  the  sub 
ject  of  the  Tariff.  This  was  arranged  at  the  meeting 
at  which  Mr.  House  and  myself  were  present,  in 
addition  to  Mr.  Houston  and  Governor  Wilson. 

Inasmuch  as  Texas  had  forty  votes  at  the  Conven 
tion  and  its  psychological  influence  would  be  great  on 
the  states  bordering  upon  it,  I  had  decided  to  make  a 
very  determined  set  for  the  delegates  there.  Mr. 
House  was  spending  the  winter  in  New  York  and  I 
frequently  conferred  with  him  upon  that  situation. 
The  actual  leaders  in  the  movement  in  Texas  were 
Cato  Sells,  now  Commissioner  of  Indian  Affairs,  Mr. 
Love  and  Mr.  Thomas  Ball.  It  appealed  to  me  that 
Mr.  House  keep  me  thoroughly  advised  as  to  the  per 
sonnel  of  Texas  politics  and  rather  guide  me  in  making 
suggestions.  This  was  his  participation  in  the  Pre- 
nomination  Campaign. 

[77] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

Early  in  May,  1912,  I  motored  with  Mr.  House  to 
his  country  place  at  Beverly,  Mass.  He  was  going  to 
Europe  within  a  week.  I  remained  with  him  two  or 
three  days  and  discussed  the  situation.  As  I  was  about 
to  depart,  he  said  to  me : 

"If  I  am  any  judge  of  political  events,  Governor 
Wilson's  candidacy  is  impossible.  When  you  get  to 
Baltimore,  however,  you  will  have  a  very  great  influ 
ence  in  the  selection  of  candidates.  At  the  psycholog 
ical  moment,  bring  Senator  Culberson  forward.  He 
may  have  the  support  of  Mr.  Bryan". 

I  told  him  that  I  still  had  faith  in  Governor  Wil 
son's  nomination,  and  that  my  position  was  such  that 
I  could  not  at  any  time  abandon  him.  I  felt  it  would 
be  considered  an  act  of  treachery  if  I  should  trade  his 
delegates  off  at  the  Convention  in  the  interest  of  any 
other  man. 

Mr.  House  remained  in  Europe  until  the  latter  part 
of  August.  Soon  after  his  return,  he  addressed  a 
letter  to  me  in  which  he  said  that  Governor  Wilson  had 
not  sent  for  him  and  that  Mr.  McAdoo,  who  was  in 
charge  of  the  campaign  during  my  illness,  would  pay 
no  attention  to  him,  although  he  had  personally  gone 
to  headquarters.  I  wrote  to  Governor  Wilson  and 
suggested  that  Mr.  House  was  back  from  Europe  and 
that  he  might  be  of  distinct  service.  I  also  suggested 
that  he  send  for  Mr.  House.  In  the  rush  of  things, 
apparently,  Governor  Wilson  overlooked  the  sugges 
tion.  A  few  days  later,  Mr.  House  appealed  to  me 
again.  I  sent  word  both  to  Mr.  McAdoo  and  to 

[78] 


ENTER  COLONEL   HOUSE 

Governor  Wilson  that  Mr.  House  be  called  into 
consultation. 

When  I  returned  to  the  campaign,  Mr.  House  had 
secured  his  consultation  and  appeared  every  day  at 
headquarters.  I  was  told  that  the  President  was  lay 
ing  considerable  store  by  him  and  that  he  had  been  and 
was  a  sort  of  "observer"  of  headquarters,  whatever 
that  means.  Mr.  House  never  contributed. 

Early  in  January,  1912,  it  became  evident  that  we 
must  move  on  Washington  and  get  as  much  Congres 
sional  support  as  possible.  I  could  see  that  we  were 
not  getting  adequate  publicity  in  the  newspapers  and 
decided  to  go  to  Washington  and  look  into  that  matter. 

Upon  arriving  at  the  Willard,  I  called  up  William 
H.  Hughes,  then  in  the  lower  House,  and  asked  him 
to  come  and  see  me.  I  asked  him  to  recommend  to  me 
the  very  best  newspaper  correspondent  in  Washing 
ton.  He  said: 

"I  can  recommend  a  man  to  you,  but  you  may  not 
like  him.  He  is  a  big,  easy-going,  strapping  South 
erner,  and  you  may  not  want  too  much  of  the  South  in 
this  matter".  I  could  see  no  objection  to  the  South  as 
long  as  it  had  the  force  behind  it.  Then  he  remarked: 
"I  have  in  mind  a  man  who  can  go  and  kick  a  Senator 
in  the  shin  and  shake  the  truth  out  of  him.  He  is  liked 
by  every  member  of  Congress,  regardless  of  party". 

This  was  Thomas  J.  Pence. 

Pence  opened  our  Publicity  Bureau.  The  New 
York  Headquarters  became  devoted  to  conferences 
and  to  sending  out  the  ordinary  publicity;  the  Wash- 

[79]' 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

ington  Headquarters  was  largely  devoted  to  sending 
out  Congressional  publicity. 

We  Obtained  the  most  valuable  acquisition  that  I 
know  of  in  the  entire  campaign  in  Senator  Thomas  P. 
Gore.  Senator  Gore,  as  everyone  knows,  is  blind,  but 
he  thinks,  lives  and  sleeps  with  politics  and  public 
questions.  His  very  infirmity  gives  an  added  ability 
for  certain  sides  of  politics.  He  never  forgets  a  name 
or  a  voice.  There  is  no  man  on  this  continent  who  is 
more  accurately  familiar  with  the  personnel  of  politics. 
If  he  has  ever  heard  the  name  of  a  political  leader, 
state,  county  or  precinct,  in  the  entire  country,  he 
remembers  it  forever.  I  found  him  a  perfect  encyclo 
pedia  of  political  information.  He  was  a  genius  for 
political  organization  down  to  the  finest  detail.  He 
was  the  most  affectionately  loyal  person  with  whom  it 
has  ever  been  my  pleasure  to  come  in  contact.  Senator 
Gore  worked  incessantly  to  the  end.  He  was  opti 
mistic  always.  It  was  to  him,  more  than  any  other 
person,  ttiat  I  turned  in  the  most  difficult  moments. 


[80] 


yi 

LAUNCHING   OF   THE    1912   CAMPAIGN 

WILSON'S  LETTER  TO  JOLINE,  "KNOCKING  BRYAN  INTO  A  COCKED 
HAT",  ALARMS  His  MANAGER  —  A  RACE  OP  WRITERS  TO 
ANSWER  IT  —  BRYAN  MOLLIFIED  AND  "SHAKES'*  WITH  WIL 
SON —  McCoMBs  WINS  BIG  ADVANTAGE  FOR  WILSON  IN 
SELECTION  OF  BALTIMORE  FOR  CONVENTION  CITY  —  McAooo, 

MORGENTHAU  AND  ELKUS  "DROP  IN". 

DURING  1910  and  1911,  in  addition  to  the 
great  Congressional  triumph,  Democratic 
Governors  had  been  elected  in  the  normally 
Republican  states.  Things  looked  well  for  the  De 
mocracy.  It  was  decided,  in  celebration  of  the  glori 
ous  victories,  to  have  a  great  dinner  at  Washington  on 
Jackson  Day,  January  8,  1912.  I  learned  that  the 
prospective  candidates  for  the  Presidency,  together 
with  other  distinguished  men,  were  to  be  invited  to 
speak.  It  was  apparent  to  me  that  it  was  Mr. 
Wilson's  great  opportunity  to  compare  himself  with 
his  rivals. 

I  had  heard  all  the  men  speak  who  were  mentioned. 
I  knew  that  Mr.  Wilson  was  vastly  superior  in  ora 
tory.  The  gathering  was  to  be  the  most  notable  tihat 
the  Democratic  Party  could  produce.  Members  of 
the  National  Committee  from  all  the  states  were  to  be 

[81  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

there.  In  fact,  the  leaders  of  the  Democracy  from 
everywhere  were  to  be  present. 

Mr.  Wilson  received  an  invitation,  of  course.  He 
was  on  the  point  of  declining,  on  the  ground  that  it 
would  seem  obvious  that  he  was  a  candidate  for  the 
Presidency.  I  saw  no  reason  for  disguising  the  fact, 
but  it  was  most  difficult  to  make  him  see  my  point 
of  view. 

Finally  I  told  Representative  Hughes  of  the  Gov 
ernor's  state  of  mind.  He  was  amazed  beyond  words. 
He  got  in  touch  with  Mr.  Wilson  and  finally  convinced 
him.  It  was  most  fortunate  that  he  did,  for  Governor 
Wilson's  oration  was  a  tremendous  success,  as  he  far 
outranked  any  person  who  spoke.  When  he  sat  down 
there  was  a  great  ovation.  After  the  applause  was 
over,  Roger  C.  Sullivan,  of  Illinois,  lifted  his  glass  to 
Governor  Wilson  and  said :  "He'll  do" ! 

Mr.  Sullivan  at  the  time  was  committed  to  no  one. 
I  regarded  his  action  as  a  great  portent.  I  felt  in  my 
heart  that  he  would  ultimately  be  for  Governor  Wil 
son,  though  he  had  to  thread  his  way  through  the  maze 
of  practical  politics. 

The  forty-eight  hours  prior  to  the  dinner  were  very 
depressing  indeed,  from  the  point  of  view  of  tlhe  Wil 
son  campaign.  I  received  an  intimation  early  on  the 
morning  of  the  7th  that  the  newspapers  had  a  letter 
from  Governor  Wilson  to  Mr.  Adrian  H.  Joline  that 
would  be  of  the  most  serious  consequence  to  his  cam 
paign.  Through  confidential  sources  I  got  a  copy  of 
it,  which  read: 

[82] 


LAUNCHING  OF   THE   1912   CAMPAIGN 

"PRINCETON  UNIVERSITY, 

PRESIDENT'S  ROOM. 

Princeton,  N.  J. 

April  29,  1907 
"My  dear  Mr.  Joline: 

Thank  you  very  much  for  sending  me  your  address 
at  Parsons,  Kansas,  before  the  Board  of  Directors,  of  the 
Missouri,  Kansas  and  Texas  Railroad  Company.  I  have 
read  it  with  relish,  and  am  in  entire  agreement.  Would 
that  we  could  do  something,  at  once,  dignified  and  effec 
tive,  to  knock  Mr.  Bryan,  once  for  all,  into  a  cocked  hat. 
Cordially  and  sincerely  yours, 

WOODROW  WILSON" 
Mr.  Adrian  H.  Joline 


An  immediate  call  over  the  telephone  was  made  for 
the  Governor.  He  could  not  remember  writing  the 
letter.  He  could  not  vouch  for  its  authenticity.  I 
knew  that  it  was  to  be  published.  Its  seriousness,  from 
a  political  point  of  view,  was  obvious. 

Mr.  Bryan  had,  up  to  that  time,  not  frowned  upon 
our  candidate.  This  letter,  if  true,  would  unquestion 
ably  offend  him.  It  would  indicate  an  alliance  or 
sympathy  on  the  part  of  Governor  Wilson  with  Mr. 
Joline  and  his  associates,  who  were  identified  with 
large  banks  and  other  financial  interests. 

Governor  Wilson  and  I  conferred.  We  discussed  a 
reply  and  how  it  should  be  made.  The  nature  of  the 
reply  was  momentous.  It  might  mean  the  buckling 
up  of  the  entire  Wilson  campaign  or  it  might  cause  a 
general  deflection  of  the  Progressive  wing  of  the 
Democratic  Party  from  him,  for  at  that  time  the 

[83] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

Governor  had  no  standing  with  the  so-called  Conser 
vative  wing. 

Mr.  Wilson  wrote  in  longhand  a  tentative  statement 
to  be  incorporated  in  his  speech.  In  effect,  the  defense 
was  that  he  had  done  what  he  thought  was  proper  at 
the  time.  There  he  stopped.  I  knew  that  this  would 
not  do.  I  got  in  touch  with  Senator  James  A.  O' Gor 
man,  of  New  York.  After  we  had  argued,  Governor 
Wilson  asked  my  secretary,  Maurice  Lyons,  to  read 
his  reply  aloud.  After  it  was  read,  the  Governor  was 
silent  for  about  five  minutes.  He  requested  Mr.  Lyons 
to  typewrite  it.  When  in  form  and  again  read,  I  dis 
approved  of  it.  Finally  the  Governor  and  I  sepa 
rately  wrote  what  we  considered  amended  adequate 
replies.  He  read  mine.  I  read  his.  Neither  suited. 
We  then  set  ourselves  to  more  writing.  After  an  hour 
and  a  half,  Mr.  Wilson  wrote  out  a  statement  in  which 
he  attempted  to  justify  his  change  of  mind: 

"A  man  may  even  change  his  mind.  It  is  nothing 
to  be  ashamed  of,  to  change  your  mind  about  some 
conclusion  you  may  have  reached  on  insufficient 
information. 

"A  man  may  even  write  a  letter,  just  so  it  is  a  frank 
expression,  and  you  have  nothing  to  be  ashamed  of. 
The  letter  may  even  be  printed.  It  may  sometimes 
prove  inconvenient.  But  if  it  is  a  frank  expression, 
there  is  nothing  to  be  ashamed  of. 

"The  man  who  refuses  to  change  his  mind,  when  he 
finds  he  is  wrong,  ought  to  be  blown  apart  by  dyna 
mite,  so  that  his  parts  can  be  properly  and  normally 
readjusted". 

[84] 


LAUNCHING  OF   THE   1912   CAMPAIGN 

Meantime,  Mr.  Pence  and  I  fully  discussed  the 
seriousness  of  the  situation.  My  first  thought  was  of 
Bryan.  Reaching  him  before  he  got  to  Washington 
was  highly  important.  Mr.  Pence  found  that  Mr. 
Bryan  was  in  Raleigh,  N.  C.  We  concluded  that  we 
would  get  in  touch  with  Josephus  Daniels,  who  like 
wise  was  there. 

It  seemed  best  to  inform  Mr.  Daniels,  frankly,  that 
the  attacks  on  Governor  Wilson  always  appeared  in 
reactionary  papers  when  Mr.  Wilson  was  about  to 
speak,  with  the  purpose  of  blanketing  his  utterances. 
Such  attacks  were  a  serious  blow  to  progressive  democ 
racy,  of  which  both  Governor  Wilson  and  Mr.  Bryan 
were  exponents.  It  would  be  impossible  to  express 
the  relief  that  I  felt  when  assured  that  Mr.  Daniels 
would  take  this  position  with  Mr.  Bryan.  When  the 
happy  reply  to  Mr.  Bryan  was  worked  out,  I  requested 
Mr.  Pence  to  go  to  the  station  and  meet  Mr.  Daniels 
and  Mr.  Bryan.  Mr.  Daniels  was  his  friend.  I 
wanted  to  know,  at  least,  how  Mr.  Bryan  looked,  if  I 
could  not  get  what  he  said.  Not  until  Mr.  Pence 
reported  that  Mr.  Bryan  looked  sunny  and  cheerful 
did  the  high  tension  disappear. 

Mr.  Wilson's  reference  to  Mr.  Bryan  at  the  Jackson 
Day  dinner  was  in  a  most  happy  vein.  Mr.  Bryan's 
was  in  a  vein  equally  happy.  Mr.  Bryan  took  a  big 
man's  point  of  view.  He  grew  in  my  estimation 
tremendously. 

The  Jackson  Day  dinner  was  the  occasion  for  a 
meeting  of  the  National  Committee  in  order  to  select 
a  place  for  the  National  Convention.  Three  cities 

[85] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

desired  it, —  Chicago,  St.  Louis  and  Baltimore. 
National  Committeemen  who  supported  Mr.  Wilson 
were  few,  but  we  held  the  balance  of  power.  Eastern 
and  Southern  states  preferred  Baltimore.  Middle 
states,  which  leaned  toward  Mr.  Clark,  preferred  St. 
Louis  or  Chicago.  Western  states  had  no  preference. 

I  decided  that  Baltimore  would  be  the  best  place 
from  a  Wilson  point  of  view.  We  could  move  a  large 
number  of  supporters  from  New  Jersey,  Delaware, 
and  Maryland  into  Baltimore,  and  that  would  have  a 
psychological  influence  on  delegates.  We  also  had 
the  very  strong  support  of  the  Baltimore  Sun.  It  was 
clear  that  these  influences  might  be  of  great  value  in 
a  close  contest  in  the  convention. 

I  could  not  afford,  publicly,  to  express  my  prefer 
ence.  What  the  Wilson  people  wanted  was  likely  to 
provoke  an  adverse  majority  in  the  National  Com 
mittee.  I  spread  word  to  our  friends  in  the  Committee 
that  I  thought  Baltimore  preferable.  I  pledged  them 
to  secrecy  as  to  their  intentions. 

The  National  Committeeman  from  Maryland,  Fred 
Talbott,  exceedingly  anxious  to  have  Baltimore 
selected,  came  to  me  early  in  the  morning  of  the  Com 
mittee  meeting.  He  solicited  my  support  and  demon 
strated  the  advantages  from  a  Wilson  viewpoint. 
Mr.  Talbott  was  for  Wilson's  nomination.  But  the 
case  was  of  such  great  delicacy  that  I  told  Mr.  Talbott 
I  was  not  ready  to  express  a  preference. 

However,  Baltimore  easily  prevailed.  Chicago  and 
St.  Louis  appeared  to  be  very  dangerous  from  the 
Wilson  aspect.  St.  Louis  was  in  Mr.  Clark's  logical 

C  86] 


LAUNCHING   OF   THE   1912   CAMPAIGN 

territory.  His  supporters  would  be  there  in  great 
numbers.  This  likewise  applied  to  Chicago,  and  there 
Mr.  Wilson  had  practically  no  newspaper  support. 
Mr.  Hearst,  who  was  for  Clark,  owned  a  paper  that 
might  have  very  great  influence  on  the  delegates. 

A  certain  psychology  of  every  national  convention 
is  produced  from  the  outside.  Delegates  are  perhaps 
unaware  of  it.  This  was  notably  true  of  the  Demo 
cratic  convention  of  1896,  at  Chicago,  which  I  attended. 
Mr.  Bryan  was  nominated.  I  had  attended  six  or 
seven  national  conventions,  both  Republican  and 
Democratic.  I  had  a  fixed  impression  that  the  atmos 
phere  of  the  place  in  which  the  convention  is  held  is  of 
tremendous  importance  in  the  selection  of  the  nominee. 

Another  interesting  occurrence  took  place  at  the 
National  Committee  meeting.  A.  Mitchell  Palmer, 
one  of  our  ardent  supporters,  contested  the  seat  of 
James  M.  Guffey,  of  Pittsburgh.  GufTey  had  long 
been  a  member  of  the  National  Committee.  He  had 
been  a  very  important  factor  in  Democratic  councils. 
Mr.  Palmer  and  Vance  McCormick  came  to  me  with 
their  briefs.  Naturally,  I  was  greatly  predisposed  in 
Mr.  Palmer's  favor.  I  was  sure  that  Mr.  Guffey 
would  never  be  with  us.  I  was  also  sure  that  Mr. 
Guffey  had  a  legal  right  to  the  seat.  I  could  only  say 
I  was  with  him  in  spirit.  I,  therefore,  thought  I 
should  make  no  recommendations  to  our  friends  in 
the  Committee.  They  were  about  equally  divided. 
Mr.  Bryan  took  a  proxy.  He  made  a  very  severe 
attack  on  Mr.  Guffey.  It  was  without  avail. 

Before  the  Jackson  Day  dinner  I  had  established 
[  87  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

headquarters  at  Washington  and  had  communicated 
with  our  friends  throughout  the  country  to  meet  me 
there.  They  came  in  large  numbers.  We  analyzed 
conditions,  laid  plans  and  selected  leaders.  Among 
others  with  me  was  Henry  Morgenthau,  afterward 
Ambassador  to  Turkey. 

Rabbi  Wise,  a  very  brilliant  orator  and  influential 
man  among  the  Hebrews  in  New  York,  had  been 
attracted  to  Governor  Wilson.  He  wrote  to  our  head 
quarters  for  literature  that  he  might  prepare  an  article 
about  him.  I  subsequently  met  Mr.  Wise.  I  raised 
the  question  of  securing  prominent  Hebrews  Who 
might  be  of  financial  as  well  as  political  assistance 
to  us.  He  selected  his  friend,  Henry  Morgenthau, 
who  had  been  very  prominent  in  Hebrew  circles  in 
New  York.  He  had  practically  retired  from  busi 
ness,  was  a  man  of  high  ideals,  and  was  quite  willing 
to  devote  large  sums  from  his  private  fortune  in  fur 
therance  of  them. 

Mr.  Morgenthau  was  very  much  impressed  with 
Mr.  Wilson's  speech  of  January  6th  on  the  Jewish 
Passport  Question,  and  likewise  with  his  speech  at 
Washington.  He  gave  me  a  pledge  to  contribute 
$5,000  a  month  to  the  Wilson  campaign.  This  was 
indeed  a  great  relief.  It  was  a  great  gratification 
to  have  his  support  in  New  York.  He  proved  to 
be  an  indefatigable  worker.  Later  another  Hebrew 
of  high  ideals  joined  me,  Abram  I.  Elkus.  He  not 
only  contributed  largely  from  his  private  mainte 
nance,  but  was  exceedingly  active  in  every  direction 

[88] 


LAUNCHING   OF   THE   1912   CAMPAIGN 

up  to  the  day  of  the  nomination  and  throughout  the 
summer  campaign. 

Governor  Wilson  had  no  more  genuine  and  enthu 
siastic  supporters  than  Mr.  Morgenthau  and  Mr. 
Elkus.  Mr.  Elkus  was  always  willing  to  lay  aside 
his  private  business  for  a  public  ideal.  His  very 
large  experience  in  public  affairs  made  him  a  valu 
able  associate. 

With  the  Jackson  Day  dinner  over,  we  perfected 
an  organization.  I  had  been  able  to  confer,  person 
ally,  with  leaders  from  almost  every  state.  Flesh- 
and-blood  contact  enabled  us  to  work  with  a  better 
understanding.  The  Wilson  campaign  was  then 
launched  in  a  very  concrete  manner.  It  had  received 
a  great  impetus.  Its  largest  asset,  however,  still  was 
the  Governor's  popularity. 

At  this  period  Mr.  McAdoo  had  appeared  on  the 
scene  for  the  first  time.  We  had  not  made  any  great 
headway  then  among  the  Democratic  organizations, 
but  we  had  made  headway  among  the  newspapers. 

The  question  of  money  was  still  a  very  trouble 
some  one.  The  selection  of  delegates  to  the  National 
Convention  by  primaries  was  rapidly  approaching, 
but  before  discussing  this  I  will  return  to  phases  of 
our  publicity. 


[89] 


VII 
PUBLICITY  AND  STRATEGY 


How  McCoMBs  APPRISED  THE  VOTERS  WHO  AND  WHAT  WILSON 
WAS  —  SECOND  CHOICE  CHANCES  IN  THE  CONVENTION  EN 
HANCED  BY  KEEPING  OUT  OF  "FAVORITE-SON  STATES"  — 
BRYAN'S  OHIO  TOUR  FINANCED  —  NINETEEN  WILSON  DELE 
GATES  ELECTED  IN  BUCKEYE  STATE  —  EVEN  BREAK  IN 
OKLAHOMA  —  CAMPAIGN  FUND  LACKS  $36,000  —  McCoMss 
BORROWS  MORE  MONEY  —  CHARLES  R.  CRANE  MAKES  His 
FIRST  DONATION,  $5,000. 


FTniHE  Rural  Free  Delivery  had  changed  the 
general  methods  of  politics.  The  United 

JL  States  had  become  more  of  a  reading  public. 
People  in  remote  districts  read  monthly  and  weekly 
magazines.  Daily  newspapers  were  delivered  at 
doors  quickly.  I  thought  that  we  should  have  sup 
port  among  monthly  and  weekly  magazines.  Mr. 
McClure,  of  McClure's  Magazine,  was  approached 
for  an  article  on  Woodrow  Wilson.  He  assigned 
Burton  J.  Kendrick  to  prepare  it.  This  article  was 
reproduced  in  pamphlet  form.  We  sent  more  than 
half  a  million  copies  throughout  the  United  States.] 

(Walter  H.  Page,  editor  of  the  World's  Work, 
and  I  arranged  that  Bayard  Hale  write  four  articles 
on  Mr.  Wilson.  The  Governor  was  consulted.  I 
read  proofs.  The  last  article  dealt  with  the  Prince- 

[90] 


PUBLICITY  AND   STRATEGY 

ton  University  controversy.  Mr.  Hale  handled  oppo 
nents  of  Mr.  Wilson  very  viciously.  When  I  saw 
the  proofs,  I  protested  that  the  article  be  toned  down. 
I  was  receiving  contributions  from  Princeton  alumni. 
Many  had  not  favored  the  Governor's  side.  This 
article,  as  originally  drafted,  would  renew  the  Prince 
ton  schism  and  cut  off  our  contributions.  It  would 
also  make  many  violent  opponents  for  Wilson.  After 
much  controversy  the  article  was  toned  down.  I  pur 
chased  large  quantities  of  magazines  from  Mr.  Page. 

Mark  Sullivan,  of  Collier's  Weekly,  rendered  valu 
able  services  until  he  heard  the  call  of  the  Bull  Moose. 

In  the  fall  of  1911  I  bought  the  Trenton  True 
American.  Cleveland  H.  Dodge  and  (be  it  said  in 
whispers)  Mr.  George  W.  Perkins,  Bull  Moose 
leader,  held  the  dominating  interest.  We  got  out  a 
Woodrow  Wilson  issue.  The  True  American  was 
sent  largely  to  Democratic  papers  for  clipping  pur 
poses.  We  sent  the  paper  to  every  fifth  Democratic 
voter  in  a  state.  This  was  in  furtherance  of  my  gen 
eral  plan  to  build  the  Woodrow  Wilson  campaign 
from  the  bottom  up  rather  than  from  the  top  downT^ 

I  determined  that  it  was  inadvisable  and  imprac 
ticable  to  make  a  fight  for  delegates  in  states  in  which 
there  were  prospective  candidates.  These  were  Ala 
bama  (Mr.  Underwood)  ;  Indiana  (Mr.  Marshall)  ; 
Missouri  (Mr.  Clark)  ;  Ohio  (Governor  Harmon) ; 
Massachusetts  (Mr.  Foss)  ;  Connecticut  (Governor 
Baldwin),  and  North  Dakota  (Mr.  Burke,  if  he 
decided  to  run).  I  conceived  that  it  would  be  better 
to  abandon  these  states  out  of  courtesy,  as  resentment 

[  91  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

might  be  created  among  the  followers  of  the  Presi 
dential  candidates  in  those  states.  It  might  spread 
to  other  states.  At  Baltimore  the  great  struggle 
would  begin  and  I  knew  we  must  have  friends  on 
second  choice.  However,  I  sent  confidential  messen 
gers  into  states  to  find  out  our  friends  and  prepare 
for  second  choice  at  Baltimore. 

I  had  a  personal  agreement  with  the  Harmon  man 
ager  in  Ohio  that  I  would  not  come  into  the  state, 
but,  of  course,  would  keep  in  touch  with  our  friends 
there. 

Governor  Harmon,  during  the  course  of  his  term, 
had  provoked  decided  hostility.  It  came  mainly 
through  the  Bryan-Baker  factions.  It  also  included 
people  who  sought  office  and  did  not  get  it. 

Baker  and  the  followers  of  the  late  Tom  Johnson 
opposed  Governor  Harmon,  perhaps,  on  the  principle 
that  they  did  not  consider  him  radical  enough.  Rep 
resentative  Lentz,  Harvey  Garber,  ex-National  Com- 
mitteeman,  and  former  State  Chairman  Finley  were 
ardent  Bryanites. 

The  Bryan  people  asked  me  if  I  would  assist  in 
financing  a  speaking  trip  of  Mr.  Bryan  through  Ohio. 
That  involved  the  possibility  that  Mr.  Bryan  was  to 
campaign  for  himself.  But  there  was  a  distinct  anti- 
Harmon  feeling  in  Ohio.  While  I  refused  to  organize 
it,  I  concluded  that  I  would  aid  the  Bryan  excursion. 
I  gave  Mr.  Garber  $4,000.  It  helped  to  consolidate 
opposition  to  Mr.  Harmon. 

I  did  not  stipulate  that  the  assistance  of  Mr.  Bryan 
should  result  in  assistance  to  Mr.  Wilson.  I  knew 

[92] 


PUBLICITY   AND    STRATEGY 

tlhe  sentiment  in  Ohio  was  stronger  for  him  than  it 
was  for  any  candidate.  If  the  opposition  got  together, 
as  I  calculated  it  would,  Mr.  Wilson  would  come  to 
Baltimore  with  considerable  strength.  The  Ohio 
primaries  developed  the  fact.  Nineteen  Wilson  dele 
gates  were  selected  out  of  a  total  of  forty. 

The  Clark  campaign  developed  aggressively  early 
in  January.  Mr.  Clark  was  a  "native  son".  His 
managers  determined  that  the  first  state  to  select  their 
delegates  should  be  Missouri,  their  candidate's  home. 
Many  Missourians  advised,  strongly,  that  Governor 
Wilson  become  a  candidate  in  that  state.  I  declined 
to  consent.  Mr.  Clark's  supporters  controlled  the 
state  organization.  Mr.  Clark  became  practically 
the  unanimous  choice.  Mr.  Folk,  who,  rumor  had  it, 
was  looking  toward  the  Presidency  with  the  implied 
support  of  Mr.  Bryan,  agreed  to  support  Mr.  Clark. 

The  next  contest  was  in  Oklahoma.  Mr.  Clark 
was  exceedingly  well  and  favorably  known  in  that 
state.  There  was  some  Harmon  support.  It  readily 
disappeared.  The  contest  narrowed  to  one  between 
Mr.  Clark  and  Mr.  Wilson.  The  Wilson  contest 
was  led  by  Senator  Gore.  The  Clark  contest  was  led 
by  Senator  Robert  L.  Owen  and  Charles  W.  Haskell, 
former  Governor  and  former  Treasurer  of  the 
National  Committee.  The  Oklahoma  contest  was  not 
a  state- wide  primary;  it  was  a  contest  for  delegates 
selected  in  each  county. 

The  battle  was  a  draw.  We  were  fortunate  that  it 
so  resulted.  The  Clark  forces  were  exceedingly  well 
organized.  Mr.  Clark  had  the  advantage  of  living 

[93] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

in  a  neighboring  state.  He  had  the  advantage,  also, 
of  a  tremendous  acquaintance.  Governor  Wilson 
knew  less  than  half  a  dozen  people  in  the  entire  state. 

J£ansas  was  the  next  state  in  order.  It  was  neces 
sary  that  we  make  a  determined  stand  there.  Diffi 
culties  were  more  obvious  than  those  of  Oklahoma; 
the  state  bordered  on  Missouri,  and  Mr.  Clark  had 
many  justly  valued  friendships  there.  He  had  been 
speaking  in  the  state  for  years.  He  had  come  in  their 
hour  of  need ;  indeed,  in  their  hour  of  hopelessness. 

A  decided  handicap  was  to  be  overcome.  Never 
theless,  some  of  the  strongest  men  in  the  state  were 
with  us.  These  were  Homer  S.  Martin,  State  Chair 
man;  George  H.  Hodges,  Governor;  Frank  Watson, 
William  Orr,  Hugh  P.  Farrelly  and  Frank  Comisky. 
Martin,  who  afterward  became  Vice  Governor  of  the 
Philippines,  and  I  planned  the  campaign. 

Senator  Gore  and  I  advised  Governor  Wilson  to 
speak  at  Topeka  on  Washington's  Birthday,  taking 
his  hazards  on  a  defeat. 

Opposition  to  Governor  Wilson  had  become  highly 
concentrated.  It  was  rumored  that  to  prevent  his 
sweeping  the  country  in  the  primaries,  an  arrange 
ment  had  been  made  that  the  country  should  be 
divided  among  the  other  three  leading  candidates  in 
their  respective  strongholds, —  Mr.  Underwood  in  the 
South,  Mr.  Harmon  in  the  East,  and  Mr.  Clark  in  the 
West.  I  shall  not  comment  on  the  truth  of  this 
'  Triple  Alliance  ".  It  has  never  been  demonstrated 
to  me.  I  do  not  believe  the  gentlemen  had  the  slightest 
knowledge  of  the  existence  of  any  such  entente. 

[94] 


PUBLICITY  AND    STRATEGY 

In  Kansas  we  were  met  with  a  most  vehement  attack 
on  Governor  Wilson.  It  was  based  upon  his  History 
of  the  American  People  and  his  alleged  slight  to 
Southern  Europeans  who  came  to  America.  This  was 
given  the  widest  circulation  and  it  was  harmful. 

Kansas  having  gone  against  us,  and  Wisconsin 
being  the  next  state,  it  was  necessary  to  make  a  deter 
mined  effort  there. 

In  the  previous  fall,  I  had  met  Joseph  E.  Davies, 
National  Committeeman,  on  his  return  from  Europe. 
He  did  not  know  much  about  the  situation.  After  a 
protracted  talk  he  decided  to  espouse  the  Wilson 
cause.  He  put  me  in  personal  touch  with  his  partner, 
George  Aylward,  now  District  Attorney  at  Madison, 
and  Frank  B.  Shutze,  now  Postmaster  at  Milwaukee. 
These  were  the  Wisconsin  pioneers. 

\T  determined  that  everything  possible  should  be 
done  in  Wisconsin  to  stem  what  I  considered  the  rising 
tide  for  Speaker  Clark.  From  headquarters  we  sent 
tons  of  literature  to  the  Democrats  in  Wisconsin. 

We  covered  the  state  thoroughly  with  the  Trenton 
True  American.  I  also  gave  Mr.  Davies  $15,000  — • 
a  mighty  sum  for  us  in  those  times  —  to  carry  on  the 
campaign.  It  was  more  than  a  mighty  sum  in  view 
of  my  personal  situation.  I  had  incurred  a  personal 
indebtedness  on  behalf  of  the  campaign  of  more  than 
$36,000.  At  this  juncture,  Thomas  J.  Pence  said  to 
me  at  Washington: 

'  You  need  not  worry  about  the  Wisconsin  pub 
licity,  'The  Old  Man  of  the  Sea'  (Senator  Gore) 
and  I  will  mix  the  poison  '^ 

[95] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

Senator  Gore  organized  a  campaign  down  to  the 
precincts  in  Wisconsin.  The  LaFollette  Campaign 
Committee,  composed  largely  of  former  President 
Theodore  Roosevelt's  friends,  had  concluded  that 
Senator  Robert  M.  LaFollette,  of  Wisconsin,  was 
impossible  as  a  candidate  for  the  Republican  or  Pro 
gressive  Presidential  nomination,  and  had  plainly 
told  him  so.  This  was  a  few  days  prior  to  the  Pubr 
lishers'  dinner  in  Philadelphia,  at  which  Senator 
LaFollette  utterly  collapsed  physically  and  nervously. 

The  one  man  on  the  LaFollette  Committee  who 
protested  against  the  abandonment  of  the  Senator 
was  Charles  R.  Crane,  of  Chicago.  President  Wilson 
later  offered  Crane  the  post  of  Ambassador  to  Russia. 
Mr.  Crane  had  been  confirmed  as  Minister  to  China 
under  Mr.  Taft.  He  was  recalled  in  the  process  of 
his  journey.  At  the  break-up  of  the  LaFollette  Com 
mittee,  Mr.  Crane  asserted  that  he  would  continue  in 
his  financial  support  of  Mr.  LaFollette. 

I  went  to  Chicago  to  confer  on  the  Wisconsin  situa 
tion,  and  also  to  see  Roger  C.  Sullivan  again.  The 
deficit  hanging  over  me  and  the  great  expense  that 
was  to  follow  were  quite  depressing.  I  had  found 
out  that  primaries  are  the  most  expensive  form  of 
political  campaigning.  The  odds  are  all  in  favor  of 
the  man  with  the  money  and  the  man  who  has  the 
organization  behind  him. 

As  I  sat  in  the  Blacks  tone  Hotel,  alone,  on  a  foggy 
morning,  I  was  raking  my  mind  on  how  to  discover 
some  new  person  to  contribute  to  the  Wilson  cam 
paign.  I  thought  of  Charles  R.  Crane,  and  deter- 

[96] 


PUBLICITY  AND    STRATEGY 

mined  at  once  to  see  him.  It  was  a  short  journey  to 
his  office. 

Mr.  Crane  received  me  with  great  politeness.  I 
told  him  that  I  admired  his  courage  in  continuing  to 
support  Mr.  LaFollette,  but  that,  of  course,  Mr. 
LaFollette's  nomination  was  impossible.  I  argued 
to  Mr.  Crane  that  Governor  Wilson  stood  for  pro 
gressive  ideals,  and  that  there  was  no  inconsistency 
in  supporting  both  Wilson  and  Mr.  LaFollette. 

After  twenty  minutes  Mr.  Crane  gave  me  a  check 
for  $5,000,  and  said  that  he  would  give  me  $5,000 
more  later.  This  $5,000  went  into  the  maw  of  the 
Wisconsin  primaries. 

Mr.  Crane  had  influence,-  and,  indeed,  a  substan 
tial  interest  in  the  Milwaukee  Journal.  He  promised 
the  support  of  the  Journal  for  Governor  Wilson.  He 
also  enjoyed  intimate  acquaintanceship  with  the 
Scripps-McRae  papers.  He  volunteered  to  argue 
for  the  support  of  that  chain  of  great  dailies  for  Gov 
ernor  Wilson,  and  it  was  largely  accomplished. 

If  I  ever  had  an  inspiration  it  was  certainly  the 
inspiration  of  seeing  Mr.  Crane.  I  left  his  office  still 
$36,000  in  debt,  but  feeling  vastly  more  hopeful  of 
the  general  result.  His  face  and  his  first-spoken 
word  convince  one  that  he  is  a  man  of  high  ideals  and 
fidelity  of  purpose. 

From  Mr.  Crane's  office  I  went  into  conference  — 
the  third  one  —  with  Roger  C.  Sullivan,  the  National 
Committeeman  from  Illinois.  It  was  plain  that 
although  a  chronic  bitter  fight  was  being  made  on  Mr. 
Sullivan  he  would  control  the  delegation  at  Baltimore. 

[97] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

The  first  time  I  saw  him  was  on  the  twelfth  of  Feb 
ruary  —  Lincoln's  Birthday  —  when  Governor  Wil 
son  spoke  at  the  Lincoln  Day  dinner  in  the  Hotel 
LaSalle.  It  was  a  rather  soggy  occasion.  The  busi 
nessmen  of  Chicago,  as  elsewhere,  viewed  Wilson  with 
suspicion  and  alarm.  Outside  of  a  very  cordial  talk, 
we  got  nowhere.  Mr.  Sullivan,  very  properly,  was 
looking  after  his  own  political  position.  The  very 
mixed  condition  of  Illinois  would  not  permit  him  to 
make  a  statement.  I  knew  that  if  Roger  Sullivan 
ever  committed  himself  to  us,  his  word  would  be  as 
good  as  his  bond. 

The  net  result  of  the  first  conference  was  that  he 
expressed  a  very  high  regard  for  Mr.  Wilson. 

On  the  second  occasion,  Senator  Saulsbury  and  I 
were  on  a  Western  tour,  terminating  in  Topeka,  where 
Governor  Wilson  was  to  speak.  Mr.  Sullivan  again 
took  the  position  that  his  own  leadership  was  involved, 
and  that  he  was  compelled  to  protect  that.  He  would 
not  commit  himself  to  anyone.  We  both  knew  his 
underlying  political  judgment  was  that  Governor 
Wilson  should  be  nominated. 

On  the  third  occasion,  we  had  a  very  long  conver 
sation.  Mr.  Sullivan  was  even  more  enthusiastic  about 
Governor  Wilson,  but  less  hopeful  of  his  nomination. 
Nevertheless,  I  thought  that  the  conference  would  at 
least  develop  a  cordiality  between  us  and  cement 
mutual  confidence.  That  it  did  was  demonstrated 
when  in  the  Baltimore  Convention  Mr.  Sullivan 
finally  swung  the  58  votes  from  Illinois  to  Wilson,  and 
made  his  nomination  certain. 

[98] 


VIII 
PREPARATIONS   FOR   CONVENTION 

ONLY  327  OF  THE  1088  NATIONAL  DELEGATES  FOR  WILSON  AS 
THE  NET  RESULT  OF  PRESIDENTIAL  PRIMARIES  —  McCoMBs 
TOURS  SOUTH  AND  WEST  TO  GAIN  VETO  POWER  IN  CONVEN 
TION  —  "ONLY  A  MIRACLE  CAN  SAVE  WILSON",  SAYS 
DAVIES  —  WILSON  CONFERENCE  AT  WASHINGTON  GLOOMY  — 
NEWTON,  PUBLICITY  MAN,  DISCHARGED. 

THE  CONTEST  in  Wisconsin  involved  the 
vote  of  a  very  large  Southern  European 
element,  especially  in  Milwaukee.     A  very 
bitter  pamphlet  prepared  by  George  Fred  Williams 
against  Governor  Wilson  was  the  chief  weapon  of  the 
opposition.     It  appealed  very  strongly  to  the  foreign 
vote. 

Wisconsin  had  been  so  thoroughly  organized  that 
the  primary  came  out  quite  to  our  satisfaction.  We 
won  twenty  out  of  the  twenty-four  delegates.  We 
had,  at  least,  checked  the  Clark  tide.  We  tripled  our 
circulation  of  publicity,  but  we  were  still  short  of 
money.  Contributions  were  given  in  a  spirit  of  great 
trepidation,  and  the  campaign  was  not  underwritten 
at  all,  except  by  Mr.  Morgenthau. 

The  time  for  the  selection  of  delegates  in  Illinois 
was  coming  apace.  The  state  was  absolutely  rent  with 
factionalism.  Mr.  Clark's  supporters  had  organized 

[99  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

the  state  most  thoroughly  and  with  great  skill.  Mr. 
Hearst's  papers  were  pounding  the  Wilson  candidacy 
with  great  effect.  Goven  i  Dunne's  forces  were 
working  for  the  nomination  of  the  Missourian  with  the 
support  of  Mayor  Harrison  and  of  Mr.  Hearst's 
newspapers. 

Mr.  Sullivan  was  working  to  maintain  control  of 
the  state  organization.  It  was  impossible  for  us 
under  such  circumstances,  to  have  an  adequate  organi 
zation  in  the  state.  It  would  have  required  a  vast 
sum  rf  money  to  obtain  it.  We  did  not  have  the 
funds. 

Accordingly,  I  organized  a  faithful  group,  mainly 
composed  of  young  men  outside  of  any  organization. 
They  included  William  Brown,  Jr.,  later  Naval 
Officer  of  the  Port;  River  McNeill,  later  Collector  of 
Customs;  William  C.  Niblac,  a  prominent  banker; 
Dixon  Williams,  a  manufacturer;  Irving  Shuman, 
later  Assistant  United  States  Treasurer  at  Chicago; 
Lawrence  Stringer,  later  Congressman-at-large,  and 
the  Jones  brothers,  Thomas  D.  and  Frank.  Thomas 
D.  was  afterward  nominated  by  the  President  for  the 
Federal  Reserve  Board.  This  group  had  the  very 
greatest  difficulty  in  raising  funds.  Jusi  before  the 
selection  of  delegates,  I  p;a\  ?  the  organization  $250, 
c\cry  cent  that  I  could  afford,  for  the  payment  of  a 
deficit  on  printing. 

Ten  days  before  the  selection  of  delegates,  a  primary 
law  was  passed  in  Illinois.  When  the  news  came  to 
me,  I  told  our  organization  that  Illinois  was  hopeless 
and  that  it  must  go  to  Mr.  Clark.  I  recommended  the 

[  100  ] 


PREPARATIONS  FOR  CONVENTION 

expenditure  of  no  further  money,  but  upon  their 
insistence  for  funds  I  gave  them  $3,000.  It  was  more 
of  a  reward  for  the  loyalty  of  their  services  than 
anything  else. 

Mr,  Clark  won  by  a  tremendous  plurality, —  over 
140  COG  I  received  the  news  ;u  .my  New  York  hotel. 
I  was  $57,000  personally  committed  to  the  campaign. 
The  morning  was  foggy,  and,  of  course,  to  me  was 
blacker  than  usual.  I  had  breakfast  and  walked  down 
Fifth  Avenue,  not  knowing  where  any  further  funds 
were  coming  from.  I  puffed  vigorously  at  a  black 
cigar.  I  was  of  course  not  willing  to  give  up.  Indeed, 
it  was  a  matter  of  pride  not  to  surrender  until  thor 
oughly  beaten  at  Baltimore,  and  I  still  thought  we 
would  not  be  beaten. 

The  success  of  the  Wisconsin  primaries  was  not 
long-lived.  The  Clark  movement  got  a  tremendous 
and  thoroughly  organized  swing.  Nebraska,  Iowa, 
Ca!ifn:nk,  Washington,  Colorado,  Nevada,  New 
Mexico,  Massachusetts,  Rhode  IslancV  Marjrland, 
went  for  Mr.  Clark  almost  in  succession.  Alabama, 
Mississippi,  Georgia,  Florida,  a  part  of  Tennessee,  a 
part  of  North  Carolina,  went  sweepingly  in  turn  for 
Mr.  Underwood. 

While  these  events  were  occurring,  Mr.  Joseph  E. 
Davies  said  that  Governor  Wilson  could  only  be 
nominated  by  a  political  miracle. 

I  knew  it  was  necessary  for  us  to  buttress  ourselves 
in  a  few  states  to  check  the  almost  overwhelming  tide. 
I  selected  Minnesota,  South  Dakota,  North  Carolina, 
and  South  Carolina  in  which  to  concentrate  the  fight. 

[101  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

We  had  made  a  formal  fight  in  Massachusetts.  It 
consisted  mainly  of  speakers.  We  had  the  able  ser 
vices  of  Robert  L.  Henry,  who  had  transferred  him 
self  from  Wisconsin,  where  we  had  retrieved  ourselves 
with  nine  delegates. 

The  "Old  Man  of  the  Sea"  (Senator  Gore)  and  I 
were  much  in  conference.  Pence  was  pounding  away 
with  publicity  in  every  direction.  The  New  York 
Headquarters,  so  far  as  its  resources  would  allow  it, 
was  consistently  sending  out  Wilson  publicity. 

In  Minnesota  we  had  some  very  able  men.  They 
included  Fred  B.  Lynch,  E.  L.  Wise,  editor  of  the 
Duluth  Herald,  which  was  a  power  with  its  editorials ; 
Mr.  Jacques,  Mr.  Hudson,  and  others.  We  secured 
a  handsome,  but  belated  victory  in  Minnesota. 

Under  the  able  leadership  of  E.  S.  Johnson,  opposed 
violently  by  Senator  Pettigrew  and  George  Fred 
Williams,  we  took  South  Dakota. 

Under  the  leadership  of  William  H.  Osborne,  and 
other  strong  men,  we  took  twenty  out  of  the  twenty- 
four  North  Carolina  delegates. 

With  Senator  Tillman  and  Mr.  Gonzales,  now 
Minister  to  Cuba,  we  took  South  Carolina. 

On  the  28th  of  May  the  New  Jersey  primaries  carne 
on.  As  was  to  be  expected,  Senator  Smith  held  his 
own  in  Essex.  The  result  was  24  Wilson  out  of  the  28 
state  delegates. 

[fey  the  1st  of  June  all  of  the  state  conventions  and 
primaries  were  overr- 

Early  in  April  the  strain  was  beginning  to  become 
too  much  for  me.  During  the  period  I  had  not  taken 

[  102] 


PREPARATIONS  FOR  CONVENTION 

a  Sunday  or  a  holiday  off.  I  had  worked  from  twelve 
to  eighteen  hours  a  day.  I  frequently  felt  that  I  must 
give  up. 

While  Mr.  Clark  was  sweeping  the  country,  the 
Governor  had  become  very  much  discouraged.  He 
thought  it  was  too  much  to  call  on  his  friends  to  do. 
He  more  than  once  intimated  that  he  desired  to  with 
draw.  My  argument  was,  that  it  would  be  unfair  to 
his  friends  who  had  so  vigorously  supported  him,  and 
who,  I  was  sure,  would  rather  go  to  defeat  than  to  quit 
in  the  midst  of  a  conflict. 

After  June  1st  the  tactics  for  the  Convention  had 
to  be  worked  out.  I  sent  into  all  of  the  states.  I  took 
a  list  of  the  delegates  selected,  sent  to  me  from  an 
inquiry  made  as  to  their  first  and  second  choice.  This 
I  carefully  noted  in  a  book. 

In  New  York,  I  had  declined  to  make  a  fight  for^ 
two  reasons:  I  knew  that  the  sentiment  of  the  state 
was  decidedly  against  Governor  Wilson.  I  knew  that 
the  organization  which  controlled  the  selection  of  the 
delegates  was  against  him.  My  only  hope  was  to  fur 
ther  the  amicable  and  cordial  terms  with  the  delegates 
selected,  in  the  hope  that  at  some  juncture  in  the 
Convention  they  might  see  fit  to  vote  with  us. 

It  was  apparent  that  the  only  effort  that  could  be 
made  there  was  to  turn  the  edge  of  animosity.  This 
position  I  took  counter  to  many  suggestions  and  the 
violent  protestations  of  Governor  Wilson's  friends.  I 
knew  a  fight  would  result  only  in  creating  bitter  state 
animosities  which  would  prejudice  success  in  the  state 
of  any  Democrat  nominated  in  the  Convention,  and 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

could  by  no  chance  be  of  any  value  to  Governor 
Wilson.  The  only  thing  done  in  the  state  was  the 
circulation  of  a  large  amount  of  publicity. 

Some  of  the  delegates,  notably  Abram  I.  Elkus, 
Henry  Morgenthau,  Martin  H.  Glynn,  Samuel 
Untermeyer,  and  others,  were  loyal  Wilson  men. 
The  suggestion  was  made  that  a  contesting  delegation 
go  to  Baltimore,  following  the  precedent  of  the  Anti- 
Snap  movement  in  the  Democratic  convention  of  1892. 
The  Anti-Snap  was  all  right.  But  the  facts  were  not 
the  same.  I  was  sure  that  no  convention  would  pay 
any  attention  to  such  a  movement. 

The  net  result  of  the  selection  of  delegates  prior  to 
the  Baltimore  convention  showed  Mr.  Wilson  to  be  in 
possession  of  327  out  of  the  1088  delegates, —  less  than 
a  third. 

'  Within  a  few  days  after  the  1st  of  June,  I  went 
up  into  the  country  with  my  list  of  delegates  and  all 
of  the  information  that  I  had  acquired  during  the 
fifteen  months  of  campaigning,  to  lay  out  a  plan  of 
battle  for  submission  to  my  associates.  I  was  quite 
alone.  First  I  studied  and  learned  by  heart  the  per 
sonnel  of  the  1088  delegates.  I  found  that  many 
Clark  delegates  held  Wilson  as  their  second  choice, 
and  that  some  were  very  sympathetic  with  Harmon. 

I  determined  that  if  we  could,  in  the  process  of  the 
convention,  muster  a  veto  power, —  that  is,  more  than 
one-third,  and  hold  it  in  compact  order  for  four  or  five 
days,  we  had  an  excellent  chance  to  secure  many  more 
delegates  and  perliaps  the  nomination.  /  As  to  the 
Underwood  delegates,  who  Were  entirely  from  the 

[  104  ] 


PREPARATIONS  FOR  CONVENTION 

South,  it  seemed  clear  that,  at  the  convention,  they 
should  be  left  entirely  alone  in  order  to  strengthen 
them.  Their  great  value  at  the  first  part  of  the  con 
vention  would  be  in  blockading  the  Clark  movement 
and  preventing  his  nomination. 

I  was  aware  that  the  Underwood  people  hoped  to  be 
the  residuary  legatees  of  either  the  Wilson  or  Clark 
strength.  I  resolved  that  during  the  first  two  days  of 
the  convention  we  should  merely  do  sharp -shoo  ting  at 
the  Clark  delegates, —  that  is  to  say,  draw  off  indi 
vidual  delegates  to  get  the  coveted  one-third. 

I  thought  I  could  see  where  we  would  get  more 
than  one-third  of  the  delegates  in  this  manner  and  hold 
them  together. 

As  to  the  floor  organization,  I  determined  upon  a 
committee  composed  of  vigorous,  active  men,  that 
could  do  continuous  manoeuvering,  and  who  were 
physically  vigorous  enough  to  work  day  and  night. 

Governor  Burke,  of  North  Dakota,  now  Treasurer 
of  the  United  States,  wrote  that  if  we  needed  the 
North  Dakota  delegates  we  could  have  them  at  any 
time. 

I  returned  from  my  seclusion  and  laid  the  plan  of 
organization  before  Governor  Wilson,  Senator  Gore, 
Mr.  Pence,  and  one  or  two  others.  It  was  accepted. 

About  June  10, 1  went  to  Washington  and  took  up 
the  matter  of  our  Congressional  support.  We  worked 
out  the  personnel  of  the  floor  leaders  and  called  a 
secret  meeting  at  the  Bellevue-Stratford  Hotel, 
Philadelphia.  There  were  present  Governor  Wilson, 
Senator  Gore,  Senator  Saulsbury,  Mr.  Burleson,  and, 

[  105  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

I  think,  Mr.  Palmer,  Mr.  McGillicuddy,  Robert  S. 
Hudspeth  and  Representative  Hughes.  I  proposed 
a  plan  for  carrying  off  the  delegates  of  the  various 
states,  one  from  Pennsylvania  and  one  from  Texas, 
who  were  not  on  the  Floor  Committee,  to  work  among 
the  various  delegations  between  sessions. 

Mr.  Pence  evolved  the  idea  of  having  a  complete 
press  bureau  in  Baltimore  so  as  to  get  immediate 
favorable  publicity  directly  into  the  hands  of  the  dele 
gates.  The  publicity  here  was  done  by  clippings.  I 
determined  to  put  Colonel  Thomas  R.  Burch  in  charge 
.  of  the  convention  hall  galleries  and  to  be  Commissioner 
and  "Chief  of  Enthusiasm".  I  arranged  to  have 
brought  down  to  Baltimore,  Princeton,  Yale  and 
Harvard  Woodrow  Wilson  Clubs,  which  numbered 
some  1500  young  men  with  strong  lungs  and  stronger 
\enthusiasm. 

The  plans  for  Baltimore  were  complete;  but  to 
return  to  some  other  incidents. 

About  January  15,  Byron  R.  Newrton,  later  Assist 
ant  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  and  Collector  of  the 
Port  of  New  York,  then  publicity  agent,  taken  from 
Mr.  McAdoo's  office,  became  exceedingly  unsatisfac 
tory.  His  enthusiasm  had  fallen  away.  I  attributed 
it  at  first  to  nervousness.  They  told  me  that  he  was 
doing  absolutely  nothing  at  headquarters,  and  became 
exceedingly  quarrelsome.  This  happened  at  the  time 
of  the  Watterson  interview,  when  for  the  first  time  I 
came  forward  with  continuous  publicity  which  neces 
sarily  involved  my  name. 

Newton  secretly  represented  Mr,  McAdoo.      He 

[ 


PREPARATIONS   FOR   CONVENTION 

was  jealous  because  I  was  directing  the  movement, 
and  because  of  his  greater  age.  Finally,  with  great 
reluctance,  I  was  compelled  to  discharge  him  to  bring 
order  into  the  headquarters.  He  left  grudgingly. 
He  wrote  a  vitriolic  letter  to  Governor  Wilson  con 
cerning  the  condition  of  the  campaign.  That  was  the 
last  I  heard  of  Newton,  until  at  Baltimore,  I  am  reli 
ably  informed,  he  publicly  appeared  on  the  floor  of 
the  convention  exploiting  alleged  injurious  letters. 

At  the  instance  of  Dan  Fellow  Platt,  of  New  Jer 
sey,  I  engaged  Walker  W.  Vick  as  an  assistant  at 
headquarters.  He  seemed  to  have  a  large  acquaint 
ance  in  the  South.  As  a  try-out,  I  sent  him  down 
there  to  look  over  the  situation.  He  came  back  with 
valuable  information.  Mr.  Vick  proved  himself  to  be 
a  valuable  executive.  Upon  letting  Mr.  Newton  go, 
I  put  Mr.  Vick  in  charge  of  headquarters,  associating 
with  him  Mr.  Parker,  a  publicity  man,  and  others. 

Soon  afterwards  I  asked  Senator  Gore  to  recom 
mend  a  man  who  was  familiar  with  Middle  West  con 
ditions.  He  suggested  Judge  Thomas  H.  Owen  of 
Oklahoma.  Judge  Owen,  at  Senator  Gore's  instance, 
volunteered  to  come  without  salary  to  headquarters 
and  spend  a  month.  He  proved  himself  of  very  great 
value  in  organization  and  in  his  familiarity  with 
Middle  Western  conditions. 

To  go  back  a  little,  I  determined  on  March  14th 
that  it  would  be  of  advantage  to  go  into  the  South  and 
confer  with  some  of  our  friends  in  the  various  states. 
My  particular  aim  was  toward  New  Orleans.  I  went 
to  Augusta,  to  the  Bon  Air  Hotel,  for  a  few  days' 

[ 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

rest,  occupying  the  time,  however,  in  receiving  Wilson 
leaders  from  the  surrounding  states,  including  J.  T.  G. 
Crawford,  National  Committeeman  from  Florida; 
Mr.  Gonzales,  of  South  Carolina,  and  Bowdrie  Phinzy, 
of  Augusta.  Mr.  Saulsbury  was  there.  The  vacation 
consisted  of  planning  for  the  future  and  sending  out 
of  telegrams  to  various  leaders  in  the  primaries. 

From  Augusta  I  went  to  Atlanta  and  conferred 
with  the  Wilson  leaders  in  Georgia,  especially  Colonel 
Gray,  editor  and  proprietor  of  the  Atlanta  Journal, 
who  was  rendering  us  valiant  service.  The  trip  con 
vinced  me  that  Mr.  Underwood  must  have  Alabama, 
Georgia  and  Florida. 

Lieutenant  Governor  Bilbo  met  me  at  New 
Orleans.  He  was  not  entirely  committed  to  Under 
wood. 

An  analysis  of  the  situation  in  Mississippi  showed 
that  the  state  was  largely  dominated  by  Senator  Var- 
daman  and  Governor  Brewer.  I  was  sure  that  no 
success  could  be  had  there  for  us. 

According  to  our  plan  of  not  abandoning  any  state 
completely,  excepting  New  York  and  the  Presidential 
candidate  states,  we  made  fights  in  all  of  the  others, 
with  the  anticipated  result. 

My  object  in  going  to  New  Orleans  was  specific. 
The  southern  half  of  Louisiana  was  disrupted  over  the 
Underwood  Bill  of  1911,  because  it  had  a  provision  for 
free  sugar.  Louisiana  people  contended  that  it  was 
confiscatory.  Mr.  Wilson,  in  his  speech  of  January  3, 
1912,  had  pronounced  himself  against  any  tariff  that 
would  prove  confiscatory.  At  that  time  I  did  not 

[  108  ] 


PREPARATIONS  FOR   CONVENTION 

dream  that  he  would  be  for  free  sugar.  Indeed,  he 
had  told  me  that  he  had  not  made  up  his  mind,  but 
that  if  it  were  confiscatory,  he  would  be  against  it. 

In  New  Orleans  I  met  Colonel  Ewing,  National 
Committeeman  of  Louisiana  and  editor  of  a  prominent 
daily  paper,  and  editors  of  several  other  papers.  They 
were  satisfied  that  as  among  Clark,  Underwood,  and 
Wilson,  Wilson  was  the  better  choice  for  Louisiana. 
The  delegation  was  about  evenly  divided  between 
Wilson  and  Clark.  The  southern,  or  sugar,  half  of  the 
state  was  for  Wilson. 

I  then  made  a  trip  into  my  native  state,  Arkansas. 
I  had  had  considerable  hopes,  or  rather  profound  long 
ing.  Upon  my  arrival  at  Little  Rock  I  found  that 
the  effective  work  of  Jerry  C.  South  had  entirely  pre 
cluded  our  having  it,  and  I  left  in  chagrin. 

I  proceeded  to  St.  Louis ;  then  to  Chicago,  to  renew 
my  friendship  with  Roger  Sullivan,  and  then  to  New 
York. 

The  day  following  my  arrival  I  took  a  trip  to 
Atlantic  City  for  sea  air,  conferences,  and  contribu 
tions.  Mr.  Pence  came  up  from  Washington  to 
report,  Judge  Owen  to  confer  with  us  all,  and  Vick 
to  pave  the  way  for  contributions. 

Through  the  editor  of  an  Atlantic  City  paper,  we 
were  able  to  raise  about  $5,000.  This  was  a  great  help 
because  we  were  bankrupt  again,  and  there  were  con 
tinued  demands  for  money. 

Referring  to  the  trip  to  Topeka,  which  I  have  men 
tioned  in  a  previous  chapter,  Mr.  Saulsbury  and  I 
took  it  together.  The  dinner  on  this  occasion  was  for 

[  109] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

both  men  and  women.  The  ceiling  was  low,  the  Gov 
ernor  was  out  of  voice,  Homer  S.  Martin  implored  us 
for  funds  we  did  not  have.  We  came  into  contact  with 
the  vicious  George  Fred  Williams'  letter,  which  was 
being  circulated  tremendously.  It  was  not  a  bridge 
of  comforts.  But  our  leaders  were  enthusiastic.  On 
the  return  I  invited  as  many  of  them  as  were  going  in 
that  direction  to  dine  with  me  at  Kansas  City.  I  took 
Mr.  Martin  across  into  St.  Louis,  where  I  could  draw 
some  money  and  appease  him  slightly.  We  then  went 
to  Louisville  and  enjoyed  the  hospitality  of  the  Pen- 
dennis  Club  and  the  companionship  of  Urey  Wood- 
son, —  and  learned  that  Kentucky  was  for  Clark.  We 
journeyed  thence  to  Frankfort,  met  Governor  Mc- 
Creary,  Desha  Breckenridge,  and  ex-Governor  Beck- 
ham,  and  found  that  Kentucky  was  for  Clark  more 
than  ever. 

The  "hog's  eye  was  sot".  The  leaders  were  nearly 
all  against  us.  We  left  a  thin  line,  mainly  composed 
of  very  young  men,  as  a  rear  guard,  and  departed  for 
Washington.  There  I  stopped  to  check  up  events  with 
the  "Old  Man  of  the  Sea",  and  then  on  to  New  York 
to  continue  the  work. 

June  20,  1912,  the  entire  staff  of  New  York  and 
Washington  Headquarters  was  moved  to  Baltimore. 
We  had  most  of  the  tenth  floor  of  the  Emerson  Hotel 
and  the  main  room  downstairs.  I  was  urged  to  take 
the  big  room  downstairs  for  $10,000,  for  the  conven 
tion,  at  what  might  be  called  a  prodigious  sum  from 
the  Wilson  standpoint.  I  was  urged  on  by  my  good 
friend  Colonel  McGraw,  of  West  Virginia,  who  was 

[ 


PREPARATIONS   FOR   CONVENTION 

accustomed  to  the  old  days  of  conventions,  and  who 
made  great  merriment  over  my  objection  to  paying 
such  an  extraordinary  price.  The  days  between  the 
20th  and  25th  were  spent  in  conference  with  the  Wil 
son  leaders  and  in  laying  further  plans  for  the 
convention. 

Mr.  McAdoo,  during  this  time,  was  at  the  Repub 
lican  convention  in  Chicago.  However,  he  had 
reserved  a  suite  at  the  Emerson. 


[in 


IX 
McCOMBS'    ORGANIZATION 

BATTLE  FOR  CONVENTION  CONTROL  —  BRYAN  BITTERLY  ATTACKS 
PARKER  AS  "PREDATORY  INTERESTS  CANDIDATE"  —  PARKER 
DEFEATS  BRYAN  FOR  TEMPORARY  CHAIRMAN  OF  THE  CON 
VENTION —  THE  WILSON  GROUP  SUPPORTS  BRYAN  TO  ELIM 
INATE  CLARK  —  CLARK'S  MANOEUVRES  AGAINST  BRYAN  TO 
PREVENT  His  FOURTH  PRESIDENTIAL  NOMINATION. 

[EDITOR'S  NOTE  — The  following  is  compiled  by  the  editor.] 

THE  SKELETON  organization  with  which 
Mr.  McCombs  entered  the  Baltimore  con 
vention  consisted  in  the  main  of  young 
college  graduates .  of  Princeton,  Harvard,  Yale, 
Columbia,  Cornell,  University  of  Pennsylvania  and 
other  universities.  In  addition,  Mr.  McCombs  had 
succeeded  in  enlisting  these  more  or  less  influential 
leaders  in  these  subjoined  states: 

Alabama:  Frank  P.  Glass,  Judge  Peter  J.  Ham 
ilton,  former  Governor  W.  D.  Jelks,  General  Bibb 
Graves,  Judge  W.  E.  Thomas,  ex-Governor  Senator 
B.  B.  Comer. 

California:  James  D.  Phelan,  United  States 
Senator. 

Delaware:  Willard  Saulsbury,  afterward  United 
States  Senator. 


McCOMBS'    ORGANIZATION 

Florida:  Frank  L.  Mayes,  J.  T.  G.  Crawford, 
J.  W.  Appleyard. 

Illinois:  Edwin  Hurley,  afterward  United  States 
Shipping  Commissioner;  Irving  B.  Shuman. 

Iowa:   Jerry  B.  Sullivan. 

Kansas:  Homer  S.  Martin,  Governor  George  H. 
Hodges. 

Louisiana:    Senator  Robert  E.  Broussard. 

Maine :  Hobadiah  Gardner,  recently  member  of  the 
Inter-Boundary  Commission;  Daniel  McGillicuddy, 
former  Governor  Plaisted. 

Massachusetts:  E.  E.  Filene,  Charles  H.  Grasty. 

Missouri:  Edward  F.  Goltra. 

New  Jersey:  Colonel  George  Harvey,  William 
Hughes,  Dan  Fellows  Platt,  Judge  R.  S.  Hudspeth, 
Colonel  T.  H.  Birch,  Congressman  Robert  Brenner, 
John  Hinchcliffe. 

New  Hampshire:  Eugene  E.  Reed. 

New  Mexico:  United  States  Senator  A.  A.  Jones. 

New  York:  Henry  Morgenthau,  George  Foster 
Peabody,  Franklin  D.  Roosevelt,  William  Church 
Osborn,  Thomas  Mott  Osborne,  Fred  S.  Penfield, 
Cleveland  H.  Dodge,  Walter  H.  Page. 

North  Carolina:  Hugh  MacRae,  "The  Three 
Sprunts",  A.  H.  Gouverneur,  H.  C.  McQueen, 
Thomas  H.  Wright,  former  Governor  Robert  Glenn, 
A.  H.  Eller,  Colonel  W.  H.  Osborne,  E.  J.  Justice, 
Captain  S.  J.  Williams,  J.  R.  Preston,  Major  W.  F. 
Robertson,  General  J.  O.  Carr,  Josephus  Daniels, 
just  retired  as  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 

North  Dakota:   Governor  John  Burke. 
[113] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

Ohio:  W.  W.  Durbin,  Harvey  Garber. 

Oklahoma:  United  States  Senator  Thomas  P.  Gore5 
Judge  Thomas  H.  Owen. 

Oregon:  W.  B.  King. 

Pennsylvania:  Joseph  M.  Guffey,  A.  Mitchell 
Palmer,  W.  W.  Roper,  Vance  McCormick,  Roland 
Morris,  Ambassador  to  Japan. 

South  Carolina:  R.  S.  Whaley,  W.  E.  Gonzales, 
W.  W.  Ball,  J.  Willard  Ragsdale,  John  Gary  Evans. 

Rhode  Island:   Congressman  O'Shaughnessey. 

South  Dakota:    Senator  Edward  S.  Johnson. 

Texas:  R.  L.  Henry,  A.  S.  Burleson,  Colonel  T.  H. 
Ball. 

Tennessee:  Hobart  F.  Fischer. 

Vermont:    J.  Walter  Lyons,  Thomas  H.  Browne. 

Virginia:  Stuart  G.  Gibboney,  ex-Governor  Elly- 
son. 

West  Virginia:  Colonel  John  T.  McGraw. 

Wisconsin:  Joseph  E.  Davies. 

District  of  Columbia:  Charles  A.  Douglass. 

Hawaii :  John  H.  Wilson. 

Porto  Rico:    Henry  G.  Molina,  Henry  W.  Dooley. 

Kentucky:  Henry  S.  Breckinridge,  Governor 
Yagar,  now  in  Porto  Rico;  J.  W.  C.  Beckham. 

[EDITOB'S  NOTE  —  Mr.  McCombs  resumes  his  narrative.] 

After  Chairman  Norman  E.  Mack  of  the  National 
Committee,  on  June  25,  1912,  had  formally  called  the 
convention  to  order,  he  submitted  the  name  of  Judge 
Alton  B.  Parker,  former  candidate  for  President  of 
the  United  States,  for  Temporary  Chairman.  When 


McCOMBS'    ORGANIZATION 

he  asked  for  other  nominations,  Mr.  Bryan  arose. 
Referring  to  his  credentials  as  three  times  the  standard 
bearer  of  the  Democracy,  and  the  fact  that  six  and  a 
half  million  people  had  voted  for  him  on  each  occa 
sion,  he  opposed  Judge  Parker  on  the  ground  that  the 
Judge  had  been  nominated  for  the  forces  in  St.  Louis, 
chiefly  Messrs.  Thomas  F.  Ryan  and  August  Belmont, 
who  had  defeated  him  (Mr.  Bryan)  for  President. 
He  presented  Senator  John  W.  Kern  of  Indiana,  who 
had  run  with  him  on  the  Democratic  ticket  in  1908, 
and  he  spent  much  of  his  time  in  rehearsing  his  personal 
achievements. 

Mr.  Kern  recited  his  personal  friendship  for  Mr. 
Parker.  He  urged  him  to  retire  in  the  interest  of 
harmony  in  favor  of  Senator  O' Gorman  of  New  York, 
Senator  Culberson  of  Texas,  Representative  Clayton 
of  Alabama,  former  Governor  Campbell  of  Ohio, 
former  Governor  Folk  of  Missouri  or  Senator  Shively 
of  Indiana.  He  added: 

"If  there  is  to  be  no  response;  if  the  responsibility 
is  to  rest  there;  if  this  is  to  be  a  contest  between  the 
people  and  the  powers ;  if  it  is  to  be  a  contest  such  as 
has  been  described  —  a  contest  which  I  pray  God  may 
be  averted  —  then  the  cause  to  which  I  belong  is  so 
great  a  cause  that  I  am  not  fit  to  be  its  leader.  If  my 
proposition  for  harmony  is  to  be  ignored,  and  this 
deplorable  battle  is  to  go  on,  there  is  only  one  man, 
who  has  been  at  the  forefront  for  sixteen  years,  the 
great  American  Tribune,  William  J.  Bryan.  If  you 
will  have  nothing  else,  if  that  must  be  the  issue,  then 
the  leader  must  be  William  Jennings  Bryan". 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

We  knew  in  advance  that  Mr.  Bryan  was  to  make 
the  attack,  and  that  Mr.  Kern,  by  declining  the  nomi 
nation,  was,  in  effect,  to  support  Mr.  Bryan.  Judge 
Parker,  we  also  knew,  had  the  support  of  a  great  many 
Clark  men,  as  well  as  the  Harmon  and  Underwood 
people. 

Senator  Ollie  James,  of  Kentucky,  was  Mr.  Clark's 
close  personal  friend.  We  at  once  decided  that  the 
thing  to  do,  inasmuch  as  we  could  not  win  on  the  issue 
of  the  Temporary  Chairmanship,  was  to  get  in  behind 
Senator  James. 

I  conceived  this  move  on  the  theory  that  it  was  a 
foregone  conclusion  that  Judge  Parker  was  to  be 
elected  Temporary  Chairman,  and  that  we  might  draw 
away  some  of  the  Clark  support  by  developing  a  situ 
ation  where  delegates  favorable  to  Mr.  Clark  would 
not  vote  for  his  best  and  most  outspoken  friend.  This 
would  reveal  a  combination  for  Judge  Parker.  It  had 
the  desired  effect.  Immediately,  over  the  country,  the 
Clark  forces  were  accused  of  joining  with  the  reaction 
ary  forces. 

Right  here  I  may  clear  up  a  false  impression  as  to 
Judge  Parker's  participation.  I  learned  from  him, 
that  he  did  not  even  know  that  he  was  to  be  placed  in 
nomination  for  Temporary  Chairman,  at  Baltimore, 
until  his  name  was  submitted  to  the  convention.  When 
his  name  was  submitted,  and  attack  was  made  upon 
him,  he  felt  a  personal  pride  in  letting  the  issue  be 
determined  by  the  convention  itself.  He  was  not  a 
party  to  the  matter  at  all.  He  accepted  the  position 

[116] 


McCOMBS'    ORGANIZATION 

in  entire  good  faith,  and  of  course  discharged  it  with 
high  distinction. 

By  the  support  of  James,  I  conceived  that  we  had 
won  the  first  skirmish. 

Of  course,  it  was  impossible  to  determine  Mr. 
Bryan's  ultimate  position,  except  by  a  slender  chain  of 
circumstances  and  by  his  moves.  I  had  known  that, 
in  two  states  at  least,  he  had  suggested  that  the  dele 
gates  be  divided  equally  between  Mr.  Clark  and  Mr. 
Wilson.  This  was  a  danger  signal  to  me,  because,  if 
that  policy  were  followed  out  generally,  it  would  mean 
the  impossibility  of  nominating  either.  Personally,  I 
preferred  a  whole-hearted  minority  of  the  delegation 
to  a  substantial  equality  with  Mr.  Clark  of  perhaps 
unenthusiastic  delegates.  My  plan  was  always  to  hold 
thoroughly  intact,  as  a  second  line  of  defense,  the 
pledged  delegates,  in  the  belief  that  if  we  could  ever 
get  them  up  to  one-third  of  the  convention,  my  way 
would  be  easy. 

The  James  support  gave  the  Wilson  candidacy  a 
very  large  impetus. 

After  Mr.  Kern's  speech,  Mr.  Bryan  agreed  to 
become  a  candidate  for  the  Temporary  Chairmanship. 
He  denounced  Parker  as  the  candidate  of  "Wall 
Street  predatory  interests".  Two  things  were  to  be 
determined  —  the  cohesiveness  of  the  agreement  on 
Judge  Parker,  and  the  personal  following  of  Mr. 
Bryan  in  the  convention. 

Alabama,  whose  Presidential  preference  was  Mr. 
Underwood,  voted  for  Mr.  Bryan  with  the  exception 
of  1%  votes.  In  Arizona,  Bryan  got  4  and  Parker  2. 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

One  of  the  delegates,  when  Arizona  was  called,  asked 
that  the  name  be  called,  so  that  it  might  be  known  who 
had  voted  for  Wall  Street  and  who  voted  for  Bryan. 
Illinois  cast  53  votes  for  Parker  and  5  for  Bryan. 
The  Unit  Rule  applying  there,  the  entire  58  votes 
went  to  Judge  Parker.  In  Oklahoma,  15  were  for 
Bryan  and  5  for  Parker,  the  Wilson  men  voting  for 
Bryan.  The  general  result  was  that  Judge  Parker 
received  579  votes,  Bryan  508,  O' Gorman  4  and  Kern 
1.  The  Wilson  forces  supported  the  Bryan  chair 
manship  almost  solidly. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  election  of  Judge  Parker 
was  eminently  satisfactory  to  us.  We  enjoyed  the 
selection  of  Judge  Parker  in  every  respect.  The 
Temporary  Chairmanship  of  the  National  Convention 
is  not  a  position  of  very  tremendous  power.  We  knew 
that  Judge  Parker  would  be  eminently  fair,  and  that 
we  would  make  great  inroads  into  the  good  graces  of 
the  supporters  of  Bryan  and  the  so-called  Progressive 
supporters  of  Clark. 

The  suspicion  was  rife  that  Judge  Parker  was 
elected  by  a  combination  against  the  interest  of  Mr. 
Wilson.  Mr.  James'  name,  of  course,  never  came 
before  the  convention  of  his  own  desire.  The  events 
leading  up  to  the  selection  of  Judge  Parker  as 
Temporary  Chairman  were: 

June  21st,  four  days  previous,  the  selection  of  Judge 
Parker  as  Temporary  Chairman  was  made  by  the  sub 
committee  on  arrangements.  The  vote  stood: 
Parker,  New  York,  8 ;  James  of  Kentucky,  3 ;  Henry 
of  Texas,  3;  Kern  of  Indiana,  1 ;  Senator  O' Gorman, 

[  118  ] 


McCOMBS'    ORGANIZATION 

1.  Daniels  of  North  Carolina,  Osborne  of  Wyoming, 
and  Ewing  of  Louisiana,  voted  for  Henry.  All  were 
Wilson  men.  McGraw  of  West  Virginia  and  Huds- 
peth  of  New  Jersey  voted  for  O'Gorman  and  Kern, 
respectively.  Woodson  and  Wade,  Clark  men,  voted 
for  James,  as  did  Ball  of  Delaware. 

The  Parker  vote  was :  Mack  of  New  York,  Sullivan 
of  Illinois,  Taggart  of  Indiana,  Howell  of  Georgia, 
Johnson  of  South  Dakota,  Wood  of  Michigan,  Brown 
of  Vermont,  and  J.  Fred  Talbott  of  Maryland. 

The  next  day  Bryan  addressed  the  following  tele 
gram  to  Champ  Clark,  Governor  Foss  of  Missouri, 
Governor  Wilson  of  New  Jersey,  Governor  Burke  of 
North  Dakota,  Governor  Baldwin  of  Connecticut, 
Mayor  Gaynor  of  New  York: 

"I  took  it  for  granted  that  no  committeeman  inter 
ested  in  Democratic  success  would  desire  to  offend  the 
members  of  a  convention,  overwhelmingly  progressive, 
by  naming  a  reactionary  to  sound  the  keynote  of  the 
campaign.  Eight  members  of  the  sub-committee, 
however,  have,  over  the  protest  of  the  remaining  eight, 
agreed  not  only  on  a  reactionary  but  upon  the  one 
Democrat  among  those  not  candidates  for  the  presi 
dential  nomination  who  is  in  the  eyes  of  the  public 
most  conspicuously  identified  with  the  reactionary  ele 
ment  of  the  party.  I  shall  be  pleased  to  join  you  and 
your  friends  in  opposing  his  selection  by  the  full  com 
mittee  or  by  the  convention.  Kindly  answer  here." 

Champ  Clark  answered  at  once : 

"Have  consulted  with  Committee  having  my  inter 
ests  in  charge  and  agree  with  them  that  the  supreme 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

consideration  should  be  to  prevent  any  discord  in  the 
convention.  Friends  of  mine,  on  the  sub-committee  of 
arrangements,  have  already  presented  the  name  of 
Hon.  Ollie  James  to  the  sub-committee.  I  believe  if 
all  join  in  the  interests  of  harmony  in  an  appeal  to  the 
entire  National  Committee  to  avoid  controversies  in 
matters  of  organization,  the  committee  will  so  arrange 
as  to  leave  the  platform  and  nomination  of  candidates 
as  the  only  real  issues  on  which  delegates  need  divide". 

Mr.  Bryan's  telegram  was  a  challenge.  It  required 
an  answer.  On  the  sub-committee  Mr.  Clark's  friends 
were  divided.  His  answer  had,  of  course,  strong 
points  of  common  sense.  But  it  did  not  satisfy  the 
public.  Governor  Marshall's  answer  approved  the 
selection  of  Parker.  The  Harmon  men  regarded  the 
selection  of  Mr.  Parker  as  a  victory  for  themselves. 
The  Underwood  men  were  satisfied  to  be  quiet. 

On  the  whole,  there  was  a  feeling  in  the  National 
Committee  that  Mr.  Bryan  had  put  all  candidates  in 
a  very  embarrassing  position  and  had  raised  a  very 
unnecessary  issue.  The  situation  was  probably  best 
sized  up  by  the  statement  of  J.  Fred  Talbott  of  Mary 
land,  National  Committeeman,  who  was  for  Mr. 
Wilson,  and  he  said : 

"We  need  all  the  Democrats  there  are  in  order  to 
win  the  election.  Bryan  should  not  say  to  the  Con 
servatives  that  they  cannot  have  a  look  in  at  that 
convention.  Our  decision  to  make  Judge  Parker 
Temporary  Chairman  was  the  decent  thing  to  do.  I 
am  surprised  that  Bryan  should  not  be  in  favor  of 
doing  the  decent  thing.  I  thought  I  was  taking  the 

[  120  ] 


McCOMBS'   ORGANIZATION 

best  course  for  the  party  in  voting  for  Parker,  and  I 
still  think  so". 

The  Clark  men  were  in  distinct  discomfort.  If  they 
did  not  support  Judge  Parker  they  felt  themselves  in 
a  position  of  antagonizing  Charles  F.  Murphy  of  New 
York,  Roger  C.  Sullivan  of  Illinois,  and  Thomas  T. 
Taggart  of  Indiana.  They  made  an  attempt,  on  the 
theory  that  these  three  men  would  determine  the 
destinies  of  the  convention,  to  line  up  the  whole  Clark 
influence  for  Judge  Parker.  In  the  sub-committee 
the  Wilson  men  did  not  join  in  a  straight  out  and  out 
fight  on  Judge  Parker,  but  scattered  their  votes  among 
others,  without  concentration. 

The  fight  on  Judge  Parker  was  distinctly  a  Bryan 
fight.  It  was  not  a  clean-cut  issue  between  the  Clark 
and  Wilson  forces,  although  the  Wilson  forces  handled 
themselves  at  that  juncture  with  more  boldness. 

The  atmosphere  of  Baltimore  could  be  summed  up 
in  these  words:  "What  shall  we  do  with  Bryan  and 
what  is  Bryan  going  to  do  with  us"? 

On  the  night  of  June  22d,  the  Wilson  Floor  Com 
mittee  met  and  discussed  the  question  of  whether  Mr. 
Wilson  should  make  a  reply,  and  if  so,  what  it  should 
be.  It  was  apparent  that  the  whole  campaign  of 
Governor  Wilson  was  progressive.  The  men  who 
supported  him  were  progressive.  He  must  stand  or 
fall  on  that  issue.  While  there  was  no  personal  objec 
tion  to  Judge  Parker,  we  determined  that  whatever 
Mr.  Bryan's  motives  were,  and  however  unfortunate 
the  position  was  in  which  he  placed  the  convention,  that 
an  answer  in  the  first  place  was  the  desirable  thing. 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

In  the  second  place,  silence  on  the  matter  seemed  the 
height  of  folly. 

Accepting  it  as  a  fact  that  the  so-called  reactionary 
element  put  Mr.  Parker  forward,  it  seemed  the  proper 
thing  to  agree  with  Mr.  Bryan,  and  take  the  chance  of 
alienating  New  York  and  the  other  so-called  Con 
servative  delegations.  It  did  not  seem  to  me  a  very 
great  risk.  It  was  obvious,  inasmuch  as  the  issue  was 
small,  and  the  convention  would  be  a  hard-fought  one, 
that  as  soon  as  Judge  Parker  had  surrendered  his 
duties  as  Temporary  Chairman,  the  convention  would 
forget  about  the  petty  animosities  created.  This 
proved  to  be  the  fact. 

In  our  meeting  we  drew  up  a  suggestion  to  Mr. 
Wilson  as  to  the  logical  position  to  take.  The  sub 
stance  of  it  was  in  the  reply  given  by  Mr.  Wilson, 
although  the  Governor  went  somewhat  further  toward 
Mr.  Bryan  than  the  Committee  had  recommended. 
The  Wilson  reply  to  Bryan  was: 

"You  are  quite  right.  Before  hearing  of  your  mes 
sage  I  clearly  stated  my  position.  The  Baltimore 
convention  is  to  be  a  convention  of  Progressive,  of  men 
who  are  Progressives,  in  principle  and  by  conviction. 
It  must,  if  it  is  not  put  in  a  wrong  light  before  the 
convention,  express  its  convictions  in  its  organization 
and  in  its  choice  of  men  who  are  to  speak  for  it.  You 
are  to  be  a  member  of  this  convention,  and  are  entirely 
within  your  rights  in  doing  everything  within  your 
power  to  bring  that  result  about. 

"No  one  will  doubt  where  my  sympathies  lie;  and 
you  will,  I  am  sure,  find  my  friends  in  the  convention 

C  122  ] 


McCOMBS'    ORGANIZATION 

acting  upon  clear  conviction  and  always  in  the  interest 
of  the  people's  cause.  I  am  happy  in  the  confidence 
that  they  need  no  suggestion  from  me". 

It  is  to  be  remembered  that  Mr.  Bryan  had  stated, 
many  times,  that  Mr.  Clark  and  Mr.  Wilson  were  both 
Progressives  and  satisfactory  candidates.  This  left 
the  Clark  supporters,  so  far  as  the  Bryan  influence 
was  concerned,  rather  in  the  lurch.  At  this  time 
Doctor  Hall,  the  committeeman  from  Nebraska,  said 
that  he  had  a  letter  from  Mr.  Bryan  in  which  Mr. 
Bryan  stated  that  he  was  not  a  candidate,  did  not  want 
to  be  nominated  and  would  not  allow  his  name  to  be 
used.  Doctor  Hall  started  to  bring  forth  the  letter, 
but  felt  the  restraining  hand  of  some  of  the  Bryan 
supporters. 

It  was  indeed  a  situation  that  might  well  have 
pleased  Mr.  Bryan,  because  he  had  wedged  himself  in 
as  the  central  figure  and  had  been  cast  in  the  role 
again  of  the  "Gladiator  Against  Wall  Street". 

A  relatively  small  position,  that  of  Temporary 
Chairman,  the  only  qualifications  of  which  were  that 
the  person  be  a  well-known  man  and  a  good  speaker, 
had  become  the  center  of  a  storm.  The  whole  trouble 
could  have  been  averted  if  Mr.  Murphy  of  New  York 
had  accepted  Senator  O' Gorman  as  Temporary  Chair 
man.  O' Gorman  was  not  accepted  for  the  reason  that 
at  a  meeting  of  the  National  Committee  early  in 
March  his  name  had  been  suggested  by  John  T. 
McGraw  of  West  Virginia,  a  Wilson  man.  Mr. 
Murphy  would  not  allow  it  to  go  through  because  he 
had  not  been  consulted  first  about  Senator  O' Gorman. 

[  123  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

At  that  time  there  was  no  feeling  between  Murphy 
and  O'Gorman. 

On  June  24th,  Bryan  arrived  in  Baltimore.  He 
was  received  with  great  acclaim.  His  personal  popu 
larity  was  at  once  apparent.  He  was  called  on  by 
delegates  to  the  convention.  It  was  obvious  that  there 
was  a  grim  determination  on  the  part  of  the  Eastern 
and  Southern  states  to  prevent  his  nomination  in  any 
event.  To  me,  that  sounded  like  security.  The  con 
clusion  was  obvious  that  at  some  time  during  the  con 
vention  the  delegates  might  feel  themselves  compelled 
to  accept  Wilson  instead  of  Bryan. 

As  one  Pennsylvania  delegate  said  in  conversation 
with  a  New  York  delegate: 

"You'll  take  Wilson,  or  we'll  jam  Bryan  down  your 
throat"! 

Later  on,  when  asked  about  the  Temporary  Chair 
manship,  Mr.  Bryan  said: 

"I  have  declined  to  accept  it  and  shall  not  present 
my  name  for  the  place".  Asked  if  he  were  a  candidate 
for  the  Presidential  nomination,  he  replied: 

"Be  patient!    Hush!    Wait!    There  is  no  hurry" ! 

The  so-called  Conservative  element  was  becoming 
unpopular.  Wilson  delegates  were  arriving  in  large 
numbers.  We  were  pouring  publicity  on  them.  The 
Wilson  delegates  in  groups  of  two  were  going  about 
among  the  delegations  with  the  Wilson  propaganda. 
Their  manner  was  one  of  good  nature  rather  than 
bitter  partisanship.  Our  strength  was  not  great 
enough  to  be  violently  against  any  candidate,  and  such 
a  stand  was  bad  on  general  principles. 

[  124  ] 


McCOMBS'    ORGANIZATION 

The  fury  of  the  Temporary  Chairmanship  fight  on 
the  24th  grew  apace. 

Tuesday,  the  25th,  was  the  deciding  day.  The 
National  Committee  endorsed  the  action  of  the  sub 
committee.  Judge  Parker  received  31  votes.  Ollie 
James,  behind  whom  the  Wilson  forces  united,  received 
20  votes.  The  Clark  followers  went  to  Judge  Parker. 

The  charge  was  made  that  the  Clark  votes  were  pur 
chased  by  promise  of  support.  It  went  out  through 
the  country.  This  was  most  unfortunate  for  Mr. 
Clark,  because  many  of  his  delegates  were  not  tied  up 
for  many  ballots  under  instruction. 

Bryan  was  furious.  Senator  James  said  he  would 
not  accept  the  nomination  for  Temporary  Chairman 
from  the  convention  as  he  was  for  Clark  first,  last,  and 
all  the  time.  This  was  construed  as  an  indication  of  a 
Clark  alliance  with  the  anti-Bryan  leaders.  A  large 
section  of  the  press  construed  Judge  Parker's  success 
in  the  committee  as  a  combination  of  Underwood, 
Clark  and  Harmon  followers  to  defeat  Governor 
Wilson  at  all  hazards. 

After  the  result  in  the  committee  I  said: 

"I  do  not  think  the  result  of  the  vote  on  the  Tem 
porary  Chairmanship  in  the  National  Committee  will 
have  any  effect  on  Wilson's  chances.  We  were  for  a 
Progressive  for  Chairman,  and  we  are  still  for  a  Pro 
gressive.  We  accepted  a  Clark  man  and  voted  for 
him.  The  result  may  be  reversed  in  the  convention. 
Even  if  it  is  not,  it  will  not  show  that  the  reactionaries 
are  in  control.  Some  delegates  may  have  voted  for 
Parker  because  of  personal  friendship,  and  some 

[  125] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

because  of  a  desire  to  support  the  National  Committee 
as  a  matter  of  regularity". 

On  the  26th  of  June  the  convention  assembled. 

*  Mr.  Bryan  made  a  personal  appeal  that  he  instead  of 

Judge  Parker  be  made  Temporary  Chairman,  and 

designated  Parker  as  the  "candidate  of  the  predatory 

Wall  Street  interests". 

Mr.  Bryan  played  his  card  magnificently,  even 
though  he  lost  by  a  vote  of  579  to  510.  He  got  a  vote 
which  attested  strongly  to  his  personal  popularity. 
Those  510  votes,  at  the  moment  they  were  delivered, 
represented  to  my  mind  510  potential  Wilson  votes. 
When  it  came  to  a  fight  on  the  floor,  half  of  the  Clark 
delegates  could  not  be  delivered  to  Judge  Parker. 
That  was  significant.  Underwood  and  Harmon  were 
temporarily  driven  into  obscurity. 

The  Clark  interests  were  paying  heavily  for  the 
imputation  of  a  deal.  Bryan  put  Kern  in  nomination 
for  Temporary  Chairman,  and  it  is  said  that  Kern  was 
willing  to  retire  if  Judge  Parker  would.  This  was  all 
lost  in  the  din  and  confusion.  Although  those  who 
were  near  Mr.  Bryan  could  not  fail  to  be  impressed 
by  his  masterly  effort,  it  was  lost  on  the  crowd.  Then 
Bryan  nominated  himself. 

Delegates  were  rushing  to  the  platform  to  speak. 
Everything  was  in  confusion. 

The  roll  was  called:  Parker  579,  Bryan  510,  O' Gor 
man  3,  Kern  1. 

The  Wilson  delegates  stood  almost  solidly  for 
Bryan. 

Mr.  Parker,  taking  the  chair,  made  an  able  speech. 

C  126  ] 


McCOMBS'    ORGANIZATION 

It  was  conciliatory  in  tone.  No  exception  could  be 
taken  to  it  by  Conservative  or  Radical.  It  was 
received  almost  formally.  The  Temporary  Chairman 
ship  incident  was  gone. 

What  stood  out  was  that  Judge  Parker  would  not 
have  succeeded  but  for  the  Clark  support  in  the  con 
vention.  That  was  the  opening  wedge  for  driving  into 
the  heart  of  the  Clark  movement. 

Many  Clark  leaders  believed  that  Bryan  was  in 
sight,  and  that  the  Conservative  element  would  rush 
immediately  to  Clark's  support.  Predictions  were 
made  that  he  would  win  on  the  first  or  second  ballot. 
My  conclusion  was  that  Clark  was  definitely  out  of  the 
race,  and  could  under  no  circumstances  get  a  two- 
thirds  vote  in  the  convention. 


127  ] 


X 

THE    BALTIMORE    CONVENTION 

McCoMBs  SECURES  ABROGATION  OF  THE  UNIT  RULE  —  MURPHY, 
TAGGART,  SULLIVAN,  ET  AL  IGNORE  THE  INJUNCTION  — 
BRYAN  DEMANDS  WITHDRAWAL  OF  RYAN  AND  BELMONT  AS 
DELEGATES  —  CALLS  THEM  "MONEY-TRUST  DESPOTS"  — 
CLARK  RECEIVES  A  MAJORITY  VOTE  ON  TENTH  BALLOT,  BUT 
NOT  THE  NECESSARY  TWO-THIRDS  —  CHAIRMAN  JAMES  is 
ACCUSED  or  TRYING  TO  STAMPEDE  THE  CONVENTION  FOR 
CLARK. 

[EDITOR'S  NOTE  —  From  this  point  in  the  narrative,  the  story 
of  the  Wilson  campaign  will  be  a  compilation  from  notes 
which  Mr.  McCombs  left  and  which  have  been  put  together 
with  as  much  care  as  possible.] 

ON  THE   afternoon  of  June  26,   1912,   the 
century-old  unit  rule  was  smashed.      This 
feat  was  accomplished  by  another  combina 
tion  of  the  Wilson  men,  led  by  Mr.  McCombs,  and  the 
Bryan  men,  led  by  Mr.  Bryan. 

Under  the  unit  rule  the  vote  of  every  individual 
delegate  was  cast  for  the  candidate  declared  for  by  a 
majority  of  his  state  colleagues.  Of  course,  many 
delegations  were  absolutely  dominated  by  the  state 
bosses.  Charles  F.  Murphy,  for  instance,  assumed 
power  to  cast  the  solid  90  votes  from  New  York,  not 
only  for  any  candidate  he  desired,  but  for  any  proposi 
tion  that  suited  him. 

[  128  ] 


THE  BALTIMORE   CONVENTION 

Roger  C.  Sullivan  threw  the  58  votes  of  Illinois  as 
he  pleased.  Thomas  T.  Taggart  threw  the  30  from 
Indiana  as  he  chose,  while  E.  H.  Moore  sought  to 
handle  the  48  from  Ohio  in  a  similar  way,  according 
to  his  own  plans. 

Twenty  of  the  New  York  delegates  were  at  heart 
for  Wilson.  Nineteen  from  Ohio,  a  few  from  Illinois, 
Indiana  and  other  states,  whose  delegates  were  used 
by  the  anti-Wilson  bosses  as  "rubber  stamps",  also 
desired  to  vote  for  the  New  Jersey  Governor.  Bound 
by  the  iron  unit  rule  riveted  at  state  convention  or 
caucus,  they  were  forced  to  be  mere  mute  automatons. 
During  ballot  after  ballot,  they  were  held  for  the  one 
candidate  whose  nomination  they  opposed. 

McCombs  saw  in  the  abrogation  of  the  unit  rule  a 
chance  to  break  the  anti- Wilson  strangle  hold  on  dele 
gates  who  voted  en  bloc. 

He  called  a  conference  of  all  the  Wilson  leaders. 
Newton  D.  Baker,  afterward  Secretary  of  War,  rep 
resented  Ohio;  A.  Mitchell  Palmer,  afterward  Attor 
ney  General,  and  James  M.  GufTey,  Pennsylvania; 
Senator  James  A.  O'Gorman,  William  G.  McAdoo, 
John  B.  Stanchfield,  J.  Sergeant  Cram,  Herman 
Ridder,  and  others,  New  York;  Robert  S.  Huds- 
peth,  New  Jersey;  Josephus  Daniels,  afterward 
Secretary  of  the  Navy,  North  Carolina,  and  Mr. 
Bryan  and  his  brother,  Charles  W.,  Nebraska. 

It  was  determined  at  this  conference  that  the  report 
of  the  majority  of  the  Committee  on  Rules  permitting 
the  leader  of  a  delegation  to  cast  every  vote  for  his 
personal  choice,  should  be  beaten.  A  minority  report, 

[  129  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

submitted  by  Mr.  Baker,  of  Ohio,  declaring  that  each 
delegate  should  be  upheld  in  supporting  his  undivided 
preference,  was  prepared  and  presented. 

The  Murphy-Taggart-Ryan-Moore-Sullivan  com 
bine  fought  this  bitterly.  For  hours  an  acrimonious 
debate  raged  upon  the  floor,  but  by  a  vote  of  565% 
to  491%  the  minority  report  was  adopted. 

Triumphant  shouts  greeted  this  from  the  Wilson 
cohorts.  Of  course,  the  anti-Wilson  men  were  cha 
grined.  Murphy,  Taggart,  Moore  and  Sullivan, 
however,  persisted  in  announcing  the  vote  of  their 
respective  delegations  as  solid  for  Clark,  Hajmon, 
Marshall  or  Underwood,  as  if  the  unit  rule  dBS^mrori 
had  reaffirmed  the  unit  rule.  They  justified  it  on  the 
ground  that  there  were  no  challenges  from  the  state 
delegates. 

This  defiance  of  the  convention  majority  provoked 
fury  in  the  delegations  where  the  pro- Wilson  votes  had 
been  suppressed.  Many  took  the  advice  of  McCombs 
and  demanded  a  poll.  This  furnished  a  check  for  each 
delegate  publicly  to  proclaim  his  choice,  no  matter  how 
often  he  was  delivered  for  the  favorite  of  his  leader. 

[EDITOR'S  NOTE  —  McCombs  continues  his  narrative  here.] 

Probably  one  of  the  most  tense  moments  of  the 
convention  came  after  its  organization.  At  8  o'clock 
in  the  evening  of  the  26th,  Mr.  Bryan  addressed  the 
convention  in  these  words : 

"Mr.  Chairman,  .1  understand  that  the  rules  under 
which  we  are  acting  require  that  the  resolutions  be 
referred  to  the  Committee  on  Resolutions.  I  have  a 


THE  BALTIMORE   CONVENTION 

resolution  which  I  think  ought  to  be  acted  upon  before 
we  begin  the  nominations.  I,  therefore,  ask  unanimous 
consent  for  its  immediate  consideration." 

Mr.  Bryan,  upon  unanimous  consent,  read  the 
resolution : 

"Resolved:  That  in  this  crisis  in  our  party's  career, 
and  in  our  country's  history,  this  convention  sends 
greetings  to  the  people  of  the  United  States,  and 
assures  them  that  the  party  of  Jefferson  and  of  Jack 
son  is  still  the  champion  of  popular  government  and 
equality  before  the  law.  As  proof  of  our  fidelity  to 
the  people,  we  hereby  declare  ourselves  opposed  to  the 
nomination  of  any  candidate  for  President  who  is  the 
representative  of^  or  under  obligation  to  J.  Pierpont 
Morgan,  Thomas  F.  Ryan,  August  Belmont,  or  any 
other  member  of  the  privilege-hunting  and  favor- 
seeking  class.  Be  it  further 

"Resolved:  That  we  demand  the  withdrawal  from 
this  convention  of  any  delegate  or  delegates  constitut 
ing  or  representing  the  above  named  interests". 

Mr.  Belmont  and  Mr.  Ryan  were  delegates.  Mr. 
Morgan,  a  Republican,  was  not.  The  convention  was 
immediately  thrown  into  chaos.  All  rules  of  parlia 
mentary  procedure  were  attempted  at  once  to  prevent 
the  resolution  from  coming  up,  and  it  required  a  sus 
pension  of  the  rules  and  a  two-thirds  vote  for  it  to  be 
passed. 

Mr.  Bryan  said  furthermore: 

"This  is  an  extraordinary  resolution,  but  extraor 
dinary  conditions  need  extraordinary  remedies.  We 
are  now  engaged  in  the  conduct  of  a  convention  that 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

will  place  before  this  country  the  Democratic  nominee, 
and  I  assume  that  every  delegate  in  this  convention  is 
here  because  he  wants  that  nominee  elected.  It  is  in 
order  that  we  may  advance  the  cause  of  our  candidate 
that  I  present  this  resolution. 

"There  are  questions  of  which  a  court  takes  judicial 
notice;  and  there  are  subjects  upon  which  we  can 
assume  that  the  American  people  are  informed.  There 
is  not  a  delegate  in  this  convention  who  does  not  know 
that  an  effort  is  being  made  right  now  to  sell  the 
Democratic  Party  into  bondage  to  the  predatory 
interests  of  this  nation.  It  is  the  most  brazen,  the  most 
insolent,  the  most  impudent  attempt  that  has  been 
made  in  the  history  of  American  politics  to  dominate 
a  convention;  stifle  the  honest  sentiment  of  a  people 
and  make  the  nominee  the  bond-slave  of  the  men  who 
exploit  the  people  of  this  country. 

"I  need  not  tell  you  that  J.  Pierpont  Morgan, 
Thomas  F.  Ryan  and  August  Belmont  are  three  of 
the  men  who  are  connected  with  the  great  money  trust 
of  this  country;  who  are  as  despotic  in  their  rule  of 
the  business  of  the  country,  and  as  merciless  in  their 
command  of  their  slaves  as  any  men  in  the  country. 

"Some  one  has  suggested  that  we  have  no  right  to 
discuss  the  delegates  who  come  here  from  a  sovereign 
state.  I  reply,  that  if  these  men  are  willing  to  insult 
six  and  a  half  million  Democrats,  we  ought  to  speak 
out  against  them,  and  let  them  know  we  resent  the 
insult. 

"I,  for  one,  am  not  willing  that  Thomas  F.  Ryan 
and  August  Belmont  shall  come  here,  with  their  paid 

[  132  ] 


THE  BALTIMORE   CONVENTION 

attorneys,  and  seek  secret  counsel  with  the  managers 
of  this  party.  And  no  sense  of  politeness  or  courtesy 
to  such  men  will  keep  me  from  protecting  my  party 
from  the  disgrace  that  they  inflict  upon  us. 

"My  friends,  I  cannot  speak  for  you.  You  have 
your  own  responsibility;  but  if  this  is  to  be  a  conven 
tion  run  by  these  men;  if  our  nominee  is  to  be  their 
representative  and  tool,  I  pray  you  to  give  us,  who 
represent  constituencies  that  do  not  want  this,  a  chance 
to  go  on  record  with  our  protest  against  it.  If  any  of 
you  are  willing  to  nominate  a  candidate  who  repre 
sents  these  men,  or  who  is  under  obligation  to  these 
men,  do  it  and  take  the  responsibility.  I  refuse  to  take 
that  responsibility. 

"Some  have  said  that  we  have  not  a  right  to  demand 
the  withdrawal  of  delegates  from  this  convention.  I 
will  make  you  a  proposition.  One  of  these  men  sits 
with  New  York  and  the  other  sits  with  Virginia.  If 
the  State  of  New  York  will  take  a  poll  of  her  dele 
gates,  and  a  majority  of  them  —  not  Mr.  Murphy,  but 
a  majority  of  the  delegates  on  a  roll  call,  where  her 
delegates  can  have  their  names  recorded  and  printed  — 
do  not  ask  for  the  withdrawal  of  the  name  of  Mr. 
Belmont;  and  if  Virginia  will,  on  a  roll  call,  protest 
against  the  withdrawal  of  Mr.  Ryan,  I  will  then  with 
draw  the  last  part  of  the  resolution,  which  demands 
the  withdrawal  of  these  men  from  the  convention.  I 
will  withdraw  the  last  part,  on  the  request  of  the  state 
delegations  in  which  these  gentlemen  sit;  but  I  will 
not  withdraw  the  first  part,  which  demands  that  our 
candidate  shall  be  free  from  entanglement  with  them". 

[  133  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

Here  again  Mr.  Bryan  referred  to  his  six  and  one- 
half  million  votes. 

Several  of  Bryan's  friends  surged  to  the  platform 
and  urged  the  withdrawal  of  the  duly  elected  dele 
gates,  Mr.  Ryan  and  Mr.  Belmont.  He  evidently 
saw  that  the  second  part  of  his  resolution  was  a  mistake. 

The  dashing  and  brilliant  member  of  the  Virginia 
delegation,  Henry  D.  Flood,  rushed  to  the  plat 
form  and  said: 

"In  the  name  of  the  sovereign  State  of  Virginia, 
which  has  24  votes  on  this  floor,  I  accept  the  insolent 
proposition  made  by  the  only  man  in  this  convention 
who  wants  to  destroy  the  prospect  of  Democratic 


success", 


Mr.  Price,  of  Virginia,  came  to  the  platform  and 
said: 

"On  behalf  of  the  sovereign  State  of  Virginia,  we 
protest  as  to  the  latter  part  of  the  resolution;  but  no 
one  will  accede  more  heartily  and  more  thoroughly  to 
the  first  part  of  the  resolution  than  the  State  of  Vir 
ginia.  Virginia  has  always  been  able  to  control  her 
own  internal  affairs.  She  has  never  yet  asked  aid  or 
help  from  any  outside  influence.  If  there  are  undesir 
able  citizens  on  the  delegation  from  Virginia,  Virginia 
will  take  that  responsibility. 

"Last  night,  on  the  Ohio  resolution,  there  were 
only  three  and  one-half  Virginia  votes  against  sustain 
ing  the  minority  report,  and  to-day,  on  the  Utah  reso 
lution,  it  was  unanimous.  Virginia  is  able  to  right  her 
wrongs  and  demand  her  rights  at  the  hands  of  this 
convention.  Mr.  Bryan  has  very  kindly  yielded  me 

I  134  ] 


THE   BALTIMORE   CONVENTION 

this  moment,  and  he  will  now  make  his  own  statement". 

Mr.  Bryan  was  obviously  embarrassed  by  the  latter 
part  of  the  resolution.  He  asked  the  states  of  Virginia 
and  New  York  if  they  were  willing  to  poll  their  dele 
gates.  Virginia  was,  but  New  York  was  not. 

Finally,  Bryan  abdicated  on  the  latter  part  of  the 
resolution,  saying: 

"I  now  withdraw  the  latter  part  of  the  resolution; 
but  I  do  not  intend  that  any  member  of  this  conven 
tion  shall  shield  his  negative  vote,  against  the  prin 
cipal  part  of  the  resolution,  by  hiding  behind  the  latter 
part  of  it.  I  intend  that  the  men  who  think  the  first 
part  of  this  resolution  is  either  wrong  or  unnecessary 
shall  have  a  chance  to  say  so  on  roll  call. 

"In  answer  to  the  argument  of  the  gentleman  from 
West  Virginia  (Mr.  McCorkle)  that  this  question 
ought  not  to  be  brought  up  now  for  fear  of  disturbing 
harmony,  I  present  him  the  Bible  doctrine  —  and  I 
challenge  him  to  deny  if  he  can  —  'If  thy  right  hand 
offend  thee,  cut  it  off'.  I  am  sure  that  if  it  is  worth 
while  to  cut  off  the  right  hand  to  save  the  body,  it  is 
worth  while  to  cut  off  Morgan,  Ryan  and  Belmont  to 
save  the  Democratic  Party". 

Of  course,  the  latter  part  of  the  resolution  was  the 
only  thing  that  was  really  offensive.  The  first  part 
was,  in  effect,  a  vote  by  the  delegates  as  to  their  free 
dom  from  malicious  influence  and  an  affirmation  of 
virtue.  Some  of  our  delegations  were  chafing  under 
it,  but  I  sent  word  to  them  to  that  effect. 

A  roll  call  showed  the  initial  part  of  the  resolution 
adopted  by  this  vote:  883  yeas,  201%  nays ;  not  vot- 

[  135  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON   PRESIDENT 

ing,  3~y%.  New  York  voted  its  entire  delegation,  Yea. 
Virginia  voted  its  entire  delegation,  Yea,  with  the 
exception  of  %,  not  voting. 

At  the  time  that  Bryan  was  making  his  speech,  I 
was  standing  close  by  him.  I  looked  at  him  and  Mr. 
Murphy  alternately.  I  said  to  myself:  "One  of  two 
things  will  happen  now.  Murphy  will  sit  still,  or  he 
will  do  a  very  brilliant  thing:  he  will  eliminate  Wilson 
from  the  contest  by  voting  for  him."  But  he  did  not 
rise  to  brilliancy  and  the  convention  gradually  flooded 
down  to  normal,  while  Mr.  Bryan  cooled  himself  with 
a  palm  leaf  fan. 

I  remember  during  this  Bryan  speech,  that  Fred 
erick  J.  Talbott,  for  many  years  a  member  of  Con 
gress  and  a  member  of  the  Democratic  National 
Committee,  a  very  old  and  a  very  lovable  man,  but 
withal  possessed  of  strong  traits,  passed  between  me 
and  Mr.  Bryan.  He  shook  his  fist  in  Bryan's  face 
and,  with  the  tears  streaming  down  his  own,  said : 

"Everybody  in  this  convention  wants  the  Democrats 
to  win,  except  you" ! 

"Uncle  Fred"  was  for  Wilson.  I  gently  pulled  him 
back  to  his  seat  and  said : 

•  "Let  the  man  go  on;  he  has  got  a  lot  of  speeches  to 
make,  and  this  one  had  just  as  well  be  made  now". 

After  the  nominating  and  seconding  speeches,  con 
suming  from  3  A.  M.  to  7  A.  M.,  June  28,  the  first  ballot 
was  taken.  It  showed  Mr.  Clark  to  have  440%,  Mr* 
Wilson  324,  Mr.  Harmon^  148,  Mr.  Underwood 
117%,  Mr.  Marshall  31,  Mr.  Baldwin  22,  Mr.  Sulzer 
2,  and  2  not  voting. 

[  136] 


THE  BALTIMORE   CONVENTION 

The  vote  on  the  first  ballot  was,  of  course,  exactly 
as  expected.  It  was  calculated  to  a  certainty. 

Before  the  ballot  was  taken,  I  went  to  a  leading 
Harmon  member  of  the  Ohio  delegation.  I  said  that, 
inasmuch  as  the  question  of  the  unit  rule  had  been 
raised,  and  although  it  had  been  defeated,  and  19  votes 
could  be  cast  for  Mr.  Wilson,  I  regarded  it  a  courte 
ous  thing  that  the  whole  vote  of  the  State  of  Ohio 
should  be  cast  for  Mr.  Harmon  on  the  first  ballot. 
They  could  state  to  Wilson  delegates  in  the  Ohio  dele 
gation  that  I  was  quite  willing  and  would  recommend 
such  a  procedure. 

My  idea,  in  addition  to  the  courtesy,  was,  that  by 
making  this  generous  offer  (which  I  hoped  would  be 
accepted  by  the  Wilson  men),  I  would  need  and  get 
the  Harmon  support  at  some  stage  in  the  proceeding. 
We  could  lend  19  votes  for  a  few  ballots,  because 
we  did  not  have  the  necessary  one-third  of  the 
convention  at  that  time.  The  Wilson  delegates,  who 
were  more  strictly  anti-Harmon  than  pro-Wilson, 
in  the  main,  to  my  disappointment  refused  to  make 
the  concession. 

At  this  juncture  the  Wilson  votes  were:  Delaware, 
6;  Louisiana,  9  out  of  11;  Michigan,  10  put  of  30; 
Minnesota,  24;  New  Jersey,  24  out  of  28;  North 
Carolina,  16%  out  of  24;  North  Dakota,  10;  Ohio,  10 
out  of  48;  Oklahoma,  10  out  of  20;  Oregon,  10; 
Pennsylvania,  71  out  of  76;  South  Carolina,  18;  South 
Dakota,  10 ;  Tennessee  gave  each  of  the  leading  can 
didates,  Clark,  Wilson,  Harmon  and  Underwood,  6; 
Texas,  40 ;  Utah,  6  out  of  8 ;  Virginia,  9V2  out  of 

[  137  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

Wisconsin,  19  out  of  26;  Hawaii,  3  out  of  6;  Porto 
Rico,  3  out  of  6.  Total,  324. 

Mr.  Clark  secured  Arizona,  Arkansas,  California, 
Idaho,  Illinois,  Iowa,  Kansas,  Kentucky,  part  of 
Louisiana,  part  of  Maine,  Maryland  and  Massachu 
setts  ;  part  of  Michigan,  Missouri,  Nebraska,  Nevada, 
New  Hampshire,  New  Jersey,  New  Mexico,  1  in 
Ohio,  half  of  Oklahoma,  Rhode  Island,  part  of  Ten 
nessee,  part  of  Utah,  Washington,  West  Virginia, 
Wisconsin,  Wyoming,  most  of  Alaska,  District  of 
Columbia,  part  of  Hawaii,  and  Porto  Rico.  This 
made  a  total  of  440%.  It  is  to  be  observed  that  Mr. 
Clark's  votes  were  well  spread  over  the  Union;  that 
Mr.  Harmon's  votes  were  pretty  well  confined  to  Ohio 
and  New  York,  with  a  few  scattering  votes.  Mr. 
Underwood's  votes  were  limited  to  the  South,  with  a 
few  scattering  votes  elsewhere.  It  is  readily  seen  that 
the  Underwood  and  Harmon  votes,  as  a  class,  were 
very  nearly  identical  in  nature.  They  constituted  all 
that  part  of  the  convention  that  wished  a  "safe"  can 
didate.  The  various  Clark  delegations  were  honey 
combed  with  men  who  were  really  at  heart  for  some 
of  the  other  candidates. 

When  we  went  into  the  convention,  I  was  confident 
that  the  greatest  potential  strength  lay  in  Mr.  Under 
wood's  candidacy;  that  is,  the  votes  could  be  delivered 
without  much  persuasion,  and  speedily.  I  told  our 
floor  managers  that  if  we  could  get  by  the  tenth  ballot 
without  Mr.  Underwood's  nomination,  he  could  be 
gradually  marooned  in  the  South.  My  theory  was, 
that  unless  the  votes  were  developed  quickly  for  him, 

[  138  ] 


THE   BALTIMORE   CONVENTION 

his  managers  would  take  the  position  of  hoping  to  be 
the  residuary  legatees  of  Clark,  Wilson  or  Harmon, 
or  all  of  them. 

I,  therefore,  advised  our  Floor  Committee  not  to 
make  any  attempt  to  take  votes  from  Mr.  Underwood. 
I  preferred  that  his  strength  in  the  South  should 
remain  normal,  because  votes  in  his  hands  were  safer 
than  elsewhere.  I  also  suggested  that  we  should 
devote  our  energies  to  the  Clark  delegates,  in  order  to 
bring  out  the  Wilson  strength  that  lay  among  them. 
I  was  quite  sure  that  the  Harmon  strength  would 
atrophy  of  itself. 

I  knew  that  Mr.  Marshall,  Mr.  Baldwin,  and  Mr. 
Foss  would  receive  the  votes  of  their  states  because 
they  were  their  governors,  and  the  delegations  pre 
ferred  to  wait  until  things  developed. 

But  reverting  to  the  Underwood  situation:  My 
analysis  of  the  convention  was  that  upon  quick  devel 
opment,  in  addition  to  the  delegates  that  he  had, 
Underwood  might  have  had  California,  a  large  part  of 
Colorado,  Illinois,  Indiana,  Kentucky,  Maryland, 
Massachusetts,  New  Hampshire,  4  from  New  Jersey, 
New  York,  most  of  Ohio,  Rhode  Island,  Tennessee, 
Vermont,  most  of  Virginia  and  West  Virginia.  A 
fair  analysis  showed  that  Mr.  Harmon's  candidacy 
was  impossible  and  Mr.  Underwood  was  the  natural 
legatee  of  this  strength. 

Mr.  Clark's  delegations  had  a  great  many  Under 
wood  men  among  them.  I  reasoned  this  way  on  the 
tactics  of  the  situation:  I  did  not  have  an  idea  that 
Mr.  Clark  could  be  nominated,  but  I  determined  to 

[  139  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

pull  out  the  Wilson  strength  from  his  delegations  as 
quickly  as  possible,  to  forestall  the  same  move  on  the 
part  of  the  Underwood  men.  I  had  not  much  hope  of 
the  Harmon  strength. 

The  first  night  of  the  convention  was  long  and 
tedious.  The  nominating  speeches  were  of  course  long. 
After  we  took  our  first  ballot,  Friday,  about  7  A.  M., 
we  adjourned  until  4  p.  M. 

Ballot  number  two  showed  Clark  with  a  gain  of  5. 
Wilson  gained  15%.  Harmon  and  Underwood  lost 
slightly. 

Proselyting  tactics  continued  in  the  third  ballot. 
The  result  was  about  the  same. 

On  the  fourth  ballot  we  broke  into  Connecticut  for 
1  vote  and  into  Nebraska  for  3.  We  got  several 
scattering  delegates  which  put  Wilson  up  to  351.  I 
was  aiming  at  something  more  than  one-third  of  the 
delegations  early,  so  that  we  could  have  a  veto  power. 
My  plan  was  to  pledge  and  repledge  these  delegates  to 
stand  by  Wilson, —  to  cheer  them  all  the  time  with  the 
argument  that  he  could  be  nominated.  This  we  did 
before  and  after  ev£ry  session  of  the  convention. 

The  result  was  that  we  had  very  few  defections. 
I  was  never  fearful  of  a  defection,  for  I  had  it  ascer 
tained  positively,  before  each  session,  that  our  votes 
would  stay  with  us.  That  left  my  mind  free  to  work 
out  the  problem  of  accession. 

The  sixth,  seventh  and  eighth  ballots  remained  about 
the  same  all  around.  So  did  the  ninth. 

On  the  tenth  ballot  the  fireworks  began.  New  York 
changed  its  90  votes  f ror^Harmon  to  Clark.  Most  of 

[  140  ] 


THE  BALTIMORE   CONVENTION 

Tennessee  went  to  Clark.  Mr.  Harmon  was  deserted. 
The  Underwood  strength  practically  remained  intact. 
Mr.  Clark  had  556  votes,  or  more  than  a  majority. 

The  standards  were 


taken  from  the  various  delegations.  There  was  a  great 
march  of  the  delegates  about  the  hall  and  over  the 
platform. 

To  the  casual  observer,  it  looked  as  though  Mr. 
Clark  was  the  sure  nominee  of  the  convention,  for  no 
Democrat  had  ever  failed  of  nomination  in  a  conven 
tion  who  had  received  a  majority  of  its  votes  (with 
one  possible  exception)  . 

I  got  word  down  to  the  various  Wilson  delegations 
that  were  standing  like  a  rock,  that  this  was  as  high  as 
Mr.  Clark  could  possibly  go,  and  that  if  a  majority 
were  a  prerequisite  of  nominating  him,  he  would  never 
have  gotten  it.  The  90  votes  of  New  York,  for 
example,  would  not  have  been  cast  for  him  if  it  was 
necessary  to  give  him  two-thirds. 

It  was  clear  to  me  that  the  move  was  made  to  elim 
inate  Mr.  Wilson.  Furthermore,  I  was  sure  that  the 
Underwood  managers  understood  the  situation  and 
would  not  leave  him  for  Mr.  Clark.  Mr.  Harmon  was 
out  of  the  race. 

Chairman  Ollie  James,  in  announcing  the  vote,  like 
an  exhorter  at  a  camp  meeting,  shouted: 

"No  candidate  having  received  two-thirds  of  the  vote 
cast,  no  nomination  is  made.  Mr.  Clark  having 
received  eleven  more  than  a  majority,  is  not  the  nom 
inee  until  he  receives  two-  thirds."  The  language  was 
considered  an  exceedingly  unfair  attempt  on  the  part 

[141] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

of  Senator  James  to  indicate  that  it  was  now  the  duty 
of  the  convention  to  nominate  Mr.  Clark.  This 
brought  forth  a  violent  Wilson  protest. 

I  was  standing  with  Billy  Hughes  of  New  Jersey. 
I  called  his  attention  to  the  perfectly  egregious  posi 
tion  which  Chairman  James  was  taking  to  implore  the 
convention,  under  the  stimulus  of  a  wave,  to  give  the 
two-thirds  to  Clark.  Hughes  was  one  of  James' 
closest  friends.  He  said:  "I  will  fix  him"! 

Hughes  went  to  the  desk  and  said  to  James:  "There 
is  a  movement  among  the  delegates  to  depose  you  as 
Chairman  because  of  such  unparliamentary  tactics". 

The  effect  on  Chairman  James  was  instantaneous. 
After  that  he  was  indulgent  and  polite  to  a  degree. 

After  the  Clark  demonstration,  we  gave  the  word 
for  a  Wilson  demonstration.  Again  bedlam  broke 
forth.  Sentiment  in  the  gallery  was  pronouncedly 
with  Governor  Wilson. 


XI 

WILSON    HOISTS    THE    WHITE    FLAG 

BEGS  McCoMBS  TO  WITHDRAW  His  NAME  AS  A  PRESIDENTIAL 
CANDIDATE  —  McCoMBS  REPLIES:  "You  BET  YOUR  LIFE, 
I  WON'T"!  —  OTHER  INSTANCES  OF  WILSON'S  TRYING  TO 
QUIT  WHEN  HE  FEARED  DEFEAT  —  BRYAN  EXCORIATES 
MURPHY  AND  "SUBTLETY"  —  SWINGS  TO  WILSON. 

EARLY  FRIDAY,  June  28,  I  was  apprised 
that  Senator  William  J.  Stone,  manager  for 
Champ  Clark,  had  sent  a  telegram  to  Gov 
ernor  Wilson,  at  Sea  Girt,  insisting  that  he  withdraw. 
The  message  urged  that  never  in  the  history  of  the 
Democratic  Party  had  a  Democratic  candidate,  receiv 
ing  a  majority  of  the  votes  in  a  convention,  failed  of  a 
nomination.  The  Missourian  argued  that  it  was  use 
less  for  Governor  Wilson  to  continue  in  the  field,  and 
that  his  nomination  was  impossible.  Therefore,  it  was 
his  patriotic  duty  to  quit. 

The  moment  I  learned  of  the  Stone  message,  I 
called  up  Governor  Wilson.  He  admitted  having 
received  the  Stone  telegram,  and  added:  "Governor 
Stone's  logic  is  correct.  You  are  authorized  to  with 
draw  my  name  from  further  consideration". 

I  begged  the  Governor,  if  only  to  protect  his  sup 
porters,  to  abandon  such  an  idea.  I  pleaded  that 

[  143] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

thousands  of  members  of  his  party  had  risked  their 
political  and  financial  lives  for  him.  He  owed  it  to 
them  to  stick  as  long  as  they  would  stick. 

The  Governor  seemed  obdurate  and  I  rang  off. 

About  2  A.  M.,  Saturday,  I  was  sitting  alongside  of 
Chairman  James  on  the  convention  hall  platform. 
Walter  W.  Vick  handed  me  a  message,.  It  had  come 
by  'phone  to  our  headquarters  at  the  Hotel  Emerson, 
and  had  been  relayed  from  there. 

I  was  engaged  m  reforming  our  lines  and  did  not 
inspect  the  message  promptly  enough  to  suit  Vick. 
Pale,  and  apparently  alarmed,  Vick  begged  me  to  read 
the  paper. 

It  was  another  message  from  Governor  Wilson.  It 
again  insisted  that  I  take  him  out  of  the  race.  He 
specifically  directed  me  to  release  the  delegates  who 
had  been  voting  for  him. 

I  was  thoroughly  enraged.  I  felt  that  if  loyal  Wil 
son  men  were  willing  to  fight  to  the  last  for  the  Gov 
ernor,  he  at  least  might  maintain  his  nerve  and  stand 
with  them.  I  also  had  an  abiding  faith  that  he  was  to 
be  nominated,  though  Clark  still  had  a  majority,  but 
not  the  necessary  two-thirds. 

Turning  to  Vick,  I  said:  "The  Governor  wants  to 
withdraw" ! 

"You  won't  let  him  now,  will  you"?  inquired  Vick. 

"You  bet  your  life  I  won't"!  I  answered.  "Not  a 
word  about  this  to  anyone",  I  added. 

I  tuckedLtbe ^^  Goiasrnoiisdnstructions  into  my  pocket. 
They  remj^ed-tnere ^  until  the  convention  nominated 
him.  That  act  of  itself  made  history,  for  which  I  hope 

[  144  ] 


WILSON   HOISTS   THE   WHITE   FLAG 

to  be  forgiven.  Had  the  contents  of  that  message 
become  noised  about  that  convention  hall,  Woodrow 
Wilson  would  never  have  been  President  of  the  United 
States.  There  would  have  been  a  stampede  to  Clark, 
and  he  and  not  Wilson  would  have  been  nominated. 

My  position  was  that  Governor  Wilson  was  not 
through  until  he  was  "knocked  out".  He  owed  it  to 
his  friends,  if  not  to  himself,  to  remain  in  the  fight 
until  the  finish. 

As  I,  suffering  from  loss  of  sleep,  fought  to  hold  the 
Wilsonian  delegates,  I  could  not  help  recalling  other 
occasions  when  Wilson  would  have  destroyed  himself 
but  for  my  interposition. 

I  had  known  him  to  be  subject  to  frequent  panics 
and  overweening  pride.  I  learned,  from  many  experi 
ences,  that  Wilson  was  the  boldest  man  when  victory 
was  near  and  the  first  to  withdraw  when  defeat 
threatened. 

When  we  lost  the  Illinois  primaries  by  an  over 
whelming  majority  to  Champ  Clark,  Governor  Wilson 
in  alarm  despatched  a  Princeton  professor  to  me.  He 
said: 

"The  Governor  feels  it  is  useless  for  him  to  remain 
longer  in  the  field.  He  authorizes  me  to  say  to  you 
that  he  wishes  to  withdraw  from  the  contest  for  the 
Presidential  nomination.  He  desires  to  do  this  grace 
fully  now,  so  as  to  avoid  the  humiliation  of  defeat". 

My  reply  was:  "My  good  Professor,  please  tell  the 
Governor  that  you  saw  me,  and  that  I  said  that  he 
should  consider  others  than  himself.  He  should 
remember  that  a  lot  of  people  may  fare  worse  than  he 

[  145  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

because  they  have  given  up  their  time  and  their  money 
and  risked  their  political  future  in  his  cause.  He  will 
have  to  debate  it  with  me  and  give  a  better  argument 
before  I  will  listen".  I  never  heard  from  the  Professor 
again. 

When  the  Governor  passed  Clark  and  secured  a 
majority  of  the  delegates  himself,  he  called  me  on  the 
'phone  and  said:  "I  was  wrong  and  you  were  right. 
My  eternal  gratitude  to  you.  You  knew  the  situation. 
I  did  not.  I  shall  never  forget  your  loyalty  and  your 
courage". 

After  getting  Governor  Wilson's  instructions  to 
withdraw,  and  forgetting  them,  the  Governor  called 
me  up  again  and  asked  if  I  had  made  public  a  message 
to  Mr.  Bryan  agreeing  that  no  candidate  should 
accept  the  support  of  Charles  F.  Murphy. 

"No,  but  we  have  secured  enough  delegates  to  nom 
inate  you  since  you  sent  the  note,  Governor",  I  replied. 

"That's  fine!  That's  fine!  I  thank  you  most  pro 
foundly",  added  the  Governor. 

On  the  eleventh  ballot,  an  incident  occurred  which 
was  small,  apparently,  in  significance,  but  proved  to 
be  of  great  value.  Mr.  Ives,  of  Arizona,  changed  his 
vote  to  Wilson.  Mr.  Clark  receded  2  and  Mr.  Wilson 
gained  4. 

On  the  following  ballot  Mr.  Clark  lost  a  few  votes 
again.  Evidently,  the  managers  of  Mr.  Clark  were 
quite  willing  to  stand  where  they  were  at  this  time.  I 
very  much  doubted  the  wisdom  of  it,  but  from  their 
viewpoint  they  had  lost  very  few  votes,  and  by  one  of 
those  fortuitous  events  of  a  convention  might  arouse 

[146] 


WILSON   HOISTS   THE   WHITE   FLAG 

further  enthusiasm.  We  were  quite  willing  to  adjourn 
and  look  for  weaknesses  in  our  delegations  and  develop 
further  strength  if  possible. 

The  adjournment  was  at  3  o'clock  Saturday  morn 
ing,  June  29th,  until  1  p.  M.  During  this  and  the 
previous  night  not  a  single  one  of  the  Wilson  man 
agers  had  taken  off  his  clothes. 

As  I  walked  out  of  the  hall  I  was  sure  that  the 
Clark  candidacy  was  gone.  Again,  it  was  possible  to 
cast  his  strength  to  Mr.  Underwood  or  some  other 
candidate.  If  the  late  Mayor  Gaynor  of  New  York 
ever  had  a  chance  in  the  convention  it  was  at  this 
moment,  when  by  moving  New  York  and  a  few  other 
states  to  him  a  real  sentiment  might  have  been  built  up. 

At  the  end  of  the  session  the  floor  leaders  were 
desperately  tired.  Six  or  eight  of  us  went  over  to  the 
Belvidere  Hotel  and  woke  up  a  sleeping  waiter.  We 
had  arrived  at  that  state  of  exhaustion  where  neither 
food  nor  drink  appealed  to  us.  After  sitting  for  ten 
or  fifteen  minutes,  in  some  strange  way  watermelon 
occurred  to  me.  I  said : 

"Gentlemen,  in  celebration  of  the  forthcoming  nom 
ination  of  Woodrow  Wilson  in  this  convention,  I  wish 
you  to  join  me  in  raising  to  our  lips  luscious,  red, 
Georgia  watermelon". 

That  was  all  we  had.  We  analyzed  the  vote,  studied 
the  tactics  of  the  situation  and  planned  the  next  session 
until  about  7  o'clock  in  the  morning. 

Of  course,  the  first  move  was  to  reassure  and 
repledge  our  delegations. 

I  got  out  my  long  book,  showing  the  utmost  Clark 
[147] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

strength.  I  told  my  friends  that  I  could  reach  that 
Clark  was  through. 

,  After  a  long  discussion  of  ways  and  means  and  the 
Delegations  we  desired  to  secure,  I  concluded  that  the 
first  thing  to  do  was  to  pledge  every  Wilson  delegation 
for  the  day.  This  was  agreed  to,  with  the  exception  of 
one  leader  of  giant  physique,  who  left  the  room  saying 
he  was  an  "opportunist"  (Frederick  B.  Lynch,  of 
Minnesota  [Ed.]). 

Saturday  found  all  our  delegations  well  tightened 
up  and  safe.  It  was  clear  that  the  best  thing  was  to 
carry  through  the  general  Clark  "potting"  process, 
turn  every  Bryan  move  to  our  advantage,  and  watch 
for  some  tactical  change. 

The  opening  ballot,  at  1  o'clock  p.  M.,  showed  a 
Clark  loss  of  a  few  votes  and  a  Wilson  p.  M.  gain  of 
a  few.  Governor  Foss  of  Massachusetts  for  the  first 
time  entered  with  two  votes. 

On  the  fourteenth  ballot  Nebraska  asked  to  be 
passed.  Nebraska  then  asked  to  be  polled.  When  the 
name  of  Mr.  Bryan  was  reached  he  said: 

"As  long  as  Mr.  Ryan's  agent,  as  long  as  New 
York's  90  votes  are  recorded  for  Mr.  Clark,  I  withhold 
my  vote  from  him  and  cast  it" 

At  this  point  there  was  a  demonstration. 

Senator  Stone  requested  that  Mr.  Bryan  be  heard, 
and  asked  unanimous  consent,  which  was  agreed  to. 

Mr.  Bryan  resumed: 

"The  vote  of  the  State  of  New  York  in  this  conven 
tion,  as  cast  under  the  unit  rule,  does  not  represent  the 
intelligence,  the  virtue,  the  Democracy  or  the  patriot- 

[148] 


WILSON   HOISTS   THE  WHITE   FLAG 

ism  of  the  90  men  who  are  here.  It  represents  the 
will  of  one  man  —  Charles  F.  Murphy  —  and  he  rep 
resents  the  influences  that  dominated  the  Republican 
convention  at  Chicago  and  are  trying  to  dominate  this 
convention.  If  we  nominate  a  candidate  under  con 
ditions  that  enable  these  influences  to  say  to  our  can 
didate,  'Remember  now  thy  Creator',  we  cannot  hope 
to  appeal  to  the  confidence  of  the  progressive  Demo 
crats  and  Republicans  of  the  nation.  Nebraska,  or 
that  portion  of  th^  delegation  for  which  I  am  author 
ized  to  speak,  is  not  willing  to  participate  in  the  nom 
ination  of  any  mkn  who  is  willing  to  violate  the 
resolution  adopted  by  this  convention,  and  to  accept 
the  high  honor  of  the  Presidential  nomination  at  the 
hands  of  Mr.  Murphy. 

"When  we  were  instructed  for  Mr.  Clark,  the 
Democratic  voters  who  instructed  us  did  so  with  the 
distinct  understanding  that  Mr.  Clark  stood  for  pro 
gressive  Democracy.  Mr.  Clark's  representatives 
appealed  for  support  on  no  other  ground.  They  con 
tended  that  Mr.  Clark  was  more  progressive  than  Mr. 
Wilson,  and  indignantly  denied  that  there  was  any 
co-operation  between  Mr.  Clark  and  the  reactionary 
element  of  the  party.  Upon  no  other  condition  could 
Mr.  Clark  have  received  a  plurality  of  the  Democratic 
vote  of  Nebraska. 

"The  thirteen  delegates  for  whom  I  speak  stand 
ready  to  carry  out  the  instructions  given  in  the  spirit 
in  which  they  were  given,  and  upon  the  conditions 
under  which  they  were  given ;  but  some  of  these  dele 
gates —  I  cannot  say  for  how  many  I  can  speak, 

[  149  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

because  we  have  not  had  a  chance  to  take  a  poll  —  will 
not  participate  in  the  nomination  of  any  man  whose 
nomination  depends  upon  the  vote  of  the  New  York 
delegation. 

"I  shall  withhold  my  vote  from  Mr.  Clark  as  long  as 
New  York's  vote  is  recorded  for  him.  And  the  posi 
tion  that  I  take  in  regard  to  Mr.  Clark  I  will  take  in 
regard  to  any  other  candidate  whose  name  is  now  or 
may  be  before  the  convention.  I  shall  not  be  a  party 
to  the  nomination  of  any  man  who  will  not,  when 
elected,  be  absolutely  free  to  carry  out  the  anti-Mor- 
gan-Ryan-Belmont  resolution  and  make  his  adminis 
tration  reflect  the  wishes  and  hopes  of  those  who 
believe  in  a  government  of  the  people,  by  the  people 
and  for  the  people. 

"If  we  nominate  a  candidate  who  is  under  no  obli 
gation  to  these  interests  which  speak  through  Mr. 
Murphy,  I  shall  offer  a  resolution  authorizing  and 
directing  the  Presidential  candidate  to  select  a  cam 
paign  committee  to  manage  the  campaign,  in  order 
that  he  may  not  be  compelled  to  suffer  the  humiliation 
and  act  under  the  embarrassment  that  I  have,  in  hav 
ing  men  participate  in  the  management  of  his  cam 
paign  who  have  no  sympathy  with  the  party's  aims, 
and  in  whose  Democracy  the  general  public  has  no 
confidence. 

"Having  explained  the  position  taken  by  myself 
and  those  in  the  delegation  who  view  the  subject  from 
the  same  standpoint,  I  will  now  announce  my  vote"  — 

Governor  McCorkle,  of  West  Virginia,  asked  Mr. 
Bryan  whether  he  intended  to  be  understood  that  he 

[  150  ] 


WILSON   HOISTS   THE   WHITE   FLAG 

would  not  support  the  nominee  of  the  convention  if  he 
were  voted  for  and  nominated  by  the  vote  of  the  State 
of  New  York  in  the  convention. 

Mr.  Bryan  replied: 

"I  distinguish  between  refusing  to  be  a  party  to  the 
nomination  of  a  candidate  and  refusing  to  support 
him. 

"Now  I  am  prepared  to  announce  my  vote,  unless 
again  interrupted.  With  the  understanding  that  I 
shall  stand  ready  to  withdraw  my  vote  from  the  one 
for  whom  I  am  going  to  cast  it,  whenever  New  York 
casts  her  vote  for  him,  I  cast  my  vote  for  Nebraska's 
second  choice,  Governor  Wilson". 

The  result  of  the  Nebraska  poll  showed  12  for  Wil 
son  and  4  for  Clark. 

Mr.  Bryan's  subtlety  was  apparent.  The  only  con 
struction  that  could  be  placed  upon  it  was  that  he  was 
seeking  the  nomination  for  himself.  Mr.  Clark  had 
about  one-half  of  the  convention.  Mr.  Wilson  lacked 
nearly  100  votes  of  a  majority.  By  the  accession  of 
certain  Bryan  strength  in  the  Clark  delegations,  Mr. 
Clark  and  Mr.  Wilson  could  be  brought  up  to  about 
even  numbers. 

For  months  reports  had  come  to  me  that  it  was  Mr. 
Bryan's  personal  desire  that  this  be  the  case  in  the 
Baltimore  convention.  Indeed,  I  had  direct  reports 
from  Wisconsin  and  other  states  that  he  wished  the 
delegations  to  be  divided  between  Wilson  and  Clark, 
the  reasoning  being  that  a  deadlock  between  these  two 
delegations  would  produce  enough  strength  in  the 

[151  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

event  of  a  breakup  to  nominate  him.      Mr.  Bryan 
began  to  feel  that  the  Clark  strength  was  too  great. 

Governor  Brewer,  of  Mississippi,  propounded  this 
question  to  Mr.  Bryan: 

"If  Mr.  Clark,  Mr.  Underwood,  Mr.  Marshall,  Mr. 
Wilson,  Mr.  Harmon,  Mr.  Kern,  or  Governor  Foss  is 
nominated  by  this  convention  by  a  two-thirds  major 
ity,  with  New  York  voting  for  the  man  who  is  nom 
inated,  will  you  support  the  Democratic  nominee"? 

Mr.  Bryan  replied: 

"I  deny  the  right  of  any  man  to  put  a  hypothetical 
question  to  me,  unless  he  is  prepared  to  put  into  that 
question  every  essential  element  that  is  necessary  to  be 
understood  before  it  can  be  answered  intelligently.  I 
have  no  expectation  that  any  nomination  in  this  con 
vention  will  be  secured  in  any  way,  or  under  any 
conditions,  that  will  prevent  my  giving" 

Mr.  Bryan  was  interrupted,  but  continuing,  said : 

"I  expect  to  support  the  nominee  of  this  conven 
tion.  I  do  not  expect  anyone  to  be  nominated  here 
who  will  not  deserve  the  support  of  the  Democratic 
Party.  I  do  not  expect  anyone  to  be  nominated  who 
would  permit  a  partnership  between  Morgan,  Ryan, 
Belmont  and  himself.  But  I  do  not  consider  myself 
under  obligations  to  give  bond  to  answer  the  question 
categorically  until  the  conditions  arise  when  I  can 
know  what  I  am  answering" ! 

On  the  fourteenth  ballot  Mr.  Wilson  made  a  further 
gain.  Mr.  Underwood  began  to  sink. 

On  the  sixteenth  ballot  Idaho  asked  to  be  polled, 
with  accessions  of  two  for  Wilson.  The  unit  rule  was 

[  152] 


WILSON   HOISTS   THE   WHITE   FLAG 

applied.  We  considered  the  polling  of  delegations,  at 
frequent  intervals,  although  bound  by  the  unit  rule, 
tended  strongly  to  show  Wilson  strength  in  the  delega 
tions  and  a  desire  to  change.  This  tactic  was  used  to 
bolster  up  the  enthusiasm  that  we  already  had,  and  to 
continue  the  solidity  of  our  delegations.  I  gave  them 
distinct  hope  that  at  some  time,  the  delegations  which 
asked  to  be  polled,  and  which  showed  unknown  Wilson 
strength,  would  ultimately  break  over.  I  regarded  it 
as  of  tremendous  psychological  value. 

On  the  seventeenth  ballot  Tennessee  asked  to  be 
polled.  The  poll  showed  Mr.  Clark  was  being 
deserted,  and  an  attempt  was  being  made  to  shift  the 
strength  from  him  to  Underwood.  This  was  offset  by 
further  accessions  to  the  Wilson  camp. 

The  nineteenth  ballot  showed  about  the  same  con 
ditions. 

On  the  twentieth  ballot  Mr.  Clark  sank  to  512,  and 
Mr.  Wilson  went  from  358  to  388. 

On  the  twenty-first  ballot,  the  State  of  Washington 
asked  to  be  polled,  and  2%  votes  were  declared  for 
Mr.  Wilson.  The  Washington  delegation  was  very 
tightly  controlled  by  Hugh  R.  Wallace  and  Judge 
Turner.  As  soon  as  I  found  that  2%  votes  could  be 
relied  on  in  that  delegation  I  had  the  fact  brought  out 
by  the  poll.  Wyoming  then  asked  to  be  polled.  It 
showed  2  votes  for  Mr.  Wilson.  The  whole  6  votes 
had  theretofore  been  cast  for  Mr.  Clark.  The  unit 
rule  applied,  but  the  sentiment  was  shown. 

On  the  next  ballot  Mr.  Wilson  went 
Mr.  Clark  down  to  508.     Mr.  Francis,  of  Missouri, 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

moved  for  an  adjournment.  The  motion  was  defeated. 
We  were  on  the  up  grade. 

On  the  twenty-second  ballot,  Massachusetts  changed 
its  vote  to  2  for  Clark  and  34  for  Foss.  Vermont  cast 
its  8  votes  for  Foss.  The  Clark  vote  was  lessened, 
while  the  Wilson  vote  remained  practically  stationary. 

On  the  twenty-third  ballot  Clark  slipped  a  few 
votes,  Tvhile  Mr.  Wilson  gained  a  few.  Mr.  Foss 
received  45. 

The  next  ballot  showed  no  important  change  except 
that  Mr.  Foss  lost  2,  while  Mr.  Clark  gained. 

The  sharpshooters  were  at  work. 

After  consultation  with  one  of  the  Wilson  leaders 
I  concluded  that  it  was  about  time  to  poll  the  Iowa 
delegation.  The  result  showed  9  for  Wilson  and  17 
for  Clark.  The  unit  rule  prevailed,  but  the  strength 
was  shown.  The  psychology  was  apparent.  Governor 
Wilson  got  an  accession  of  3%  votes. 

At  this  point  Senator  Stone  made  a  very  adroit 
suggestion: 

"I  ask  the  unanimous  consent  of  this  convention  to 
the  following  agreement, —  that  after  two  additional 
ballots,  the  candidate  receiving  the  smallest  number  of 
votes  be  dropped,  and  after  the  next  ballot  thereafter 
the  candidate  receiving  the  smallest  vote  on  that  ballot 
be  dropped,  and  so  on  until  the  last  ballot ;  and  that  on 
that  ballot  the  candidate  receiving  the  greatest  number 
of  votes  be  declared  the  nominee  of  the  convention". 

The  introduction  of  this  motion  required  unanimous 
consent.  Objection  was  made.  The  motion  was  never 
put.  Its  object,  however,  was  apparent. 

r  154  ] 


WILSON   HOISTS   THE   WHITE   FLAG 

Mr.  Marshall  would  have  disappeared,  Mr.  Foss 
would  have  disappeared,  Mr.  Underwood  would  have 
disappeared,  leaving  the  contest  between  Wilson  and 
Clark.  Senator  Stone  no  doubt  thought  that  Massa 
chusetts  would  return  to  Mr.  Clark,  that  Indiana 
would  go  for  him,  and  that  the  Underwood  vote  might 
follow.  There  was  every  reason  to  believe  that  this 
would  be  true. 

Mr.  Clark  was  getting  into  desperate  straits.  If  the 
Wilson  managers  had  not  been  alert,  the  motion  might 
possibly  have  been  put.  But  whether  they  objected 
or  not,  I  am  confident  that  the  Underwood  managers 
would  have  objected,  because  there  is  every  reason  to 
believe  that  they  still  hoped  to  be  residuary  legatees  of 
the  convention. 

On  the  very  next  ballot  Mr.  Clark  dropped  27 
votes.  Governor  Wilson's  vote  remained  about  the 
same. 

Wilson  sentiment  had  begun  to  work  on  the  Mary 
land  delegation.  A  poll  showed  12  votes  for  Clark, 
2^/2  votes  for  Wilson  and  1%  not  voting.  These  tac 
tics  had  been  winning  votes  for  us  right  along.  Wher 
ever  we  could  get  a  poll  we  demanded  it.  I  resolved 
to  keep  up  the  practice  as  a  continuous  performance. 

But  let  me  revert  to  the  Washington  delegation. 

When  I  began  seeking  an  entry  into  that  delegation 
for  the  purposes  of  a  poll,  I  thought  that  the  intellec 
tual  polish  of  Governor  Wilson  might  appeal  to 
women.  Washington  had  a  woman  on  its  delegation. 
I  accordingly  selected  the  two  most  suave  and  hand 
some  men  that  we  had  to  lay  siege  to  the  lady.  They 

[  155  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

were  present  Postmaster  General  Albert  S.  Burleson 
and  Joseph  E.  Davies,  now  Commissioner  of  Corpora 
tions.  In  the  various  lulls  I  could  observe  these  two 
on  their  way  back  to  the  Washington  delegation 
straightening  their  ties,  smoothing  their  hair  and  pre 
paring  to  give  first-class  imitations  of  gallants  and 
cavaliers. 

The  lady  was  fat  and  of  stern  appearance.  They 
would  spend  ten  or  fifteen  minutes  with  her  and  come 
away  with  every  appearance  of  being  complete  misogy 
nists.  Nevertheless,  I  cheered  them  on.  The  lady 
was  not  susceptible.  She  voted  for  Clark  until  the 
very  last  ballot.  Whether  this  gives  any  light  on  the 
question  of  women  in  politics  I  do  not  know.  It  is 
merely  mentioned  here  for  what  it  is  worth,  and  as  an 
incident. 

Shortly  before  the  twenty-sixth  ballot  I  had  a  con 
ference  with  Mr.  Burleson  and  Mr.  Palmer.  We  con 
cluded  that  we  had  about  reached  our  strength  for  the 
time  being.  It  \vas  about  10  o'clock  at  night.  We 
concluded  an  attempt  at  adjournment.  Sunday  was 
approaching.  We  went  to  the  Clark  and  Underwood 
managers.  They  agreed  that  one  more  ballot  should 
be  taken  and  that  then  we  should  adjourn. 

At  that  time  the  weary  delegates  were  standing  in 
the  aisles,  waiting  for  an  adjournment,  glad  to  get  out 
of  the  heat.  The  adjournment  was  taken.  The  con 
vention  was  next  to  be  in  session  at  11  o'clock  Monday 
morning. 

Mr.  McCombs'  narrative  again  suddenly  stops. 

From  notes  of  his  own  and  data  supplied  for  the 
[  156  ] 


WILSON   HOISTS   THE   WHITE   FLAG 

book  by  Walker  W.  Vick  and  others,  it  seems  that 
there  was  a  breach  of  agreement  or  serious  and  almost 
fatal  misunderstanding  between  Mr.  McCoiribs  and 
Senator  Stone  as  to  just  when  adjournment  should 
become  effective. 

This  provoked  a  quarrel  between  Mr.  McCombs  and 
Mr.  Palmer,  'head  of  the  Pennsylvania  delegation, 
which  did  not  heal  for  a  long  time. 

According  to  the  scattered  manuscript,  the  twenty- 
sixth  ballot  had  hardly  been  completed  when  Mr. 
McCombs  hurried  to  Roger  C.  Sullivan,  chairman  of 
the  Illinois  delegation. 

"Now,  Roger,  this  is  your  chance" !  said  McCombs. 
"You  can  name  the  next  President  on  the  next  ballot. 
Hurry  up"! 

"All  right,  Billie,  I'll  call  my  delegation  together", 
replied  Sullivan,  as  he  gathered  his  Illinoisans  in  a 
side  room. 

When  the  Prairie  State  delegates  got  together, 
McCombs  uttered  a  fervent  appeal.  He  said: 

"Clark  has  shot  his  bolt.  He  never  again  can  get  a 
majority,  much  less  two-thirds.  Harmon  has  with 
drawn.  Underwood  will  soon  be  out  of  it.  Compro 
mise  on  a  dark  horse  is  impossible.  If  Illinois  will 
come  in,  she  will  get  the  credit  for  naming  the  winner". 

A  controversy  followed.  Ultra-Clark  men  insisted 
that  all  was  not  over  with  their  favorite.  Sullivan, 
himself,  was  skeptical  if  it  were  tihe  psychological 
moment  to  desert  the  Missourian. 

"Act  quick,  Roger!  They  are  calling  the  roll", 
pleaded  McCombs,  in  a  frenzy. 

[  157] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

Sullivan  directed  a  poll  of  his  delegation.  To  the 
delight  of  McCombs,  and  the  astonishment  of  Sulli 
van,  it  showed  40  for  Wilson  and  only  18  for  Clark. 

Under  the  unit  rule,  Sullivan  would  be  authorized 
to  cast  the  entire  58  votes  for  Wilson. 

"I'll  throw  the  whole  delegation  to  Wilson  on  next 
ballot,  Billie",  said  Sullivan  to  McCombs,  as  the  two, 
followed  by  the  Illinois  contingent,  flocked  back  to  the 
convention  hall. 

McCombs  was  amazed,  on  reaching  the  auditorium, 
to  discover  hundreds  of  delegates  streaming  out.  The 
band  was  playing  "Good  Night,  Ladies". 

"What  does  this  mean"?  demanded  McCombs,  in 
tones  of  mingled  surprise  and  disgust. 

"Adjourned  until  Monday" !  yelled  someone. 

"Who  ordered  this"?  shouted  McCombs,  in  wrath. 

"Don't  know,  but  the  Clark  men  put  it  over",  was 
the  response. 

Mr.  McCombs,  amid  the  uproar,  ascertained  that 
while  he  was  corraling  the  Illinois  delegation,  Senator 
Stone  and  A.  Mitchell  Palmer  had  put  their  heads 
together. 

"Everybody  is  hungry  and  tired.  We  want  food 
and  sleep.  Let's  quit  now  until  Monday",  said  the 
cunning  Stone  to  Palmer  in  McCombs'  absence  from 
the  floor. 

Palmer,  exhausted  and  discouraged,  suspected  no 
trap. 

"All  right,  Governor,  make  your  motion  to  adjourn 
and  I  will  not  oppose  it",  he  answered  the  Clark 
manager. 

[  158] 


WILSON   HOISTS    THE   WHITE   FLAG 

McCombs  sought  Palmer.    In  a  fury  he  exclaimed: 

"Why  did  you  agree  to  this  adjournment?  The 
compact  was  for  one  more  ballot  before  we  quit". 

"I  regarded  it  useless  for  us  to  continue  to-night 
and  believed  we  could  get  more  votes  for  Wilson  on 
Monday",  was  the  reply  of  the  Quaker  from  the 
Keystone  State. 

"I  had  it  all  fixed  with  Roger  Sullivan  to  bring  his 
whole  brood  to  Wilson  on  the  next  ballot.  You  have 
'gummed  the  cards', —  maybe  ruined  our  chance  to 
win",  McCombs  shouted  in  rage. 

"I  knew  nothing  about  Illinois.  I  was  busy  on  the 
floor  holding  our  people  in  line" !  was  Palmer's  meek 
reply. 

"Why  not  consult  me  once  in  a  while?  I  am  run 
ning  the  Wilson  campaign,  and  took  the  job  before 
I  ever  heard  of  you",  retorted  McCombs. 

"Await  orders  from  me  hereafter" !  was  his  parting 
shot  at  Palmer. 

McCombs,  who  had  had  little  or  no  sleep  for  seventy- 
two  hours,  dashed  back  to  the  Belvidere.  He  issued 
a  hurry  call  for  all  his  counsellors. 

"It's  a  shameful  mess  and  Mitchell  Palmer  got  us 
into  it.  But  we  have  twenty-four  hours  to  clear  it 
up",  said  McCombs  to  his  adjutants. 


[  159  ] 


XII 
BRYAN    UNMASKS 

IN  DESHABILLE,  HE  BESEECHES  McCoMBS  TO  DESERT  WILSON 
AND  NOMINATE  HIM  —  THE  PETITION  SPURNED  INDIGNANTLY 
—  MITCHELL  PALMER'S  PLAN  THWARTED  —  MAYOR  GAYNOR 
BOWLED  OUT  —  MURPHY  SAYS  "LET  CAUCUS  DECIDE"  — 
WILSON  LEADS  CLARK  FOR  THE  FIRST  TIME  —  JAMES  ORDERS 
ANTI-UNIT  RULE  ENFORCED  —  ALMOST  A  DEATH-BLOW  TO 
CLARK. 

[EDITOR'S  NOTE  —  McCombs'  narrative  is  here  resumed.] 

IT  BECAME  apparent  that  we  must  get  into 
Sunday  in  order  to  maintain  our  strength,  which 
was  about  60  votes  behind  Clark.  I  suggested 
to  Daniel  F.  Cohalan,  of  New  York,  that  he  should 
get  as  early  an  adjournment  as  possible  so  as  to  go 
into  Sunday  for  recruiting.  He  and  I  went  to  Senator 
Stone.  Stone  agreed  to  a  meeting  at  11  o'clock  p.  M. 
We  then  went  along  with  the  voting  sagging  back  and 
forth,  and  finally  got  up  to  within  40  votes  of  Clark, 
Harmon  and  Underwood  hanging  back  in  the  rear 
with  110  and  117  votes,  respectively. 

While  they  were  counting  the  last  ballot  before  the 
adjournment,  I  was  informed  by  one  of  my  special 
messengers  that  Mr.  Clark  was  on  the  way  to  the  con 
vention  to  appear  personally  in  answer  to  Bryan's 
speech.  While  many  disagree  with  me,  and  I  am  told 

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BRYAN  UNMASKS 

most  of  Clark's  friends  did,  he  was  on  the  way  to  the 
Convention  Hall,  and  close  by,  when  we  were  near  the 
end  of  counting  the  last  ballot  before  the  agreed 
adjournment. 

It  was  my  view  that  Mr.  Clark  should  be  allowed  to 
come  on  the  stage  at  all  hazards.  I  reasoned  that, 
while  the  attack  may  have  been  justified,  he  would 
commit  suicide  so  far  as  the  convention  was  concerned. 
I  rushed  several  members  down,  including  Senator 
Hughes,  of  'New  Jersey,  to  tell  Senator  Stone  that  we 
were  willing  to  take  another  ballot.  The  purpose  of 
that  was  to  allow  Mr.  Clark  time  to  get  on  the  floor. 
However,  the  delegates  were  drifting  into  the  aisles, 
and  going  away,  and  my  messengers  were  wholly 
unable  to  reach  Senator  Stone.  Therefore,  the  count 
on  that  ballot  was  completed,  the  convention  was 
adjourned,  and  Mr.  Clark,  too,  departed. 

I  have  always  regretted  that  this  dramatic  incident 
did  not  take  place.  Purely  as  a  dramatic  incident,  it 
would  have  filled  the  night!  In  my  opinion,  it  would 
have  fixed  the  convention  for  Mr.  Wilson  perma 
nently.  However,  I  returned  to  my  hotel,  went  to  my 
room,  bathed,  and  put  on  a  fresh  suit  to  work  through 
the  night. 

At  this  stage,  Mr.  Bryan  was  permitted  among  us 
by  his  speech  for  Wilson,  although  he  had  delivered 
only  18  votes.  We  had  about  as  much  of  Bryanism 
as  the  convention  could  endure. 

Nevertheless,  about  midnight,  Mr.  Bryan's  brother 
Charles  came  to  my  room,  which  was  at  the  other  end 
of  the  hall  from  Mr.  Bryan's  room,  and  asked  if  I 

[161  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

would  'have  a  talk  with  Mr.  Bryan.  I  said,  "Of 
course" ! 

I  appeared  in  a  few  moments,  as  fresh  as  a  man 
might  be  who  had  been  at  work  since  8  in  the  morning. 

Friends  who  were  in  Mr.  Bryan's  room  disappeared 
instantly.  We  were  alone.  He  was  standing  in  a 
corner,  with  his  side  face  to  me.  His  appearance  was 
very  grim.  His  mouth  looked  like  a  mouth  that  has 
been  created  by  a  slit  of  a  razor.  He  was  clad  in  a 
brown  undershirt,  baggy  black  trousers  and  a  pair  of 
carpet  slippers.  His  hair  was  ruffled. 

Mr.  Bryan  turned  to  me  and,  greeting  me  briskly, 
said : 

'McCombs,  you  know  that  Wilson  cannot  be  nom 
inated.  I  know  that  Clark  cannot  be  nominated.  You 
!  must  turn  your  forces  to  a  progressive  Democrat  like 
;  me",  placing  a  forefinger  vigorously  on  his  chest. 

I  replied  with  great  moderation,  because  I  did  not 
want  him  to  have  a  chance  to  break  out  again: 

"Mr.  Bryan,  you  have  been  in  national  politics 
longer  than  I  have ;  but  Mr.  Wilson  has  entrusted  me 
with  the  management  of  his  campaign  in  Baltimore.  I 
told  him  before  I  left  Sea  Girt  that  I  would  rise  or  fall 
with  his  fortunes.  We  have  not  fallen" !  and  I  rapidly 
left  the  room. 

Mr.  Bryan  was  in  a  rage.  I  had  secured  the  true 
Bryan  position,  which  I  had  suspected  since  in  March 
of  1912,  namely, —  to  create  an  equal  Wilson  and 
Clark  strength,  break  through  the  middle  and  get  the 
,  nomination.  This  suspicion  came  to  me  early  in 
March,  when  several  mid- Western  leaders,  or  their 

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BRYAN  UNMASKS 

representatives,  told  me  that  Mr.  Bryan  had  suggested 
that  they  divide  their  state  delegations  equally  between 
Wilson  and  Clark.  I  at  once  concluded  that  Mr. 
Bryan  was  a  candidate  on  the  "break  through  the 
middle"  theory.  I  told  them  to  go  back  home  and  get 
as  many  delegates  as  they  could  for  Wilson ;  that  they 
would  be  our  delegates  when  they  got  to  Baltimore 
and  would  not  shift  to  anyone  else. 

Sunday  I  got  busy  among  the  Illinois,  Indiana, 
Michigan,  Maryland  and  other  delegations.  That  day 
a  very  astonishing  event  happened.  At  the  house  of 
the  brother-in-law  of  A.  Mitchell  Palmer  (later  Attor 
ney  General),  there  met  Messrs.  Palmer,  of  Pennsyl 
vania,  and  Burleson,  of  Texas,  both  of  our  forces; 
Judge  Cohalan,  Mr.  Murphy,  of  New  York,  and  Mr. 
Sullivan,  of  Illinois.  I  knew  of  the  event  within 
twenty  minutes  after  the  meeting  began. 

The  purpose  on  the  face  of  it  was  to  come  to  a  con 
clusion  as  to  a  candidate,  pretending  to  be  for  Under 
wood,  but  really  being  for  Palmer.  I  had  made 
Palmer  floor  parliamentarian  for  the  purpose  of  hold 
ing  him  tight.  I  wanted  him  put  in  a  position  to  have 
to  say  Woodrow  Wilson  every  fifteen  minutes  during 
the  convention.  Palmer's  first  choice  was  himself, — 
strangely  enough,  because  he  had  no  backing.  The 
Philadelphia  end  of  his  delegation  bitterly  opposed 
him  and  only  came  in  through  my  work.  I  kept  my 
eye  on  Palmer  continuously.  I  gave  him  things  to  do 
that  were  immaterial,  but  made  him  appear  for  Wood- 
row  Wilson.  The  Sunday  conference  proved  I  was 
correct  in  my  suspicions. 

[  163  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

I  went  to  Palmer  Sunday  night  and  told  him  the 
details  of  that  conference,  and  that  if  he  did  another 
thing  I  had  fifty  good  husky  Irishmen  to  throw  him 
out  of  Baltimore.  There  was  no  more  display. 

Burleson,  because  he  had  no  standing  at  the  con 
vention  to  speak  of,  I  utterly  ignored  in  the  matter. 
We  never  brought  him  into  any  conference  that  was 
of  any  value.  Even  after  the  campaign  was  organ 
ized,  I  put  Burleson  in  a  position  in  which  there  was 
absolutely  nothing  to  do.  He  was  one  who  could  go 
to  Coney  Island  or  spend  his  evenings  on  the  roof 
gardens  as  pleasantly  as  he  might. 

About  5  o'clock  p.  M.  Sunday,  after  we  had  been 
pushing  back  and  forth  wearily  most  of  the  day,  and 
without  much  headway,  Norman  E.  Mack,  Chairman 
of  the  National  Democratic  Committee,  asked  me  to 
go  into  a  conference  in  his  room  at  the  Belvidere. 

I  agreed  readily  because  there  was  not  much  hap 
pening,  nor  much  ready  to  happen.  I  found  there, 
beside  Mr.  Mack,  A.  Mitchell  Palmer,  who  spoke 
sometimes  for  Woodrow  Wilson;  William  J.  Stone 
and  David  R.  Francis,  representing  Champ  Clark; 
William  Bankhead,  manager  for  Oscar  W.  Under 
wood;  Thomas  T.  Taggart,  manager  for  Thomas  R. 
Marshall;  Roger  Sullivan,  of  Illinois;  Luke  Shea,  of 
Tennessee,  and  Charles  F.  Murphy,  of  New  York. 

Mr.  Mack  started  by  saying  that  we  must  select  a 
candidate,  and  that  this  convention  appeared  to  be 
deadlocked.  Therefore,  we  were  gathered  for  a  con 
ference. 

I  regarded  it  as  a  set-up  game.  Mr.  Mack  called 
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BRYAN  UNMASKS 

on  me  first  to  speak  about  conditions  in  the  conven 
tion,  and  the  probability  of  our  agreeing  upon  a  can 
didate.  I  sparred  and  said  that  I  saw  present  two 
of  the  elder  statesmen  of  the  Democratic  Party,  Sen 
ator  Stone  and  Senator  Bankhead,  and  that  it  would 
be  impudence  on  my  part  to  speak  before  they  did. 
My  purpose  was  to  get  at  the  real  meaning  of  the 
conferees. 

Senator  Bankhead  made  a  very  bitter  speech  against 
the  Wilson  forces.  Advancing  within  two  feet  of  me, 
he  said  that  I  knew  Woodrow  Wilson  could  not  be 
nominated,  and  that  I  should  not  be  put  in  a  position 
of  the  dog-in-the-manger.  Senator  Stone  made  a 
mellifluous  oration  about  the  traditions  of  the  Demo 
cratic  Party,  the  seriousness  of  its  purposes,  its  great 
principles  and  the  necessity  of  allowing  the  delegates 
to  make  a  choice  at  the  earliest  possible  moment  so 
that  they  might  go  home.  Then  he  turned  to  me  and, 
pointing  his  finger  at  me,  said: 

"Mr.  McCombs,  Mr.  Bryan  has  asked  each  candi 
date  in  this  convention  if  he  would  take  the  nomination 
if  the  votes  of  New  York  were  necessary  thereto. 
What  is  your  position"? 

Of  course,  I  knew  that  either  answer  to  that  ques 
tion  was  wrong.  If  I  said  Governor  Wilson  would 
take  those  votes  under  the  conditions,  it  would  imme 
diately  get  to  the  Convention  Hall,  and  all  the  Bryan 
influence  and  radicals  of  the  West,  of  which  we  had 
many,  would  discard  Wilson  forever.  Either  answer 
to  that  question  meant  destruction. 

It  came  my  time  to  speak.  I  talked  about  four 
[  165  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

minutes  upon  the  reason  why  Wilson  should  be  nom 
inated  and  sat  down.  I  did  not  know  how  many  dis 
appointments  there  were.  But  I  recall  that  Mr. 
Murphy  took  me  by  the  shoulder  and  said: 

"You're  all  right,  young  fellow"! 

Then  we  proceeded  into  the  anteroom,  where  Mr. 
Mack  had  provided  a  buffet.  I,  as  graciously  as  I 
could,  opened  a  bottle  of  beer,  gave  a  glass  to  Senator 
Stone,  lifted  mine  to  the  flag  above  the  mantel,  he 
doing  the  same. 

I  said:  "Senator,  no  matter  who  is  the  nominee  of 
this  convention,  the  Republic  will  survive" ! 

We  resumed  the  occupation  of  selecting  a  candidate 
as  best  we  might. 

Results  of  the  Sunday  and  Monday  conferences 
were: 

First,  a  definite  conclusion  on  the  part  of  everyone 
that  Woodrow  Wilson  would  be  a  candidate  before 
that  convention  until  the  last;  second,  that  Mitchell 
Palmer,  as  a  candidate  for  the  Presidency,  might  as 
well  have  been  in  Shantung. 

[EDITOR'S  NOTE  —  Narrative  here  taken  up  by  editor  from 
Mr.  McCombs'  notes.] 

During  Sunday  Mr.  McCombs  devoted  himself 
especially  to  delegates  from  his  own  State  of  New 
York,  led  by  Charles  F.  Murphy,  and  Indiana,  led  by 
Thomas  T.  Taggart. 

Murphy  was  sticking  by  Clark,  and  Taggart  by 
Marshall. 

McCombs  summoned  all  the  Wilson  men  from  New 
York  that  he  could  muster.  These  delegates 

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BRYAN  UNMASKS 

responded:  Senator  James  A.  O'Gorman,  John  B. 
Stanchfield,  J.  Sergeant  Cram,  Charles  B.  Alexander, 
James  W.  Gerard,  Lawrence  Godkin,  William  G. 
McAdoo,  Samuel  Untermeyer,  Alonzo  McLoughlin, 
Edward  Lazansky,  Abram  I.  Elkus,  Herman  Ridder, 
Henry  L.  Schurman,  Thomas  D.  McCarthy,  and 
others. 

McCombs  directed  them  to  keep  banging  away  at 
Murphy  and  his  adherents  to  quit  throwing  away  their 
votes  on  a  "dead  one"  and  cast  them  for  a  "live  one". 

Then  McCombs  assailed  Murphy  himself.  He  told 
him  that  he  would  be  mighty  lonesome  if  he  persisted 
in  supporting  Clark;  that  he  had  been  deserted  by 
Roger  C.  Sullivan  and  other  comrades,  and  that  Tag- 
gart,  with  his  Hoosiers,  would  soon  follow  Sullivan 
into  the  Wilson  camp. 

Murphy  was  obdurate.  He  was  loyal  to  Clark  for 
the  nonce.  He  began  to  weaken,  however,  when 
Thomas  F.  Smith,  his  most  trusted  adviser,  warned 
him  that  he  would  again  risk  political  jeopardy  if  he 
persisted  in  delaying  a  junction  in  the  naming  of 
Wilson. 

To  add  to  Mr.  McCombs'  perplexity  in  getting  hold 
of  the  entire  New  York  delegation,  the  William  J. 
Gaynor  boosters  got  to  work.  Mr.  Gaynor  was  then 
Mayoi  of  New  York.  He  was  ambitious  to  be  Presi 
dent.  Corporation  Counsel  Archibald  R.  Watson, 
Fire  Commissioner  Joseph  F.  Johnson,  and  other 
members  of  the  Gaynor  cabinet,  were  doing  their 
utmost  to  break  into  the  Empire  State  and  other  dele 
gations.  They  had  greatly  impressed  William  J. 

[167] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

Bryan  that  Gaynor  could  at  least  be  used  to  defeat 
Clark.  They  were  almost  incessantly  prodding  Mr. 
Murphy  with  the  argument  that  neither  Clark  nor 
Wilson  could  be  nominated,  and  that  here  was  his 
chance  to  name  a  New  Yorker. 

McCombs  sought  to  block  the  Gaynor  movement 
with  pleas  that  the  Mayor's  Democracy  was  of  a  dubi 
ous  brand.  As  an  aspirant  for  judicial  and  mayoralty 
honors,  he  had  demanded  support  from  the  most 
implacable  enemies  of  the  party,  and  he  had,  after  his 
election,  refused  to  fulfil  his  contracts  with  the  organ 
ization  that  nominated  him.  In  proof  of  this,  Mr. 
McCombs  produced  a  list  of  appointments  of  the 
"Mugwump"  stamp  and  another  list  of  loyal  Demo 
crats  who,  as  applicants  for  office,  had  been  denied 
preferment  of  any  sort. 

Early  Sunday  morning,  Mr.  McCombs  discovered 
that  Senator  Stone,  the  Clark  field  marshal,  was  still 
conniving  to  force  the  withdrawal  of  all  "trailers". 
That  is,  he  was  planning  to  put  out  of  the  race  Under 
wood,  Harmon,  Baldwin,  and  other  aspirants,  and 
bring  their  supporters  in  a  block  to  Clark. 

Thomas  F.  Ryan  was  found  trying  to  deliver  his 
Underwood  men  to  Clark.  Ohio  delegates  pledged  to 
Harmon  were  being  importuned  to  desert  him,  while 
Homer  S.  Cummings  had  been  approached  to  with 
draw  the  Governor  of  Connecticut  and  line  up  with  the 
Missourian. 

McCombs  put  Roger  Sullivan  to  work  on  the  Vir 
ginians  who  stuck  to  Underwood,  and  the  Ohioans 
who  held  on  for  Harmon.  He  also  induced  Edmund 

C  168  ] 


BRYAN  UNMASKS 

H  Moore,  manager  for  Harmon,  to  withhold  as  many 
Harmon  men  as  he  could  control  from  Clark.  Newton 
D.  Baker,  too,  aided  in  preserving  the  integrity  of  the 
Harmon  forces  so  far  as  Clark  invasions  were  con 
cerned,  and  helped  to  pick  off  a  few  delegates  from 
the  Buckeye  State  for  Wilson. 

Meantime,  all  the  managers  were  being  besought  to 
"stake"  impoverished  delegates  wrho  were  threatened 
with  being  dispossessed  of  their  lodgings  and  denied 
food.  McCombs,  Stone,  Francis,  Bankhead,  and 
others,  were  constantly  implored  to  furnish  means  for 
room  rent  and  food.  Threats  were  made  by  many 
delegates  that  if  they  were  not  given  funds  they  would 
board  the  first  train  for  their  homes. 

Managers  for  all  the  candidates  had  to  put  up  large 
sums  of  money  to  hold  proprietors  of  votes  in  Balti 
more  for  at  least  another  twenty-four  or  forty-eight 
hours.  They  turned  their  pockets  inside  out  and  bor 
rowed  right  and  left  to  satisfy  the  demands  of 
sleepy,  "hungry  delegates. 

Despite  all  the  Sunday  exertions  of  Mr.  McCombs 
and  his  associates,  the  initial  ballot  (twenty-seventh) 
on  Monday  was  intensely  disappointing.    Wilson  got 
but  406%, —  a  loss  of  one  since  Saturday  night.  Clark 
held  469,  which  had  been  cast  for  him  on  the  twenty- 
fifth.     On  the  twenty-eighth  ballot,  however,  Wilson? 
suddenly  gained  a  block  of  30.     One  only  came  from  ' 
Clark;    the   others   were   deserters    from   Harmon, 
Underwood  and  Baldwin. 

On  the  thirtieth,  Wilson  jumped  into  the  lead  for  v 
the  first  time.    His  supporters  shouted  in  glee. 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

As  the  Clerk  called,  "Wilson,  460;  Clark,  455,"  the 
band  struck  up  "Glory,  Glory,  Hallelujah"!  The 
Pennsylvania  delegates,  led  by  Palmer  and  Guffey, 
chanted: 

"Pennsyl,  Pennsyl,  Pennsylvania ! 

Pennsyl,  Pennsyl,  Pennsylvania ! 

Pennsyl,  Pennsyl,  Pennsylvania ! 

Well  vote  for  Wilson  too !" 

Counting  on  Wilson  leaping  to  the  van  on  the  thir 
tieth,  McCombs  rushed  over  to  Roger  Sullivan  and 
begged:  "Now,  Roger,  make  good.  You  promised 
that  Illinois  would  come  in  on  the  twenty-sixth.  Get 
a  move  on" ! 

But  Mr.  Murphy  and  Mr.  Taggart  had  seen  Sul 
livan  since  McCombs  had.  They  had  persuaded  him 
to  "hold  off"  for  awhile. 

On  the  thirty-first  Wilson  scored  475%  and  Clark 
446l/2. 

The  thirty-second  chalked  up  4771/2  for  Wilson  and 
447%  for  Clark. 

On  the  thirty-fifth  Wilson  increased  his  total  to 
494%. 

Clark  got  433%,  the  lowest  number  received  by  him 
during  the  convention. 

During  this  ballot  Florida,  which  had  been  voting 
solidly  for  Underwood,  threw  2  votes  for  Wilson. 
This  break,  which  McCombs  had  engineered  over  Sun 
day,  caused  Governor  Gilchrist  to  leap  upon  a  chair 
and  shout: 

"Florida  was  instructed   for  Underwood.      Any 


BRYAN  UNMASKS 

delegate  who  violates  those  instructions  commits  a 
dishonorable  act"! 

McCombs  had  seen  to  it  that  Senator  James  A. 
O' Gorman,  an  ardent  Wilsonite,  had  become  substi 
tute  for  Chairman  Ollie  James,  when  the  latter  had 
all  but  collapsed  through  fatigue. 

"The  unit  rule  has  been  abolished.  Each  delegate 
is  at  liberty  to  vote  for  whom  he  pleases",  was  the 
rebuking  edict  of  the  acting  Chairman. 

Wilson  voters  greeted  this  with  thunderous  cheers. 

McCombs  walked  over  to  the  Wilson  contingent  of 
the  New  York  delegation,  whose  block  of  90  was  still 
being  cast  for  Clark,  and  implored  them  to  follow  the 
example  of  their  Florida  brethren.  He  also  appealed 
to  Chairman  Murphy  to  release  such  of  his  delegates 
as  wished  to  vote  for  Wilson. 

"If  the  caucus  agrees,  all  right.  The  caucus  will 
decide" !  was  Murphy's  response. 

But  no  caucus  other  than  those  yet  held  was  called, 
and  New  York  continued  to  cast  her  entire  vote  for 
Clark. 

Senator  James  having  returned  to  the  chair,  Senator 
Stone  insisted  that  he  reverse  the  ruling  of  Senator 
O' Gorman  that  no  unit  rule  prevailed.  James 
answered  this  by  declaring  a  break  of  one  to  Wilson 
in  the  Colorado  delegation  to  be  in  accordance  with 
the  convention  mandate. 

Iowa,  on  the  thirty-ninth  ballot  joined  the  Wilson 
procession.    This  put  the  New  Jersey  Governor's  total 
at  501  for  the  first  time. 
/  When,  on  the  forty-second  ballot  Ohio  registered 


BRYAN  UNMASKS 

19  for  Wilson,  and  it  looked  as  if  Wilson  might  appro 
priate  the  whole  48  on  the  forty-third,  the  Clark  man 
agers  sprang  another  adjournment  resolution. 

It  was  nearly  1  A.  M.  Tuesday.  Delegates  were 
exhausted  and  hungry.  No  power  could  hold  them  in 
their  seats.  So  they  voted  761  to  260  to  adjourn  until 
Tuesday  noon. 

Though  Clark  managers  boasted  that  the  adjourn 
ment  was  still  another  victory  for  them,  it  proved  the 
undoing  of  the  former  Speaker  of  the  House. 


[  172  ] 


XIII 
WILSON  WINS  NOMINATION 

VICTORIOUS  ON  FORTY-SIXTH  BALLOT  —  SULLIVAN  CLINCHES  IT 

—  MURPHY  CAPITULATES  —  McCoMBs  WARNED:   "REMEMBER 
JIM  SMITH"  !  —  McAooo  PICKS  PALMER  FOR  VICE  PRESIDENT 

—  McCoMBs  SELECTS  MARSHALL  —  SUMMARY  OP  THE  UNPRE 
CEDENTED  BALLOTS  FOR  THE  PRESIDENCY. 

[EDITOR'S  NOTE  —  Editor's  narrative  continued.] 

BEFORE   daylight  Tuesday,   Mr.   McCombs 
had  exacted  a  renewed  and  copper-riveted 
pledge  from  Roger  C.  Sullivan  to  head  the 
final  stampede  for  Wilson.     This  time,  Sullivan  ful 
filled  his  contract. 

On  the  forty-third  ballot,  Sullivan,  measuring  every 
word,  roared: 

"Illinois  casts  18  votes  for  Clark  and  40  for  Wilson. 
Under  the  rule  adopted  by  the  delegation,  therefore, 
all  58  Illinois  votes  are  cast  for  Wilson" ! 

A  wild  whoop  came  from  the  forty  Texans ;  another 
from  the  seventy-six  Pennsylvanians. 

Sullivan  was  hugged  and  kissed  and  cheered  by 
Wilson  devotees. 

Surlily,  Clark  men  shouted :  "What  did  you  get  for 
it,  Roger"? 

[  173  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

"The  choice  of  this  convention,  that's  all"!  was  the 
retort. 

With  the  total  defection  of  Illinois  from  Clark  to 
Wilson,  Wilson's  aggregate  mounted  to  612.  Clark's 
dwindled  to  329. 

Wilson  gained  17  on  the  forty-fourth.  Clark  could 
get  but  306, — the  memorable  number  that  stood  to 
the  finish  for  Ulysses  S.  Grant  at  the  Republican 
National  Convention  of  1880. 

Clark  stuck  at  306  on  the  forty-fifth,  while  Wilson's 
total  went  to  633. 

Underwood  and  Foss,  the  latter  of  whom  on  late 
ballots  had  been  supported  by  Massachusetts,  were 
both  withdrawn.  Their  followers  joined  the  Wilson 
parade. 

Then  Charles  F.  Murphy  nodded  to  John  J.  Fitz 
gerald,  of  Kings. 

Amid  a  frightful  hub-bub,  created  by  yelling, 
marching  battalions  of  Wilsonites,  Fitzgerald  wearily 
and  reluctantly  mounted  the  stage. 

In  husky  tones,  tinged  with  a  look  of  disgust,  he 
was  barely  heard  to  say: 

"I  move  that  the  nomination  of  Woodrow  Wilson 
for  President  of  the  United  States  be  made  unani 
mous"  ! 

Frenzied  cheers  from  the  jubilant  Wilson  shouters 
smothered  what  Fitzgerald  might  have  added. 

Amid  a  crash  of  band  music,  tooting  of  horns, 
shrieks  through  megaphones,  and  yells  from  thou 
sands,  the  tally  clerk  informed  Chairman  James  that 
the  forty-sixth  and  final  ballot  registered: 


McCoMBs  FELICITATES  WILSON   ON   His  PRESIDENTIAL 
NOMINATION  AT  SEA  GIRT,  N.  J.,  1912 


WILSON  WINS  NOMINATION 

Wilson,  890;  Clark,  84;  Harmon,  25;  Underwood, 
12;Foss,  27. 

Chairman  James,  his  voice  subdued  to  a  whisper, 
proclaimed: 

"I  declare  Woodrow  Wilson  the  unanimous  choice 
of  this  Convention  for  the  Democratic  nomination  for 
President  of  the  United  States"! 

The  full  table  of  ballots  follows: 

THE  BALLOTS 

WILSON     CLARK 

First 324  441% 

Second 339%  446% 

Third 345  441 

Fourth 3491/2  443 

Fifth 351  443 

Sixth 354  445 

Seventh 352%  449% 

Eighth 351%  448% 

Ninth 351%  462 

Tenth .7$3T.v  351%  556  n* 

Eleventh 35*%  654 

Twelfth 354  647% 

Thirteenth 356  654% 

Fourteenth 362  650 

Fifteenth 362%  651 

Sixteenth 362%  661 

Seventeenth 362%  545 

Eighteenth 361  635 

Nineteenth 358^  532  ~ 

Twentieth 388%  512  \ 

Twenty-first 395%  508^ 

Twenty-second 396%  510% 

Twenty-third 399  497% 

Twenty-fourth 402%  496 

[  175] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

WILSON  CLARK 

Twenty-fifth 405  469 

Twenty-sixth 407%  463 

Twenty-seventh 406%  469 

Twenty-eighth. , 437%  468% 

Twenty-ninth 436  468% 

Thirtieth 460  455 

Thirty-first 475%  446% 

Thirty-second 477%  446% 

Thirty-third 477%  447% 

Thirty-fourth 479%  447% 

Thirty-fifth 494%  433% 

Thirty-sixth 496%  434% 

Thirty-seventh 496%  432% 

Thirty-eighth. 498%  425 

Thirty-ninth 501%  424 

Fortieth 601%  424 

Forty-first 499%  424 

Forty-second 494  430 

Forty-third 612  329 

Forty-fourth 629  306 

Forty-fifth 633  306 

Forty-sixth 890  84 

TOTAL: 

WILSON 890 

CLARK 84 

HARMON 25 

UNDERWOOD 12 

FOBS 27 

!As  Mr.  McCombs  stood  upon  the  Convention  hall 

platform,  both  his  hands  squeezed  almost  to  a  pulp  by 
hysterical  Wilsonites,  a  Princeton  chum  accosted  him 
with  "Well,  Bill,  you  certainly  put  'Woody'  over!  I 

[  176] 


WILSON  WINS  NOMINATION 

did  not  think  it  possible.  But  look  out!  Recall  the 
fate  of  Uncle  Jim  Smith"! 

"What  do  you  mean"?  asked  McCombs. 

"The  first  throat  cut  politically  in  New  Jersey  after 
Jim  Smith  had  nominated  and  elected  Wilson  Gov 
ernor  was  Jim  Smith's.  Be  careful  that  the  first 
throat  cut  after  you  elect  Wilson  President  is  not  your 
own"! 

"I  ridiculed  this  warning  at  the  time,"  said  Mr. 
McCombs  frequently  to  me  after  his  turn  came. 
"Had  I  but  taken  my  Princeton  friend's  advice,  I 
might  have  been  spared  much  mental  and  physical 
anguish". 

Mr.  McCombs  fulfilled  his  pledge  to  Thomas  T. 
Taggart,  to  throw  the  Wilson  vote  to  Thomas  R. 
Marshall,  of  Indiana,  for  Vice  President.  Influen 
tial  friends  of  Champ  Clark  begged  him  to  become 
Wilson's  running  mate.  The  Missourian  declined. 
Marshall  was  nominated  after  a  battle  of  five  hours. 

Mr.  McCombs,  in  describing  the  selection  of  the 
Hoosier,  wrote: 

[EDITOR'S  NOTE  —  Mr.  McCombs'  narrative  resumed.] 

Unfortunately,  the  psychology  of  every  convention, 
whether  Democratic  or  Republican,  has  been  that 
very  little  regard  is  paid  to  the  selection  of  a  Vice 
President.  This  is  particularly  true  where  the  con 
vention  is  long  and  intense,  as  was  the  case  at  Balti 
more. 

Nobody  seriously  discussed  the  Vice  Presidency 
until  Mr.  Wilson  had  been  nominated.  During  a  con 
vention,  the  Vice  Presidency  may  be  made  the  subject 

[  177  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

of  a  trade  for  delegates  from  this  territory  for  some 
candidate  for  the  Presidency.  This  should  not  be. 

Under  our  Constitution  the  Vice  President's  func 
tions  while  in  office  are  exceedingly  small.  He  merely 
performs  the  duties  of  a  presiding  officer.  Natur 
ally,  that  does  not  involve  the  selection  of  a  very  great 
man. 

He  does  not  even  participate  in  the  debates.  He 
is  more  or  less  out  of  touch  with  both  Houses.  He  is 
entirely  out  of  touch  with  the  President  and  the  execu 
tive  side  of  Washington. 

He  should  be  made  of  the  same  mental  stature  as 
the  President,  for  if  the  President  dies,  the  Vice  Presi 
dent  immediately  becomes  President  and  charged  with 
all  the  great  duties  of  that  office. 

If  I  were  proposing  a  constitutional  amendment, 
I  would  at  least  make  the  Vice  President  a  member 
of  the  President's  cabinet  so  that  he  may  keep  in  touch 
with  things  as  they  go  from  the  executive  side.  I 
would  give  him  full  voting  powers  in  the  Senate.  The 
present  Vice  President,  Mr.  Marshall,  has  told  me 
the  actual  truth  about  the  office. 

When  Mr.  Wilson  was  nominated  in  Baltimore 
early  that  Tuesday  afternoon  I  went  to  my  hotel  and 
slept  for  a  while.  Refreshed,  I  called  up  the  Gov 
ernor  and  asked  him  what  he  thought  about  the  Vice 
Presidency.  I  told  him  the  candidates  would  prob 
ably  be  Governor  Burke,  of  North  Dakota;  Mayor 
Preston,  of  Baltimore,  and  Governor  Marshall,  of 
Indiana.  I  told  him  that  he  could  have  his  choice 
for  the  Vice  Presidency,  and  asked  him  to  make  a  sug- 

[  178] 


WILSON  WINS  NOMINATION 

gestion.  His  suggestion  was  that  I  do  what  I  was 
willing  as  representing  him. 

I  went  to  the  Convention  that  evening.  On  the 
way  I  mulled  over  various  possibilities  of  the  Demo 
cratic  Party. 

Governor  Burke,  of  North  Dakota,  was  a  good  man, 
but  he  came  from  a  sparsely  settled  territory.  He 
had  no  National  prominence.  He  could  not  help  on 
the  ticket.  Mayor  Preston,  of  Baltimore,  labored 
under  the  same  difficulties.  I  thought  of  other  men 
and  concluded  that  Marshall  was  the  man. 

As  I  went  into  the  door  of  the  Convention  hall  I 
was  met  by  Luke  Lee,  of  Mississippi.  He  took  me 
into  a  private  room.  There  were  gathered  McAdoo, 
Burleson,  Palmer,  and  a  few  others  who  had  worked 
for  Wilson.  I  don't  remember  the  names  of  all,  but 
curiously  enough,  I  do  the  number.  There  were 
eleven. 

They  started  in  by  saying  that  we  must  decide  who 
should  be  the  Vice  President.  A  vote  was  proposed. 
Somebody  mentioned  Palmer.  Then  I  knew  what 
the  vote  would  be.  I  also  knew  that  Palmer  could  not 
help  the  ticket  at  all,  because  he  came  from  the  State 
of  Pennsylvania. 

I  said  that  eleven  men  could  not  decide  who  was  to 
be  the  Vice  President  of  the  United  States. 

I  proceeded  to  the  floor.  I  spoke  to  the  leaders  of 
the  large  delegations.  Marshall  was  nominated  by  a 
tremendous  majority.  I  humbly  record  that  on  the 
first  ballot  I  received  28  votes  from  my  native  state, 
Arkansas,  for  this  exalted  position. 

[  179] 


XIV 
"PROVIDENCE  DID  IT"! 

WILSON  So  EXCLAIMS  TO  McCoMBs,  WHO  is  CHILLED  BY  ABSENCE 
OF  GRATITUDE  FROM  THE  PRESIDENTIAL  NOMINEE  —  Mc- 
COMBS,  IN  COLLAPSE,  BEATS  McAooo  TO  "His  PRESENCE"  — 
MESSRS.  KERN,  PALMER,  DANIELS,  TAGGART  AND  HUDSPETH 
URGE  McCoMBs  FOR  NATIONAL  CHAIRMAN  —  WILSON  PRE 
FERS  McAooo,  BUT  MAKES  HIM  VICE  CHAIRMAN  AND  CHOOSES 
ALL  CAMPAIGN  COMMITTEE. 

[EDITOR'S  NOTE  —  The  McCombs  narrative  is  resumed.] 

I  WENT  up  to  Sea  Girt  with  the  National  Com 
mittee  to  congratulate  Governor  Wilson  the  day 
after  his  nomination  for  President.     He  shook 
hands  with  us  generally.    When  I  spoke  to  him,  he 
said:     "McCombs,  you  know  I  am  a  Presbyterian 
and  believe  in  predestination  and  election.     It  was 
Providence  that  did  the  work  at  Baltimore". 

Now,  I  shall  not  pass  into  any  discussion  of  the 
various  theologies ;  but  I  stood  there  a  complete  wreck 
from  a  campaign  at  Baltimore,  during  which  I  slept 
no  more  than  two  hours  a  night.  I  saw  other  drawn 
faces  about  me.  I  saw  faces,  too,  of  men  who  had 
come  to  the  Wilson  standard  as  events  turned.  None 
cast  their  eyes  to  a  selfish  future,  but  all  were  hopeful, 
highly  hopeful,  that  the  man  who  stood  before  them 

[  180] 


"PROVIDENCE   DID   IT" 

might  be  elected,  and  that  in  their  own  locality  they 
might  restore  Democracy  completely. 

I  could  not  accept  Wilson's  view  of  fore-ordination 
in  the  presence  of  that  group  who  had  all  but  given 
their  life's  blood  to  make  him  the  nominee  of  the  Dem 
ocratic  Party  for  the  Presidency  of  the  United  States. 

I  must  confess  that  I  felt  a  chill,  because  I  felt  that 
the  man  had  in  mind  the  using  of  entirely  new  meth 
ods.  I  was  chilled,  also,  because  I  thought  that  if  he 
attempted  to  apply  that  Predestination  doctrine  to  the 
extreme,  the  Democratic  campaign  might  find  itself 
very  much  in  the  ruck. 

I  was  tired  beyond  expression.  I  did  not  desire  to 
become  Chairman  of  the  Democratic  National  Com 
mittee,  though  this  had  been  suggested  to  me  by  mem 
bers  on  all  hands  and  it  had  been  suggested  to  the  Gov 
ernor  himself. 

In  the  National  Committee  itself  there  was  a  fair 
amount  of  discord  growing  out  of  many  campaigns. 
It  was  thought  that  I  would  smooth  everything  over 
and  could  handle  things  without  any  friction.  I  was 
personally  friendly  with  every  member  of  the  Com 
mittee.  I  had  dealt  with  them  all  and  none  came  out 
of  Baltimore  with  anything  but  the  friendliest  feelings 
toward  me. 

Mr.  Wilson,  after  two  weeks  of  silence,  acquiesced 
to  my  election  as  Chairman  of  the  National  Com 
mittee,  July  12th. 

There  had  been  wonderment  about  Wilson's  delay  in 
giving  his  opinion.  Many  of  the  members  told  me 
they  suspected  conspiracy.  I  said  I  really  did  not 

[181] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

want  the  place  as  I  was  already  worked  to  death,  and 
that  I  would  not  take  it  unless  the  sentiment  of  the 
entire  Committee  was  taken  and  unless,  without  the 
exercise  of  force  from  any  quarter,  I  should  be  the 
unanimous  choice.  But  in  accepting,  I  sailed  into  a 
sea  upon  which  I  hope  no  other  man  will  ever  have 
the  misfortune  to  launch  his  bark. 

Mr.  Wilson,  at  the  outset,  handed  me  a  campaign 
committee  list  composed  of  gentlemen  all  of  whom  I 
liked,  but  many  of  whom  I  would  not  have  chosen 
for  this  particular  work. 

I  was  given  absolute  power  by  the  National  Com 
mittee  to  select  the  campaign  committee  and  to  do 
nearly  anything  I  thought  fitting.  At  the  meeting 
of  the  Committee  in  Chicago  where  I  was  elected, 
there  was  great  enthusiasm  over  the  fact  that  we  were 
"on  our  way"  and  intended  to  push  the  campaign 
through  to  victory.  I  felt  very  much  heartened. 

Returning  to  New  York  I  found  Wilson  intent 
upon  having  William  G.  McAdoo  for  Vice  Chairman, 
for  what  reason  I  can  never  divine.  However,  since 
Wilson's  inauguration  many  reasons,  Wilsonian,  have 
appeared  why  he  wanted  him,  but  from  a  public  and 
political  point  of  view  there  was  none. 

I  strongly  advised  Mr.  Wilson  to  have  as  Vice 
Chairman  a  man  from  the  West  who  understood 
Western  conditions.  I  also  spoke  insistently  for 
Judge  Martin  J.  Wade,  who  was  a  member  from 
Iowa  and  an  exceedingly  able  man.  He  was  held 
in  very  high  esteem  by  the  Westerners,  and  by  the 
Committee  itself.  I  thought  he  could  handle  Western 

[  182  ] 


"PROVIDENCE   DID   IT" 

headquarters  better  than  anybody  else.  But  Gov 
ernor  Wilson  was  obdurate  and  we  accepted  McAdoo 
as  Vice  Chairman  grudgingly. 

[EDITOR'S  NOTE  —  Mr.  McCombs  modestly  bequeathed  the 
task  of  elaborating  the  story  of  his  selection  as  the  National 
Chairman  to  fellow  Committeemen.  They  prepared  the  follow 
ing  details.] 

Immediately  upon  the  adjournment  of  the  Balti 
more  convention,  Mr.  McCombs  nearly  collapsed 
physically.  A  physician  was  called  and  McCombs 
was  ordered  to  bed.  Instructions  were  given  that  he 
must  not  be  disturbed  for  at  least  a  day.  To  make 
his  rest  doubly  sure,  Mr.  McCombs  was  then  taken 
to  a  private  apartment  which  he  had  used  for  secret 
conferences  during  the  Convention.  The  patient, 
suffering  from  brain,  as  well  as  body  fag,  was  induced 
to  sleep. 

While  Mr.  McCombs  was  undergoing  this  enforced 
vacation,  Mr.  McAdoo  dashed  off  to  Sea  Girt,  N.  J., 
to  be  the  first  to  recite  to  Governor  Wilson  the  details 
of  the  Convention.  After  Mr.  McAdoo  had  hurried 
from  Baltimore,  rumors  reached  the  McCombs  head 
quarters  that  McAdoo  had  gone  to  insist  that  he 
should  be  rewarded  with  the  Chairmanship  and  the 
executive  conduct  of  the  campaign.  Mr.  McCombs' 
friends  were  also  told  that  William  J.  Bryan  would 
demand  the  retention  of  Chairman  Norman  E.  Mack, 
who  had  handled  his  1908  campaign,  while  Wisconsin 
leaders  were  reported  to  have  gotten  back  of  Joseph 
E.  Davies  of  the  Badger  State. 

While  McCombs,  maybe  unconscious  of  much  of 
this,  slept  at  Baltimore,  National  Committeeman 

[  183  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

Robert  S.  Hudspeth,  of  New  Jersey,  was  also  speed 
ing  to  Sea  Girt.  Hudspeth  had  been  very  influential 
in  securing  all  the  delegates  but  four  from  New 
Jersey,  Wilson's  home  state,  and  holding  them  intact 
for  forty-six  ballots. 

But  in  the  race  Hudspeth  won  and  reached  Sea 
Girt  before  McAdoo.  Governor  Wilson  learned  from 
him  first,  the  accurate  story  of  how  and  to  whom  he 
owed  his  nomination.  Hudspeth  frankly  informed 
Wilson: 

"But  for  that  crippled  but  militant  Princeton  lad, 
McCombs,  Clark,  Bryan,  or  an  unknown  would  have 
defeated  you.  If  any  one  individual  is  to  be  rewarded 
for  your  triumph  it  is  Billy  McCombs.  He  lies  ill 
in  Baltimore.  Never,  never  forget  what  he  did  for 
you"! 

Governor  Wilson  listened  rather  frigidly  to  Judge 
Hudspeth's  encomiums  on  McCombs.  He  gave  no 
intimation  as  to  what,  if  anything,  he  proposed  to  do 
to  prove  his  gratitude. 

After  his  conference  with  the  nominee,  Judge 
Hudspeth  was  asked  by  newspaper  correspondents  if 
he  would  be  a  candidate  for  National  Chairman. 

"Under  no  consideration.  I  don't  want  the  place", 
he  replied  decisively.  "McCombs  has  won  it  through 
distinguished  service.  He  has  been  the  pacemaker. 
He  knows  the  delegates  who  fought  with  him  the  fight 
for  Wilson.  It  would  be  bad  business,  indeed,  to  trade 
horses  in  the  middle  of  the  stream". 

A.  Mitchell  Palmer  went  straight  to  Governor 
Wilson,  too,  and  said,  "We  need  a  campaign  con- 

[  184  ] 


"PROVIDENCE   DID   IT" 

ducted  in  the  same  spirit  in  which  McCombs  con 
ducted  the  nominating  battle  for  you.  We  need  a 
Chairman  young  enough  to  inject  that  spirit  into  the 
party  and  voters". 

Senator  Ollie  James,  who  had  been  permanent 
Chairman  of  the  Convention,  reinforced  Hudspeth's 
advice  with:  "McCombs  has  shown  himself  to  be  a 
young  man  of  great  ability  as  an  executive  and  a 
wonderful  organizer". 

"Hum"!  observed  Wilson.  "That  is  right.  Mc 
Combs  undoubtedly  is  a  fine  executive"!  And  that 
was  all. 

Senator  John  W.  Kern,  of  Indiana,  who  had  been 
Alton  B.  Parker's  running  mate  in  1904,  told  Gov 
ernor  Wilson:  "We  all  like  McCombs  first  rate.  We 
like  the  type  to  which  he  belongs". 

Senator  Thomas  T.  Taggart,  also  of  Indiana, 
former  Chairman  of  the  National  Committee,  who  had 
finally  swung  the  Hoosier  delegation  to  Wilson,  added 
his  insistence  that  McCombs  lead  the  party  organiza 
tion  in  the  coming  fray. 

Governor  Wilson  had  been  so  inoculated  with 
demands  for  McCombs'  retention  as  Campaign  Man 
ager  that  when  McAdoo  finally  turned  up  he  was 
told  that  the  Vice  Chairmanship  was  all  he  could 
hope  for. 

Possibly  McAdoo  would  have  made  some  headway 
had  not  McCombs  himself  suddenly  appeared  at  Sea 
Girt. 

When,  after  fourteen  hours'  sleep,  McCombs  was 
informed  of  McAdoo's  activities,  he  set  out  for  Sea 

[  185  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

Girt  as  fast  as  a  seventy-mile  an  hour  car  could  carry 
him. 

Governor  Wilson  was  entertaining  guests  at 
luncheon,  on  the  lawn  at  his  Sea  Girt  cottage,  when 
McCombs  hove  in  sight.  As  he,  like  an  apparition, 
alighted,  and,  with  the  aid  of  a  cane,  started  straight 
for  the  "Boss",  as  Tom  Taggart  addressed  Wilson, 
National  Chairman  Norman  E.  Mack,  who  sat  next 
to  the  Governor,  exclaimed,  "Why,  there  is  McCombs 
now!  I  thought  he  was  ill  in  Baltimore"! 

Governor  Wilson,  himself  astounded,  greeted  Mc 
Combs:  "Why,  how  did  you  get  here?  I  thought  you 
were  sick  in  bed  at  Baltimore" ! 

McCombs,  as  if  looking  for  McAdoo,  smiled  grimly 
and  replied:  "I  was  never  sick  a  minute.  I  slept 
fourteen  hours  yesterday  and  am  fit  as  can  be.  I  am 
like  a  leather  shoestring.  You  can  stretch  me  quite 
a  ways  without  breaking  me". 

Governor  Wilson,  Mr.  Mack  and  others  laughed  at 
this  simile  and  treated  McCombs  as  if  he  had  just  sur 
vived  a  serious  surgical  operation. 

Josephus  Daniels,  afterward  Secretary  of  the  Navy 
eight  years,  tapped  McCombs  affectionately  on  the 
back  and  said:  "Governor  Wilson,  I  want  you  to 
know  that  we  learned  at  Baltimore  to  respect  Mr. 
McCombs  and  have  faith  in  him.  We  found  that  he 
talked  our  language  and  that  we  talked  his.  If  he 
makes  the  same  brilliant  campaign  for  your  election 
as  he  did  for  your  nomination,  no  Taft  nor  Roosevelt 
can  possibly  defeat  you"! 

It  was  not  until  July  12th,  over  a  fortnight  after 
[  186  ] 


"PROVIDENCE   DID   IT" 

he  had  been  nominated,  that  Governor  Wilson  finally 
determined  to  risk  his  Presidential  election  manage 
ment  to  McCombs. 

Those  who  had  been  associated  with,  or  had  observed 
Mr.  McCombs'  masterful  management  of  the  Pre- 
and  in-Convention  campaigns  had  been  persistent  in 
their  support  of  McCombs,  and  finally  induced  Gov 
ernor  Wilson  to  name  him  as  chairman. 

On  July  12,  National  Committeeman  Hudspeth, 
of  New  Jersey,  Josephus  Daniels,  of  North  Carolina, 
and  Mr.  McCombs  held  a  prolonged  conference  with 
Governor  Wilson  at  Sea  Girt.  When  it  ended,  Judge 
Hudspeth  came  upon  the  lawn  and  announced:  "It's 
McCombs!  Governor  Wilson  has  selected  him  for 
Chairman  of  the  National  Committee". 

McCombs,  smiling  but  mute,  limped  to  his  auto  as 
rapidly  as  he  could. 

National  Committeeman  Daniels,  addressing  a 
group  of  newspaper  correspondents,  said:  "You  saw 
that  young  man  going  past  with  a  slight  limp.  I 
have  no  doubt  many  of  you,  as  hundreds  of  others, 
will  wonder,  whether  he  is  robust  enough  for 
the  big  job  that  may  be  asked  of  him.  He  is  a  great 
deal  more  robust  than  he  looks  and  will  outlast  a  great 
many  men  that  may  appear  to  be  stronger". 

"Did  you  urge  Governor  Wilson  to  make  Mr. 
McCombs  National  Chairman"?  Mr.  Daniels  was 
asked. 

"I  certainly  did,  and  he  is  the  choice  of  all  genuine 
friends  of  the  Governor",  responded  Daniels. 

"The  National  Committee  will  meet  at  New  York 
[  187  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

July  15th  to  organize  for  the  campaign",  announced 
Chairman  Mack. 

"The  'Boss'  says  Chicago",  quoth  Tom  Taggart 
mischievously.  "If  you  doubt  it,  ask  him",  added  the 
Hoosier  leader. 

Mack  went  inside  the  Wilson  cottage.  He  looked 
sheepish  when  he  returned. 

"Right,  Tom.  The  Committee  meets  at  noon  at  the 
Hotel  Congress,  Chicago,  July  15th". 

"That's  what  the  'Boss'  told  me,  and  what  the  'Boss' 
says,  goes",  retorted  Taggart  with  a  snicker. 

Judge  Hudspeth  personally  carried  Governor  Wil 
son's  orders  to  the  Committee  which  met  at  Chicago 
the  following  Monday.  The  Judge  presented  Mr. 
McCombs'  name  for  the  Chairmanship  in  this  way: 
"Mr.  McCombs'  intelligence  and  sagacious  handling 
of  Governor  Wilson's  nominating  campaign  during 
the  past  year  and  a  half  has  demonstrated  his 
entire  fitness  for  leadership  and  showed  him  to  be 
amply  equipped  to  carry  the  Democratic  Party  to 
victory". 

Neither  McAdoo,  nor  any  follower,  offered  a  word 
openly  against  McCombs.  He  was  chosen  Chairman 
unanimously. 

When  Mr.  Mack  surrendered  his  gavel,  Mr. 
McCombs  briefly  acknowledged  his  election:  "I  can 
not  hope  to  achieve  success  unless  I  have  the  active 
support  of  this  Committee. 

"This  is  to  be  a  business  campaign.  We  shall  pay 
strict  attention  to  the  business  of  electing  Governor 
Wilson  President". 

[  188  ] 


"PROVIDENCE   DID   IT" 

"And  we  must  raise  a  million  dollars  at  once  to  do 
it",  said  Roger  Sullivan,  of  Chicago. 

McCombs  did  his  best  to  get  a  nation-wide  repre 
sentative  of  all  factions  in  the  Executive  Committee. 
He  planned  to  put  upon  it  Charles  F.  Murphy,  Tom 
Taggart,  William  J.  Stone,  John  H.  Bankhead,  and 
others  who  had  fought  Wilson's  nomination.  The 
"Boss"  overruled  him. 

July  17th  Governor  Wilson,  premising  it  by  saying 
"I  am  entirely  satisfied  with  the  way  the  National 
Committee  has  met  my  suggestions",  announced  his 
famous  "Veranda"  or  "Rocking  Chair"  Committee. 

It  comprised  William  F.  McCombs,  William  G. 
McAdoo  and  James  A.  O'Gorman,  of  New  York; 
Robert  S.  Hudspeth,  of  New  Jersey;  A.  Mitchell 
Palmer,  of  Pennsylvania;  Josephus  Daniels,  of  North 
Carolina;  William  Saulsbury,  of  Delaware;  Joseph 
E-  Davies,  of  Wisconsin;  Thomas  P.  Gore,  of  Okla 
homa;  Col.  Robert  Ewing,  of  Louisiana;  Will  R. 
King,  of  Oregon;  James  A.  Reed,  of  Missouri,  and 
Daniel  McGillicuddy,  of  Maine. 

All  had  loyally  supported  Wilson  for  the  Presi 
dential  nomination  except  Mr.  Reed,  of  Missouri.  He 
had  made  the  nominating  speech  for  Champ  Clark  in 
the  Convention. 

The  Governor  directed  that  Mr.  McAdoo  assume 
the  duties  of  "Vice  Chairman",  and  Joseph  E.  Davies 
the  Secretaryship.  He  also  named  Henry  Morgen- 
thau  as  Chairman  of  the  Finance  Committee. 

With  a  Campaign  Committee,  every  member  of 
which  was  picked  by  Governor  Wilson,  Chairman 
McCombs  began  the  arduous  duties  of  the  canvass. 

[  189] 


XV 

McCOMBS  AND  McADOO  QUARREL 

AT  BITTER  ODDS  AS  CAMPAIGN  BEGINS  —  McAooo  IGNORES  His 
CHIEF  IN  SELECTING  HEADQUARTERS  FORCE  —  "BEAT  ROOSE 
VELT",  DIRECTS  McCoMss  AS  HE  FALLS  ILL  —  McAooo 
LEVIES  ON  McCoMBs'  POLITICAL  ASSETS  AND  is  PUT  OUT  OP 
His  PRE-EMPTED  POST  —  NOMINEE  FAILS  AS  A  PEACE-MAKER. 

[EDITOR'S  NOTE  —  This  chapter  is  written  by  the  Editor.] 

THE  popular  vote-getting  campaign  for  Wilson 
began  auspiciously  on  the  surface.    But  bick 
erings  inside  the  camp  were  constant. 
The  Republican  camp  was  splitting  up.     William 
H.  Taft  had  been  renominated  for  President  by  the 
reactionary  Republicans.     Progressives  had  bolted  the 
convention  and  nominated  Theodore  Roosevelt,  who 
had  twice  been  President. 

McCombs'  plan  was,  of  course,  to  keep  the  Repub 
licans  split.  He  was  convinced  from  the  outset  that 
Taft  was  hopelessly  out  of  the  running.  It  was 
Roosevelt  who  must  be  beaten  in  order  to  elect  Wilson. 
Mr.  McCombs,  therefore,  concentrated  his  efforts 
toward  weaning  Progressives  away  from  Roosevelt  as 
well  as  Taft.  Roosevelt  was  posing  as  the  only  Pro 
gressive.  McCombs  saw  to  it  that  Wilson  was  pre- 

[  190  ] 


McCOMBS   AND   McADOO   QUARREL 

sented  to  the  voters  as  rather  more  of  a  Progressive 
than  Roosevelt. 

With  all  this  serious  business  in  hand,  there  was, 
of  course,  the  question  of  national  headquarters. 

Chairman  McCombs  authorized  Vice  Chairman 
McAdoo  to  lease  headquarters  in  the  Fifth  Avenue 
Building  at  Broadway  and  Twenty-third  street,  New 
York  City.  This  McAdoo  did.  But  without  con 
sulting  McCombs,  he  engaged  a  large  staff.  Among 
them  was  K.  B.  Conger,  who  had  been  associated  with 
McAdoo  in  his  Hudson  Terminal  enterprise. 

Inspecting  the  pay-roll  one  day,  McCombs  discov 
ered  that  Conger  was  down  for  a  weekly  salary  of 
$150,  and  Byron  R.  Newton,  afterward  Collector  of 
the  Port  of  New  York,  for  $120  a  week. 

As  McCombs  had  been  struggling  to  get  enough 
money  to  pay  headquarters  rent,  he  was  surprised. 

"What  are  these  men  doing  for  their  fancy  sala 
ries"?  demanded  McCombs  of  McAdoo. 

"Conger  leased  headquarters  for  us  and  is  acting 
as  Superintendent.  Newton  is  working  at  Sea  Girt, 
New  Jersey,  with  Walter  Measday,  at  the  Wilson 
publicity  bureau.  He  volunteered",  was  McAdoo's 
reply. 

"Get  rid  of  both",  directed  McCombs.  "Conger  is 
useless.  I  fired  Newton  months  ago". 

But  McAdoo  carried  Newton's  case  to  the  Presi 
dential  nominee  and  he  was  retained.  Conger  is  said 
to  have  continued  to  draw  $150  a  week  for  the  re 
mainder  of  the  campaign,  though  McAdoo  and  Treas 
urer  Rollo  Wells  had  many  a  dispute  about  it. 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

VAugust  12,  1912,  Mr.  McCombs  was  prostrated 
with  neurasthenia.  )  He  was  stricken  while  on  duty  at 
headquarters,  and  he  was  carried  to  the  Hotel  Knick 
erbocker.  Dr.  John  D.  McBarren  advised  that  unless 
McCombs  were  immediately  relieved  from  duty  he 
might  die.  The  stricken  Chairman  was  taken  to  the 
home  of  Mrs.  Ethel  Thomas,  a  sister,  at  Flushing, 
L.  I.  He  grew  worse  and  was  removed  to  Paul 
Smith's  in  the  Adirondacks  where  his  sister,  Corinrie, 
accompanied  him. 

For  six  weeks  McCombs  fought  illness  and  physi 
cians  to  get  back  at  his  job.  Despite  protests  from 
his  medical  advisers  and  his  family,  McCombs  slipped 
away  from  his  sanatorium  September  4,  1912,  and 
suddenly  appeared  at  the  Hotel  Plaza  in  New  York. 
There  he  again  collapsed.  Dr.  Simon  Baruch,  father 
of  Bernard  M.  Baruch  (one  of  Wilson's  financial 
angels)  was  summoned.  He  ordered  McCombs  to 
bed  and  to  retire  from  active  campaign  duties. 

"I'll  do  my  job  by  'phone"!  was  McCombs'  dogged 
response. 

"And  commit  suicide" !  admonished  Dr.  Baruch. 
fwliile  McCombs  was  doing  wire  work  from  the 
Plaza,  McAdoo  sat  in  a  swivel  chair  at  the  Fifth 
Avenue  headquarters.  He  assumed  the  full  duties  of 
National  Chairman  and  started  in  to  reorganize  the 
force  employed  by  McCombs.  He  packed  off  to  Chi 
cago,  Albert  S.  Burleson,  of  Texas,  whom  Colonel 
House  afterward  induced  President  Wilson  to  make 
Postmaster  General;  Thomas  P.  Gore,  afterward 
United  States  Senator  from  Oklahoma;  Frank  B. 


McCOMBS   AND   McADOO   QUARREL 

Lord,  and  other  staff  officers  installed  by  McCombs. 
Any  officer  or  employee  of  the  McCombs  brand 
seemed  persona  non  grata  to  him*) 

One  day,  a  loyal  friend  of  McCombs  dropped  in 
upon  him  at  the  Plaza.  McCombs,  propped  up  with 
pillows,  was  'phoning  commands  to  lieutenants  in 
other  states. 

During  a  lull,  McCombs  asked:  "How  are  things 
going  at  headquarters"? 

"McAdoo  is  trying  to  administer  on  your  estate 
before  you  die" !  was  the  shot  returned.  "He  has  fired 
about  all  your  friends,  except  Joe  Daniels". 

McCombs  went  immediately  to  the  Fifth  Avenue 
building. 

Reaching  headquarters,  he  recognized  few  attaches 
whom  he  had  appointed.  He  was  mystified  and 
angered  by  an  army  of  strange  people.  The  office  boy 
accosted  him  with: 

"Who  do  you  want  to  see"? 

McCombs  entered  the  room  which  he  had  reserved 
for  himself  prior  to  his  physical  collapse.  McAdoo 
was  swinging  about  in  his  revolving  chair  giving 
orders  to  subordinates  of  his  own  selection. 

Regarding  McCombs  as  if  he  were  a  spectre, 
McAdoo  asked:  "How  are  you  feeling,  Bill?  Why 
did  you  come  back  until  you  were  completely  recov 
ered?  Things  are  going  fine". 

"I  am  here  to  resume  command,  and  you  will  please 
vacate  my  desk",  said  McCombs.  McAdoo  obeyed. 
McCombs  fell  into  his  old  chair  and  summoned  Treas 
urer  Rollo  Wells,  Chairman  Henry  Morgenthau,  of 

[  193  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

the  Finance  Committee,  Chairman  Josephus  Daniels, 
of  the  Publicity  Bureau,  Secretary  Joseph  E.  Davies, 
and  Assistant  Secretary  Walker  W.  Vick. 

"I  desire  to  see  these  gentlemen  alone",  said 
McCombs  as  he  glanced  at  McAdoo.  McAdoo 
departed.  McCombs  then  learned  additional  details 
about  McAdoo  changing  his  campaign  plans  and  rear 
ranging  the  office  force.  Rollo  Wells  reported  the 
treasury  all  but  empty. 

Just  then,  however,  Chairman  McCombs  opened  a 
letter  from  a  North  Carolina  friend.  It  enclosed  a 
check  for  $54.66,  the  proceeds  of  the  final  bale  of 
cotton  sold  by  him  that  Fall. 

"We  are  not  broke  yet,  Rollo",  observed  McCombs 
in  glee.  "But  we  shall  have  to  dig  somewhere,  or  we 
shall  be  broke". 

Just  as  Chairman  McCombs  was  about  to  start  for 
Sea  Girt  to  get  a  show-down  from  Governor  Wilson 
as  between  him  and  McAdoo,  the  Governor  suddenly 
appeared  in  New  York.  He  called  upon  McCombs. 
At  the  conclusion  of  the  interview,  Governor  Wilson 
said: 

"There  is  no  friction  between  Mr.  McCombs  and 
Mr.  McAdoo.  It  was  necessary  for  Mr.  McCombs 
to  have  a  short  rest.  Mr.  McCombs  is  one  of  the  most 
indomitable  men  I  ever  knew.  There  is  a  sacrifice 
that  no  one  can  accept  from  any  man.  That  is  his 
health.  Mr.  McCombs  is  much  stronger  and  will  con 
tinue  to  perform  his  duties  as  Chairman  of  the 
National  Committee". 

McCombs'  friends  were  elated  over  Governor  Wil- 
[  194  ] 


McCOMBS  AND   McADOO   QUARREL 

son's  at  least  public  support  of  Chairman  McCombs 
as  absolute  campaign  manager.  Mr.  McCombs  was 
mightily  pleased  and  accepted  as  an  expression  of 
popular  approval  this  editorial  in  the  New  York 
American,  September  12, 1921: 

"JUSTICE  TO  MANAGER  MCCOMBS. 

"Governor  Wilson  has  done  well  to  lay  at  rest  the 
rumor  that  political  bosses  and  jealous  rivals  were  to 
compass  the  retirement  of  William  F.  McCombs  as 
manager  of  his  campaign. 

"To  Mr.  McCombs,  more  than  to  any  single  indi 
vidual  friend  in  the  United  States,  Governor  Wilson 
owes  his  nomination  at  Baltimore. 

"The  labors  of  the  young  Princetonian  to  this  end 
were  assiduous  and  extraordinary.  His  devotion 
amounted  almost  to  consecration.  His  energy  was 
prodigious,  and  he  displayed  conspicuous  ability  in 
every  phase  of  the  campaign  of  which  he  was  the 
recognized  manager  and  director  from  the  beginning. 

"Working  at  times  almost  single-handed,  and 
spending  his  time  and  his  money  with  lavish  loyalty, 
Mr.  McCombs  impaired  his  health  in  the  cause  of  his 
candidate. 

"We  felt  sure  that  Governor  Wilson  could  not 
afford  and  would  not  consent  to  his  retirement.  The 
Democratic  nominee  knows  better  than  most  men  the 
character  and  capacity  of  the  young  leader  who  piloted 
his  fortunes  at  Baltimore.  Nothing  short  of  a  physical 
incapacity  to  go  on  with  the  work  could  possibly  jus 
tify  McCombs'  enforced  retirement. 

[  195  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

"Least  of  all,  could  Governor  Wilson,  at  this  stage 
of  his  campaign,  afford  to  bring  upon  himself  the 
charge  of  ingratitude  to  a  friend  and  benefactor  such 
as  this  able  and  brilliant  young  laywer  has  so  splen 
didly  demonstrated  himself  to  be. 

"The  American  took  it  for  granted  that  the  wise  and 
discreet  Democratic  nominee  would  allow  no  machine 
bosses  or  new-found  friends  to  compass  the  humiliation 
of  the  best  and  most  effective  friend  that  his  political 
career  has  developed. 

"Mr.  McCombs  deserves  to  finish  the  work  that  he 
began". 

Six  hundred  admirers  of  Chairman  McCombs 
joined  in  a  Hotel  Astor  dinner  September  29,  1912, 
to  celebrate  his  convalescence  and  restoration  to  com 
mand  of  the  Wilson  campaign.  Governor  Wilson 
joined  in  the  greeting.  He  eulogized  McCombs  in 
this  way: 

"I  am  not  here  for  any  other  purpose  than  to  render 
my  tribute  of  sincere  admiration  and  affection  for 
William  F.  McCombs.  It  must  mean  a  great  deal 
to  a  man  who  has  spent  his  life  in  teaching,  that  one 
of  the  men  he  taught,  one  of  the  men  with  whom  he 
has  been  associated  as  master  with  pupil,  should  so 
believe  in  him  as  Mr.  McCombs  has  believed  in  me, 
for  this  is  the  highest  reward  of  a  teacher.'9 

As  Mr.  McCorribs  arose  to  reply,  he  was  more 
lustily  cheered  than  his  "master".  He  said: 

"I  am  working  in  the  interest  of  an  ideal.  I  am 
working  to  accomplish  what  is  best  for  the  Govern- 


McCOMBS  AND  McADOO   QUARREL 

ment.  I  consider  Woodrow  Wilson  the  best  man  to 
carry  out  my  ideals.  There  is  no  reason  why  the  one 
million  college  graduates  in  this  country  should  not 
participate  in  government.  I  hate  distinction  of  class. 
We  should  all  collaborate  for  the  best  kind  of  gov 
ernment". 

William  B.  Hornblower,  President  John  H. 
Finley,  of  the  College  of  the  City  of  New  York,  Col. 
John  Temple  Graves,  Rennold  Wolf  and  Augustus 
Thomas  threw  oratorical  bouquets  at  Mr.  McCombs. 

Assuming  that  the  Democracy  of  the  country  was 
solidly  behind  Wilson,  Chairman  McCombs  resumed 
his  battle  to  rally  every  Republican  he  could  to  his 
candidate's  support.  His  arguments  were  admirably 
epitomized  in  an  address  to  all  voters  October  28, 
1912.  Here  it  is: 

"It  becomes  my  duty,  as  Chairman  of  the  Demo 
cratic  National  Committee,  at  the  beginning  of  the 
last  week  of  the  campaign,  to  convey  two  messages  to 
the  millions  of  citizens  who  are  striving  to  uphold  the 
principles  of  constitutional  and  popular  government 
by  electing  Woodrow  Wilson  President  of  the 
United  States. 

"The  first  is  of  good  cheer.  A  painstaking  and 
unprejudiced  examination  of  reports  from  all  sources 
fully  justifies  the  common  expectation  of  a  sweeping 
victory  on  November  5.  The  party  which  polled  more 
than  6,000,000  votes  four  years  ago  is  united  abso 
lutely,  the  opposition  is  broken  about  evenly  in  twain, 
and  hundreds  of  thousands  of  patriotic  citizens  who 
have  never  cast  a  Democratic  ballot  will  surely  vote 

[197] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

for  Woodrow  Wilson.  Defeat,  under  such  circum 
stances,  is  virtually  inconceivable. 

"My  second  message  is  one  not  of  apprehension,  but 
of  warning.  We  must  expect  that  the  desperate  situ 
ation  in  which  our  antagonists  now  find  themselves 
will  incite  them  to  extreme  measures  as  they  approach 
the  end  of  their  resources.  There  should  be  no  relaxa 
tion  of  effort  in  these  last  few  days  at  any  point  in 
the  line.  There  will  be  none  on  the  part  of  those 
charged  with  the  responsibility  of  conducting  the 
campaign. 

"To  those  who  are  being  told  that  Democratic  suc 
cess  spells  panic  and  depression  we  say:  Remember 
1907 — with  President  Roosevelt  at  the  helm  and  Ses- 
retary  Taf  t  at  his  elbow.  Whose,  then,  was  the  respon 
sibility? 

"To  those  confronted  by  the  dilapidated  bogy  of 
free  trade,  we  say:  Read  not  what  our  opponents 
write,  but  what  our  candidate  says.  He  needs  no 
interpretation.  None  can  deny  either  his  ability  or 
his  freedom  to  speak  for  himself.  And  when  he  pro 
nounces  the  Democratic  proposal  and  his  purpose  to 
be  'neither  free  trade  nor  anything  approaching  free 
trade',  but  only  'readjustment  of  the  schedules  to  meet 
the  actual  business  conditions  and  interests  of  the 
country',  to  the  end  that  the  tariff  shall  cease  to  be  the 
well-spring  of  oppressive  monopoly  and  covert  taxa 
tion  of  the  many  for  the  benefit  of  the  few,  no  fair- 
minded  man  can  question  either  the  truth  of  his  words 
or  the  reality  of  his  intent. 

"All  agree  that  business  stability  and  popular  satis- 


McCOMBS   AND   McADOO   QUARREL 

faction  cannot  be  achieved  until  the  tariff  shall  be 
revised.  Both  Mr.  Taft  and  Mr.  Roosevelt  promise, 
if  elected,  to  take  steps  to  that  end.  But  the  history 
of  their  administrations  shows  conclusively  that  it 
cannot  be  done  under  their  guidance.  The  policy  of 
each,  as  clearly  indicated  by  the  methods  he  proposes, 
is  one  of  procrastination.  The  Democratic  purpose 
no  less  surely  is  that  of  prompt  and  effective,  though 
careful  and  considerate,  action. 

"President  Taft  generously  admits  that  the  Repub 
lican  Party  is  not  entitled  to  exclusive  credit  for  the 
bountiful  crops,  but  his  advocates  do  not  shrink  from 
advancing  the  fact  as  an  argument  for  standing  pat. 
Prosperity,  they  assert,  is  at  hand  if  the  existing  con 
dition  be  maintained.  Why  interfere?  Why  not  let 
well  enough  alone?  Why  elect  a  President  and  install 
a  party  whose  purpose  is  to  close  our  mills,  destroy 
our  industries  and  drive  a  starving  people  to  soup- 
houses? 

"It  seems  strange  that  questions  such  as  these  should 
be  propounded  to  presumably  intelligent  persons ;  and 
yet  they  are  put  forth  constantly  upon  the  only  sup- 
posable  theory  that  the  supreme  object  of  one-half 
of  the  American  people  is  to  bring  ruin  and  disaster 
upon  the  other  half  and  incidentally,  of  course,  upon 
themselves. 

"Not  many,  I  suspect,  are  likely  to  impute  to  Gov 
ernor  Wilson  this  malign  intent;  and  even  those  who 
try  to  conjure  up  with  him  a  spirit  of  destructiveness 
do  not  deny  his  possession  of  intelligence.  May  it  not 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

be  pertinent,  then,  to  ask  what  could  be  his  object  in 
inflicting  miseries  upon  his  fellow  men? 

"Assuming,  as  one  must,  if  these  premonitions  are 
to  be  heeded  at  all,  that  his  heart  would  be  rejoiced 
by  universal  calamity,  is  it  within  reason  to  anticipate 
that  he  would  be  eager  to  go  down  in  history  as  a 
President  who  has  wrought  only  havoc?  Is  it  not  more 
probable  that  he  would  be  ambitious  to  give  the 
country  a  praiseworthy  and  successful  administra 
tion?" 

"But  we  are  told  that  the  business  world  is  seri 
ously  apprehensive,  that  Governor  Wilson's  election 
would  retard  the  return  of  prosperity.  This  fear,  it 
is  solemnly  declared  in  the  face  of  full  confidence 
manifested  while  the  betting  is  4  to  1,  is  the  only 
obstacle  in  the  path  of  great  industrial  progress. 

"Suppose  the  existing  conditions  were  reversed. 
Suppose  business  was  at  a  standstill  and  prospects 
seemed  hopeless.  What,  then,  would  be  the  outcry 
of  our  critics,  now  pressed  so  hardly  as  plausible  argu 
ments?  Surely  nothing  else  than  positive  insistence 
that  the  Democratic  Party  and  the  Democratic  can 
didates  are  at  the  bottom  of  it  all.  And  the  moral, 
of  course,  would  be  plain:  Vote  against  the  man  who 
inspires  misgivings. 

"But  the  facts  do  not  coincide  with  the  theory.  It 
becomes  necessary  to  advance  a  paradox  as  an  argu 
ment  to  fit  the  case.  The  absurdity  of  the  whole  thing 
is  too  apparent.  Moreover,  if  stability  is  the  chief 
desideratum,  what  is  to  be  said  of  the  record  begun 
with  the  agitation  of  Mr.  Roosevelt  in  1906  and  con- 

[  200  ] 


McCOMBS   AND   McADOO   QUARREL 

tinued  with  the  shilly-shallying  of  Mr.  Taft  to  this 
very  day? 

"We  will  let  well  enough  alone  when  we  have  made 
it  better. 

"To  those  sincere  citizens  who  want  real  progress 
accomplished  we  say:  What  could  in  reason  be  antici 
pated  from  Mr.  Roosevelt's  best  endeavors,  with  Con 
gress  and  the  courts  against  him,  except  turmoil  and 
strife?  Does  not  Mr.  Wilson  embody  all  that  is  best, 
most  rational  and  attainable  in  Mr.  Roosevelt's 
declared  aspiration?  Surely  Governor  Wilson  is  as 
clear-minded,  as  wide-visioned,  as  free-handed,  as 
honest,  as  earnest  and  as  resolute. 

"Moreover,  if  elected,  unlike  Mr.  Roosevelt,  he  will 
have  a  Congress  of  his  own  party  faith,  open  to  his 
suggestion  and  responsive  to  his  leadership.  Does  not 
such  a  situation  presage  greater  actual  accomplish 
ment  in  the  interest  of  the  whole  people? 

"To  the  thousands  of  patriotic  Republicans  who 
regard  apprehensively  the  violation  of  our  most  vital 
tradition  and  resent  the  attitude  of  Mr.  Roosevelt 
toward  the  great  party  to  which  he  owes  every  step 
in  his  marvelous  political  advancement  we  say  this: 
You  are  being  urged  to  vote  for  Mr.  Taft,  not  for 
the  purpose  of  electing  him,  because  that  is  known  to 
be  impossible,  but  merely  to  give  him  a  larger  number 
of  ballots  than  will  be  cast  for  Mr.  Roosevelt.  What 
is  to  be  gained  thereby? 

"It  is  a  recognized  fact  that  hundreds  of  thousands 
of  Republicans  are  going  to  vote  for  Wilson  anyway. 
The  Taft  vote,  then,  will  be  no  measure  of  the  real 

[  201  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

Taf  t  strength  and  sentiment.  Its  size,  whether  larger 
or  smaller  than  Mr.  Roosevelt's  vote,  will  signify 
nothing.  Since  the  President  is  to  be  in  the  minority 
in  any  case,  as  compared  with  Mr.  Wilson,  it  cannot 
matter  how  small  that  minority  shall  be. 

"Nobody  on  November  6  will  be  able  to  estimate 
the  number  of  Republicans  who  voted  for  Wilson, 
who  would  have  voted  for  Taft  but  for  their  sense  of 
a  patriotic  duty  to  defeat  Mr.  Roosevelt  at  all  hazards. 
Under  such  circumstances,  whatever  the  result  as  to 
second  and  third  places,  Roosevelt  boasting  can  avail 
nothing. 

"Why,  then,  take  chances?  Why  not  make  assur 
ance  of  the  perpetuation  of  constitutional  government 
doubly  sure  by  voting  for  Wilson,  as  President  Taft 
most  certainly  would  advise  and  do  himself  if  he  should 
become  convinced  of  the  possibility  of  Mr.  Roosevelt's 
accession  to  a  third  term? 

"This  is  said  in  no  partisan  spirit.  The  action  pro 
posed  is  urged  upon  sober,  thoughtful  and  honorable 
men  as  that  of  patriotism.  Everybody  knows  that  Mr. 
Taft  cannot  be  elected.  How  great  will  be  the  politi 
cal  effect  of  the  sympathy  accorded  Mr.  Roosevelt  as 
a  consequence  of  a  lunatic's  misdeed  is  wholly  conjec 
tural.  It  seems  apparent,  however,  that  the  avidity 
of  his  supporters  in  trying  to  capitalize  the  shocking 
performance  of  an  irresponsible  person  has  defeated 
its  own  purpose,  and  that  Mr.  Roosevelt  has  practi 
cally  no  chance  of  success. 

"There  remains  the  one  and  only  remote  possibility 
of  the  election  going  to  the  House  of  Representatives, 

[  202  ] 


McCOMBS   AND    McADOO    QUARREL 

and  the  utter  chaos,  confusion,  bartering  and  strain 
upon  our  governmental  system,  which  would  surely 
upset  the  country  beyond  possible  calculation,  and 
might  easily  endanger  American  institutions. 

"Upon  these  grounds  we  solicit  the  suffrages  of  our 
fellow  citizens  of  all  political  faiths  for  Woodrow 
Wilson,  and  urge  continuance  of  unremitting  endeavor 
upon  those  already  committed  to  the  great  cause  of 
wholly  free  and  truly  popular  government  for  which 
he  stands  as  a  candidate  for  President  of  the  United 
States". 

A  note  in  the  McCombs  manuscript  indicated 
anew  his  belief  that  Roosevelt,  not  Taft,  was  the  can 
didate  who  stood  most  in  Wilson's  way.  Mr. 
McCombs  wrote: 

"Never  at  any  time  did  anyone  assume  that  Mr. 
Roosevelt  was  not  dangerous  in  that  campaign.  I 
believe  that  if  his  campaign  had  been  properly  organ 
ized  he  might  have  been  more  successful  and  very 
close  to  Mr.  Wilson  indeed. 

"The  idea  often  expressed  that  when  Wilson  was 
nominated  nothing  need  have  been  done  to  elect  him 
is  fallacious  indeed.  We  had  to  fight  every  minute  of 
the  day.  I  knew  that  Taft  was  out  of  it.  But  there 
were  so  many  possible  turns  in  the  fortunes  of  the 
Roosevelt  wheel,  and  so  many  tremendous  possibilities 
in  the  resourceful  Roosevelt  himself,  that  no  foe  was 
safe  in  counting  him  out  until  the  ballots  were 
counted". 


[  208  ] 


XVI 
"I    OWE    YOU    NOTHING—" 

WILSON  ELECTED  BY  AN  UNPRECEDENTED  PLURALITY  —  O'GoR- 
MAN  PROCLAIMS  "THIS  BOY,  McCoMBs,  DID  IT"  —  PRESI 
DENT-ELECT  WIRES  His  "THANKS"  —  "!T  WAS  ORDAINED  OF 
GOD  THAT  I  SHOULD  BE  PRESIDENT"!  SAID  WILSON  TO  Mc- 
COMBS  WHEN  ACTUALLY  ELECTED  —  WILSON  IGNORES  ALL 
NATIONAL  COMMITTEE  RECOMMENDATIONS  FOR  APPOINTMENTS 
—  NAMES  BRYAN,  McAooo,  TUMULTY,  ET  AL,  DESPITE  PRO 
TESTS  OF  THOSE  WHO  WON  FOR  HIM  —  McCoMBs'  SLATE 
THROWN  INTO  THE  WASTE  BASKET  —  HOUSE  PICKS  CABINET 
MINISTERS. 

[EDITOR'S  NOTE  —  This  chapter  is  compiled  from  posthumous 
notes.] 

CHAIRMAN  McCOMBS   received  election 
returns  November  5,  1912,  in  the  East  Room 
of  the  Waldorf-Astoria.    Grouped  about  him 
were  Colonel  E.  M.  House,  Josephus  Daniels,  Senator 
James  A.  O'Gorman,  Frederic  C.  Penfield,  Rollo 
Wells,    Henry    Morgenthau,    John    L.    DeSaulles, 
Colonel  George  Harvey,  John  W.  Clifton,  and  others. 
At  9  P.  M.,  Mr.  McCombs,  pale  and  worn,  leaning 
upon  the  arm  of  Robert  Adamson,  stepped  to  the 
doorway,  and  with  a  jubilant  smile,  announced:   "We 
have  carried  forty  states.     The  victory  is  complete. 
We  have  carried  New  York,  Illinois,  Massachusetts, 

[  204  ] 


"I  OWE  YOU  NOTHING" 

Indiana,  New  Jersey  and  even  Senator  Penrose  con 
cedes  we  have  carried  Pennsylvania". 

Senator  O' Gorman  placed  his  arms  affectionately 
about  McCombs  and  exclaimed:  "This  is  not  a  victory 
for  the  Democratic  Party.  It  is  a  victory  for  the 
American  people.  It  is  the  biggest  sweep  in  the 
history  of  the  country". 

All  but  hugging  McCombs,  Senator  O'Gorman 
added:  "And  here  is  the  boy  who  did  it" ! 

Many  present,  including  the  women,  crowded  about 
McCombs  and  wrung  his  hand.  An  hour  later  this 
wire  came  from  President-elect  Wilson,  dated  Prince 
ton,  reading: 

"WILLIAM  F.  McCoMBS,  Democratic  National  Commit 
tee,  New  York: 

"I  deeply  appreciate  your  telegram  and  wish  to  extend 
to  you  and  the  members  of  the  campaign  committee  my 
warm  congratulations  on  the  part  you  played  in  the  or 
ganization  and  conduct  of  a  campaign  fought  out  upon 
essential  issues.  A  great  cause  has  triumphed.  Every 
Democrat,  every  Progressive  of  whatever  alliance,  must 
now  lend  his  full  force  and  enthusiasm  to  the  fulfillment 
of  the  people's  hopes,  the  establishment  of  the  people's 
rights  so  that  justice  and  progress  may  go  hand  in  hand. 

WOODROW  WILSON" 

This  message  came  in  response  to  one  sent  the 
President-elect  by  Chairman  McCombs  reading: 

"PRESIDENT-ELECT  WOODROW  WILSON,  Princeton,  N.  J.: 
"My  warmest  congratulations  to  you,  our  next  Presi 
dent.     You  have  won  a  splendid  and  significant  victory. 
At  this  hour  you  appear  to  have  received  the  largest 

[  205  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT, 

electoral  vote  ever  given  to  a  Presidential  candidate. 
The  indications  are  that  your  administration  will  be  sup 
ported  by  a  Congress  Democratic  in  both  branches. 

WILLIAM  F.  McCoMBs" 

By  midnight  Chairman  McCombs  received  advices 
warranting  him  in  saying:  "Taft  has  carried  but  two 
states  —  Utah  and  Vermont.  We  have  won  thirty- 
nine,  if  not  forty,  states,  with  at  least  442  of  the  531 
electoral  votes.  We  have  the  House  of  Representa 
tives  by  two  to  one  and  the  Senate  is  safely  Demo 
cratic." 

The  final  returns  proved  the  accuracy  of  Mr. 
McCombs'  statement.  Wilson  got  442,  Roosevelt  77, 
and  Taft  only  12  votes  in  the  electoral  college.  Wil 
son  carried  every  state  except  Michigan,  Minnesota, 
Pennsylvania,  South  Dakota  and  Washington.  Taft 
carried  Utah  and  Vermont  only. 

Wilson's  popular  and  electoral  plurality  was  the 
greatest  in  America's  history.  The  total  vote  was 
14,720,037.  Wilson  received  a  total  of  6,292,718 
votes,  Roosevelt  4,057,429,  Taft  3,369,221.  Wilson 
got  over  Roosevelt  a  plurality  of  2,235,289,  and  over 
Taft  2,923,497.  He  got  more  electoral  votes  than 
Roosevelt  and  Taft  combined. 

Justifiably  elated  that  under  his  direction  a  Demo 
cratic  President  had  been  elected  for  the  first  time 
since  1892,  Mr.  McCombs  decided  to  pay  a  personal 
visit  of  felicitation  to  the  President-elect.  Sleeping 
hardly  two  hours  after  a  night  of  receiving  returns 
and  jubilation,  Mr.  McCombs  went  to  Princeton,  New 
Jersey,  November  6, 1912. 

[  206  ] 


"I  OWE  YOU  NOTHING*' 

He  received  a  rousing  greeting  from  the  university 
students  for  his  masterful  and  victorious  conduct  of 
the  campaign.  He  was  all  but  stunned,  however,  by 
the  reception  from  the  man  for  whose  nomination  and 
election  he  was  the  indisputable  chief  instrument. 
Mr.  McCombs  frequently  recited  to  me  the  incidents 
of  that  visit.  He  said: 

"I  called  upon  the  President-elect  at  the  residence 
he  had  leased  after  resigning  as  President  of  Prince 
ton  University.  I  was  somewhat  amazed  to  be  kept 
waiting  for  an  audience.  I  forgave  that,  at  the 
moment,  because  the  house  was  thronged  with  jubilant 
men  and  women,  pressing  about  the  winner  with  their 
congratulations. 

"At  last  the  President-elect  deigned  to  recognize 
me.  He  imperiously  beckoned  me  into  his  library. 
When  we  reached  there,  I  said:  *  Governor,  I  came 
over  to  offer  you  my  sincerest  congratulations  upon 
your  election  and  to  express  my  hope  that  you  will 
have  a  happy  and  successful  administration'. 

"The  President-elect  took  my  hand  in  a  frigid, 
mechanical  way.  His  stenographer  started  to  leave 
the  room. 

"He  said  to  the  stenographer:  'You  need  not  leave. 
I  shall  continue  my  dictation'. 

"Surprised,  I  inquired:  'What  does  this  mean, 
Governor'  ? 

"The  Governor  fidgeted  a  bit  and  jerked  out:  'It 
means  that  every  word  that  passes  here  is  to  be 
recorded  in  black  and  white'. 

"Then  I  became  provoked  and  insisted  upon  an 
[  207  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

explanation  of  the  affront  which  I  believed  had  been 
deliberately  offered  me.  When  I  protested,  the  Presi 
dent-elect,  with  a  heartlessness  of  which  up  to  this 
time  I  was  ignorant,  turned  upon  me  and  in  measured 
tone  said: 

"  'Before  we  proceed,  I  wish  it  clearly  understood 
that  I  owe  you  nothing'. 

"I  modestly  suggested  that  I  might  be  given  credit 
for  doing  a  little  toward  his  nomination  and  election. 

"Haughtily,  Governor  Wilson  retorted:  'Whether 
you  did  little  or  much,  remember  that  God  ordained 
that  I  should  be  the  next  President  of  the  United 
States.  Neither  you  nor  any  other  mortal  or  mortals 
could  have  prevented  that' ! 

"I  gasped.  I  could  hardly  believe  what  I  heard. 
As  I  distinctly  recall  it,  I  observed  that  of  course  God 
helped,  but  there  were  men  who  had  sacrificed  health, 
wealth  and  time  to  give  Wilson  the  high  office  he 
sought. 

"I  had  been  commissioned  by  members  of  the 
National  Committee  to  ask  that  some  of  them  be 
rewarded. 

"With  an  iciness  which  was,  I  believe,  natural,  or 
cultivated  at  times,  the  President-elect  replied: 

"  'I  am  tired  out.  I  am  going  to  Bermuda  for  a 
rest.  I  must  insist  that  I  shall  not  be  annoyed  with 
applications  for  office  until  my  return'. 

"I  replied,  as  calmly  as  my  resentment  would  per 
mit:  'I  am  tired,  too.  So  are  hundreds  and  thousands 
of  others  who,  when  you  attempted  to  hoist  the  white 
flag,  rallied  about  you  and  nominated  and  elected  you. 

[  208  ] 


"I  OWE  YOU  NOTHING" 

They  are  entitled  to  immediate  and  generous  consid 
eration.  They  have  commissioned  me  to  speak  for 
them.  I  recognize  your  right  to  name  your  private 
secretary  and  other  members  of  your  confidential 
staff.  But  members  of  the  National  Committee  have 
some  suggestions  to  submit  as  to  members  of  the 
Cabinet  and  heads  of  other  departments  and  bureaus'. 

"Very  curtly,  Governor  Wilson  responded:  'I 
reserve  the  privilege  of  naming  whom  I  please  for  my 
official  family.  But,  in  any  event,  I  shall  consider  no 
one  seriously  until  after  I  return  from  my  vacation'. 

'  'May  I  ask  if  you  have  selected  your  private 
secretary?  During  your  absence  I  may  have  to  com 
municate  with  him  if  I  cannot  get  in  touch  with  you', 
I  persisted. 

6  'I  have  none  and  will  make  no  choice  until  I  get 
back  from  Bermuda',  was  Wilson's  answer. 

"All  the  satisfaction  I  got  was  that  the  President 
elect  had  not  selected  a  single  man  to  serve  under  him. 
I  presented  him  a  list  of  names  of  men  who  had  been 
indorsed  by  the  National  Committee  for  some  of  the 
most  desirable  offices.  He,  scarcely  glancing  at  it, 
tossed  the  document  to  his  stenographer  and  said,  as 
he  bowed  me  out:  'I  may  have  another  talk  with  you 
when  I  get  back  from  Bermuda'. 

"This  was  the  briefest  interview  I  ever  had  with 
Mr.  Wilson.  If  ever  I  had  to  know  Mr.  Wilson,  this 
was  the  way  to  find  him  out. 

"I  determined  not  to  be  on  bad  terms  with  him  no 
matter  what  happened.  I  had  a  perfectly  certain  idea 
about  the  way  he  was  going  to  handle  things.  I  knew 

[  209  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

that  it  meant  the  ruin  of  the  Democratic  Party  if  it 
continued ;  but  I  felt  that  I  owed  an  obligation  to  the 
party  which  had  not  been  in  power  for  twenty  years. 
I  felt  that  what  had  not  been  done  before  must  be  done, 
namely:  that  the  party  as  a  party  must  be  strength 
ened  in  the  matter  of  its  organization ;  that  its  policies 
must  be  formulated  definitely  and  distinctly. 

"There  should  be  no  turpiture,  no  excuses,  no  vacil 
lation.  I  believed,  as  I  do  yet,  that  the  processes  of 
government  must  be  derived  from  the  people,  and  that 
the  people,  high  and  low,  must  be  furnished  with  all 
the  facts  about  all  the  great  events  or  the  great  pro 
posals  affecting  them. 

"I  concluded  to  remain  over  at  Princeton  a  few  days 
and  do  what  I  could  to  impress  the  President-elect 
that  I  had  made  pledges  to  his  most  influential  sup 
porters  which  he  must  satisfy.  I  soon  learned  that  Mr. 
McAdoo  and  Mr.  Tumulty  had  spent  election  day 
with  Governor  Wilson  and  had  submitted  a  list  of 
recommendations  for  nearly  every  desirable  office 
within  his  gift. 

"When  the  newspaper  correspondents  asked  Mr. 
McAdoo  why  he  was  not  at  his  desk  at  New  York 
Headquarters,  he  stammered:  'Well,  I  thought  I 
would  come  over  and  be  the  first  to  congratulate  the 
President-elect'. 

"Mrs.  Wilson,  I  was  afterward  informed,  reached 
the  President-elect  with  the  definite  news  of  his  victory 
only  a  minute  or  two  ahead  of  Mr.  McAdoo. 

"I  called  on  the  President-elect  again  the  Thursday 
after  election. 

[  210  ] 


"I  OWE  YOU  NOTHING" 

"An  army  of  photographers  besieged  us  for  snap 
shots.  The  President-elect  finally  condescended  to 
have  his  picture  taken  with  me.  I  can  hardly  say  I 
wore  a  triumphant  smile  as  the  'snapshooters'  shot  us 
in  various  poses. 

" Apparently  to  show  the  public  that  he  was  not 
ungrateful  or  discourteous,  the  President-elect  invited 
me  to  go  with  him  to  the  Princeton-New  York  Uni 
versity  football  game  the  following  Saturday.  We 
were  accompanied  by  'Big  Bill'  Edwards.  While  we 
were  watching  the  'Tigers'  overwhelm  the  Gotham 
boys,  I  once  or  twice  sought  to  get  a  definite  answer 
about  appointments  to  carry  back  to  my  associates  on 
the  National  Committee.  At  each  hint  Governor 
Wilson  scowled.  Finally,  in  indignation,  mock  or 
genuine,  he  said: 

"  'Once  and  for  all,  Mr.  McCombs,  not  a  word  on 
this  subject  until  I  get  back  from  my  vacation.  I 
must  insist  upon  rest  and  a  chance  to  think'. 

"I  did  not  renew  the  subject,  and  returned  to  New 
York  absolutely  in  the  dark  as  to  the  fate  of  men  who 
had  fought  and  made  sacrifices  to  make  Wilson 
President". 

Governor  Wilson  departed  for  his  vacation  a  few 
days  later.  He  was  absent  until  December  16th. 
Whether  or  not,  while  away,  he  inspected  the  recom 
mendations  of  Chairman  McCombs  and  his  associates, 
the  fact  remains  that  in  the  list  submitted  by  them 
these  names  appeared: 

For  Secretary  of  State:  Richard  Olney,  of  Massa 
chusetts. 

[211  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

For  Secretary  of  the  Treasury:  Henry  Morgen- 
thau,  of  New  York. 

For  Secretary  of  War:  Colonel  John  T.  McGraw, 
of  West  Virginia,  or  General  "Bibb"  Graves,  of 
Alabama. 

For  Attorney  General:  Robert  L.  Henry,  of  Texas. 

Not  one  of  the  men  proposed  by  McCombs  was 
appointed. 

While  the  President-elect  was  hibernating  in  South 
ern  climes,  McCombs  learned  that  William  G. 
McAdoo  was  stating  that  he  would  be  Secretary  of 
the  Treasury,  and  Joseph  P.  Tumulty  that  he  would 
be  Secretary  to  the  President. 

He  was  not  surprised  that  McAdoo  aimed  to  handle 
the  nation's  billions.  But  he  was  rather  astonished 
that  Tumulty  still  sought  the  Secretaryship  to  the 
President.  McCombs  had  been  informed  that  just 
before  leaving  the  country  Governor  Wilson  had 
offered,  and  Tumulty  had  accepted,  the  Secretaryship 
of  the  Supreme  Court  of  New  Jersey.  This  position 
carried  a  salary  in  excess  of  that  drawn  by  the  Presi 
dent's  Secretary.  Nevertheless,  McCombs  kept  hear 
ing  that  Tumulty  was  to  be  at  the  elbow  of  the 
President  at  Washington.  Unwelcome  as  this  was  to 
him,  he  decided  to  withhold  continued  opposition  on 
the  ground  that  the  President  of  course  was  warranted 
in  choosing  whom  he  pleased  for  this  confidential  place. 

McAdoo,  for  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  was  a 
proposition  which  McCombs  found  difficult  to  tolerate. 
He  called  a  conference  of  those  who  had  been  inti 
mately  associated  with  him  in  the  campaign  and  sought 

[  212] 


"I  OWE  YOU  NOTHING" 

their  advice.  It  was  agreed  that  McCombs  himself 
ought  to  avow  himself  a  candidate  for  head  of  the 
financial  branch  of  the  government.  Reluctantly, 
McCombs  accepted  the  advice  on  condition,  however, 
that  he  personally  should  not  submit  the  suggestion  to 
the  President-elect. 

"I  wish",  urged  McCombs,  "to  be  in  the  position  of 
one  seeking  no  office  at  all  under  the  Wilson  adminis 
tration.  As  Chairman  of  the  National  Committee, 
however,  I  reserve  the  right  of  recommending  candi 
dates  whose  fitness  is  guaranteed  by  those  who  were 
most  responsible  for  the  nomination  and  election  of 
Governor  Wilson.  Of  course,  should  the  President 
elect  offer  me  the  Secretaryship  of  the  Treasury,  or 
the  Attorney  Generalship,  I  would  feel  very  grateful 
and  complimented.  But  I  shall  never  personally  ask 
either  or  any  place  from  him". 

Colonel  E.  M.  House,  Cleveland  H.  Dodge,  and 
others,  called  upon  the  President-elect  upon  his  return 
from  Bermuda,  December  16,  1912.  They  eulogized 
McCombs  and  urged  that  he  be  made  either  Secretary 
of  the  Treasury  or  Attorney  General.  They  argued 
that  he  was  entitled  to  any  office  the  President-elect 
could  give  him. 

"What  about  McAdoo"?  asked  the  President-elect. 

"Consider  first  the  man  who  did  more  to  put  you  in 
the  White  House  than  any  other.  We  do  not  care 
what  you  do  for  McAdoo  after  that",  was  the  reply 
of  Mr.  Dodge. 

"Well,  I'll  see  McCombs  and  talk  it  over  with 
him",  responded  Governor  Wilson. 

[  213  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT, 

Within  a  few  hours  after  the  President-elect  got 
back  from  his  outing,  the  writer  happened  to  meet  a 
Wall  Street  friend. 

"It  is  no  news  to  you,  I  presume,  that  William  J. 
Bryan  is  to  be  Secretary  of  State,  is  it"?  asked  my 
friend. 

"It  is",  was  my  answer. 

"Well,  President-elect  Wilson  has  offered  the  port 
folio  to  Bryan  and  there  is  the  devil  to  pay  about  it. 
But  Bryan  will  accept",  said  my  informant. 

I  called  up  Mr.  McCombs  at  his  New  York  office. 
I  told  him  of  my  information.  He  answered:  "Don't 
believe  all  you  hear  in  Wall  Street.  Most  people  go 
broke  on  that.  There  is  no  chance  of  Bryan's  appoint 
ment.  The  President-elect  knows,  as  well  as  I  do, 
that  Bryan  did  his  best  to  deprive  him  of  the  nomina 
tion  and  sought  to  appropriate  it  for  himself.  I  am 
going  to  Princeton  to  see  the  Governor  this  afternoon. 
I  shall  call  you  up  this  evening  and  give  you  the  facts". 

About  10  P.  M.  McCombs  did  call  me.  He  said:  "I 
regret  to  say  that  your  informant  was  right.  The 
President-elect,  in  his  desire  to  start  his  administration 
without  friction  with  any  factions  of  his  party,  has 
offered  the  Secretaryship  of  State  to  Mr.  Bryan.  I 
have  made  as  vehement  a  protest  as  I  can,  and  shall 
continue  to  do  so  until  the  very  hour  of  the  nomina 
tions.  I  have,  in  detail,  reminded  the  President-elect 
of  the  plot  engineered  by  Bryan  at  the  Baltimore 
convention  to  prevent  the  Governor's  nomination  and 
secure  his  own.  I  shall  ask  every  true  friend  of  the 
President-elect  to  unite  with  me  in  insisting  that 

[  214  ] 


"I  OWE  YOU  NOTHING" 

Bryan  shall  not  be  intrusted  with  any  confidential 
place  under  the  administration.  I  have  cordially 
renewed  my  recommendation  that  Richard  Olney,  who 
was  Secretary  of  State  under  Grover  Cleveland,  is  the 
ideal  man  to  handle  foreign  affairs.  I  shall  persist 
in  this". 

During  this  memorable  interview  with  the  Presi 
dent-elect,  Governor  Wilson  asked  Mr.  McCombs  if 
he  and  his  associates  would  strenuously  oppose  the 
appointment  of  William  G.  McAdoo  for  Secretary  of 
the  Treasury. 

"We  shall  content  ourselves  with  filing  our  objec 
tions",  replied  Mr.  McCombs.  "We  know  McAdoo. 
We  do  not  consider  him  a  friend  of  your  friends,  or  of 
yours.  He  is  for  McAdoo.  That's  all!  Had  his 
advice  been  accepted  at  Baltimore,  you  would  not 
have  been  the  convention  nominee". 

"Would  you  personally  resent  McAdoo's  appoint 
ment"?  asked  the  President-elect. 

"Not  personally,  but  for  your  own  sake",  was 
McCombs'  reply. 

Mr.  McCombs  learned  that  the  President-elect  was 
considering  Lindley  M.  Garrison,  of  New  Jersey,  for 
Secretary  of  War.  He  commended  this,  but  warmly 
recommended  Colonel  John  T.  McGraw,  National 
Committeeman  from  West  Virginia,  for  Garrison's 
assistant.  As  a  second  choice,  Mr.  McCombs  sug 
gested  General  "Bibb"  Graves,  of  Alabama.  Mc 
Graw  had  been  one  of  the  original  Wilson  boosters. 
General  Graves,  despite  the  fact  that  his  state  delega 
tion  was  pledged  to  and  fought  to  the  finish  for  the 

[  215  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

nomination  of  Oscar  W.  Underwood,  contended  as 
hard  as  he  could  for  Wilson's  selection. 

For  Attorney  General,  McCombs  argued  earnestly 
for  the  naming  of  Robert  L.  Henry,  of  Texas.  He 
was  Chairman  of  the  Rules  Committee  of  the  House 
of  Representatives  and  had  charge  of  the  Wilson 
parliamentary  programme  at  the  Baltimore  con 
vention. 

But  the  President-elect  had  already  promised 
Colonel  House  to  appoint  Albert  S.  Burleson,  of 
Texas,  Postmaster  General.  He  pleaded  that  he 
could  not  choose  two  members  of  the  cabinet  from 
Texas.  McCombs  admitted  that  this  would  be  unfair 
to  other  states.  So  Henry  was  eliminated  and 
Burleson  agreed  upon  as  the  Texas  member. 

The  final  conference  of  the  cabinet  makers  was  held 
on  the  night  of  the  last  day  in  February  at  the  home  of 
Colonel  House  in  New  York.  There  were  present  the 
President-elect,  Colonel  House,  Chairman  McCombs, 
and  others. 

The  session  was  protracted  until  almost  daylight. 
Colonel  House  fought  for  the  appointment  of  Bryan 
as  Secretary  of  State.  McCombs  renewed  his  attack 
upon  the  Nebraskan,  declaring:  "He  has  opposed 
you,  Governor,  from  the  day  you  became  a  candidate 
for  the  Presidency.  He  regards  himself  as  the  only 
American  fit  to  be  President.  You  are  in  his  way. 
He  will,  if  appointed,  seek  to  build  up,  out  of  patron 
age,  a  machine  to  plague  you.  I  beg  of  you,  again,  do 
not  take  this  man  into  your  confidence". 

The  President-elect  was  obdurate.  He  persisted 
[  216  ] 


"I  OWE  YOU  NOTHING" 

that  Bryan  must  be  placated,  and  that  the  party  wing 
of  which  he  was  leader  would  become  an  administra 
tion  auxiliary  if  the  man  from  Lincoln  was  made  Sec 
retary  of  State.  Governor  Wilson  also  laid  stress 
upon  the  point  that  even  if  Bryan  was  out  for  mischief, 
he  could  accomplish  less  in  the  State  than  in  any  other 
department. 

Disgusted,  and  still  admonishing  Wilson  that  he  was 
risking  ruin  for  himself  and  his  administration, 
McCombs  reluctantly  withdrew  his  open  opposition 
to  Bryan. 

To  the  very  last  he  fought  McAdoo  for  Secretary  of 
the  Treasury  and  Tumulty  for  Presidential  Secretary. 
He,  however,  cheerfully  acquiesced  in  the  election  of 
Franklin  K.  Lane  as  Secretary  of  the  Interior,  and 
David  Houston  for  Secretary  of  Agriculture.  Mc 
Combs  at  first  questioned  whether  Josephus  Daniels 
possessed  the  ability  to  fill  the  Secretaryship  of  the 
Navy,  a  post  so  admirably  administered  by  William 
C.  Whitney,  Benjamin  F.  Tracy  and  others  who  had 
built  up  America's  sea  armada. 

But  Daniels  had  rendered  valuable  service  in  the 
campaign.  Southern  Democrats  appeared  to  be 
behind  him.  Then,  too,  Daniels  had  been  loyal  to 
McCombs  when  the  plot  was  brewing  to  remove  him 
as  National  Chairman  and  substitute  McAdoo. 

McCombs  was  astounded  when  informed  that  the 
President-elect  had  chosen  William  C.  Redfield  for 
another  New  York  member  of  the  cabinet  and  assigned 
to  the  Secretaryship  of  Commerce.  Redfield,  Mc 
Combs  maintained/ was  without  any  following  at  all. 

[  217  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

He  was  in  disfavor  with  Democrats  of  his  home  county 
of  Kings.  He  had  been  a  frequent  caller  at  head 
quarters  during  the  campaign,  and  had  "annoyed" 
the  managers  constantly,  persisting  in  interrupting 
their  work  by  dissertations  on  the  tariff.  The 
President-elect,  however,  stuck  to  Redfield. 


[  218  ] 


XVII 
INSIDERS    AND    OUTSIDERS 

McCoMBs  DECLINES  ALL  OFFERS  OF  PLACE  UNDER  WILSON  — 
TREATED  AS  A  "RANK  OUTSIDER"  AT  INAUGURATION  —  CAN 
NOT  PASS  BRYAN-McAooo-TuMULTY  TROCHA  —  REPUBLICAN 
MANAGER  FRANK  H.  HITCHCOCK,  "DowN  AND  OUT",  COM 
MISERATES  WITH  McCoMBs  —  WHITE  HOUSE  ANNOUNCEMENT 
THAT  McCoMBs  is  "PATRONAGE  DISTRIBUTOR"  —  McAooo  is 
REAL  DISPENSER. 

THREE  DAYS  before  inauguration,  March  4, 
1912,  Mr.  McCombs  publicly  announced  that 
he  would  not  accept  any  office  within  the  gift 
of  the  President.  At  a  reception  in  his  honor  given 
by  the  National  Press  Club,  Washington,  D.  C., 
March  1,  he  was  introduced  as  a  "man  who  can  have 
anything  he  wants  under  the  Wilson  administration". 
Mr.  McCombs  smiled.  In  response,  he  said:  "I 
accept  this  introduction  instead  of  the  cabinet  place 
for  which  you  boys  have  so  generously  supported  me 
and  other  honors  you  have  sought  to  confer.  I  shall 
take  no  official  place  under  this  administration.  I 
consider  myself  amply  rewarded  because  I  have  been 
identified  with  the  battle  which  terminated  in  the  elec 
tion  of  Woodrow  Wilson  as  President  of  the  United 
States". 

[  219  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

Newspaper  correspondents  were  astonished  at 
They  had  picked  McCombs  for  almost  every  desirable 
place  the  President  had  to  bestow.  They  thronged 
about  McCombs  and  asked  if  he  was  serious. 

"I  certainly  am.  There  is  nothing  of  the  office- 
seeker  about  me.  I  shall  retain  the  National  Chair 
manship,  however,  and  do  all  in  my  power  to 
strengthen  the  administration  and  party  with  the 
people". 

McCombs'  announcement  seemed  to  confirm  reports 
that  he  and  the  President-elect  had  quarrelled  over 
the  distribution  of  offices.  The  newspaper  men  rushed 
telegrams  all  over  the  country  to  that  effect. 

Mr.  McCombs  felt  like,  and  was  treated  by  jealous 
rivals,  as  a  "rank  outsider",  at  the  inauguration  of 
President  Wilson  in  1913.  William  J.  Bryan,  Wil 
liam  G.  McAdoo,  Joseph  P.  Tumulty  and  A.  Mitchell 
Palmer  constituted  themselves  a  bodyguard  about  the 
new  executive  which  Mr.  McCombs  was  too  modest  to 
try  to  break  through. 

Early  in  the  morning  of  March  4,  Mr.  McCombs, 
merely  as  a  citizen,  courteously  called  upon  the  Presi 
dent,  at  the  latter's  hotel.  He  was  lost  in  the  multi 
tude  assembled  in  and  about  the  Presidential  suite. 
He  did  not  attempt  to  force  his  way  in. 

Mr.  Bryan,  who  had  been  appointed  Secretary  of 
State;  Mr.  McAdoo,  who  had  been  appointed  Secre 
tary  of  the  Treasury;  Mr.  Tumulty,  who  was  named 
for  Secretary  to  the  President,  and  Mr.  Palmer,  who 
afterward  became  Attorney  General,  saw  to  it  that 
McCombs  had  no  chance  to  get  a  word  in  private  with 

[  220  ] 


INSIDERS   AND   OUTSIDERS 

the  man  he  had  helped  much  more  than  they  had  to 
send  to  the  White  House. 

After  being  closeted  with  the  President  an  hour, 
Mr.  Bryan  came  out.  He  told  newspaper  men  that  it 
had  been  decided  to  offer  the  French  Ambassadorship 
to  Mr.  McCombs. 

The  veriest  novice  in  politics  knew  that  McCombs 
could  not  afford  and  would  not  accept  the  post. 

Just  as  Mr.  McCombs  was  leaving  the  Presidential 
quarters  he  was  told  by  a  third  party  of  the  tender. 
A  smile  of  derision  played  upon  his  face.  Frowning, 
he  said:  "I  cannot  take  a  place  which  would  cost  me 
a  hundred  thousand  dollars  a  year  to  maintain". 

It  was  exasperating  enough  to  have  the  rumor  of 
the  tender  come  through  a  comparative  stranger.  It 
was  the  more  galling  that  the  official  news  should 
emanate  from  a  man  against  whom  he  had  warned  the 
President,  but  who  had  been  taken  into  the  Presiden 
tial  family. 

Mr.  Wilson  had  hardly  been  sworn  in  than  Mr. 
McCombs  spied,  in  the  crowd  at  the  rear,  Frank  H. 
Hitchcock.  Hitchcock  had  been  Chairman  of  the 
Republican  National  Committee  from  1907  to  1912 
and  Postmaster  General  under  President  Taft.  He 
had  just  lost  his  job. 

"One  touch  of  nature  makes  the  whole  world  kin". 
So  thought  McCombs  as  he  greeted  Hitchcock.  With 
a  sadness  and  sympathy  that  Hitchcock  will  never 
forget,  McCombs  said: 

"I  wonder,  Frank,  if  I  don't  feel  and  look  quite  as 
miserable  as  you  do"? 

[  221  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

"I'm  sorry  for  you,  old  man.  Let's  go  downtown 
and  have  some  lunch",  replied  Hitchcock,  as  he  linked 
his  arm  in  McCombs'  and  led  him  to  his  limousine. 
The  Democratic  and  Republican  Warwicks  drove  to 
a  hotel.  For  an  hour  or  more  they  discussed  their 
respective  predicaments. 

"Well,  Bill!  At  least  I  had  a  chief  who  was  grate 
ful,  though  the  man  you  picked  defeated  him",  said 
Hitchcock,  commiseratingly. 

The  men  rehearsed  their  disappointments  until  they 
heard  the  bands  blaring  on  their  way  down  from  the 
Capitol.  They  joined  a  party  on  the  reviewing  stand, 
opposite  the  White  House,  to  witness  the  return  of 
the  parade  escorting  the  new  President. 

March  5,  the  day  after  President  Wilson's  inaugu 
ration,  Chairman  McCombs  called  the  National  Com 
mittee  together.  Rumor  had  it  that  William  G. 
McAdoo,  jubilant  over  his  elevation  to  the  Secretary 
ship  of  the  Treasury,  and  Joseph  P.  Tumulty,  angered 
by  McCombs'  opposition  to  his  appointment  as  Secre 
tary  to  the  President,  planned  to  supplant  the  Chair 
man  and  substitute  one  of  their  own  clique. 

McCombs  learned  of  this  the  night  before.  He  con 
ferred  with  Henry  Morgenthau,  smarting  under  the 
refusal  of  the  President  to  make  him  his  Secretary  of 
the  Treasury;  Committee  Treasurer  Rollo  Wells, 
Homer  S.  Cummings,  of  Connecticut;  Clark  Howell, 
of  Georgia,  and  others.  He  discovered  that  enough 
votes  were  available  to  prevent  consummation  of  any 
McAdoo-Tumulty  plot. 

When  the  Committee  met,  members  flocked  about 
[  222  ] 


INSIDERS  AND   OUTSIDERS 

McCombs,  pledged  their  support  and  denounced  as 
an  outrage  the  refusal  of  the  President  even  to  con 
sider  their  recommendations  for  office  and  his  per 
sistent  decimation  to  testify  publicly  to  Mr.  McCombs' 
wonderful  achievements  in  nominating  and  electing 
him. 

McCombs  expressed  his  gratitude  for  the  devotion 
of  his  associates.  He  was  much  touched  when  a  reso 
lution  was  offered  and  adopted  tendering  the  gratitude 
of  the  Committee  for  his  great  accomplishments,  and 
pledging  undying  affection  and  loyalty  to  him  for  the 
future. 

Chairman  McCombs  returned  his  appreciation  and 
added:  "It  will  be  a  great  delight  to  carry  on  the  work 
of  the  Committee  and  to  join  with  you  in  broadening 
its  scope.  I  do  not  believe  that,  after  an  election, 
whether  it  results  in  victory  or  defeat,  a  committee 
should  be  dormant  until  a  few  months  before  another 
election.  We  should  be  in  thorough  co-operation  all 
the  time.  I  don't  know  how  to  get  along  without 
organization.  My  mind  runs  in  that  channel.  We 
have  the  best  body  of  fighting  Democrats  in  the  coun 
try.  In  order  to  assure  a  continuation  of  what  we 
have  accomplished,  we  must  continue  an  organized 
army.  Unless  we  do,  we  are  going  to  meet  an  organ 
ized  army  on  the  other  side.  That  will  be  dangerous. 

"It  will  be  a  great  delight  to  receive  suggestions 
and  advice  from  Committeemen.  Two  years  from 
now,  when  we  meet  strong  opposition,  we  can  main 
tain  ourselves  in  a  Congress  and  reorganize  for  the 
Presidential  battle  of  1916". 

[  223  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

This  speech  was  vociferously  applauded. 

Clark  Howell  offered  a  resolution  empowering 
Chairman  McCombs  to  name  a  committee  to  take 
charge  of  the  Senatorial  campaigns  in  Illinois  and 
New  Hampshire.  The  Chairman  chose  Homer  S. 
Cummings,  of  Connecticut,  as  McCombs'  Vice  Chair 
man;  Hollo  Wells,  of  Missouri,  Treasurer,  and 
Thomas  J.  Pence  to  take  charge  of  Washington  Head 
quarters.  The  McAdoo-Tumulty  group  uttered  not 
a  public  peep  against  McCombs  at  this  meeting. 

Commenting  on  the  foregoing,  Mr.  McCombs  wrote 
this  memorandum  for  his  book: 

"I  contemplated  resigning  as  Chairman  on  the  5th 
of  March,  1913.  I  was  making  every  preparation  for 
it.  Before  the  Committee  meeting,  I  told  some  of 
my  most  intimate  friends  on  the  Committee  of  my 
purpose.  It  went  the  rounds.  Their  answer  to 
me  was : 

"  'You  have  just  laid  down  plans  for  the  cohesion 
and  the  strengthening  of  the  Democratic  Party;  you 
have  been  all  through  this  thing;  you  know  its  every 
corner;  you  have  the  complete  confidence  of  the 
Democracy  of  America;  you  must  stay  and  finish 
the  job.' 

"  I  yielded  to  that  argument,  much  to  my  regret." 

Chairman  McCombs  remained  in  Washington  for 
a  few  days  to  renew  his  efforts  to  place  friends.  He 
called  frequently  at  the  White  House  and  kept  at  the 
President  to  fulfil  his  obligations.  March  14th  a  semi 
official  note  from  the  White  House  read: 

"Mr.  McCombs  will  not  accept  the  Ambassador- 
[  224  ] 


INSIDERS  AND  OUTSIDERS 

ship  to  Paris.  He  will  remain  as  the  head  of  the 
Democratic  National  Committee. 

"Second:  Mr.  McCombs  will  supervise  the  distribu 
tion  of  patronage  throughout  the  United  States  —  all 
the  states. 

"Third:  In  New  York  Senator  James  A.  O'Gor- 
man,  who  has  evinced  an  inclination  to  lean  toward 
Tammany  in  the  matter  of  recommendations,  will  step 
aside,  and  Mr.  McCombs,  who  has  never  had  any  con 
nection  with  Tammany,  will  recommend  the  patronage 
there." 

It  was  also  announced:  "Under  the  agreement 
reached,  Mr.  McCombs'  word  will  be  final  with  the 
President.  This  does  not  mean,  however,  that  Mr. 
McCombs  and  the  President  will  not  confer  with  Sen 
ators  and  Representatives.  On  the  contrary,  there 
will  be  many  such  conferences.  The  best  men  will 
get  the  places.  Where  there  is  a  number  of  appli 
cants,  the  recommendations  of  Senators  and  Repre 
sentatives  will  be  followed. 

"The  President's  action  in  deciding  to  accept  Mr. 
McCombs'  recommendations  means  that  the  indepen 
dent  and  Progressive  Democrats  in  New  York  will 
fare  just  as  well  as  the  Tammany  men.  Senator 
O' Gorman  is  satisfied  with  the  arrangement.  He  and 
Chairman  McCombs  will  work  together  in  New  York 
with  the  understanding  that  all  recommendations 
must  be  passed  upon  by  McCombs." 

Despite  this  compact,  the  President  failed  to  fulfil 
any  part  of  it. 

Popular  wrath  at  the  refusal  of  the  President  to 
[  225  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

manifest  the  slightest  gratitude  for  his  Warwick's 
prodigious  accomplishments  in  his  behalf  became 
nation-wide.  Even  Wilson  administration  organs 
attacked  the  President  for  his  alleged  declination  to 
show  some  appreciation  of  what  McCombs  had  done 
for  him.  The  President  renewed  his  offer  to  Mr. 
McCombs  for  a  foreign  mission. 

The  moment  this  became  known,  enemies  of  the 
administration  shouted: 

"Wilson  and  McAdoo  plan  to  drive  McCombs  out 
of  the  country  and  thus  lay  hold  on  the  party  organ 
ization  he  has  in  his  grip" ! 

However  this  may  have  been,  President  Wilson, 
soon  after  his  inauguration  and  shutting  McCombs 
and  his  friends  out  of  his  official  family,  formally 
tendered  to  Mr.  McCombs  the  Ambassadorship  to 
France  a  second  time.  It  came  in  the  form  of  a  brief 
note.  Mr.  McCombs  received  it  while  prostrated  by 
illness  in  New  York.  He  felt  that  the  honor  offered 
required  an  answer  in  person.  He  was  about  to  go 
direct  to  Washington  when  his  physician  directed  that 
he  remain  in  bed.  Mr.  McCombs  therefore  deputized 
his  law  partner,  Frederick  R.  Ryan,  to  carry  his 
answer  to  the  President. 

Mr.  Ryan  went  to  the  White  House,  and  was  there 
courteously  received  by  Mr.  Tumulty.  It  was  neces 
sary  to  await  the  President's  convenience,  he  being 
extremely  busy  that  morning.  After  a  delay  of  about 
three  hours,  the  President  met  Mr.  Ryan  in  the  office 
of  the  Executive  Secretary.  Mr.  Ryan  explained 
briefly  his  mission  to  the  President,  stating  the  reasons 

226 


INSIDERS  AND   OUTSIDERS 

actuating  Mr.  McCombs  in  declining  the  Ambassador 
ship.  On  learning  that  Mr.  McCombs  was  ill,  the 
President  asked:  "Is  he  following  the  advice  of  his 
physician"?  Mr.  Ryan  replied  that  he  believed  he 
was.  The  President  then  said:  "If  that  is  so,  it  is  the 
first  time  in  his  life  that  Mr.  McCombs  ever  followed 
anybody's  advice".  With  that  statement  he  turned 
abruptly  and  went  back  to  his  office. 

Shortly  thereafter  Mr.  McCombs  talked  the  matter 
over  with  the  President,  and  on  March  21, 1913,  issued 
the  following  statement  in  connection  therewith : 

"To-day  I  communicated  to  the  President  my  final 
decision  as  to  the  very  great  honor  he  has  done  me  in 
tendering  me  the  Ambassadorship  to  France,  with 
assurances  of  my  profound  appreciation.  No  public 
position  within  his  gift  could  be  more  attractive  to  me 
personally.  In  view  of  its  very  great  dignity  and 
importance,  I  have  naturally  studied  the  matter  with 
much  care. 

"After  reconsidering  the  tender,  the  prime  motives 
which  were  in  my  mind  before  have  impelled  me  to 
decline.  The  acceptance  of  the  post  would  involve 
greater  sacrifices  than  I  should  make.  I  do  not  feel 
that  I  can  afford  to  leave  my  life  work  —  practice  of 
the  law.  I  feel  compelled  to  devote  myself  to  my  per 
sonal  affairs,  and  at  the  same  time  I  will  lend  any 
assistance  in  my  power  that  will  contribute  to  the 
success  of  the  Democratic  Administration  and  the 
Democratic  Party". 

The  President  issued  this  comment : 

"I  am  very  sorry  indeed  that  Mr.  McCombs  cannot 
[  227  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

acce.pt  the  appointment  to  France.  I  was  particu 
larly  anxious  that  he  should.  My  admiration  for  his 
abilities,  my  knowledge  of  his  singular  capacity  for 
grasping  complex  situations,  my  confidence  in  his  tact 
and  resourcefulness,  as  well  as  my  affection  for  him 
and  the  intimate  relations  that  of  course  exist  between 
us,  combine  to  make  my  disappointment  very  great 
indeed.  But  I,  of  course,  appreciate  the  force  of  the 
reasons  he  gives.  He  would  have  accepted  at  an 
unreasonable  sacrifice.  I  could  not  further  press  the 
offer  upon  him". 

Simultaneously  the  President  issued  this  memo 
randum: 

"It  is  a  great  pity  that  the  country  has  to  ask  such 
sacrifices  of  those  who  are  invited  to  serve  abroad  —  a 
service  which  every  year  becomes  more  exacting  and 
more  important.  The  sacrifice  of  time,  of  means  and 
of  opportunity  at  home  is  very  serious  for  any  but 
men  of  large  means  and  leisure,  and  the  diplomatic 
service  is  unnecessarily  hampered". 

Mr.  McCombs  was  later  informed  by  the  President 
during  a  short  interview  that  he  had  offered  the 
Ambassadorship  to  Great  Britain  to  Richard  Olney, 
who  had  been  recommended  by  Mr.  McCombs  for 
Secretary  of  State.  Mr.  Olney  declined.  Then  the 
mission  was  offered  to  Charles  W.  Eliot,  President 
Emeritus  of  Harvard  University.  He,  too,  declined. 
Then  William  H.  Sharp  took  the  post. 


[  228  ] 


XVIII 
COLONEL  HOUSE  — THE  "INTRIGUER" 

TRIES  TO  BARGAIN  WITH  McCoMBS  TO  DISCARD  WILSON  FOR 
BRYAN  AND  "WE'LL  CONTROL  THE  UNITED  STATES"  —  OFFER 
FURIOUSLY  REJECTED  —  THOUGH  OPPOSED  TO  WILSON'S 
NOMINATION,  THE  "COLONEL"  NAMES  WHOM  HE  PLEASES 
FOR  OFFICE  —  "FED  ON  WILSON'S  PASSION  FOR  GREATNESS 
AND  SAID  'No' !  OR  'YES'  !  AS  REQUIRED"  —  How  HE  MUDDLED 
THINGS  FOR  THE  PRESIDENT  —  MORGENTHAU,  BARUCH  AND 
ELKUS  PORTRAYED. 

[EDITOR'S  NOTE  —  Mr.  McCombs  takes  up  his  narrative  again, 
devoting  nearly  an  entire  chapter  to  Colonel  House.] 

DURING  the  pre-convention  months,  once  a 
week,  whenever  possible,  Governor  Wilson 
came  to  my  apartment,  the  Royalton,  in 
West  44th  Street,  to  talk  over  matters  in  general.     I 
always  made  it  a  point,  in  view  of  his  lack  of  knowl 
edge  of  men  in  public  or  political  life,  or  men  who 
might  be  of  assistance,  to  have  him  meet  them  there. 

It  is  to  be  understood  that  Governor  Wilson  spent 
his  life  exclusively  in  an  academic  atmosphere.  I  dare 
say  that  even  when  he  went  to  Washington  as  Presi 
dent  he  did  not  know  seventy-five  men  in  public  life. 
Indeed,  I  think  this  is  no  exaggeration. 

The  meetings  at  the  Royalton  had  this  advantage: 
I  could  select  tHe  men  that  I  knew  might  be  attracted 

[  229  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

to  him,  and  those  whom  I  knew  would  at  once  dislike 
him  intensely.  In  the  case  of  the  latter,  I  must  con 
fess  that  I  kept  them  away  from  him  and  drew  the 
picture  myself. 

During  November,  Governor  Wilson  was  to  be  in 
town.  I  asked  Colonel  House  if  he  would  care  to 
meet  him.  Mr.  House,  of  course,  accepted  with 
pleasure.  In  a  few  minutes  he  arrived  from  his  hotel. 
I  presented  him.  The  conversation  ran  along  conven 
tion  lines.  It  did  not  touch  any  subject  involving 
public  affairs,  much  less  the  Presidency. 

Other  gentlemen  came,  who  had  an  appointment, 
and  Colonel  House  retired. 

Late  in  December,  the  Colonel  called  up  and  asked 
me  if  I  would  care  to  present  an  invitation  to  Governor 
Wilson  to  dine  with  a  Professor  Houston,  who  had 
been  President  of  the  University  at  Austin,  Texas, 
but  who  was  then  President  of  the  University  at  St. 
Louis. 

Mr.  House  said,  incidentally,  that  Mr.  Houston 
had  made  a  special  study  of  the  tariff,  and  that  the  two 
might  meet  on  common  ground  on  that  issue,  especially 
since  the  Governor  was  to  make  his  tariff  speech  on 
January  3,  1912. 

The  dinner  passed  off  quite  pleasantly.  There  was 
general  conversation.  President  Houston  intimated  a 
desire  to  discuss  the  tariff.  Governor  Wilson  caromed 
off  the  issue  and  there  was  nothing  further  heard  of 
that.  The  conversation  was  then  resumed  along  con 
ventional  lines,  Colonel  House  not  participating. 

I  went  later  to  see  Colonel  House  on  the  very  prac- 
[  230  ] 


EDWARD  M .  HOUSE 


COLONEL  HOUSE  — THE  "INTRIGUER" 

tical  matter  of  his  contribution.  He  said  he  could 
make  none,  then  disappeared. 

However,  during  the  spring  of  1912  I  was  invited 
by  Colonel  House  to  become  a  week-end  guest  at 
Beverly,  Massachusetts.  I  accepted  the  invitation  and 
moreover  had  a  very  pleasant  time. 

The  Texas  situation  was  discussed.  I  told  him  that 
it  was  all  "sewed  up"  and  that  Colonel  Ball,  of  Austin, 
had  the  matter  thoroughly  in  hand.  The  Colonel  then 
made  it  known  to  me  that  he,  too,  had  been  writing 
some  letters. 

I  can  positively  state  that  Colonel  House  had  noth 
ing  to  do  with  carrying  the  State  of  Texas  in  the 
primaries  for  Woodrow  Wilson,  except,  as  he  told 
me  himself,  he  had  written  a  few  letters.  I  think  no 
responsible  person  who  took  part  in  that  difficult 
primary  would  contradict  me  for  an  instant. 

But  returning  to  the  Beverly  week-ends:  As  I  was 
getting  in  my  cab  to  go  for  my  train  one  day,  Colonel 
House  came  out  with  me.  He  said:  "You  know,  Mr. 
McCombs,  that  Woodrow  Wilson  cannot  be  nom 
inated.  I  think  I  can  do  something  with  Bryan,  and 
if  you  will  turn  the  present  forces  of  Woodrow  Wilson 
to  Senator  Culberson  of  Texas,  you  and  I  will  control 
the  United  States  for  the  next  four  years". 

I  tried  to  be  as  polite  as  possible  inasmuch  as  I  was 
a  departing  guest.  But  I  said  that  I  had  told  Gov 
ernor  Wilson  that  I  would  be  with  him  until  the  end. 
No  such  combination  as  the  Colonel  suggested  was 
possible  in  the  convention. 

Senator  Culberson  was  unfortunately  a  sick  man. 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

For  that  reason  he  was  losing  his  grip  on  the  public. 
In  addition,  he  came  from  the  wrong  state.  I  felt  sure 
that  if  Mr.  Bryan  had  anything  in  his  mind  at  all  about 
the  convention  it  would  be  his  own  candidacy. 

I  left  House,  feeling  that  he  was  a  puny  intriguer, 
but  bold  enough  to  assert  an  absurdity  when  it  might 
possibly  be  to  his  advantage.  I  think  when  this  Bev 
erly  conversation  is  analyzed  in  the  light  of  subsequent 
events,  much  may  be  augured  of  what  happened  in 
Washington  during  Mr.  Wilson's  incumbency  as 
President. 

Colonel  House  took  no  further  interest.  I  never 
saw  nor  heard  of  him  again  until  some  one  told  me, 
shortly  before  the  Baltimore  convention,  that  he  had 
sailed  for  Europe  for  an  indefinite  stay. 

Contrary  to  other  published  statements,  and  my 
associates  in  the  Baltimore  convention  will  bear  me 
out,  Colonel  House  had  nothing  whatever  to  do  with 
that  convention  or  its  processes. 

On  his  return  from  abroad,  the  Colonel  came  to  me, 
and  said  he  would  like  a  letter  from  me  of  presentation 
to  the  Presidential  nominee.  I  thereupon  wrote  one 
for  him  to  Governor  Wilson,  but  in  the  confusion  of 
his  mail  probably  he  did  not  have  a  chance  to  answer 
it.  Colonel  House  came  to  me  ten  days  later,  much 
perturbed.  He  asked  if  I  would  give  him  a  letter  of 
presentation  which  he  would  take  by  hand  to  Sea  Girt. 
It  was  a  small  courtesy.  I  knew  that  the  Governor's 
business  was  such  that  he  might  not  to  able  to  see  him 
for  days.  But  Colonel  House  persisted.  I  wrote  to 
the  Governor  saying  that  this  letter  presented  Colonel 

[  232  ] 


COLONEL  HOUSE  — THE  "INTRIGUER" 

House,  whom  he  perhaps  remembered  as  having  met 
at  my  apartment,  and  at  dinner  at  Colonel  House's 
home  in  New  York  when  Professor  Houston  and  I 
were  present. 

Colonel  House  took  the  letter  and  expressed  profuse 
thanks.  I  heard  nothing  of  it  for  some  time.  I  noticed 
about  the  third  week  before  the  Presidential  campaign 
closed  that  Colonel  House  was  around  headquarters 
every  afternoon,  trying  to  meet  everybody.  Further 
more,  he  was  anxious  that  I  should  go  riding  through 
the  park  with  him,  but  I  never  did. 

In  some  way  or  other,  which  I  can  never  tell,  I 
became  suspicious  that  House  was  at  that  time  intrigu 
ing.  I  paid  no  special  attention  to  it  because  I  could 
not  imagine  that  he  could  he  helpful  or  hurtful  to 
anyone. 

The  election  took  place.  I  did  not  see  anything 
more  of  Colonel  House.  He  had  been  merely  a 
passing  incident  to  me  because  I  had  been  in  the  large 
business  of  putting  a  big  operation  through. 

About  December  15, 1912,  the  President-elect  went 
to  the  Waldorf-Astoria  prior  to  sailing  for  Bermuda. 
I  called  to  pay  my  respects  and  wish  him  a  pleasant 
journey. 

I  found  House  there,  seated  with  him  alone.  The 
President-elect  and  I  had  fifteen  or  twenty  minutes' 
general  conversation.  House  sat  silently,  in  a  bowed 
position,  his  hands  crossed  over  his  chest.  He  never 
took  his  eyes  off  the  President-elect.  With  servile 
alacrity  he  agreed  with  every  word  the  President-elect 
uttered. 

[  283  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

After  this  session  I  left  the  President-elect,  and  he 
went  to  his  boat  bound  for  Bermuda. 

I  could  not  but  wonder  at  the  presence  of  House. 
...  Why,  above  all  men,  should  he  be  there?  His 
manner  was  nothing  more  or  less  than  that  of  a  digni 
fied  flunky  who  was  only  permitted  to  sit  down  and 
say  "Yes"  or  "No"  to  the  President-elect,  as  the  case 
might  require. 

As  I  walked  down  the  corridor  to  the  elevator,  I 
wondered  very  much  where  House  fitted  in.  I  kept 
wondering  about  him  as  I  went  down  the  elevator. 
As  I  passed  out  of  the  hotel,  I  felt  I  had  the  psychol 
ogy  of  it,  when  I  remembered  that  James  R.  Keene 
told  me  about  the  great  horse  Sysonby:  that  in  order 
to  keep  him  quiet,  his  trainers  always  kept  a  kitten 
in  the  stall  with  him.  Very  often,  too,  the  kitten 
was  taken  as  far  as  the  track  when  the  horse  was  to 
race. 

Nobody  seemed  to  know  that  House  was  becoming 
influential.  But  it  was  only  about  the  time  of  the 
inauguration  that  I  found  out  that  he  had  a  power 
with  Wilson.  Of  course,  it  is  well  known  that  he  put 
Bryan,  Burleson,  McReynolds  and  Houston  into  the 
Cabinet.  This  he  did  out  of  hand. 

It  became  clear  to  me  that  if  House,  an  unknown, 
had  this  much  power,  in  the  end  the  organized  Democ 
racy  of  America  was  to  receive  a  severe  shock.  There 
is  no  question  that  House  was  responsible  for  most  of 
the  large  appointments  of  the  Wilson  administration 
and  for  grievous  mistakes  in  that  regard. 

It  is  absolutely  sure  also,  that  his  hand  was  evident 
C  234  ] 


COLONEL  HOUSE  — THE  "INTRIGUER" 

in  some  of  the  great  mistakes  in  Wilson's  executive 
politics,  as  well  as  his  legislative  suggestions. 

I  have  made  faithful  inquiry  and  have  yet  failed  to 
get  a  view  from  a  single  impartial  man  who  knew 
House  that  he  did  not  exactly  conform  to  the  impres 
sion  which  I  took  away  with  me  on  the  first  evening  at 
the  Gotham  in  New  York. 

House  has  been  called  by  many  "a  man  of  mystery". 
Such  is  far  from  the  case.  In  my  mind,  in  the  first 
instance,  we  must  take  count  of  the  analogy  of 
Sysonby.  In  the  second  place,  House  did  the  thing 
Which  any  newspaper  man  will  tell  you  can  be  done,— 
created  an  air  of  mystery  about  himself  by  being  with 
the  President,  and  always  refusing  to  talk. 

House  no  doubt  fed  to  the  limit  on  Mr.  Wilson's 
all-absorbing  passion  for  the  appearance  of  greatness. 
I  say  it,  without  reserve,  that  a  practical  man  would 
not  keep  House  about  him  fifteen  minutes. 

But  House  likes  publicity.  He  likes  to  create, 
through  his  atmosphere  of  mystery,  a  conviction  of 
greatness.  The  egotistical  book  called  the  "Real 
Colonel  House"  reveals  this  characteristic  of  House. 
That  book  was  written,  at  the  instance  of  House,  by 
a  newspaper  man.  I  am  told  by  the  editor  who  pub 
lished  it  that  House  personally  revised  the  proofs  and 
wrote  most  of  what  is  quoted  of  him  in  that  volume. 
If  one  can  stand  the  reading  of  it  without  nausea  in 
the  light  of  the  above  facts,  one  can  indeed  understand 
the  "Real  Colonel  House". 

In  February,  1913,  House  appeared  at  my  apart 
ment.  "Now",  said  he,  "we  must  all  fix  this  thing  up. 

[  235  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

I  will  call  McAdoo  right  up  here.  He  will  arrive  in 
twenty  minutes.  I  know  where  he  lives,  and  you  and 
he  can  have  the  selections  of  posts  in  the  Cabinet  with 
the  exception  of  one". 

I  quickly  realized  who  the  one  was  —  Bryan. 

House  continued: 

"Now  if  we  fix  this  thing  up  among  us,  McAdoo 
and  you  and  I  will  control  the  United  States  for  the 
next  four  years". 

I  was  so  enraged  at  the  thought  that  I  answered  him 
in  far  from  drawing-room  language  and  asked  him  to 
get  out  of  my  apartment  as  quickly  as  possible. 

Subsequent  events  prove  that  House  was  right,  for 
later  nothing  that  House  or  McAdoo  desired  was 
turned  down.  They  delivered  vast  volumes  of  patron 
age  throughout  the  United  States,  and  by  this  they 
high-handedly  offended  and  overruled  Congressmen 
and  Senators. 

I  have  been  told  by  hundreds  of  truthful  men  that 
when  they  wanted  anything  done  at  Washington,  it 
was  essential  to  get  the  approval  of  Mr.  House  first. 
I  have  seen  this  system  in  operation.  It  is  well  known 
that  McAdoo  practically  had  his  way  in  everything, 
and  that  the  other  members  of  the  Cabinet  need  not 
have  been  there  at  all. 

No  man  I  have  ever  asked  about  House  has  said 
that  he  had  any  intelligence.  When  persons  have  vis 
ited  him  he  has  rubbed  his  hands  like  a  girl,  using  a 
soft,  low  voice.  His  only  answer  to  any  question  has 
been  a  "We  will  see"! 

It  was  early  in  February,  1913,  that  Colonel  House 
[  236  ] 


COLONEL  HOUSE  — THE  "INTRIGUER" 

arranged  that  "Captain"  Bill  McDonald  be  dispatched 
to  Princeton  as  the  special  bodyguard  of  the  Presi 
dent-elect.  This  amused  me  intensely.  "Captain" 
Bill  was  an  old  withered  up  man,  since  dead,  who  had 
at  some  time  acquired,  under  the  skill  of  an  artist,  the 
reputation  of  a  "Gun  Fighter". 

The  "Captain"  brought  two  guns  down.  He  walked 
up  and  down  the  quiet  streets  of  Princeton  proclaim 
ing  himself  as  the  bodyguard  of  Wilson  and  the  great 
est  "Gun  Fighter"  in  the  world.  It  then  became  clear 
to  me  that  Wilson  liked  "Opera  Bouffe",  and  the 
little  publicity  this  would  bring.  It  also  appeared  that 
House  was  getting  very  close  to  the  President. 

Another  man  who,  in  making  Wilson,  rose  himself 
to  fame  was  Bernard  M.  Baruch.  He  was  the  strong 
est  character  that  developed  during  the  administration. 
For  many  years  prior  to  Wilson's  election  Baruch  was 
engaged  in  speculation  on  the  New  York  Stock 
Exchange.  The  only  place  or  position  he  held  was 
that  of  Trustee  of  the  College  of  the  City  of  New 
York.  It  was  there  that  I  first  met  him. 

Baruch  was  absorbed  in  money  making.  I  came  to 
know  him  very  well  at  the  board  meetings  of  the  col 
lege.  In  our  talks  I  often  urged  him  to  try  to  keep 
his  millions,  taken  merely  from  speculation,  and  not 
lose  them  as  had  every  man  I  had  known.  To  this 
point  I  cited  the  case  of  Mr.  James  R.  Keene. 

I  have  told  how  I  introduced  him  to  Mr.  Wilson. 
His  first  public  work  was  on  the  Preparedness  Com 
mittee  of  New  York  under  Mayor  John  Purroy 
Mitchel.  In  this  he  was  an  active  factor.  He  then 

[  237  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

went  to  Washington  and  became  a  member  of  the 
Defense  League,  an  unofficial  body^  of  which  he  was 
made  Chairman.  Later  the  President  made  him 
Chairman  of  the  War  Board. 

Baruch  is  one  of  the  most  pleasant  men  to  meet  in 
the  world.  But  his  dominating  idea  is  quick  turns 
for  profits.  The  President  constantly  pushed  him  on 
until  he  was  a  real  power  in  Washington. 

In  1911,  Rabbi  Stephen  Wise,  who  had  always  been 
an  ardent  follower  of  Mr.  Wilson,  thought  he  might 
interest  Henry  Morgenthau  in  the  cause.  After  meet 
ing  Governor  Wilson,  and  after  his  speech  for  the 
revocation  of  the  Russian  Treaty,  Mr.  Morgenthau 
agreed  to  underwrite  Governor  Wilson's  campaign 
for  $20,000  —  $5,000  a  month.  In  the  very  "weak" 
days  of  April  and  May,  Mr.  Morgenthau  became 
"very"  weak,  but  I  held  him  to  his  pledge.  I  made 
him  Chairman  of  the  Finance  Committee  later  on  this 
agreement.  I  told  Mr.  Morgenthau  and  Mr.  Abram 
I.  Elkus  that  I  would  make  either  of  them  Chairman 
of  the  Finance  Committee,  if  the  other  would  give  his 
endorsement,  including  mine,  for  some  public  office,  if 
he  desired  one. 

Elkus  and  Morgenthau  consulted.  Morgenthau 
was  agreed  upon.  Nevertheless,  Elkus  came  to  head 
quarters  on  important  work  and  served  in  a  very 
efficacious  manner. 

Morgenthau,  on  the  other  hand,  proved  a  disap 
pointment.  When  I  found  a  deficit  and  the  $640,000 
budget,  I  called  in  Morgenthau  and  Rollo  Wells,  the 
Treasurer.  I  had  already  signed  a  note  for  $200,000. 

[  238  ] 


COLONEL  HOUSE  — THE  "INTRIGUER* 

I  passed  it  to  Morgenthau  for  execution.  His  pallor 
was  such  that  I  thought  we  would  need  a  physician. 
He  begged  for  time  to  see  some  of  his  friends.  There 
upon  I  ended  the  conversation.  What  I  wanted  was 
to  get  Morgenthau  on  his  toes  in  the  matter  of  con 
tributions.  He  succeeded  in  collecting  about  $50,000 
from  somewhere  in  about  two  days.  Elkus  contributed 
something  like  $20,000  himself. 

Morgenthau,  early  in  January,  1912,  came  to  me 
before  breakfast  one  morning,  and  said  he  was  a  can 
didate  for  Secretary  of  the  Treasury.  I  asked  him 
what  had  become  of  Mr.  Elkus.  He  was  to  have  the 
first  choice.  "Oh",  he  said,  "Abie  is  ineligible" ! 

In  the  early  part  of  the  summer  of  1913,  Mr.  Mor 
genthau  came  to  see  me  while  I  was  ill  at  my  hotel  in 
Paris.  His  first  words,  accompanied  by  violent  ges 
ticulations,  were  that  he  had  been  insulted;  that  the 
President  had  offered  him  the  Ambassadorship  to 
Turkey,  and  that  he  wouldn't  take  it  if  he  knew  that 
the  four  walls  in  which  we  were  should  crush  him  to 
death. 

I  said:  "Henry,  these  walls  are  pretty  thick.  You 
had  better  go  back  to  Washington  and  take  the  place". 

He  did. 

As  for  Mr.  Elkus,  he  waited  for  many  months  with 
out  an  appointment.  He  then  succeeded  Morgenthau 
as  Ambassador  to  Turkey.  At  the  beginning  of  the 
War  he  came  back  with  a  most  excellent  record.  He 
was  one  of  the  few  men,  also,  who  appreciated  the  fact 
that  having  been  an  Ambassador  in  tfae  foreign  service 
does  not  necessitate  writing  a  book,  or  lecturing,  or 
engaging  in  moving  pictures. 

[  239  ] 


PART    II 
ANALYSIS,    RETROSPECT  — OPINIONS 


[241] 


XIX 
THE  COST  OF  VANITY 

"STAND-PATTER"  ALDRICH  PROVOKED  THE  1912  REPUBLICAN 
REVOLT  —  "ROOSEVELT  LOST  THROUGH  BAD  TACTICS  —  WIL 
SON  WON  BECAUSE  SICK  PARTIES  CLUTCHED  EACH  OTHER'S 
THROATS  —  WILSON  LOST  THROUGH  LUST  FOR  POWER,  WHICH 
MADE  HIM  THE  JOKE  OF  THE  WORLD  POWERS  —  MEDDLING, 
MUDDLING  AND  COLOSSAL  VANITY  —  BRUTAL  IN  VICTORY  — 
COWARDLY  IN  DEFEAT". 

[EDITOR'S  NOTE  —  The  McCombs  narrative  is  resumed  in  this 
chapter.] 

THE  SUCCESS  of  Wilson  was  due  not  only  to 
good  campaign  work,  but  to  a  series  of  cir 
cumstances  in  the  Republican  ranks  and  to  the 
Roosevelt-Taft  split.     The  following,  in  brief,  shows 
the  state  of  affairs : 

The  Republicans  had  reached  the  zenith  of  their 
power  in  the  time  of  Senator  Nelson  W.  Aldrich,  of 
Rhode  Island.  His  power  became  so  supreme  that  the 
younger  and  disobedient  members  of  the  Senate  had 
no  chance  whatever.  Mr.  Aldrich,  no  doubt,  believed 
that  the  Republican  Party  could  remain  in  power  as 
long  as  it  desired  by  "standing  pat";  admitting  no 
progressive  legislation  whatever,  but  grinding  along 
with  its  group  control. 

[  243  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

The  first  sign  of  explosion  appeared  in  the  failure 
to  recognize  in  any  way  the  strength  of  the  younger 
members  and  excluding  them  from  participation. 
Senator  Robert  L.  LaFollette,  of  Wisconsin,  was  the 
first  to  pry  up  the  lid.  Then  many  members  of  the 
party  followed  the  same  process.  It  proved  that  the 
power  of  the  old  leaders  was  passing  fast,  although 
they  did  not  know  it. 

There  sprang  up  a  Progressive  group  which,  to  my 
mind,  did  not  mean  at  the  beginning  anything  except 
opposition  to  the  control  in  the  Senate.  Young  lead 
ers  developed.  They  voiced  their  views  against  the 
powers  that  be,  and  by  1911  this  protest  had  spread 
all  over  the  country. 

President  Taf  t  was  sitting  by,  in  a  kind  of  way  try 
ing  to  please  everybody  and  inevitably  pleasing 
nobody.  However,  the  bold  crowd  of  "Stand-Patters" 
made  up  their  minds  that  they  would  see  it  out  and 
demonstrate  their  control  of  the  party  by  renominating 
President  Taft  in  1912. 

The  so-called  "Progressives",  first  led  by  Mr. 
LaFollette  and  later  and  finally  by  Theodore  Roose 
velt,  began  a  most  vigorous  campaign  for  the  nom 
ination.  They  produced  almost,  but  not  quite,  enough 
strength.  Thereupon,  in  another  convention,  the  voice 
of  protest  was  raised  like  a  clap  of  thunder  by  Theo 
dore  Roosevelt  as  the  Progressive  nominee. 

I  have  always  believed  that  had  Roosevelt  not 
stayed  in  his  rooms  in  Chicago  in  1912  while  the 
Republican  nominations  were  going  on,  and  had  he 
appeared  with  all  his  tremendous  vigor  in  the  conven- 

[  244  ] 


THE  COST  OF  VANITY 

tion,  lie  could  have  overthrown  the  opposition  and 
could  have  been  the  nominee.  Mr.  Roosevelt  was  a 
great  judge  of  politics.  But  as  a  tactician  he  was  a 
tremendous  failure.  Nobody  in  the  Republican  con 
vention  was  very  strong  for  Taft.  It  was  a  conven 
tion  dominated  by  elderly  men  who  could  have  been 
swept  over  as  ten  pins  if  vigor  and  force  had  been 
applied. 

Then  came  the  Baltimore  Democratic  Convention. 
There  was  bitter  fighting,  struggling  and  manouev- 
ring  from  the  first  until  the  last.  No  contest  could  have 
been  staged  that  was  more  virulent,  more  soul-search 
ing,  more  acrimonious  at  times.  There  was  a  struggle 
of  strong  men,  each  stripped  to  his  waist  to  support  his 
own  particular  candidate. 

The  Wilson  nomination  was  made.  As  one,  the 
whole  convention  like  magic  came  together  for  the 
nominee.  Leaders  and  rank  and  filers  worked  for  him 
throughout  the  campaign,  believing  that  the  moment 
had  come  when  the  Democratic  Party  might  get 
together  and  again  become  a  constructive,  fighting 
organization.  As  I  have  shown  elsewhere,  after  Mr. 
Wilson  was  elected  he  set  about  to  destroy  the  pur 
poses  of  these  men  and  to  make  them  victims  of  his 
own  vanity  and  love  of  power. 

But  to  return  to  the  Republican  Party.  It  was 
sick;  it  was  tired  and  disconsolate.  The  campaign 
centered  about  Roosevelt  alone.  There  was  no  time 
to  form  an  organization.  Unfortunately  for  him, 
those  closest  by  him  were  not  organizers.  The  Pro 
gressive  Party  was  sick  also,  sick  of  the  Republican 

[  245  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

Party,  groping  about,  holding  up  its  hands  to  Roose 
velt  as  the  possible  saviour. 

It  can  be  seen  that  Wilson  had  opposed  to  him  the 
Republican  Party  that  was  politically  sick,  and  the 
Progressive  Party,  unorganized  and  relying  upon  the 
strength  of  one  man  protesting  against  things  as  they 
were. 

I  must  say  of  Mr.  Roosevelt  that  he  premised  many 
of  our  national  necessities.  Although  his  platform  was 
loosely  joined,  it  pointed  to  things  which  the  American 
people  must  do,  and  some  of  which  they  have  done. 

Mr.  Wilson's  strength  lay  primarily  in  the  fact  that 
he  had  as  his  opponents  two  sick  parties  at  each  other's 
throats.  While  the  Democratic  Party  had  no  particu 
lar  enthusiasm  for  him,  the  leaders  had  a  vigorous  de 
sire  to  come  back  into  power.  And  they  worked.  It 
was  not  Mr.  Wilson's  personality.  In  that  campaign 
it  amounted  to  very  little.  It  was  primarily  the  fact 
that  the  Republican  Parties  had  disintegrated  into 
factions  and  schisms. 

Prior  to  the  '16  campaign,  President  Wilson  had 
made  much  more  progress  with  the  rank  and  file  of 
this  party. 

He  made  no  friends  and  many  enemies.  He  took  a 
detached  view  of  everything.  He  sat  at  Sea  Girt, 
assuming  the  best.  But  the  War  was  on.  The  idea 
of  not  changing  parties  in  the  middle  of  the  stream 
and  the  slogan,  "He  kept  us  out  of  War",  was  abroad. 
So  he  came  back  to  power,  with  very  little  to  spare, 
and  with  no  kindness  of  feeling  from  the  American 
people. 

[  246  ] 


THE  COST  OF  VANITY 

As  I  write  this  (1919),  Mr.  Wilson  is  alone  in  the 
midst  of  a  most  convulsive  situation.  He  has  proven 
himself  utterly  unfit  to  deal  with  it. 

Wilson's  visit  abroad,  which  consumed  seven  months, 
resulted  in  this:  A  wonderful  welcome  whereby  it  was 
arranged  that  he  should  sleep  in  the  palaces  of  kings, 
where  his  exceeding  vanity  from  the  beginning  was 
catered  to. 

The  crowds  in  Milan  and  other  cities  of  Italy,  told 
that  he  was  their  saviour,  wildly  acclaimed  him.  They 
threw  flowers.  He  threw  kisses.  This  parade  was 
soon  over.  His  Fourteen  Points,  which  he  solemnly 
asserted  would  go  into  the  League  of  Nations,  had 
disappeared. 

President  Wilson  told  the  foreign  potentates  "that 
the  American  people  were  with  him".  Europeans 
have  some  knowledge  of  America.  They  knew  the 
Americans  were  not  with  Wilson. 

Wilson  took  over  to  France  with  him  on  the  commis 
sion  men  who  would  do  his  bidding.  There  was  the 
ever  present  "Little  Colonel  House".  There  was 
Henry  T.  White,  an  aged  man  who  has  long  since 
retired  from  the  active  affairs  of  the  world.  There 
was  General  Tasker  T.  Bliss,  also  an  aged  man,  who 
had  never  figured  in  diplomacy.  Finally,  there  was 
Secretary  of  State  Lansing,  who,  according  to  his  own 
testimony  before  the  Senate  Committee,  was  not 
apprised  of  many  of  the  vital  parts  of  the  proposed 
covenant  until  they  were  actually  agreed  to  by  Wilson. 

It  was  Wilson  who  proposed  to  give  Shantung  to 
[  247  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

Japan,  which  would  set  up  for  Japan  a  most  powerful 
enemy  against  us  in  any  future  war. 

He  said  he  did  not  know  anything  about  the  existing 
secret  treaty  prior  to  1916,  when  it  had  been  published 
all  over  Europe.  At  this  writing  he  is  the  joke  of 
every  power  in  the  world.  He  came  back  somewhat 
more  willing  to  see  people.  He  is  in  trouble  (August 
21,1919). 

It  is  the  usual  Wilson.  He  allowed  his  pockets  to 
be  picked  by  the  Powers  of  Europe  while  masses  were 
throwing  bouquets  at  him  and  he  kisses  to  them.  The 
transformation  has  come. 

I  have  said,  and  repeat,  that  Wilson  is  the  most 
remorseless,  the  most  tyrannical  man  when  he  gets  the 
smell  of  power.  In  possible  defeat  no  one  that  the 
earth  has  ever  produced  can  excel  his  speed  in  retire 
ment. 

As  I  write  these  observations,  there  lies  before  me 
Colonel  Henry  Watterson's  analysis  of  President 
Wilson's  continuous  performance  at  Paris.  I  cannot 
improve  upon  it,  so  I  reproduce  it : 

"The  Herald,  March  31,  1919. 

"MR.  WILSON  A  PUNISHMENT  FOR  SOME  NATIONAL 
SIN,  Is  VIEW  OF  COLONEL  WATTERSON. 

"PRESIDENT'S  'MEDIOCRE  MIND  AND  COLOSSAL  VANITY' 
WILL  RESULT  IN  SETTING  EUROPE  AFIRE  BY  MID 
SUMMER,  EDITOR  DECLARES 'HIS  MISSION 

TO  MAKE  TROUBLE  WHEREVER  HE 
APPEARS' 

[Special  Despatch  to  the  Herald.] 

"MiAMi,  FLA.,  Sunday  —  In  response  to  the  Herald's 
[  248  ] 


THE  COST  OF  VANITY 

inquiry  'What  of  the  President's  continuous  performance 
in  Europe?'  Mr.  Henry  Watterson,  detained  in  Miami 
by  a  recent  indisposition,  replied: — 'I  think  the  events 
helped  along  by  the  President  himself,  will  verify  my 
forecast  that  he  is  not  merely  a  candidate  for  a  third 
term  in  the  White  House  but  that  for  a  nomination  to 
such  he  holds  all  the  winning  cards  in  his  hands.' 

"  'You  mean  that  he  controls  the  Democratic  machine?' 

"  'Why,  yes',  he  answered,  'if  you  care  to  put  it  that 
way.  The  Democratic  party  so  called,  he  long  ago 
abolished,  having  previously  much  debauched  it.  Noth 
ing  of  it  survives,  except  the  tattered  label,  and  he  holds 
that  betwixt  his  thumb  and  forefingers.  I  am  inclined 
to  believe,  however,  that  he  has  eliminated  the  United 
States  from  his  immediate  activities  as  an  established 
conquest  and  is  now  giving  his  mighty  thought  to  the 
sublimation  of  the  world'. 

"  'That  suggestion,  Mr.  Watterson'.  interrupted  the 
reporter,  'would  seem  to  require  elaboration,  if  not  ex 
planation'. 

"  'Mr.  Wilson',  the  editor  resumed,  'like  most  of  those 
whose  ambitions  outrun  their  talents,  has  become  the 
victim  of  contingencies  he  has  himself  raised  up.  He 
has  been  caught  by  the  foreign  lure.  He  sails  the  blue 
of  the  empyrean.  The  scion  of  a  race  of  religious  fan 
atics  and  rustic  scholars,  his  commonplace  mind  grew 
to  be  overtrained,  and  he  reached  manhood  already  a 
dangerous  intellectual  adventurer. 

"  'Such  characters  seem  strangely  favored  by  fortune. 
The  powers  of  evil  delight  in  exhibiting  them.  Within 
less  than  a  decade,  advanced  from  a  university  professor 
to  the  chief  magistracy,  Woodrow  Wilson  has  so  thrust 
himself  into  the  affairs  of  his  own  land,  and  other  lands, 
as  to  be  at  this  moment  the  most  conspicuous  figure  at 
the  forefront. 

[  249  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

"A  virtuous,  right  minded  man  thus  situated  would 
emulate  the  humility  of  a  Washington  and  the  humanity 
of  a  Lincoln.  Mr.  Wilson  sees  nothing  but  himself  and 
his  personal  exaltation — lives  for  nothing  except  his  own 
advantage — seeks  nothing  save  power  and  authority, 
the  concrete  things  of  rulership  represented  by  the  regal 
splendors  and  feudal  glories  which  though  somewhat 
frazzled  and  faded  still  go  on  about  him.  He  is  too 
clever  not  to  set  up  for  a  prophet.  Thus  the  League 
of  Peace  and  the  Religion  of  the  Uplift.  The  once 
famous  faker,  the  'Immortal  J.  N/,  as  he  called  himself, 
must  turn  over  with  envy  in  his  grave  and  the  bones  of 
Mother  Eddy  grow  sick  with  the  thought  of  lost  oppor 
tunities. 

"  'Don't  you  think,  Mr.  Watterson/  I  asked,  'that 
Mr.  Wilson  is  doing  more  good  than  harm  on  the  other 
side'? 

"  'If  I  were  phrase  making  or  word  splitting*  he 
replied,  'I  might  say  that  he  deserves  impeachment  for 
going  at  all.  It  is  the  old  story  of  meddle  and  muddle. 
The  world  is  full  of  it.  As  a  consequence  of  his  mal 
adroit  tinkering  Europe  will  find  itself  the  middle  of  the 
coming  summer  in  flames.  Then  we  shall  have  him  alone 
again  urging  intervention.  It  has  been  his  mission  in 
life  to  make  trouble  wherever  he  appeared.  When  the 
great  Jehovah  interjected  such  a  sinister  spirit  into  our 
affairs  it  must  have  been  to  punish  us  for  our  manifold 
delinquencies  as  a  nation  and  a  people. 

"We  should  steer  clear  of  European  complications. 
Never  has  there  been  a  time  when  the  admonitions  of 
Washington,  Jefferson  and  Monroe  carried  greater  weight. 
Mr.  Wilson's  mediocre  mind  and  colossal  vanity  have 
already  carried  him  far  to  sea.  It  is  ours  to  look  to  it 
that  he  does  not  carry  the  country  to  the  shipwreck  of 
its  institutions". 

[  250  ] 


THE  COST  OF  VANITY 

Mr.  Wilson's  ideas  of  the  functions  of  the  Execu 
tive  changed  after  entering  the  public  service.  I  have 
turned  to  my  notebook  which  sets  out  the  lectures  of 
Professor  Wilson  at  Princeton  when  I  was  a  student 
under  him.  One  of  the  points  most  pressed  was  that  of 
the  co-ordinate  powers  of  the  President,  the  Supreme 
Court  and  the  Congress. 

He  lectured  long  and  often  upon  the  very  distinct 
functions  of  these  three  bodies,  and  disparaged  any 
thing  that  might  tend  to  disrupt  the  balance  of  power 
among  the  three  bodies  as  set  out  in  the  Constitution, — 
or,  rather,  the  system  of  checks  and  balances. 

When  I  came  out  of  Princeton  I  was  much  imbued 
with  that  idea.  I  did  remember,  however,  reading 
Thomas  Jefferson's  works. 

Maybe  the  smell  of  power  of  Princeton  and  the 
complete  dominance  of  a  very  few  men,  members  of 
the  Legislature  in  New  Jersey,  completely  changed 
his  ideas.  I  often  think  that  a  man's  conception  of  his 
duties  is  much  affected  by  his  powers.  Those  powers 
sometimes  have  little  regard  for  the  Constitution,  the 
statutes  and  the  common  law. 

Mr.  Wilson  went  to  the  White  House  a  supreme 
ruler  in  his  own  heart.  He  dared  not  take  about  him 
strong  men,  for  strong  men  might  disagree  with  him, 
and  in  the  end  his  conception  as  well  as  his  practice 
might  disappear. 

The  working  out  of  Wilson's  administrations  has 
shown  that  no  man  who  had  creative  ideas  or  con 
structive  ability  could  long  survive  the  Wilson  contact. 
I  suspect  that  was  the  predominant  reason  of  Mr. 

[  251  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

Bryan's  leaving  the  Cabinet.  I  know  that  this  was 
the  reason  for  the  resignation  of  v^he  able  Lindley  M. 
Garrison,  Secretary  of  War.  /* ' 

I  think  that  Attorney  General  McReynolds,  who 
had  a  testy  sort  of  mind,  with  no  particular  vision, 
used  his  remaining  spirit  of  independence  and  was 
glad  to  go  on  the  Supreme  Court  for  that  reason.  Of 
course,  there  must  be  included  the  high  reason  that  any 
lawyer  would  accept  a  nomination  to  that  august  tri 
bunal.  But  it  was  not  the  august  tribunal  which 
brought  the  matter  about.  It  was  because  McReyn 
olds  did  not  always  agree  with  President  Wilson.  Yet 
that  was  no  reason  for  throwing  him  out  of  the  Cabinet. 
But  there  was  a  place  on  the  Supreme  Court  then. 

It  became  early  apparent  that  Wilson  was  not  only 
going  to  regard  himself  as  the  President  of  the 
country,  but  as  the  Premier  of  the  Congress.  He  said, 
I  recall,  during  my  college  days,  that,  after  all,  the 
English  system  of  government  was  the  best,  and  that 
idea  never  left  him. 

But  we  must  assume  that  he  forgot  that  there  is  no 
provision  in  our  Constitution  for  a  Premier  who  goes 
out  of  office  immediately  after  the  majority  of  Parlia 
ment  has  passed  adversely  upon  an  issue  that  he  has 
proposed,  and  that  a  general  election  is  then  declared ; 
that  thus  the  people  are  closely  in  touch  with  the  gov 
ernment  because  the  Parliament,  as  the  present  Pre 
mier,  must  always  more  directly  than  our  President 
represent  the  wishes  of  the  people. 

But  Mr.  Wilson  was  President  of  the  United  States 
under  a  written  Constitution.  He  had  his  functions 

[  252  ] 


THE  COST  OF  VANITY 

definitely  outlined.  He  could  not  fall  if  his  policy  or 
the  policies  of  the  majority  in  Congress  failed  of  sup 
port.  Whatever  act  the  Congress  adopted,  and  what 
ever  act  he  committed  short  of  an  impeachment  pro 
ceeding,  was  valid,  and  he  must  stay  for  the  period  of 
his  election. 

It  was  late  in  his  administration  after  he  had  arrived 
from  the  Peace  Conference,  and  it  was  during  that 
conference  that  he  proclaimed  himself  Premier  of  the 
United  States  and  of  the  Congress, — the  most  auda 
cious  proclamation  that  was  ever  emitted  from  the 
mouth  of  a  President  of  the  United  States.  He  must 
stay  in  his  place  until  the  time  of  election  expires. 
He  could  not  fall,  and  constitutionally  he  could  not  act 
indirectly,  as  he  did  from  the  beginning  of  his  admin 
istration  as  Premier. 

A  man  who  has  the  Wilson  conscience  and  tech 
nique  can  override  a  Congress  and  make  it  obedient  to 
his  will.  He  can,  as  in  Wilson's  case,  propose  legis 
lation  direct  from  the  White  House  and  force  it 
through. 

From  the  beginning,  President  Wilson  proposed 
legislation  in  final  form  to  the  Congress  and  it  was 
passed.  These  bills  were  called  administration  bills  — 
that  is,  bills  proposed  by  the  President  or  Premier. 
The  force  that  put  them  through  in  the  early  stages 
was  the  desire  which  was  then  prevalent  to  make  the 
party  "harmonious"  —  and  then  there  was  patronage 
to  be  distributed.  The  Congress  went  along  and 
accepted  bills  known  as  administration  bills,  and  when 
anyone  opposed  them  the  President  chopped  his  head 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

off,  whether  by  ignoring  him  or  opposing  him  in  subse 
quent  elections. 

Wilson  was  in  a  high  stage  of  exultation  then.  He 
was  the  schoolmaster  who  could  make  the  student  do 
anything  he  desired  or  be  punished. 

Congressional  bills  went  along  until  the  Panama 
Toll  Bill  was  proposed.  Mr.  Wilson  would  not  even 
explain  why  the  Panama  Toll  Bill  was  necessary,  and 
has  not  to  this  day.  He  said  it  was  for  a  high  purpose, 
and  those  thinking  Senators  who  finally  opposed  it 
were  called  the  "Wilful  Twelve", —  an  admirable 
Wilsonian  coinage. 

As  the  Congress  became  more  supine  to  him,  and 
had  accepted  him  as  the  Premier  who  could  not  fall,  I 
was  reminded  that  when  he  became  Governor  of  New 
Jersey  he  proclaimed  himself  "Leader  of  the  Party". 
This  was  unprecedented,  as  far  as  I  am  informed,  in 
history. 

He  meant  what  he  said.  He  meant  that  he  must 
control  the  Legislature,  and,  as  far  as  possible,  the 
courts. 

When  he  got  to  Washington,  he  proclaimed  himself 
the  "Leader  of  the  Party  in  the  United  States".  This, 
I  am  sure,  no  other  President  ever  did  or  ever  dared 
think  of  doing.  For  how  can  one  man,  having  co 
ordinate  power  with  two  other  equally  important 
powers  in  the  government,  proclaim  himself  the  party 
leader,  and  how  can  he,  by  the  same  implication, 
express  the  intention  of  making  the  party  malleable 
to  his  will?  But  this  thing  was  done. 

From  the  very  beginning  President  Wilson  took  a 
[  254  ] 


THE  COST  OF  VANITY 

complete  assignment  of  the  National  Congress.  Few 
members  were  allowed  even  to  see  him.  He  consulted 
with  few  leaders  in  either  branch  of  Congress,  and  that 
was  on  the  rarest  occasions.  Generally,  it  was  to 
inform  them  that  such  and  such  was  a  bill  that  was  to 
be  introduced  and  passed. 

The  only  consultation  ever  had,  so  far  as  any  person 
ever  knew,  was  with  the  "mysterious"  House  and  with 
his  son-in-law,  William  G.  McAdoo. 

Mr.  Wilson  was  a  historian.  He  preached  con 
stantly  the  preservation  of  constitutional  rights  and 
the  maintenance  of  the  system  of  checks  and  balances 
which  Mr.  Roosevelt  actually  had  not.  I  know  leaders 
in  the  party  who  could  do  this  work  with  some  degree 
of  boldness,  but  who  would  always  keep  their  minds 
on  the  Constitution  and  not  on  themselves. 

It  was  within  a  very  few  months  after  his  election 
that  I  discovered  that  Mr.  Wilson  sought  merely  to 
advance  himself;  that  he  had  lost  sight  of  the  new 
problems  confronting  him,  and  dealt  only  with  those 
which  might  advance  him.  I  knew  within  six  months 
that  his  high  purpose  was  to  abolish  the  Democratic 
Party,  make  it  supine  to  his  will,  and  to  consider  noth 
ing  except  through  the  eyes  of  one  who  was  drunk  for 
power. 

The  idea  of  "serving"  that  ran  all  through  his 
speeches  disgusted  me,  because  it  was  apparent  that 
he  meant  in  fact  serving  himself.  The  reader  of  cur 
rent  events  since  1913  ought  to  be  aware  of  this  fact. 

I  suppose  that  President  Wilson  has  not  been  much 
more  truculent  to  labor  than  the  average  President  or 

[  255  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

Member  of  Congress.  He  has  had  more  opportunities 
to  be  so. 

In  1916  the  Adamson  Law  was  demanded  of  Con 
gress  by  President  Wilson.  This  was  a  political  ven 
ture  for  the  railroad  employees.  The  Presidential 
election  was  coming  on.  It  was  passed.  It  was  passed 
in  the  interest  of  the  President's  re-election. 

In  that  year  I  was  the  nominee  of  the  Democratic 
Party  for  the  United  States  Senate.  After  the  cam 
paign  had  warmed  up,  I  talked  to  the  New  York  State 
leaders.  I  knew  they  would  tell  me  the  absolute  truth. 
I  concluded  that,  far  from  any  good  effect  that  the 
Adamson  Law  would  accomplish,  it  was  distinctly  bad. 

After  speaking  at  a  railroad  town,  the  other  speak 
ers  being  Secretary  Lane  and  Secretary  Baker,  and 
the  Democratic  nominee  for  Governor,  Judge  Samuel 
Seabury,  I  felt  there  was  nothing  of  comfort  in  the 
Adamson  Law.  It  was  the  coldest  meeting  I  ever 
addressed.  Afterward  Judge  Seabury,  who  had  been 
on  the  bench  for  ten  years  or  more,  came  into  my  state 
room  on  the  train.  He  said:  "I  may  now  address  you 
as  the  next  member  of  the  United  States  Senate  by 
100,000".  I  got  up,  closed  the  door,  and  said  to  Judge 
Seabury:  "Now,  let's  be  good  sports.  You  and  I  are 
both  beaten  by  150,000.  The  Adamson  Law  is  not 
going  to  help ;  it  is  going  to  hurt". 

However,  I  do  not  believe  labor  en  masse  can  be 
controlled.  At  the  very  beginning  of  the  Presidential 
campaign  of  1912,  at  the  first  meeting  of  the  Cam 
paign  Committee,  one  member  asked,  how  are  we 
going  to  handle  the  Church  Question.  I  said:  "We 

[  256  ] 


THE  COST  OF  VANITY 

are  not  going  to  handle  it".  "How  are  we  going  to 
handle  the  Labor  Question" ?  I  said:  "That  question, 
too,  we  will  not  handle.  There  may  be  a  general  senti 
ment  running  through  Churches,  or  running  through 
Labor,  but  in  neither  case  can  any  party  ever  hope  to 
control  it  as  a  mass.  It  is  an  impossibility". 


[257] 


XX 

McCOMBS  A  "SOCIAL  LION" 

GETS  APPENDICITIS  AND  A  BRIDE  —  FETED  IN  LONDON  AND  PARIS 
—  REFUSES  PUBLIC  SERVICE  COMMISSIONERSHIP  AND  STATE 
CHAIRMANSHIP  —  FRAMES  PARTY  PLATFORMS  AND  is  NOMI 
NATED  FOR  CONSTITUTIONAL  CONVENTION  DELEGATE  — 
ATTACKS  ROOSEVELT  AS  A  BOLTER  —  OFFERS  SERVICES  AS 
PARTY  PEACE-MAKER  —  BACKS  GLYNN  FOR  GOVERNOR  AND 
GERARD  FOR  UNITED  STAGES  SENATOR. 

IN  1913  Mr.  McCombs  became  a  social  lion  in 
London  and  Paris,  recovered  from  an  operation 
for  appendicitis,  and  brought  to  America  a  bride. 
All  this  happened  within  less  than  five  months. 

In  June,  Mr.  McCombs  went  abroad.  Though  he 
sought  to  keep  his  presence  unknown,  desiring  com 
plete  rest,  he  was  deluged  with  invitations  to  dinners, 
luncheons,  suppers  and  other  functions  by  royalty, 
statesmen  and  clubmen. 

Frederick  Townsend  Martin,  who  was  Mr.  Mc 
Combs'  companion,  described  his  visit  as  a  "social  joy 
ride".  William  Gillette,  dean  of  London  clubdom, 
pronounced  Mr.  McCombs  as  a  "wonderful  social  sen 
sation,  who  conquers  everything  with  silence  and 
smiles,  exhibiting  the  suavity  and  restraint  the 
English  admire  as  mannerisms". 

[  258  ] 


McCOMBS  A  SOCIAL  LION 

Mr.  McCombs  was  frequently  guest  of  honor  at  the 
exclusive  Marlborough  and  Bachelor  Clubs,  inside 
which  few  Americans  could  penetrate.  He  was  much 
in  the  company  of  Count  Kinsky,  the  Duke  of  Man 
chester,  Sir  Herbert  Tree,  Lord  Ingestra,  Lord 
Athlumney,  the  Duke  of  Mecklenburg  Strelitz  and 
Gustav  Harvel,  the  aviator. 

Too  much  social  effort  lowered  Mr.  McCombs' 
resistance,  and  while  in  Paris  he  was  stricken  with 
appendicitis.  On  July  8th  he  was  operated  on  success 
fully  by  Doctor  DuBouche,  the  famous  French  sur 
geon.  The  night  before  the  operation  McCombs  gave 
a  dinner  to  James  W.  Gerard,  then  Ambassador  to 
Germany,  Archibald  White,  Perry  Belmont,  and 
Martin  W.  Littleton.  They,  with  the  Ambassador  to 
Paris,  Myron  T.  Herrick,  saw  to  it  that  McCombs  had 
the  very  best  of  care.  The  patient  was  out  of  the 
hospital  in  ten  days  and  plunged  again  into  society. 

Mr.  McCombs'  state  of  mind  at  this  time  is  admir 
ably  shown  by  the  following  letter  to  his  favorite 
sister,  Corinne: 

"Paris,  July  17,  1913 
"My  darling  sweetheart  sister: — 

I  got  your  sweet  letter  and  loved  every  word  of  it. 
It  found  me  just  getting  over  the  operation  for  appen 
dicitis  (which  finally  had  to  come  although  I  fought  it 
hard).  After  all,  I  think  it  improved  me.  The  wound 
is  quite  healed  but  I  lost  strength  somewhat. 

I  am  going  to  Baden  Baden,  Germany,  to-morrow  for 
a  rest  cure  of  three  weeks.  Then  probably  up  into 
Switzerland  in  the  mountains.  I  shall  try  to  be  in  New 
York  in  September  but  I  doubt  it.  October  is  more 
likely. 

[  259  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

/  waded  through  fire  to  make  Wilson  President,  and 
now  that  he  is  there,  I  am  paying  a  terrible  penalty  of 
shattered  health.  I  know  you  are  aware  of  what  I  went 
through.  I  would  not  do  it  again  for  the  whole  earth. 

I  left  New  York  because  my  health  and  my  spirits 
would  not  stand  it  a  day  longer.  I  simply  had  to 
do  it  to  live.  Ever  since  I  have  been  here  I  have  been 
ill,  making  as  brave  a  fight  as  possible  to  restore  myself. 
I  am  glad  to  say  my  health  has  improved  but  I  am  heart 
sick  and  I  would  give  anything  to  see  you.  Returning  to 
America  now  would  merely  mean  getting  into  the  cruel 
grind  again  and  I  can't  stand  it  for  some  months  to  come. 

I  have  many  friends  here  who  look  after  me  as  best 
they  can.  The  circle  of  real  friends  is  however  very 
narrow.  Unhappily,  we  have  to  find  that  out  as  we  go. 
•  You  know  how  I  was  tricked  and  duped  when  I  was  ill. 
However,  that  is  a  closed  chapter  and  I  shall  try  to 
forget  it.  My  address  is  always  c/o  Munroe  &  Co* 
7  Rue  Scribe,  Paris.  Letters  will  be  forwarded.  Lyons 
arrives  in  Paris  to-morrow.  I  felt  I  must  have  someone. 
Let  the  boys  and  Ethel  know  how  I  am,  I  shall  write 
you  N.  Y.  c/o  Ethel. 

With  all  my  love, 

BRO.  FRANK" 

'Americans  generally  and  official  Washington  were 
astounded  November  7,  1913,  to  read  of  Mr.  Mc- 
Combs'  marriage  to  Miss  Dorothy  Williams,  daughter 
of  Colonel  John  R.  Williams,  U.  S.  A.,  and  sister  of 
Mrs.  Joseph  Leiter.  The  ceremony  was  performed 
within  the  shadow  of  Buckingham  Palace,  at  the 
quaint  little  Roman  Catholic  Chapel  of  St.  Peter  and 
St.  Edward,  by  the  Rev.  Father  Bernard  Vaughn. 
Among  the  witnesses  were  the  American  Ambassador 

[  260  ] 


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McCOMBS  A  SOCIAL  LION 

to  London,  William  H.  Page,  and  Mrs.  Page;  the 
Ambassador  to  Paris,  Myron  T.  Herrick,  Lord  Derby, 
the  Earl  of  Suffolk,  who  married  Margaret  Hyde 
Leiter,  of  Chicago;  the  Earl  and  Countess  of  Craven, 
and  Right  Hon.  Henry  Chaplin.  Charles  W.  Halsey, 
a  Princeton  classmate,  was  Mr.  McCombs'  best  man. 

Mr,  McCombs  was  much  amused  that  he  had  sur 
prised  his  bachelor  friends  by  suddenly  becoming  a 
benedict.  Explaining,  he  said:  * 'I  met  Miss  Williams 
at  the  inauguration  of  President  Wilson.  We  were 
engaged  for  several  months,  and  our  marriage  was 
necessarily  delayed  by  my  attack  of  appendicitis". 

Mr.  and  Mrs.  McCombs  returned  to  America  early 
in  November,  1913. 

January  11,  1914,  Mr.  McCombs  visited  Governor 
Martin  H.  Glynn  at  Albany.  He  received  two  offers 
from  the  Governor.  One  was  a  Public  Service  Com 
missioner  ship.  The  other  was  the  Chairmanship  of  the 
Democratic  State  Committee,  carrying  with  it  the 
management  of  Governor  Glynn's  campaign  for  re 
election. 

Mr.  McCombs  declined  both  because  he  said  he  could 
not  afford  to  abandon  his  law  practice.  Moreover,  his 
acceptance  of  the  State  Chairmanship  would  mean  his 
retirement  as  National  Chairman.  He  purposed  to 
retain  that  place  for  his  full  term,  regardless  of  the 
iWilson-McAdoo-Tumulty  plot  to  supplant  him. 

Months  after,  McCombs'  intimates  asserted  that  the 
Glynn  offers  were  all  a  part  of  the  White  House  con 
spiracy  to  oust  him  from  the  National  Chairmanship. 
Though  Glynn  failed  to  inveigle  McCombs  into  the 

[  261  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

Wilson  trap,  Glynn  was  chosen  by  the  President  to 
preside  over  the  National  Convention  which  renom- 
inated  him  in  1916,  and  later  was  awarded  a  lucrative 
place  on  the  Federal  Industrial  Board. 

"Maybe  Governor  Glynn,  for  whom  I  have  a  sin 
cere  affection,  was  unaware  of  what  Wilson  and 
McAdoo  were  trying  to  do  to  me",  observed  Mr. 
McCombs;  "but  I  was  not  caught.  I  visited  the 
Governor  at  his  request  to  advise  him  about  the  fall 
State  Campaign.  In  tendering  the  Public  Service 
Commissionership  and  State  Chairmanship,  I  believe 
he  had  no  ulterior  motive.  Anyway,  I  took  neither, 
but  I  did  do  all  I  could  to  secure  the  Governor's 
renomination  and  re-election". 

The  Democratic  State  Convention  of  1914  unani 
mously  chose  Mr.  McCombs  Chairman  of  its  Platform 
Committee.  It  also  named  him  as  a  candidate  for 
member  of  the  Constitutional  Convention  of  1915. 

Mr.  McCombs  drew  one  of  the  briefest,  but  most 
comprehensive,  declarations  of  principles  on  record. 
Its  keynote  was  protection  of  the  direct  nominations 
law  against  the  assaults  of  machine  bosses.  It  urged 
anew  the  submission  of  the  unanimous  suffrage  propo 
sition  to  popular  vote;  declared  for  a  short  ballot, 
home  rule,  biennial  legislative  sessions,  and  challenged 
political  adversaries  to  cite  a  single  instance  of  malad 
ministration  or  malfeasance  in  the  state  administration 
headed  by  Governor  Martin  H.  Glynn. 

Arguing  for  harmony,  the  renomination  of  Gov 
ernor  Glynn,  and  the  adoption  of  the  platform  draft, 
Mr.  McCombs  said: 

[  262  ] 


McCOMBS  A  SOCIAL  LION 

"The  Democratic  Party  is  unreservedly  committed 
to  the  principle  of  direct  primaries.  The  purpose  of 
the  law  is  to  give  every  voter  a  fair  and  equal  chance 
to  secure  the  nomination  of  his  choice.  The  law  is 
contrary  to  the  spirit  or  use  of  oppressive  power 
which  may  be  exercised  by  those  holding  political  office 
or  leadership.  I  am  assured  no  attempt  will  be  made 
by  Democrats  to  repeal  this  law.  They  will  do  all 
they  can  to  perfect  it. 

* 'Those  who  refuse  to  support  candidates  named  at 
Democratic  primaries  are  not  Democrats.  If  there  be 
differences  before  or  after  the  primaries,  I  offer 
Democrats  my  undivided  service". 

The  reference  to  bolters  was  aimed  at  an  organiza 
tion  formed  by  Franklin  D.  Roosevelt,  later  Assistant 
Secretary  of  the  Navy  and  candidate  for  Vice  Presi 
dent,  and  John  A.  Hennessey,  to  defeat  the  regularly 
selected  ticket.  Roosevelt  ran  at  the  primaries  against 
James  W.  Gerard,  who  was  supported  by  Mr.  Mc- 
Combs  for  United  States  Senator,  and  was  unmerci 
fully  drubbed.  Hennessey  ran  against  Glynn  for 
Governor,  also  supported  by  Mr.  McCombs,  and  was 
overwhelmingly  defeated. 

Mr.  McCombs  devoted  himself  night  and  day  to  the 
campaign  to  keep  New  York  Democratic.  Scandals 
which  had  resulted  in  the  impeachment  of  Governor 
William  Sulzer  in  1913  proved  too  heavy  a  load.  The 
Democrats  lost  to  Charles  S.  Whitman  (Republican) , 
who  was  elected  Governor,  and  James  W.  Wadsworth, 
Jr.  (Republican) ,  who  became  United  States  Senator. 

[  268  ] 


XXI 

McCOMBS  RETIRES  AS  CHAIRMAN 

QUITS  NATIONAL  COMMITTEE — DEFEATS  ALL  McAooo-BuRLEsoN- 
TUMULTY  PLOTS  TO  OUST  HIM  —  WILSON  COTERIE  CONSPIRES 
FOUR  YEARS  TO  SUPPLANT  THE  PRESIDENT-MAKER  —  Mc- 
COMBS  WINS  FIGHT  FOR  1916  CONVENTION  CITY  AND  VOLUN 
TARILY  STEPS  OUT  IN  FORMAL  NOTICE  TO  THE  PRESIDENT  — 
WILSON'S  "GREATEST  REGRETS". 

[EDITOR'S  NOTE  —  The  editor  has  written  this  chapter  from 
Mr.  McCombs'  notes.] 

AMcADOO  -  BURLESON  -  TUMULTY 
cabal  plotted  four  years  to  oust  Mr. 
McCombs  as  Chairman  of  the  Democratic 
National  Committee.  Though  apparently  inspired  by 
the  benediction  of  the  President  himself,  the  con 
spiracy  to  overthrow  him  forcibly  was  thwarted.  Mr. 
McCombs,  backed  by  a  large  majority  of  his  fellow- 
Committeemen,  stuck  to  his  post  for  the  full  term  for 
which  he  was  elected.  In  a  pert  note  to  the  President, 
personally,  he  asked  to  be  relieved  after  his  successor 
was  chosen  at  the  National  Convention  of  1916.  He 
then  gladly  retired. 

As  already  hinted,  the  White  House  coterie  sought 
McCombs'  scalp  even  upon  the  eve  of  Wilson's  first 
inauguration,  but  were  unsuccessful.  Taking  their 

[  264  ] 


McCOMBS  RETIRES  AS  CHAIRMAN 

cue  from  the  President's  refusal  to  honor  any  recom 
mendation  Chairman  McCombs  made  in  behalf  of  the 
National  Committee,  the  Wilson  group,  almost  from 
month  to  month,  sought  to  oust  McCombs  and  name 
a  substitute  "next  the  throne".  Repeated  polls  of  the 
National  Committee,  however,  revealed  a  big  majority 
for  McCombs.  Many  stood  by  McCombs  because 
they  were  angered  by  the  President's  persistent  rejec 
tion  of  the  merest  suggestion  as  to  patronage  or  policy 
presented  by  them  through  their  Chairman.  They 
were  boldly  and  coldly  informed  that  "McCombs' 
O.  K.  does  not  go  with  W.  W.  See  McAdoo,  Tumulty 
or  Joe  Daniels" ! 

Any  National  Committeeman  suspected  of  so  much 
as  sympathizing  with  McCombs  was  denied  the  slight 
est  consideration,  and  any  who  dared  make  a  request 
through  McCombs  was  blacklisted. 

For  upwards  of  three  years,  few,  if  any,  avowed 
McCombs  devotees  could  get  the  appointment  of  even 
his  village  postmaster.  Meantime,  McAdoo  was  con 
structing  a  well-formed  and  powerful  machine  through 
the  Treasury. 

Albert  S.  Burleson,  who  deserted  McCombs  the 
instant  he  became  Postmaster  General,  filled  his  offices 
with  ardent  Wilson-McAdoo  satellites.  Daniels  used 
the  Navy  Department  as  an  adjunct  to  the  Wilson 
dynasty.  Even  Cabinet  officers,  except  perhaps  Secre 
tary  of  War  Lindley  D.  Garrison,  seemed  allied  with 
the  President  to  exclude  McCombs  and  his  friends. 

In  December,  1915,  however,  the  plot  to  depose 
McCombs  was  resumed  in  earnest.  Willis  J.  Abbott, 

[  265  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

in  a  special  to  the  New  York  American,  exposed  it. 
Here  is  what  that  able  journalist  wrote  on  the  eve  of 
the  Democratic  National  Committee  meeting  of 
December  7,  1915: 

"The  Democratic  National  Committee  will  meet 
here  next  Tuesday  to  fix  the  time  and  place  of  the 
next  National  Convention. 

"Four  cities  are  contestants  for  the  honor  —  San 
Francisco,  St.  Louis,  Dallas  and  Chicago. 

"There  is  lively  interest  in  a  topic  not  specified  in 
the  call,  but  which,  nevertheless,  is  likely  to  engross 
the  attention  of  the  Committee. 

"That  is  the  effort  to  force  the  retirement  of  Chair 
man  William  F.  McCombs  and  the  substitution  for 
him  of  Committeeman  Fred  B.  Lynch,  of  Minnesota. 

"This  project  is  purely  an  administration  move. 

"At  the  White  House  this  will  be  gravely  denied; 
but  men  in  the  closest  relation  to  the  President  do  not 
hesitate  to  admit  their  participation  in  the  war  upon 
McCombs. 

"Before  the  combination  now  arrayed  against  the 
Chairman,  the  record  of  his  effective  work  for  Mr. 
Wilson's  nomination  both  before  and  at  the  Baltimore 
convention  is  likely  to  be  displayed  in  vain. 

"Mr.  Wilson,  Who  permitted  the  sidetracking  of 
McCombs  during  the  campaign,  and  thrust  him  into 
comparative  obscurity  in  the  first  flush  of  victory,  is 
now  determined  upon  his  complete  obliteration  from 
politics. 

"Of  course,  such  action  as  the  enforced  retirement 
of  a  National  Chairman  of  the  National  Committee 

[  266  ] 


McCOMBS  RETIRES  AS   CHAIRMAN 

between  campaigns  is  without  precedent,  in  the  Demo 
cratic,  or  any  other  party. 

\V iewed  dispassionately,  it  would  seem  merely  the 
expression  of  a  private  grudge,  for  between  conven 
tions  the  Chairman  of  a  National  Committee  is  with 
out  authority  or  any  useful  function.  In  theory,  at 
least,  the  Committee  is  free  from  interest  in  any  par 
ticular  candidate  for  the  nomination,  and  exists  for  the 
sole  purpose  of  arranging  a  convention  which  shall  be 
free  for  all^> 

"This,  however,  is  not  the  view  of  the  Wilson  forces. 
They  want  the  Committee  reorganized  and  made  a 
fighting  force  for  the  President's  renomination.  An 
official  closely  identified  with  the  political  side  of  the 
administration  said  to-day: 

"  *We  must  get  rid  of  McCombs,  because,  while  he 
controls  the  Committee,  we  can't  begin  the  campaign 
for  the  President's  nomination.  We  can't  raise  a 
dollar  while  he  is  at  the  head  of  things.  He  has  antag 
onized  many  of  our  strongest  supporters,  and  we  are 
absolutely  blocked  by  his  continued  control.' 

"All  of  which  is  well  enough  if  the  National  Com 
mittee  is  to  be  regarded  merely  as  a  Wilson  machine. 
But  the  effort  to  make  it  one  has  arrayed  against  the 
administration  plan  many  members  who  care  little  for 
McCombs,  but  will  show  their  resentment  against  the 
administration  by  fighting  for  his  continuance  in  office. 

"Mr.  McCombs  expresses  a  confidence  in  the  out 
come  which  his  friends  do  not  share,  and  which  per 
haps,  at  heart,  he  does  not  feel.  That  any  effort  to 
depose  him  at  this  meeting  will  result  in  a  nasty  fight, 

[  267  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

and  a  serious  injury  to  the  party,  few  doubt.  It  might 
be  shrewdly  seized  upon  by  Bryan  to  widen  the  split 
he  is  planning  to  make  in  the  party. 

"But  there  can  be  no  doubt  of  the  power  of  Wilson 
to  force  his  earliest  and  perhaps  most  efficient  champion 
out,  if  he  so  desires.  The  only  question  is  whether 
prudence  will  lead  the  President  to  put  a  curb  on  his 
followers  who  are  now  proclaiming  their  purpose  to 
force  the  issue  next  Tuesday". 

But  the  Wilson-McAdoo  plot  to  put  Chairman 
McCombs  out  did  not  succeed.  A  majority  of  the 
National  Committee  would  not  tolerate  such  a  sugges 
tion.  They  denounced  it  long  before  the  Committee 
met  at  Washington,  December  7th,  for  the  ostensible 
task  of  selecting  the  date  and  place  for  the  National 
Convention  of  1916. 

Weeks  before  the  Committee  got  together  McCombs 
had  a  big  majority  pledged  not  only  to  his  retention  as 
Chairman,  but  to  vote  with  him  to  send  the  convention 
to  St.  Louis.  He  reached  Washington  two  days  in 
advance  of  the  Committee  meeting.  He  found  the 
Wilson-McAdoo  group  split  among  three  men  who 
had  been  suggested  for  his  successor.  They  were 
Frederick  B.  Lynch,  of  Minnesota;  Vance  McCor- 
mick,  of  Pennsylvania,  and  Henry  Morgenthau,  of 
New  York.  McCombs  made  it  his  job  to  keep  them 
split. 

The  Lynch  coterie  had  lined  up  behind  Chicago  as 
the  Convention  City.  Some  of  the  McCormick  men 
were  for  St.  Louis,  some  for  Chicago,  and  some  behind 
Postmaster  General  Albert  S.  Burleson  to  send  the 

[  268  ] 


McCOMBS  RETIRES  AS  CHAIRMAN 

President-maker  to  Dallas,  Texas.  As  for  Morgen- 
thau,  there  seemed  to  be  no  votes  for  him  at  all. 

McCombs  clinched  a  renewed  grip  on  the  party's 
national  machine  by  inducing  the  Committee  to  select 
St.  Louis  for  the  convention. 

The  President,  hearing  that  the  anti-McCombs 
movement  had  proved  abortive,  ordered  the  fight  to 
cease. 

[EDITOR'S  NOTE  —  Mr.  McCombs  here  resumed  his  story.] 

The  National  Committee,  as  was  customary,  met  the 
first  week  of  January,  1916,  to  make  preliminary 
arrangements  for  the  convention  to  come.  There  were 
many  present.  After  attending  to  our  business  we 
were  informed  that  we  were  invited  to  the  White 
House  to  luncheon  the  next  day. 

Of  the  many  luncheons  I  ever  attended,  this  was  the 
most  curious.  Many  of  the  Committee  did  not  desire 
to  go.  They  told  me  so.  I  advised  them  it  was  proper 
under  the  circumstances  to  go,  notwithstanding  their 
individual  feeling.  And  with  this  spirit  I  went. 

I  never  attended  such  a  funereal  function  in  my  life. 
Every  Committeeman  seemed  embarrassed  and  ill  at 
ease.  The  meal  was  eaten  almost  in  silence. 

I,  of  course,  was  put  on  the  President's  right. 
Homer  S.  Cummings  was  on  his  left.  We  could 
pump  no  language  out  of  the  President.  Therefore, 
we  turned  to  our  neighbors.  One  Committeeman, 
seated  at  some  distance,  handed  in  a  note  behind  the 
others  to  me  with  these  words  on  it: 

"This  looks  like  the  'Last  Supper'  ". 
[  269  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

When  we  had  consumed  the  wines  set  before  us, 
everybody  was  anxious  to  go. 

We  had  to  comply  when  it  was  suggested  that  our 
picture  be  taken.  So  we  went  out  behind  the  White 
House,  where  a  member  of  the  Committee  said  to  me, 
"I  wonder  if  he  wants  our  finger  prints  too"!  After 
the  picture  was  taken,  everybody  moved  away  from 
the  White  House  and  took  a  fresh  breath  of  air. 

[EDITOR'S  NOTE  —  The  Editor  again  resumes  from  notes.] 

Having  secured  from  his  colleagues  the  vote  of  con 
fidence  he  desired,  McCombs  planned  to  quit  of  his 
own  accord. 

April  24,  1916,  he  served  formal  notice  that  he 
desired  no  identification  with  the  movement  to  violate 
the  Baltimore  platform  pledge  by  naming  the  Presi 
dent  for  a  second  term. 

Mr.  McCombs  wrote  President  Wilson: 

"My  dear  Mr.  President: 

"I  have  just  formed  a  new  partnership  for  the  practice 
of  law  which  will  become  effective  the  first  of  May.  The 
change  will  necessitate  my  devoting  substantially  all  my 
time  to  my  profession.  My  political  activities  must  be 
largely  curtailed.  My  arrangements,  however,  will  just 
ify  my  proceeding  through  to  the  end  of  the  convention 
at  St.  Louis. 

"In  view  of  the  party  precedent  that  the  nominee  for 
the  Presidency  is  requested  to  indicate  his  preference 
for  the  chairmanship  of  the  National  Committee,  and  in 
view  of  the  unity  of  sentiment  for  your  renomination,  I 
am  writing  you  at  the  earliest  moment  to  let  you  know 
that  I  could  not,  under  any  circumstances,  assume  the 
leadership  of  the  coming  Democratic  campaign.  I  am 

[  270] 


McCOMBS   RETIRES  AS  CHAIRMAN 

happy  in  the  thought,  however,  that  there  are  hosts  of 
able  and  true  men  who  can  readily  take  my  place. 

"The  Democratic  organization  is  loyal  to  your  policies 
and  your  purposes.     We  feel  assured  of  a  triumphant 
result  for  you  and  for  the  party  nominees  in  November. 
For  fifteen  years,  now,  I  have  been  in  the  active  service 
of  the  party,  and  it  is  with  a  keen  feeling  of  regret  that 
my  activities  are  of  necessity  to  be  more  limited.     If 
within  the  limits  of  my  time  I  can  be  of  assistance,  be 
assured  that  I  am  always  available, 
"With  assurance  of  high  regard, 
"Sincerely  yours, 

WILLIAM  F.  McCoMBs" 
The  President  replied: 

"My  dear  McCombs: 

"I  have  your  letter  apprising  me  of  your  inability  to 
retain  the  chairmanship  of  the  Democratic  National 
Committee  for  the  approaching  campaign. 

"I  fully  appreciate  the  necessity  you  feel  yourself  to 
be  under  to  resign  after  the  convention  shall  have  been 
held  in  June;  I  know  that  you  would  not  have  reached 
such  a  decision  had  not  your  new  business  obligations 
made  it  unavoidable.  I  do  not  feel  at  liberty,  therefore, 
to  urge  you  to  make  the  sacrifice  that  a  retention  of  the 
chairmanship  would  in  the  circumstances  involve. 

"You  have  made  many  and  great  sacrifices  already 
for  the  party  and  I  know  that  I  am  speaking  the  senti 
ment  of  all  loyal  Democrats  when  I  express  the  very 
deep  appreciation  I  have  felt  of  the  great  services  you 
have  ungrudgingly  rendered. 

"I  am  sure  that  the  greatest  regrets  will  be  felt  at 
your  retirement,  and  that  a  host  of  friends  will  join 
me  in  the  hope  that  your  new  business  connections  will 
bring  you  continued  abundant  success. 
"With  best  wishes, 

"Sincerely  yours, 

P   271   1  WOODROW  WILSON" 


XXII 
"WAR  SAVED  WILSON  IN  1916"! 

McCoMss  REFUSES  TO  BE  A  PARTY  TO  THE  PRESIDENT'S  VIOLATION 
OF  His  ONE-TERM  PLEDGE  —  "You  KNOW  I  Do  NOT  OPPOSE 
A  THIRD  TERM",  SAYS  WILSON  TO  McCoMBS,  WHEN  ASKED 
TO  FULFIL  His  PARAMOUNT  PRE-ELECTION  PROMISE  —  How 
McCoMBs  SAVED  VICE  PRESIDENT  MARSHALL  His  RENOMINA- 
TION  —  BALKS  PALMER  AND  BAKER,  WHO  SEEK  TO  SUPPLANT 

THE  HOOSIER. 

[EDITOR'S  NOTE  —  This  chapter  is  compiled  by  the  Editor.] 

AN  INSPIRED  editorial  in  the  New  York 
Sun  of  April  26,  1916,  is  illuminating  as 
to  the  reason  for  Mr.  McCombs'  retirement 
as  Democratic  National  Chairman.     It  read: 

"From  the  Democratic  Text  Book  of  1912,  pre 
pared  under  the  direction  of  Mr.  William  F.  Mc 
Combs  and  widely  circulated  by  him  among  the  voters 
of  the  United  States,  we  extract  this  campaign  pledge, 
or  promise,  prominently  displayed  on  page  14: 
"TERM  OF  PRESIDENT 

"DEMOCRATIC  PLATFORM. 

"We  favor  a  single  Presidential  term,  and  to  that 
end  we  urge  the  adoption  of  an  amendment  to  the 
Constitution  making  the  President  of  the  United 
States  ineligible  for  re-election,  and  we  pledge  the 
candidate  of  this  convention  to  this  principle". 

[  272  ] 


"WAR  SAVED  WILSON  IN   1916"! 

"The  candidate  pledged  to  the  single  term  princi 
ple  by  the  Baltimore  convention  and  pledged  again 
by  Mr.  McCombs'  committee  when  it  exhibited  the 
foregoing  declaration  as  a  reason  for  voting  for  him, 
was  Governor  Woodrow  Wilson  of  New  Jersey.  Mr. 
McCombs  had  perhaps  done  more  than  any  other 
friend  of  Dr.  Wilson  (with  the  possible  exception 
of  Colonel  George  Harvey  and  ex- Senator  James 
Smith,  Jr.)  to  prepare  the  way  for  his  nomination  on 
this  single-term  platform.  When  the  campaign 
opened  Mr.  McCombs,  in  his  dual  capacity  as  chair 
man  of  both  the  Democratic  National  Committee  and 
the  Democratic  Campaign  Committee,  at  once  took 
undisputed  first  place  among  the  promoters  of  Dr. 
Wilson's  political  fortunes.  Mr.  McKinley  scarcely 
owed  more  to  Mark  Hanna. 

"In  asking  the  fellow  citizens  to  vote  for  Woodrow 
Wilson  as  a  candidate  pledged  to  the  one  term  princi 
ple  by  the  platform  of  his  party,  Mr.  William  F. 
McCombs  took  pains  to  make  it  clear  to  everybody 
that  the  candidate  accepted  the  platform.  He  caused 
to  be  printed  on  page  343  of  the  Campaign  Text 
Book  this  passage  from  Dr.  Wilson's  speech  of  accept 
ance: 

"  'What  is  the  meaning  of  our  platform,  and  what 
is  our  responsibility  under  it?  What  are  our  duty 
and  our  purpose?  The  platform  is  meant  to  show 
that  we  know  what  the  nation  is  thinking  about ;  what 
it  is  most  concerned  about,  what  it  wishes  corrected, 
and  what  it  desires  to  see  attempted  that  is  new  and 
constructive  and  intended  for  its  long  future.  But 

[  273  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

for  us  it  is  a  very  practical  document.  We  are  now 
about  to  ask  the  people  of  the  United  States  to  adopt 
our  platform ;  we  are  about  to  ask  them  to  intrust  us 
with  office  and  power  and  the  guidance  of  their  affairs. 
They  will  wish  to  know  what  sort  of  men  we  are  and 
of  what  definite  purpose;  what  translation  of  action 
and  of  policy  we  intend  to  give  to  the  general  terms 
of  the  platform  which  the  convention  at  Baltimore  put 
forth,  should  we  be  elected'. 

"Mr.  McCombs  went  further  and  drew  a  striking 
contrast  between  Woodrow  Wilson,  pledged  to  the 
principle  of  a  single  term  and  to  be  depended  upon 
to  respect  the  platform  and  keep  the  pledge  if  elected, 
and  Theodore  Roosevelt,  one  of  his  competitors  for 
the  votes  of  the  people.  On  pages  304  and  305  of 
the  Text  Book  Mr.  McCombs  exhibited  Colonel 
Roosevelt  as  a  person  willing  to  feed  his  own  ambition 
even  by  the  violation  of  a  distinct  pledge  not  to  be  a 
candidate  again: 

1  'On  March  4,  next,  I  shall  have  served  three  and 
one-half  years,  constituting  my  first  term.  The  wise 
custom  which  limits  the  President  to  two  terms  regards 
the  substance  and  not  the  form,  and  under  no  circum 
stances  will  I  be  a  candidate  for  or  accept  another 
nomination'. 

"  'To  newspaper  correspondents  who  asked  him  if 
he  might  not  be  a  candidate  in  1912,  Theodore  Roose 
velt,  with  his  characteristic  emphasis,  replied  that  not 
in  1912,  in  1916  nor  in  any  other  year  would  he  again 
be  a  candidate  for  the  Presidency;  and  that  "under 
no  circumstances"  was  meant  for  all  time. 

[  274  ] 


"WAR   SAVED  WILSON   IN   1916"! 

"  'Theodore  Roosevelt  gave  his  solemn  word  that 
he  would  not  again  be  a  candidate  for  or  accept  another 
nomination  for  the  Presidency,  and  he  has  now  broken 
that  promise  under  circumstances  created  by  himself 
and  his  hero  worshiping  admirers'. 

"Thus,  Mr.  William  F.  McCombs  kept  before  the 
country  during  the  campaign  of  four  years  ago  the 
picture  of  Woodrow  Wilson,  pledged  by  his  platform 
to  the  single  term  principle  and  squarely  accepting  that 
platform  when  he  accepted  the  nomination;  and  also 
the  picture  of  Theodore  Roosevelt,  shamelessly  violat 
ing  a  voluntary  pledge  of  his  own  not  to  be  a  candidate 
or  accept  a  nomination  for  a  third  term.  With  this 
choice  before  them  the  people  voted;  and  they  gave 
just  2,173,538  more  votes  for  Mr.  McCombs'  pledged 
single  term  candidate  than  the  candidate  pledged  by 
Colonel  Roosevelt  not  to  seek  or  accept  under  any 
circumstances,  a  third  term. 

"Now,  Mr.  William  F.  McCombs  is  an  extremely 
conscientious  gentleman.  His  sense  of  personal  honor 
and  personal  responsibility  for  those  whose  promises 
he  has  indorsed  is  vigilant  and  alert.  He  is  almost 
meticulous  in  his  solicitude  for  the  fulfilment  of  cam 
paign  obligations.  He  must  perceive  as  clearly  as 
any  other  man  in  the  United  States  the  immorality 
involved  in  the  acceptance  by  President  Wilson  of  a 
nomination  for  a  second  term. 

"Is  any  other  explanation  needed  to  account  for 
Mr.  McCombs'  withdrawal  from  the  active  political 
support  of  the  man  for  whom  he  has  done  so  much? 
He  conducted  Governor  "Wilson's  canvass  for  the 

[  275  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

Democratic  nomination  for  President.  Under  con 
ditions  of  enormous  difficulty  he  put  his  candidate 
through  Baltimore  even  in  the  presence  of  Mr.  Bryan's 
overshadowing  prestige  with  the  delegates.  He  saw 
the  single  term  pledge  recorded.  He  used  that  pledge 
with  skill  and  success  to  accomplish  his  candidate's 
election.  He  emphasized  for  the  information  of  the 
voters  the  contrast  between  the  trustworthiness  of  a 
man  like  Wilson,  who  could  be  depended  upon  to  keep 
his  party's  pledges,  who  had  at  the  very  outset  of  the 
campaign  denounced  'the  use  of  the  organization  of 
a  great  party  to  serve  the  personal  aims  and  ambitions 
of  any  individual',  and  the  untrust worthiness  of  a  man 
who  was  running  for  a  third  term  in  violation  of  his 
pledge. 

"How  could  Mr.  McCombs,  in  self-respect  and 
simple  decency,  begin  under  these  circumstances  a 
second  campaign  for  Dr.  Wilson's  election  and  again 
ask  his  fellow  citizens  to  give  credit  to  platform 
pledges  made  in  Dr.  Wilson's  behalf? 

"We  do  not  believe  that  Mr.  McCombs  could  be 
influenced  to  become  again  the  devoted  and  disinter 
ested  engineer  of  Dr.  Wilson's  political  fortunes  by 
any  such  sophistry  as  seems  to  have  taken  possession  of 
the  President's  mind.  It  is  impossible  to  imagine  so 
level  headed  a  person  as  Mr.  McCombs  sharing  the 
delusion  that  the  office  for  which  Dr.  Wilson  is  to  run 
a  second  time  is  a  higher  and  greater  office  than  that 
of  President  of  the  United  States.  Nobody  knows 
better  than  Mr.  McCombs  that  there  is  no  such  thing 
as  a  Chief  Executive  of  Humanity,  any  more  than 

[  276] 


"WAR  SAVED  WILSON  IN   1916"! 

there  is  a  Chief  Magistrate  of  Gratitude,  or  of  Loy 
alty,  or  of  Sincerity,  or  of  any  other  beautiful  and 
desirable  abstract  quality." 

That  Mr.  Wilson  dreamed  of  a  third,  if  not  a  life- 
term,  is  demonstrated  by  a  note  Mr.  McCombs  pre 
pared  for  this  book.  Here  it  is : 

In  the  Summer  of  1912, 1  suggested  that  Governor 
Wilson  go  into  some  of  the  large  cities  and  make  pleas 
ant  speeches  like  those  of  the  pre-nomination  days, 
raising  no  particular  contest  with  the  candidates 
against  him  as  Roosevelt  and  Taft.  I  thought  they 
were  doing  an  excellent  job  of  chewing  each  other's 
ears  off.  I  did,  however,  suggest  that  he  speak  on  the 
Third  Term  in  the  case  of  Roosevelt. 

Governor  Wilson  turned  to  me  and  said:  "Mc 
Combs,  you  know  I  do  not  oppose  a  Third  Term,  and 
I  do  not  care  to  discuss  it".  Wilson  was  certainly  look 
ing  far  ahead,  as  he  had  been  at  Baltimore. 

Mr.  McCombs  formally  retired  as  Chairman  of  the 
National  Committee  at  the  Convention  of  1916.  He 
knew  that,  controlled  as  it  was  by  the  White  House 
clique,  President  Wilson's  renomination  would  be 
forced.  His  job  was,  however,  to  prevent  the  Wilson- 
McAdoo  group  from  denying  a  similar  compliment  to 
Vice  President  Thomas  R.  Marshall.  He  succeeded. 

When  Chairman  McCombs  reached  St.  Louis,  he 
found  the  Wilson-McAdoo  coterie  split  for  the  Vice 
Presidency  between  A.  Mitchell  Palmer,  of  Pennsyl 
vania,  the  then  Alien  Custodian,  and  Newton  B. 
Baker,  of  Ohio,  Secretary  of  War.  He  lined  up 
Thomas  T.  Taggarf,  of  Indiana,  Charles  F.  Murphy, 

[  277  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

of  New  York,  Roger  C.  Sullivan,  of  Illinois,  and 
Governor  James  M.  Cox,  of  Ohio,  for  Marshall.  This 
combination  smashed  the  anti-Marshall  plot. 

In  his  meagre  notes  of  the  St.  Louis  Convention, 
Mr.  McCombs  wrote:  Everybody  was  saying,  "Wil 
son  kept  us  out  of  war"  and  "To  h — 1  with  the  rest 
of  the  platform" ! 

The  McAdoo  cabal  pushed  A.  Mitchell  Palmer  for 
the  Vice  Presidency,  with  Secretary  of  War  Baker 
as  second  in  the  string. 

[EDITOR'S  NOTE  —  Mr.  McCombs  writes  the  following  text] 

Mr.  Baker  was  special  messenger  to  the  Convention 
for  certain  things  that  I  did  not  know  about,  and  did 
not  care  about.  That  Convention  was  going  to  nomin 
ate  Wilson  and  Marshall,  although  it  was  generally 
understood  that  President  Wilson  did  not  like  Mr. 
Marshall  very  much.  Throughout  his  administration, 
he  gave  him  slight  consideration.  I  think  Mr.  Marshall 
took  this  too  lightly. 

I  had  rumors,  some  weeks  before  the  Convention 
that  Mr.  Baker  was  to  be  a  candidate  for  Vice  Presi 
dent.  The  larger  leaders,  I  know,  were  very  much 
opposed  to  him.  They  were  very  much  offended  by 
what  they  thought  was  Mr.  Wilson's  idea  of  getting 
a  candidate  more  to  his  liking  as  Vice  President.  It 
was  understood  that  he  wanted  Baker  because  it  was 
thought  that  Baker  never  made  a  move  without  Wil 
son's  direction.  Furthermore,  Baker  used  classical 
English. 

I  saw  the  lickspittles  of  the  White  House  tugging 
r  278  ] 


"WAR  SAVED  WILSON  IN   1916"! 

at  the  lapels  of  the  leaders.  The  Baker  boom  Srst 
came  to  my  headquarters  as  Chairman.  I  had  received 
many  telegrams  about  it.  I  saw  no  reason  for  chang 
ing  the  order  of  things.  In  my  mind,  at  that  very 
time  Marshall  was  superior  to  Wilson.  If  there  were 
to  be  any  succession  by  fate,  we  could  not  go  very  far 
wrong  with  Marshall.  So  I  said  to  a  gentleman 
who  claimed  to  come  from  the  White  House,  that  it 
was  customary  for  the  candidate  for  Vice  Presidency 
to  have  the  delegation  from  his  own  state  with  him. 
He  had  better  see  Judge  A.,  one  of  the  leaders  of  the 
Ohio  delegation,  who  was  close  by. 

Then  I  said:  "Now,  I  suggest  that  you  go  and 
discuss  this  matter  with  Ohio  and  Judge  A.  Go  in 
and  see  him". 

He  left.  I  called  up  Judge  A.  and  told  him  the 
facts.  He  said:  "I'm  glad  you  have  given  me  the 
privilege  of  trimming  our  little  Secretary".  So 
Judge  A.  received  the  Baker  envoy  and  told  him  that 
he  did  not  think  he  could  get  Ohio.  The  man  went 
to  a  number  of  other  delegations.  Judge  A.  knew  how 
to  be  busier  at  a  Convention  than  did  this  man.  So 
the  boom  of  Baker  died  aborning. 

President  Wilson's  first  term  had  been  saved  from 
debacle  by  the  declaration  of  the  European  War  in 
1914.  This  was  pretty  generally  conceded  among  all 
the  Democrats.  Of  course,  the  minds  of  the  American 
people  were  centered  upon  one  question:  namely, 
keeping  out  of  that  terrible  conflagration.  They 
thought  that  Wilson  having  been  President  for  one 
term  should  be  re-elected  for  the  second.  Therefore, 

[  279  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

the  successful  campaign  of  1916,  which  might  have 
gone  the  other  way,  had  Mr.  Hughes  been  a  bit  more 
thoughtful  and  diplomatic  in  his  treatment  of  Hiram 
Johnson  in  California. 

I  recall  going  to  the  Republican  Chicago  Conven 
tion  after  making  arrangements  for  the  St.  Louis 
Convention.  The  Chicago  Convention  was  a  week 
before  the  Democratic  Convention  at  St.  Louis.  I 
wanted  to  see  the  forces  operating  there.  I  learned 
from  a  very  confidential  source  that  Hughes  would 
be  the  nominee.  The  rest  was  parade. 

I  went  into  a  hotel  and  met  some  friends  among 
the  Republican  leaders.  They,  in  a  jocular  way  at 
luncheon,  said:  "Your  convention  is  settled,  now, 
what  shall  we  do"? 

"Well",  I  replied,  "I  know  exactly  what  you're 
going  to  do.  You're  going  to  take  the  man  with 
whiskers  from  New  York.  Now  I'm  going  to  tell 
you,  since  you're  utterly  tied  up,  what  you  ought  to 
do.  You  should  name  Harding  or  Burton,  of  Ohio. 

"You  have  had  a  little  factional  trouble  out  there 
and  Ohio  will  go  for  Wilson,  unless  you  patch  it  up. 
If  things  go  on  as  they  are,  Wilson  will  carry  Ohio. 
If  you  nominate  Harding  or  Burton,  you  will  carry 
Ohio,  and  the  next  President  will  be  a  Republican". 

My  guess  was  correct,  as  many  of  those  disappointed 
friends  whom  I  met  there,  have  since  told  me. 

Mr.  McCombs'  prophecy  was  fulfilled.  Neither 
Warren  G.  Harding  nor  any  other  Ohio  Republican 
was  nominated  for  the  Presidency  in  1916.  Charles 
Evans  Hughes,  of  New  York,  was,  but  he  lost  Ohio 

[  280  ] 


"WAR  SAVED  WILSON  IN  1916"! 

and  Wilson  was  re-elected.  Four  years  later  Mr. 
Harding  was  nominated.  He  carried  the  country  by 
the  unprecedented  plurality  of  seven  millions. 


[  281  ] 


XXIII 
DRAFTED    FOR   THE    SENATE 

WILSON  RUNS  CONWAY  AGAINST  McCoMBs,  BUT  McCoMss 
SWEEPS  THE  PRIMARIES  —  WILSON'S  "CONGRATULATIONS"  — 
McCoMBs'  REPLY  —  WRATH  OF  "CROWN  PRINCE"-  — Mc- 
ADOO-WILSON  HANDICAP  So  GREAT  THAT  CALDER  WINS  AT 
THE  GENERAL  ELECTION  —  McCoMBs  ASSAILS  "PAP  HUNT 
ERS"  AND  "BLANK-CHECK  PROFITEERS". 

[EDITOR'S     NOTE  —  This     chapter     is     compiled     from     Mr. 
McCombs'  notes.] 

MR.  McCOMBS  was  "drafted"  for  the  New 
York  State  United  States  Senate  Demo 
cratic  nomination  in  1916.  The  move 
ment  was  orginally  conceived  by  admirers  who 
sincerely  desired  to  voice  their  protest  against  the 
ungracious  treatment  Mr.  McCombs  received  from 
President  Wilson.  They  knew  that  Wilson,  who  had 
been  renominated,  could  not  carry  New  York.  They 
hoped  that,  even  if  Mr.  McCombs  failed  of  election, 
he  would  run  so  far  ahead  of  the  President  that  he 
could  eventually  claim  vindication. 

An  unofficial  State  convention  was  called  for  Sara 
toga,  August  12th.  Long  before  that  date,  anti- 
Wilson  leaders  were  apprised  that  the  President 
planned  to  name  William  G.  McAdoo  for  the  seat 

[  282  ] 


DRAFTED  FOR  THE   SENATE 

held  by  James  A.  O' Gorman.     This  provoked  much 
resentment. 

The  McAdoo  project  died  of  inanition.  Then 
William  Church  Osborn  and  Thomas  F.  Conway  vied 
with  one  another  for  the  indorsement  of  the  adminis 
tration.  Both  Osborn  and  Conway  had  much  money. 
Osborn  had  been  a  student  at  Princeton  and  was  the 
leader  of  Putnam  County.  Conway  had  been  Lieu 
tenant  Governor  and  controlled  the  organization  in 
Clinton  and  other  northern  tier  counties. 

Samuel  Seabury,  former  Justice  of  the  Court  of 
Appeals,  had  been  picked  by  the  President  for  Gov 
ernor.  Charles  F.  Murphy  and  his  associates  reluc 
tantly  accepted  Seabury,  despite  his  frequent  and 
numerous  verbal  attacks  upon  them.  They  made  no 
violent  objection,  even  when  Franklin  D.  Roosevelt, 
Assistant  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  hurriedly  came  from 
Washington  and  announced  that  the  President  would 
insist  upon  Seabury' s  nomination  as  the  most  likely 
means  of  aiding  the  Presidential  ticket  to  capture 
New  York's  electoral  vote.  But  these  leaders  drew 
the  line  at  Osborn,  Conway,  or  any  other  Senatorial 
aspirant  picked  by  Wilson. 

On  the  afternoon  before  the  Convention  met,  there 
was  an  informal  conference  at  the  Saratoga  Race 
Track  club  house.  There  participated,  National 
Committeeman  Norman  E.  Mack,  Charles  F.  Mur 
phy,  John  H.  McCooey,  William  H.  Kelley,  William 
H.  Fitzpatrick,  Mr.  McCombs  and  others.  All 
urged  McCombs  to  take  the  Senatorial  nomination. 

[  283  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

"Neither  Wilson  nor  any  other  Democrat  can  carry 
this  state  tMs  year" !  he  stated. 

"Wilson  can't,  but  you  might",  the  leaders  replied. 
"Just  think  what  sport  you  can  have  with  Woodrow 
in  the  Senate",  laughed  one. 

"I  don't  mind  being  slaughtered  for  the  sake  of  the 
party  —  I  am  used  to  that.  But  I  beg  to  be  spared  for 
a  while",  pleaded  McCombs. 

The  leaders  finally  compelled  McCombs  to  submit 
to  the  trial.  He  was  the  overwhelming  choice  of  the 
convention.  Osborn  was  eliminated  as  a  dangerous 
rival  with  an  exposure  of  his  written  approval  of  the 
late  Mayor  John  Purroy  Mitch  el's  "wire  tapping" 
campaign,  which  so  infuriated  the  Roman  Catholic 
clergy.  Conway  received  a  few  northern  New  York 
votes. 

Though  the  convention  was  all  but  unanimous  for 
McCombs,  the  Wilson-McAdoo  faction  declined  to 
accept  its  verdict,  and  got  behind  Conway  as  a  Federal 
Administration  candidate  at  the  September  primaries. 

The  administration's  attitude  was  expressed  in  the 
editorial  columns  of  the  New  York  Sun,  August  29, 
1912,  thus: 

"The  Wilson-McAdoo  crowd  will  have  nothing  to 
do  with  McCombs.  They  look  upon  his  selection  as  a 
direct  slap  at  the  Wilson  administration,  which  they 
will  not  condone". 

An  answer  came  from  the  New  York  World,  sup 
posedly  friendly  to  the  President: 

"There  is  no  better  representative  of  the  Young 
Democracy  of  New  York  than  William  F.  McCombs. 

[  284  ] 


DRAFTED  FOR  THE  SENATE 

He  is  qualified  in  all  respects  for  the  United  States 
Senatorship". 

The  New  York  Times  reproduced  an  editorial 
eulogy  of  McCombs  printed  a  few  days  after  he  had 
secured  the  nomination  of  Wilson  for  the  Presidency 
in  1912.  Under  the  caption  "Young  Democrats"  the 
Times  said: 

"It  is  of  the  happiest  augury  for  the  Democratic 
Party  that  young  men  are  coming  to  the  fore  to  take 
part  in  its  work  and  its  councils.  Everywhere  words 
of  praise  are  bestowed  upon  W.  F.  McCombs  of  this 
city,  who,  as  an  active  and  skilful  manager  of  Governor 
Wilson's  campaign,  showed  that  he  knew  how  to  make 
friends  without  making  enemies". 

The  Brooklyn  Times  (Republican),  under  date  of 
August  20,  1915,  printed  this  tribute: 

"The  nomination  of  McCombs  is  one  of  recognition 
for  the  manager  of  tfhe  victory  for  Wilson  in  1912. 
He  shared  with  Colonel  Harvey  and  others  the  fate  of 
most  of  the  ladders  upon  which  the  President  has 
climbed  to  his  present  eminence". 

The  Philadelphia  Inquirer  (Republican)  said  Sep 
tember  1,  1916: 

"William  F.  McCombs  has  decided  to  enter  the  race 
as  the  Democratic  candidate  for  United  States  Senator 
from  New  York.  He  has  had  some  experience  work 
ing  for  others,  notably  Woodrow  Wilson. 

"Now  McCombs  made  the  grievous  error  of  enter 
ing  the  race  without  consulting  the  President,  and  in 
consequence  has  brought  down  upon  himself  the  wrath 
of  the  crown  prince"  (William  G.  McAdoo). 

[  285  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

Despite  the  bitter  opposition  of  the  Federal  machine 
headed  by  President  Wilson  and  McAdoo,  his  son-in- 
law  and  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  McCombs  swept 
the  state  at  the  Democratic  primaries,  September  19, 
1916.  He  defeated  Thomas  F.  Conway,  the  Wilson- 
McAdoo  favorite,  by  over  40,000  plurality.  Conway 
carried  a  few  counties  near  the  Canadian  border. 

Two  days  after  he  had  defeated  Conway  at  the 
primaries,  Mr.  McCombs  was  amazed  to  receive  this 
wire  from  the  President: 

"Asbury  Park,  N.  J. 

Sept.  21,  1916 
"WM.  F.  MCCOMBS: 

"I  congratulate  you  most  warmly  on  your  nomination 
by  the  Democrats  of  New  York  for  the  United  States 
Senatorship.  A  united  body  of  Progressive  voters  will 
be  behind  you. 

WOODROW  WILSON" 

Mr.  McCombs  sent  this  reply  to  the  President's 
telegram : 

"PRESIDENT   WOODROW  WILSON,    Shadow   Lawn,   Long 
Branch,  N.  J.: 

"I  thank  you  sincerely  for  you*  telegram  of  congratu 
lations.  Aside  from  my  personal  friendship,  which 
prompts  me  to  wish  you  every  success  in  the  coming 
election,  I  am  certain  that  the  masterly  way  in  which  you 
have  administered  the  affairs  of  our  Nation,  keeping  us 
free  from  war  and  giving  us  an  unprecedented  pros 
perity,  deserves  an  unmistakable  vote  of  confidence  from 
the  American  people. 

W.  F.  McCoMBs" 

[   286  ] 


DRAFTED   FOR  THE   SENATE 

McCombs  had  that  very  day  read  this  analysis  of 
conditions  in  the  Philadelphia  Inquirer: 

"William  F.  McCombs,  as  the  Tammany  candidate 
for  United  States  Senator  for  the  Democratic  nom 
ination,  wins  in  a  walk.  He  has  an  enormous  majority 
over  Thomas  F.  Conway,  presumed  to  have  the  sup 
port  of  the  Wilson  Administration.  It  might  be  sup 
posed  that  the  President  would  help  the  man  who 
managed  his  successful  campaign  in  1912.  But  the 
Wilson  personality  is  a  difficult  thing  to  understand, 
as  those  who  have  dared  to  think  for  themselves  can 
testify". 

McCombs  found  himself  pitted  against  William  M. 
Calder  (Republican)  of  Brooklyn.  Calder  had  for 
years  been  a  member  of  the  House  of  Representatives. 
He  adopted  the  Samuel  J.  Tilden  "personal  contact" 
method  of  campaign.  By  sending  personal  auto 
graphed  signature  letters  and  free  seeds  and  docu 
ments  to  practically  every  man  and  woman  in  the 
state,  Mr.  Calder's  name  had  become  a  household 
word.  Calder,  however,  antagonized  many.  He  had 
cultivated  the  habit  of  being  a  "band-wagon  jumper", 
and,  like  other  great  men,  he  too  often  changed  his 
mind. 

Having  all  but  pledged  himself  to  support  Jame^ 
W.  Wadsworth,  Jr.,  for  the  Senate  in  1914,  Calder 
suddenly  did  all  he  could  to  defeat  him. 

In  1916,  at  the  eleventh  hour,  a  Roosevelt-Barnes, 
heretofore  unheard-of  combine,  was  formed  to  beat 
Calder.  But  ten  days  prior  to  the  primaries  Colonel 
Robert  Bacon  entered  the  field.  Not  until  the  day 

[  287  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

after  the  primaries  was  it  definitely  known  whether 
Bacon  or  Calder  won  the  nomination.  Calder  nosed 
Bacon  out  by  barely  8,000.  But  for  a  25,000  Calder 
majority  in  Brooklyn,  Bacon  would  have  proved  the 
victor. 

The  Wadsworth-Calder  and  Bacon-Calder  quarrels 
gave  McCombs  some  hope  of  success.  He  began  a 
most  aggressive  state-wide  campaign,  and  was  on  the 
stump  night  and  day.  His  speeches  were  brief  but 
fetching,  particularly  to  young  men. 

Before  the  Brooklyn  Young  Democratic  Club, 
September  21st,  he  made  a  hit  with  this:  "The  differ 
ence  between  a  Republican  and  a  Democratic  admin 
istration  is  that  the  Republicans  serve  the  people  two 
months  every  four  years.  The  remainder  of  the  time 
they  hand  the  country  over  to  the  management  of  a 
board  of  directors  for  the  benefit  of  'Big  Business'. 
The  Democrats,  on  the  other  hand,  are  on  the  job  for 
the  people  365  days  in  the  year" ! 

"You  said  something,  Mac"!  roared  a  group  of 
admirers. 

Every  Democratic  newspaper  in  the  country  dis 
played  the  McCombs  speech  and  commended  it  edi 
torially  as  a  platform  by  itself. 

Mr.  McCombs  was  mightily  pleased  to  find  in  the 
New  York  Sun  the  following  day  this  paragraph: 
"Mr.  McCombs  has  experienced  every  phase  of  the 
progressive  ingratitude  with  which  it  is  the  President's 
custom  to  reward  personal  and  political  service.  It  is 
to  Mr.  McCombs  that  Woodrow  Wilson  happens  to 
be  more  deeply  indebted  for  his  political  and  personal 

[  288  ] 


DRAFTED  FOR  THE   SENATE 

fortune  than  any  man  living,  with  the  possible  excep 
tion  of  former  Senator  James  Smith,  Jr.,  and,  of 
course,  Colonel  George  Harvey". 

The  Sun  gave  a  complimentary  summary  of  Mr. 
McCombs'  speech  the  night  before. 

Mr.  McCombs  made  Freedom  of  the  Seas  one  of  the 
paramount  issues.  Day  after  day,  and  night  after 
night,  he  incessantly  kept  hammering  this  idea  into  the 
ears  of  voters:  "We  must  seriously  and  sincerely 
insist  that  our  commerce  and  communication  through 
out  the  world,  through  channels  of  trade,  shall  be  main 
tained  inviolate  and  untrammelled.  We  cannot,  with 
dignity,  tolerate  any  discrimination". 

Hoping  to  get  a  few  more  votes  for  himself,  Presi 
dent  Wilson  said  a  few  kind  words  for  McCombs  in  a 
Madison  Square  Garden  speech  a  few  days  before 
election. 

Mr.  McCombs,  in  his  final  speech  of  the  campaign, 
said : 

"I  do  not  think  that  you  expect  a  very  long  address 
from  me.  I  think  that  you  came  here,  as  I  came  here, 
to  hear  the  next  President  of  the  United  States, 
Woodrow  Wilson.  For  the  past  two  and  a  half 
months  I  have  gone  over  this  state  speaking  about 
Democratic  peace  and  prosperity.  In  the  meantime 
I  have  been  reading  the  papers  carefully  to  see  what 
issues  Mr.  Hughes  would  develop;  and  as  an  Amer 
ican  citizen  I  think  I  have  a  right  to  complain  of  Mr. 
Hughes.  There  are  Republicans  in  the  audience,  and 
I  want  to  call  your  attention  to  a  few  facts. 

"The  immortal  Abraham  Lincoln  had  a  programme. 
[  289  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

He  developed  it.  He  argued  it.  And  the  American 
people  twice  made  him  President  of  the  United  States. 
The  soldier  statesman,  Grant,  a  Republican,  had  a 
programme,  Mr.  Chairman.  He  developed  it.  He 
argued  it.  And  the  serious  thinking  people  of  this 
American  Republic  made  him  President  of  the  United 
States.  The  martyred  McKinley  had  a  programme. 
He  presented  it.  He  argued  it.  He  seriously  insisted 
upon  it.  He  was  elected  President  of  these  United 
States.  So  our  Mr.  Roosevelt.  So  our  Mr.  Taft. 
And  however  much  we  may  have  disagreed  with  them 
in  principle,  they  were  elected  by  your  votes,  and,  I 
think,  my  friends,  you  as  Americans  are  entitled  to 
insist  upon  a  programme  being  presented  to  you. 
They  have  110  right  to  insist  upon  your  voting  for 
people  who  merely  want  to  get  into  office. 

"Do  you  know  what  they  are  doing?  They  want 
you  to  fill  in  a  blank  check  and  let  them  make  out  the 
amount  after  election.  Can  you,  my  friends,  can  you 
Republicans  be  insulted  in  that  way?  This  election 
involves  a  very  homely  question.  Are  you  going  to 
maintain  that  which  you  have?  For  to  hold  is  just  as 
important  as  to  have.  Or  are  you  going  to  fly  to  those 
agencies  of  which  you  know  naught?  That  is  your 
question  to-night.  Let  me  call  your  attention  to  the 
fact  in  the  few  brief  moments  that  I  am  going  to 
address  you  that  the  Democratic  Party  is  a  party  of 
performance,  of  promise.  For  example,  for  100  years 
the  question  of  child  labor,  the  question  of  industrial 
freedom  for  children,  was  agitated  in  this  country; 
and  a  particular  bill  which  the  Democratic  Party  put 

[  290  ] 


DRAFTED  FOR  TttE  SENATE 

on  the  statute  books  lay  in  the  pigeonholes  in  the 
Senate  and  the  House  through  three  Republican 
Administrations.  The  Democratic  Party  has  released 
little  children  from  industrial  slavery. 

"I  call  your  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  Republi 
can  Party  has  taken  up  this  issue  and  that  issue  and 
the  other  and  dropped  them  with  equal  celerity  during 
this  campaign.  It  reminds  me  of  the  story  in  'Alice  in 
Wonderland',  that  charming  little  book,  where  the  girl 
mounted  seven  horses  at  the  same  time  and  simultane 
ously  rode  off  in  seven  different  directions. 

"Mr.  Hughes  a  week  ago,  as  I  saw  in  a  paper,  I 
think  in  Buffalo,  where  I  was  speaking,  said  he  was 
going  to  cut  loose.  In  these  last  two  weeks  I  have 
continued  to  wonder,  Mr.  Chairman,  what  Mr.  Hughes 
was  going  to  cut  loose  from.  Theodore  Roosevelt, 
who  snorts  flame  and  preaches  war  and  who  thus  far 
has  made  up  most  of  the  spoken  opinions  for  Mr. 
Hughes?  No,  not  yet.  Mr.  Taft,  who  has  agreed 
with  President  Wilson  in  all  of  his  foreign  policies,  in 
substance?  He  cannot  do  that.  Special  privilege? 
Will  he  cut  loose  from  that?  One  rarely  cuts  loose 
from  one's  angel.  Then  my  Republican  opponent, 
Mr.  Calder,  should  cut  loose  with  something. 

"They  have  said  a  great  deal  about  Americanism  in 
this  campaign.  That  is  not  an  issue.  Every  man,  no 
matter  where  he  was  born,  no  matter  of  what  descent, 
if  he  is  an  American  citizen,  is  for  America. 

"I  would  like  to  address  you  further  upon  this  issue 
of  Americanism.  I  shall  leave  this  thought  with  you 
as  I  go:  Let  us  make  Americanism  practical.  Let  us 

[291  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

see  that  the  flag  is  respected  in  every  port  in  all  the 
world.  Let  us  see  that  every  pound  of  American 
freight,  every  American  communication,  every  Amer 
ican  life,  is  safe  under  this  flag". 

With  all  Mr.  McCombs'  popularity  and  real  value, 
the  handicap  created  by  Wilson's  Presidential  candi 
dacy  was  too  great  for  him.  He  was  defeated  by 
Calder  by  839,314  to  603,933.  McCombs  ran  nearly 
20,000  ahead  of  Samuel  Seabury  and  received  within 
a  few  thousand  votes  as  many  as  the  entire  National 
ticket. 


[  292  ] 


XXIV 

RETRIBUTION 

WILSON'S  GREETING  ON  RETURN  FROM  PARIS  —  McCoMBs  FOILS 
BARUCH  AND  CHADBOURNE  IN  THEIR  EFFORTS  TO  MAKE 
McADoo  PRESIDENT  —  USES  EDWARDS  TO  CONSOLIDATE  EAST 
ERN  STATES  —  SOLIDIFIES  ANTI-THIRD  TERM  FORCES  — 
DESTROYS  WILSON  DYNASTY  AT  SAN  FRANCISCO. 

JULY  9,  1919,  President  Wilson  returned  to 
New  York  from  his  first  commutation  trip  to 
Paris  to  appeal  to  the  people  of  the  United 
States  to  back  his  policy  at  the  Peace  Conference. 
Mr.  McCombs  was  ill  at  his  room  at  the  Waldorf  - 
4storia.  He  sent  for  the  writer.  I  found  him  look 
ing  out  of  the  window  of  his  bed  chamber.  Fifth 
Avenue  and  Thirty- fourth  Street  were  packed  with 
a  multitude  of  men,  women  and  children.  They 
were  awaiting  the  arrival  of  the  President.  The 
President,  standing  in  an  auto  and  bowing  right  and 
left,  soon  appeared.  The  crowd  gave  him  a  chilly 
greeting.  McCombs  leaned  so  far  out  upon  the 
window  sill  that  I  cautioned  him  to  be  careful.  He 
answered : 

"I'm  all  right.  But  look  at  the  Great  Human 
itarian  -  -  the  man  who  said  he  was  going  to  make  the 
world  safe  for  Democracy!  He's  gone!  Remember 

[  293  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

the  receptions  he  got  here  in  1912  and  1916?  They 
surpassed  those  of  Bryan  in  1896  and  1900.  Wilson 
has  shot  his  bolt.  The  people  have  found  him  out. 

"Keep  your  eyes  and  ears  open  and  you  will  soon 
agree  with  me  that  Wilson  is  done  for",  he  continued. 
"The  voters  repudiated  him  by  over  a  million  plurality 
when  they  elected  a  Republican  Congress  last  Fall. 
He  has  become  a  joke  and  the  cat's-paw  of  England 
and  Japan  at  Paris.  He  will  try  for  a  renomination 
and  be  beaten  at  that.  Then  he  will  put  up  McAdoo, 
the  crown  prince,  and  he  will  be  thrown  down". 

This  prophecy  was  recalled  when  both  Wilson  and 
McAdoo  were  overwhelmed  at  the  San  Francisco 
Convention. 

McCombs  and  his  friends  were  very  busy  just  about 
this  time.  They  knew  that,  first  of  all,  they  had  to 
defeat  Wilson  for  a  third  term ;  second,  they  had  to 
prevent  Wilson  from  forcing  the  nomination  of  any 
man  to  "keep  the  Presidency  in  the  family".  That 
meant  the  elimination,  not  only  of  McAdoo,  but  A. 
Mitchell  Palmer,  Wilson's  Attorney  General ;  Mere 
dith,  Wilson's  Secretary  of  Agriculture,  or  any  one  of 
a  half  dozen  dark  horses  the  President  might  determine 
to  groom. 

It  was  decided  to  secure  a  round-up  at  the 
Democratic  National  Executive  Committee  meet 
ing  at  Atlantic  City,  September  24,  1919.  It  was 
called  for  the  ostensible  purpose  of  raising  money  to 
cancel  a  deficit  in  the  Committee  treasury;  to  guar 
antee  an  adequate  fund  for  the  Presidential  campaign 
of  1920,  and  to  organize  the  women  who  had  been  given 

[  204  ] 


RETRIBUTION 

the  right  in  many  states  to  vote  for  National  candi 
dates. 

President  Wilson  was  at  the  time  touring  the 
country,  beseeching  the  people  to  swallow  his  League 
of  Nations  covenant,  "without  the  crossing  of  a  T  or 
the  dotting  of  an  I".  McCombs,  who  was  quite  ill,  did 
not  attend  the  Atlantic  City  meeting.  But  as  in 
1912  he  worked  the  telephone  from  his  sick-room, 
so  did  he  in  1919  keep  in  touch  with  and  manipu 
late  wires  into  the  National  Executive  Committee 
meeting. 

There  was  hardly  an  hour  day  and  night  during  the 
four  days'  session  that  McCombs  was  not  in  communi 
cation  with  Executive  Committeemen  Fred  B.  Lynch, 
of  Minnesota;  Wilbur  W.  Marsh,  of  Iowa;  Norman 
E.  Mack,  of  New  York,  and  other  opponents  of 
Wilson  and  McAdoo. 

Mr.  McCombs  scented  an  intrigue  first  to  pledge  the 
Committee  for  a  Wilson  third  term,  and  second,  to 
make  McAdoo  Wilson's  legatee,  and  again  to  make 
Attorney  General  Palmer  a  third  of  the  string  of 
candidates  to  perpetuate  the  Wilson  regime. 

McCombs  had  information  that  Bernard  M.  Baruch 
and  Thomas  L.  Chadbourne  were  engineering  the 
McAdoo  campaign.  Baruch  had  become  convinced 
that  the  renomination  of  Wilson  was  impossible,  and 
that  McAdoo  was  the  most  available  man  among  the 
administration  cabal.  McAdoo  had  been  instrumental 
in  placing  Baruch  upon  the  War  Industries  Board 
and  in  sending  him  as  a  special  envoy  to  the  Paris 
Peace  Conference. 

[  295  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

McCombs  warned  Lynch,  Marsh,  Mack  and  others 
that  Baruch  and  Chadbourne  plotted  to  capture  the 
Committee  for  McAdoo.  His  admonition  seemed 
prophetic  when,  September  26th,  at  an  executive  ses 
sion,  Baruch  and  Chadbourne,  neither  a  member  of  the 
Committee,  appeared  and  boldly  urged  McAdoo' s 
claims.  The  two  expressed  very  great  sympathy  that 
the  Committee  was  bankrupt.  They  generously 
offered  to  make  good  the  entire  deficit.  "And", 
announced  Mr.  Baruch,  "we  are  prepared  to  under 
write  the  next  Presidential  campaign  for  at  least  ten 
millions,  if  the  proper  candidate  is  selected". 

A  majority  of  the  Committee  had  practically 
pledged  themselves  to  Attorney  General  Palmer  for 
the  Presidential  nomination.  He  was  a  fellow-Corn- 
mitteeman.  Loyalty  to  a  comrade  influenced  many  to 
resent  the  intrusion  of  the  McAdoo  emissaries  with 
offers  of  gold. 

The  Baruch-Chadbourne  tender  was,  therefore, 
rejected,  though  the  Committee  treasury  was  empty. 

McCombs  'phoned  in  from  New  York  that  if  the 
McAdoo-Baruch-Chadbourne  terms  were  accepted  he 
would  expose  the  whole  conspiracy.  This  clinched  the 
repudiation  of  the  Baruch-Chadbourne  offer. 

On  the  final  day  of  the  Committee  session,  Franklin 
D.  Roosevelt,  Assistant  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  sud 
denly  rushed  to  Atlantic  City.  He  whispered  that  as 
a  result  of  Wilson's  physical  collapse,  resulting  in  the 
abandonment  of  his  League  of  Nations  speaking  tour, 
the  President  must  be  considered  impossible  as  a  can 
didate  for  renomination.  The  McAdoo  and  Palmer 

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RETRIBUTION 

cliques  thereupon  resumed  their  raids.  But  the  Com 
mittee  adjourned  without  indorsing  either  candidate. 

McCombs  denounced  the  Baruch-Chadbourne  ten 
million  dollar  offer  as  a  part  of  a  conspiracy  to  buy 
the  Presidential  nomination.  He  saw  to  it  that  the 
endeavor  was  submitted  to  the  Kenyon  United  States 
Senate  Committee  investigating  Presidential  cam 
paign  expenses.  Practically  every  member  of  the 
Democratic  National  Executive  Committee  was 
grilled  about  the  tender.  The  Kenyon  Committee 
recommended  the  enactment  of  laws  prohibiting  the 
use  of  scandalously  large  sums  of  money  in  Presiden 
tial  primaries  and  elections. 

Mr.  McCombs,  during  the  Fall  and  Winter  of  1919, 
made  several  country- wide  tours.  This  object  was  to 
solidify  the  anti- Wilson  and  anti-McAdoo  forces. 
He  threw  the  administration  into  confusion  in  Illinois, 
Indiana,  Ohio,  Iowa,  Minnesota,  Missouri,  and  other 
states.  Then  he  returned  to  New  York  and  devoted 
himself  to  unifying  his  home  state  against  a  continu 
ance  of  the  Wilson-McAdoo  empire. 

In  the  Spring  of  1920,  Mr.  McCombs  was  the  man 
behind  the  organization  of  the  Edward  I.  Edwards 
Presidential  League.  It  was  formed  for  the  purpose 
primarily  of  consolidating  New  York,  New  Jersey 
and  other  Eastern  State  Democrats  against  Wilson 
and  McAdoo,  but  ultimately  to  promote  the  candidacy 
of  the  Governor  of  New  Jersey  for  the  Presidency. 

Early  in  April,  and  again  in  May,  McCombs  con 
ferred  with  Charles  F.  Murphy,  Thomas  T.  Taggart, 
Norman  E.  Mack,  Edward  H.  Moore,  George  Bren- 

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MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

nan,  and  other  anti-Wilson-anti-McAdoo  men,  at 
French  Lick  Springs,  Indiana.  It  was  agreed  to  sup 
port  Governor  James  M.  Cox,  of  Ohio,  as  the  likeliest 
to  defeat  Wilson,  McAdoo,  or  Palmer.  New  York, 
Illinois,  Ohio,  Indiana,  Kentucky,  Tennessee,  and 
other  states  represented  in  the  group,  controlled  a  third 
of  the  delegates  to  the  National  Convention.  Plans 
were  laid  at  these  conferences  to  go  after  the  other 
third,  and  thus  insure  the  nomination  of  Cox. 

In  July,  1920,  the  Wilson  machine  was  wrecked  by 
the  nomination  of  Governor  Cox  at  San  Francisco. 
At  the  close  of  the  convention,  Mr.  McCombs,  a 
jubilant  smile  upon  his  face,  stood  upon  the  platform. 
Hundreds  of  delegates  were  shrieking  their  joy  over 
the  nomination  of  Governor  James  M.  Cox,  of  Ohio, 
for  the  Presidency.  They  were  all  celebrating  the 
defeat  of  the  mighty  machine  erected  to  keep  indefi 
nitely  the  United  States  Government  in  the  hands  of 
the  Wilson-McAdoo  oligarchy. 

Mr.  McCombs  said:  "I  have  lived  to  see  Woodrow 
Wilson  deprived  of  his  ambition  to  be  Emperor  of  the 
World;  balked  in  his  desire  to  become  President  a 
third  time;  thwarted  in  his  plan  to  make  his  dynasty 
perpetual  through  the  nomination  of  his  son-in-law, 
William  G.  McAdoo,  as  his  heir,  and  thoroughly  dis 
credited  at  home  and  abroad". 

The  events  leading  up  to  this  political  cataclysm 
came  as  the  result  of  an  incessant  nation-wide 
manoeuvring.  Publicly,  the  active  principals  were 
Charles  F.  Murphy  and  Norman  E.  Mack,  of  New 
York;  Thomas  T.  Taggart,  of  Indiana;  Edmund  H. 

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RETRIBUTION 

Moore,  of  Ohio;  George  Brennan,  of  Illinois;  Gov 
ernor  Edward  I.  Edwards,  of  New  Jersey,  and  James 
A.  Reed,  of  Missouri.  Its  silent  promoter  was  William 
F.  McCombs. 


[  299 


XXV 

WILSON'S  ATTITUDE  TOWARDS 
McCOMBS 

McCoMBs  MADE  No  PROMISES  OF  OFFICE  —  SULLIVAN,  WOOD, 
REED  AND  OTHERS  SUFFER  FROM  PRESIDENT'S  ILL-WILL  — 
McCoMBs'  SUGGESTIONS  FOR  CABINET  APPOINTMENTS  IGNORED 
BECAUSE  MADE  BY  HIM  —  DENIED  A  SEAT  BECAUSE  "You 
ARE  A  POLITICIAN". 

[Mr.  McCombs  here  resumes  his  narrative.] 

THE  REASONS  for  the  hostile  attitude  taken 
by  President  Wilson  toward  me  have  been 
much  discussed.  He  always  gave  out  matters 
of  this  kind  through  the  faithful  Tumulty.  The  first 
reason  assigned  was  that  I  had  made  many  promises 
to  obtain  his  election,  and  for  that  reason  he  could  not 
fulfil  them.  I  can  say,  however,  most  emphatically, 
there  were  no  promises  made.  I  challenge  any  of 
the  lick-spittles  who  have  infested  Washington  for  the 
last  few  years  to  prove  anything  else.  I  deplore  the 
innocence  of  Mr.  Wilson,  if  innocence  it  was,  that  he 
should  have  given  any  credence  to  contrary  reports. 

As  I  have  said  before,  the  men  of  the  organization 
throughout  the  country  were  somewhat  concerned, 
after  the  incident  of  James  Smith,  Jr.,  of  New  Jersey, 

[  300  ] 


WILSON'S  ATTITUDE  TOWARDS  McCOMBS 

with  respect  to  what  would  become  of  them  if  Wilson 
were  nominated  and  elected. 

On  the  night  when  Roger  C.  Sullivan,  of  Illinois, 
agreed  to  come  over  to  Woodrow  Wilson  at  the  Balti 
more  Convention  of  1912,  he  asked  me  whether  his 
organization  would  be  attacked  by  Wilson.  I  said: 
"The  best  way  to  answer  that  is  by  a  direct  telephone 
to  Wilson  himself".  I  called  up  in  Mr.  Sullivan's 
presence,  putting  the  question  squarely.  The  ansiver 
received  was:  "By  no  means.  No.  I  like  Sullivan". 
Mr.  Sullivan  was  in  the  room  at  the  time.  Fifteen 
minutes  later  I  asked  Frederick  B.  Lynch,  of  Minne 
sota,  to  ask  Mr.  Wilson  over  the  telephone  the  same 
question.  He  received  the  same  answer. 

Mr.  Sullivan,  I  am  told,  was  never  allowed  to  be 
directly  instrumental  in  the  nomination  of  a  single 
candidate  for  office.  In  1914,  when  he  was  running 
for  the  Senate,  Assistant  Secretary  of  the  Interior 
Vrooman  made  a  campaign  in  Sullivan's  state  against 
him.  Mr.  Wilson  refused  to  write  a  letter  of  approval, 
as  he  had  done  for  other  candidates  in  close  states. 
Senator  Robert  L.  Owen,  of  Oklahoma,  also  spoke 
unimpeded  against  Mr.  Sullivan  over  Illinois.  Post 
master  General  Albert  S.  Burleson  had  been 
through  the  state  and  made  some  confidential  and 
apparently  pleasing  utterances  of  the  leaders,  but 
never  came  out  for  Mr.  Sullivan.  Even  Secretary  of 
Agriculture  David  Houston  went  through  the  state 
expressing  himself  privately  against  Mr.  Sullivan,  and 
would  never  be  interviewed  by  anyone. 

All  this  was  despite  the  fact  that  but  for  the  58 
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MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

votes  of  the  State  of  Illinois  in  the  Baltimore  Con 
vention  Mr.  Wilson  could  not  have  been  nominated ! 

Mr.  Sullivan  asked  me  to  come  to  Illinois  and  make 
a  speech  for  him.  I  did  so.  I  spoke  at  Chicago  and 
offered  to  speak  over  the  southern  part  of  the  state, 
but  this  Mr.  Sullivan  believed  was  unnecessary.  He 
thought  his  election  was  assured. 

A  similar  situation  developed  in  Maryland.  There 
was  some  support  for  Wilson  in  the  Maryland  delega 
tion,  but  it  was  not  very  strong.  Senator  John  W. 
Smith  not  only  dominated  the  delegation  completely, 
at  the  Baltimore  Covention,  but  I  am  creditably  in 
formed,  had  his  alliances  in  Virginia,  West  Virgina 
and  Tennessee.  He  was  powerful  in  these  four  states. 
I  thought  that  should  we  get  his  support  we  could 
loosen  in  a  way  the  States  of  Virginia,  West  Virginia 
and  Tennessee. 

Senator  Saulsbury  and  I  called  on  Senator  Smith 
on  a  Sunday  afternoon  before  the  Wilson  nomination. 
We  stated  the  case  for  Wilson  as  we  had  so  many  times 
previously  presented  it.  We  argued  the  matter  out 
with  Senator  Smith,  first,  on  the  ground  of  Mr.  Wil 
son's  radicalism;  second,  whether  Mr.  Wilson  would 
be  inclined  to  wreck  the  leadership  of  his  party  in  any 
state.  Senator  Saulsbury  was  a  very  close  friend  of 
Senator  Smith;  in  fact,  they  are  related. 

After  a  long  talk  I  suggested  to  Senator  Saulsbury 
that  he  should  call  up  Governor  Wilson  and  tell  him 
what  he  and  I  were  discussing  with  Senator  Smith. 
The  answers  from  Mr.  Wilson  were  that  his  record 
showed  that  he  was  not  a  radical,  and,  in  so  far  as  dis- 

[  302  ] 


WILSON'S  ATTITUDE   TOWARDS   McCOMBS 

rupting  organizations  was  concerned,  that  had  not 
been  his  practice  and  it  would  not  be  his  practice  in 
the  future.  At  that  time  he  called  attention  to  his 
appointment  of  organization  men  generally  while  he 
was  Governor  of  New  Jersey.  On  this  score,  how 
ever,  it  may  well  be  said  that  he  was  not  Governor 
very  long  before  his  National  campaign  was  started. 
At  any  rate,  the  right  answer  was  given  to  Senator 
Smith.  After  the  expiration  of  a  half  hour  I  called 
up  Governor  Wilson  and  propounded  the  same  ques 
tions  which  Senator  Saulsbury  had  asked,  and  received 
the  same  answer.  This  was  sufficient  assurance  to 
Senator  Smith,  and,  in  my  opinion,  not  only  gained  the 
support  of  Maryland,  but  carried  with  it  the  support 
of  Virginia,  West  Virginia  and  Tennessee. 

This  is  what  happened:  Senator  Smith  was  not 
allowed  to  have  or  to  pass  upon  a  single  appointment 
for  two  years.  He  became  a  Wilson  outcast.  Mr. 
Wilson,  openly  and  in  the  press,  supported  the  pri 
mary  candidacy  of  Mr.  William  Marbury  for  the  next 
Senatorial  primary  against  Senator  Smith.  It  was 
not  until  after  two  years  that  little  things  from  the 
White  House  trickled  Senator  Smith's  way. 

The  pledge  made  to  Michigan  was  of  the  most  harm 
less  variety.  That  state  we  expected,  quite  naturally, 
to  be  for  Harmon.  Mr.  Wood,  the  National  Commit- 
teeman  from  Michigan  and  a  director  somewhat  in 
that  state,  with  his  state  associates,  decided  that  they 
would  go  to  the  convention  without  endorsing  anyone. 
We  made  a  brisk  contest  in  Michigan  and  received  a 
few  votes.  The  whole  delegation  was  not  against  us, 

[  303  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

except  indirectly.  That  was  because  of  an  attack 
made  on  Mr.  Wood  by  a  young  man  whom  I  unfortu 
nately  sent  into  Michigan.  I  immediately  sent  to  Mr. 
Wood  a  letter  of  apology  which  smoothed  out  the 
situation.  I  remember  early  on  the  Sunday  morning 
of  the  Baltimore  Convention  going  to  Mr.  Wood  at 
his  apartment  and  covering  the  entire  situation  with 
him.  He  said  that  he  had  no  ambition  personally,  but 
that  Mr.  Wilson's  reputation  for  ingratitude  and  cast 
ing  aside  those  who  had  been  useful  to  him  was  a  rather 
large  obstacle  to  overcome.  I  spent  an  hour  or  two  in 
conversation  with  him.  He  said:  "Whose  recommen 
dation  do  you  think  ought  to  have  the  greatest  weight 
in  Michigan  if  we  should  nominate  and  elect  Wilson"  ? 
I  said:  "Naturally,  the  National  Committeeman,  the 
Chairman  of  the  State  Committee,  and  such  Demo 
cratic  members  of  the  lower  House  as  there  might  be, 
should  have  first  consideration".  (There  was  no 
chance  for  the  election  of  any  Democratic  Senator  in 
Michigan.)  Mr.  Wood  then  said:  "I  am  going  to 
take  your  word  about  the  man,  and  I  am  not  going  to 
take  any  chances  on  Clark  or  Bryan".  There  and  then 
we  had  the  entire  State  of  Michigan. 

There  was  but  one  other  statement  in  this  connec 
tion  which  I  made  and  which  I  must  record,  but  which 
had  not  the  slightest  influence  on  the  convention. 
Charles  F.  Murphy  asked  me  if  I  thought  Wilson 
would  set  about  to  break  up  the  organization  in  any 
state,  including  his.  I  said  "No",  on  the  record  of  the 
talk  with  Senator  Smith  and  the  general  talks  I  had 
had  with  Mr.  Wilson  himself. 

[  304  ] 


WILSON'S  ATTITUDE   TOWARDS   McCOMBS 

Mr.  Murphy  had  a  wonderful  chance  when  Mr. 
Champ  Clark's  vote  grew  less  and  less.  If,  after  the 
attack  on  certain  members  of  his  delegation  and  on 
New  York  in  general,  he  had  instantly  voted  his  dele 
gation  for  Mr.  Wilson,  the  convention  would  surely 
have  conceived  an  alliance  with  Mr.  Murphy  and  Mr. 
Wilson.  Mr.  Wilson's  Western  following  would  have 
left  him  in  an  instant,  and  Wilson  would  have  found 
his  chances  at  the  bottom  of  the  sea. 

I  did  not  expect  to  have  any  influence  on  Mr. 
Murphy,  nor  did  I  ever  expect  him  to  vote  his  delega 
tion  except  to  make  the  nomination  unanimous,  which 
was  done  by  the  able  and  admirable  John  J.  Fitz 
gerald,  of  Brooklyn. 

There  were  no  tradings  in  the  convention  so  far  as 
Wilson  was  concerned.  There  was  just  what  I  have 
told  my  readers:  a  systematic  appeal  not  only  to  the 
leaders,  but  to  the  people  as  far  as  possible  by  mail, 
on  the  record  of  Mr.  Wilson  as  Governor  of  New 
Jersey.  Then  there  was  the  impinging  of  forces  of 
each  of  the  candidates  against  the  other,  of  which  we 
succeeded  in  taking  advantage  at  the  time.  When  it 
was  all  over  the  Democrats  were  lined  up  unanimously 
for  the  choice.  They  had  not  won  in  twenty  years  or 
more.  They  had  been  compelled  to  take  up  "ism" 
after  "ism"  under  the  unquestioned  leadership  of 
Bryan.  They  did  not  know  a  great  deal  about  Wil 
son's  mind,  but  they  had  read  much  of  him  and  were 
enthusiastic  for  victory.  The  results  obtained  did  not 
proceed  from  pledges  or  promises  made  by  me,  and  no 

[  305  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

such  paltry  excuse  can  serve  as  a  justification  of  Mr. 
Wilson's  conduct. 

While  on  this  topic  my  mind  naturally  adverts  to 
Senator  James  A.  Reed,  of  Missouri. 

He  was  the  ablest  supporter  that  Mr.  Clark  had 
and  the  most  bitter  opponent  of  Governor  Wilson 
before  and  at  the  convention.  I  felt  after  the  conven 
tion  that  if  we  took  Senator  Reed  we  would  get  one 
of  the  most  valuable  possible  assets.  With  much  per 
suasion  I  induced  Mr.  Wilson  to  accept  Senator  Reed. 
I  then  approached  the  Senator  and  said  to  him: 
"Senator,  the  President  and  I  want  you  to  be  with  us. 
We  want  you  to  come  into  the  campaign  with  both 
feet.  Woodrow  Wilson  is  the  nominee.  You  are  a 
Democrat  and  an  able  one.  Everything  before  the 
nomination  at  Baltimore  is  forgotten.  In  fact,  noth 
ing  ever  happened  before  the  adjournment  at  Balti 
more".  He  took  my  hand  and  said:  "We  must  win. 
I  am  as  much  for  Woodrow  Wilson  as  you  are.  Tell 
me  where  to  work". 

I  shall  never  forget  Senator  Reed's  appearance  at 
headquarters.  A  tall,  well-formed  man,  with  aggres 
siveness  in  every  feature,  I  knew  that  when  he  started 
out  on  a  principle  his  advocacy  would  never  cease  until 
he  had  completely  lost  or  completely  won.  There  is 
no  man  in  public  life  whose  fearlessness  and  ability  I 
have  more  admired;  at  the  same  time,  personally,  with 
his  friends,  he  has  the  gentleness  of  a  lamb.  During 
the  campaign  I  cannot  think  of  a  person  who  did  more 
for  Woodrow  Wilson  than  Senator  Reed,  the  same 

[  306  ] 


WILSON'S  ATTITUDE  TOWARDS  McCOMBS 

man  who  has  been  spat  upon  from  the  White  House  to 
this  day. 

I  was  anxious  that  the  President  start  out  with  a 
Cabinet  of  marked  ability.  I  had,  prior  to  December 
29, 1912,  suggested  about  fifty  men  of  the  highest  type 
that  I  knew  in  America.  I  had  a  feeling  that  these 
suggestions  rather  bored  Governor  Wilson.  He 
didn't  ask  who  a  single  one  of  these  men  was,  although 
I  am  sure  at  that  time  he  did  not  know  fifteen  men  of 
Cabinet  size  in  America.  I  soon  found  that  the  men 
suggested  by  me  were  foreclosed  for  life,  and  for  the 
reason  that  I  submitted  their  names  to  the  President. 
Like  Senator  Reed,  there  were  many  men  of  great 
calibre  in  the  Democratic  Party  who  were  desirous  of 
entering  the  public  service.  Mr.  Wilson  did  not  know 
them.  It  was  an  obligation  of  honor,  on  my  part  at 
least,  to  present  their  names.  I  continued  doing  this, 
however,  up  to  the  time  of  the  inauguration,  always 
believing  that  the  selection  of  some  of  these  men  would 
certainly  at  the  outset  give  confidence  to  the  Wilson 
Administration,  and  always  feeling  that  I  was  doing 
my  duty,  and  that  the  President  would  eventually 
realize  this.  In  this  latter  belief  I  was  disappointed. 

In  my  own  case,  the  attitude  of  Mr.  Wilson  was 
early  apparent.  On  the  29th  day  of  December,  which 
is  Mr.  Wilson's  birthday,  he  was  invited  to  be  the 
guest  of  Staunton,  Virginia,  his  birthplace.  An  invi 
tation  to  be  present  was  also  extended  to  me. 
Although  I  was  in  wretched  physical  condition,  I  felt 
I  must  go  under  any  circumstances.  I  was  on  the 
train  that  went  from  New  York  and  stopped  at 

£  307  ] 


MAKING  WOODROW  WILSON  PRESIDENT 

Princeton  to  take  on  the  Governor.  I  greeted  him 
cordially  and  had  a  few  moments'  conversation  with 
him.  I  then  went  to  my  own  compartment  to  rest. 
About  noon  a  messenger  came  and  said  that  the  Gov 
ernor  wanted  to  see  me.  "McCombs,"  he  said,  "I 
don't  want  to  put  you  in  the  Cabinet  because  you  are 
a  politician.  I  think  you  would  fit  excellently  in 
diplomacy".  I  said:  "Mr.  Wilson,  I  am  not  seeking 
a  position  in  your  Cabinet,  nor  can  I  take  a  position  in 
diplomacy".  He  then  asked  me  which  of  all  the  posts 
in  the  world  I  considered  best.  Innocently  enough,  I 
said  "France".  Whereupon  he  said:  "I  would  like 
you  to  go  to  France,  or,  if  you  would  care  for  it, 
London  or  Berlin  or  the  Governorship  of  the  Philip 
pines".  I  told  the  President-elect  that  I  had 
exhausted  my  personal  fortune  to  such  a  degree  that 
I  could  not  afford  to  keep  up  the  post  of  Ambassador 
to  any  of  these  countries  for  any  length  of  time  without 
financial  ruin.  He  said:  "I  will  put  a  bill  through 
Congress  that  will  give  all  the  posts  $17,800  extra  for 
maintenance".  I  said:  "Governor,  that  is  a  mere  pit 
tance  for  any  of  these  posts.  I  cannot  afford  it.  I 
must  get  back  now  to  New  York  and  gather  my  things 
together  and  resume  my  practice,  which  I  have  totally 
neglected  for  two  years". 

The  idea  of  my  impoverishment  did  not  impress  him 
much.  He  resented  palpably  my  refusal  to  go  to  any 
of  these  posts.  I  could  tell  this  from  a  peculiar  show 
ing  of  white  in  his  eyes  and  the  lengthening  of  his  jaw. 
My  own  feeling  was  to  get  off  at  Washington  and  go 
back  to  New  York,  but  I  had  accepted  the  invitation 

[  308  ] 


WILSON'S  ATTITUDE   TOWARDS   McCOMBS 

to  go  to  Staunton,  and  I  went.  Shortly  after  this 
Colonel  House  appeared  and  urged  that  I  take  Paris 
or  London,  stating  there  would  be  a  great  investment 
even  though  I  spent  everything  I  had  and  borrowed 
the  money  to  go. 

I  felt  that  I  had  already  invested  sufficiently  in  Mr. 
Wilson,  and  declined  further  hazard  in  that  field. 


END 


[  309  ] 


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